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FRIEDRICH SOLMSEN  
(4 February 1904 — 30 January 1989)

Photo courtesy the University of  
Wisconsin-Madison Photography Lab



## PREFACE

The present volume of *ICS* is a *Gedenkschrift* for Friedrich Solmsen (1904–1989). It comprises twenty-five select contributions commemorating the great scholar by his friends and colleagues, former students and present admirers. Three additional articles will appear in *ICS* XVII (1992)—by W. M. Calder III (Urbana), D. E. Hahm (Columbus, Ohio), and E. Vogt (Munich).

Solmsen's extraordinary academic career in three countries extends through sixty years (1929–1989).<sup>1</sup> It is only natural that during such a span of time the number of his friends and students has become legion. I have selected a group of scholars particularly close to Solmsen. In this endeavor I have been kindly assisted by Lieselotte Solmsen (Chapel Hill), Fritz's wife and assistant since 1932, and by Helen F. North (Swarthmore). My most sincere gratitude to them.

I am also greatly indebted to David Sansone (Urbana) for his self-denying assistance in the editing and proofreading of the volume, as well as to Fannie LeMoine (Madison) for her kindness in providing me with the photo of Fritz of my choice.

The impact of Solmsen's scholarship on Classical studies in the United States has not yet been explored. On his life and work compare Helen F. North, *Gnomon* 61 (1989) 757–59; Eckart Mensching, "Zur Berliner Philologie in der späteren Weimarer Zeit—über Friedrich Solmsens Berliner Jahre (1922–1933)," *Latein und Griechisch in Berlin* 33 (1989) 26–76, as well as Solmsen's own recollections published in *GRBS* 20 (1979) 89–122 and 30 (1989) 117–40.

I have been privileged to know Fritz since 1959. For the past thirty years I have greatly benefited from his enormous erudition and sound judgment—especially while preparing my critical edition of Diogenes Laertius. May this modest volume be a token of my gratitude and admiration.

Urbana, August 1991

Miroslav Marcovich

<sup>1</sup>*Privatdozent* at the University of Berlin (1929–1933); Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge (1933–1937); Professor at Olivet College, Michigan (1937–1940); Professor at Cornell University (1940–1962); Professor at the University of Wisconsin at Madison (1962–1974); finally, occasional Visiting Professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (1974–1989).





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# The Prosody of the Epic Adonius and its Prehistory

HENRY M. HOENIGSWALD

**Summary:** 1. True monosyllables in verse-final position are rare but not exceptional in Homer and Hesiod. 2. Verse-final monosyllables beginning with consonant groups are listed. 3. Overwhelmingly they follow words ending in short vowels. 4. This is not a property of overall diction or vocabulary as can be shown with a sample taken from certain earlier locations in the line. An excursus deals (1) with another phenomenon not limited to line-end, viz. the alternation between  $\pi$ - and  $\pi\tau$ -, etc. and that between  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ - and  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\iota$ -; and (2) with words in  $-\eta\xi$ ,  $-\tau\xi$ ,  $-\iota\gamma\xi$ ,  $-\omega\xi$ ,  $-\omega\psi$  which would (or do) create overlength even with a following vowel and are often placed at line-end. 5. In practically all of the 114 cadences with verse-final monosyllables that begin with single consonants nothing heavier precedes than a diphthong or long vowel, or a short vowel followed by one consonant; in addition, there are eight cases with long vowel plus consonant before a vocalic initial. Thus, overlength at word-boundary in the sixth longum is as good as excluded. 6. Word-end after the fifth longum avoids overlength, exceptions being largely the work of formula (illustrated from a sample). 7. The line-final "cadences" of the Rgveda are restricted in strikingly similar ways (though word-end is not a factor). 8. A sample with instances of problematic overlength in Homer and Hesiod, concentrated in the latter part of the hexameter but not tied to word-boundary, is examined with a view to further study. 9. Indo-European sound-structure and poetic technique.

1. TRUE MONOSYLLABLES (i.e. ones which are neither enclitic nor preceded by a proclitic, whether this is taken orthographically or in some more sophisticated way<sup>1</sup>) are infrequent at line end (" | ") in Homer and Hesiod—only 1% in Homer even by Hartel's count. On the other hand, they are not the monstrosities of classical Latin (*ridiculus mus*!) nor are they mere lapses like, for example, the infractions of Hermann's Bridge after

<sup>1</sup> The uncertainty is notorious. De-facto proclitics not sanctioned by diorthotic practice (e.g. not competing for space with a breathing sign) may in principle be recognized by their failure to occur at end of line;  $\kappa\alpha\iota$  is an example. On  $\eta$  see Wackernagel 1955: 619. There is no one clear-cut criterion, however. See note 4, and Visser 1988: 28 n. 23.

the fourth trochee. In fact, they can be formulaically well entrenched, as witness ἀχνύμενος κῆρι, νεφεληγερέτα Ζεύς, ἀκάματον πῦρι, (αἶ κέ) ποθι Ζεύς, (ἐξέλ)ετο Ζεύς, εὐρεῖα χθώνι.

2. Some of these monosyllables begin with a consonant group, including, of course, ζ, ξ, ψ (on δ[*f*], ' , ρ, etc. see Section 2 [c]).<sup>2</sup> The group may consist of

(a) sounds other than stop-and-liquid:

νεφεληγερέτα Ζεύς| A 511, 517, 560, Δ 30, E 764, 888, H 280, 454, Θ 38, 469, K 552, Λ 318, Ξ 293, 312, 341, O 220, Π 666, P 198, Y 19, 215, X 182, Ω 64, α 63, ε 21, ι 67, μ 313, 384, ν 139, 153, ω 477, *Th.* 558, *Op.* 53; μητίετα Ζεύς| A 175, B 197, 324, Z 198, H 478, Θ 170, I 377, K 104, Λ 278, M 279, 292, O 377, 599, Π 249, Ω 314, ξ 243, π 298, υ 102, *Th.* 56, 520, 904, 914, *Op.* 104; μητίετα Ζεῦ| A 508; στεροπηγερέτα Ζεύς| Π 298; εὐρύοπα Ζεύς| E 265, Θ 442, I 419, 686, N 732, Ξ 203, O 724, P 545, Ω 296, β 146, γ 288, δ 173, λ 436, ξ 235, ρ 322, ω 544, *Th.* 514, *Op.* 229, 239, 281; εὐρύοπα Ζεῦ| Π 241; εὐρύοπα Ζῆνι| Θ 206, Ξ 265, Ω 331, *Th.* 884; ἀθάνατος τέκετο Ζεύς| B 741, Ξ 434, Φ 2, Ω 693; ἐξέλετο Ζεύς| Z 234, T 137; ἰοῶδύσατο Ζεύς| Σ 292; ὠδύσαο Ζεῦ| α 62; ἐξέλασε<sup>3</sup> Ζεύς| *Th.* 820; αἶ κέ ποθι Ζεύς| A 128, Z 526, δ 34, μ 215, χ 252; ἀλλὰ ποθι Ζεύς| T 273; οὐδέ ποτε Ζεύς| Π 644; αὐτὰρ ἐμὲ Ζεύς| Θ 364, Y 92; αἶ κεν ἐμοὶ Ζεύς| X 256; ὕε δ' ἄρα Ζεύς| M 25, ξ 457; οἶσιν ἄρα Ζεύς| Ξ 85, π 422; 20<sup>η</sup> σε περὶ<sup>4</sup> Ζεύς| ἀνθρώπων ἥχθηρε τ 363–64; ἔγρετο δὲ Ζεύς| O 4; αἶε δὲ Ζεύς| Φ 388;

'Αρτέμιδι<sup>5</sup> ξύν<sup>5</sup>| ο 410;

οὐκ ἔλαθε πτώξ| P 676;

ἄγχι δ' ἄρα στάς| Ω 477; ἐγγύθι δὲ στάς| α 120;

Δολίον πατέρα σφόν<sup>6</sup>| ω 411; ὑπερβασίης ἔνεκα σφῆς| Π 18; ἐπισπόμενοι μένεῖ σφῶ| ξ 262, ρ 431, ω 183;

<sup>2</sup> There is no reason to distinguish between two-consonant and three-consonant groups like στρ-.

<sup>3</sup> Underlining of letters calls attention to the possibility of ephelecytic *v* or metrical lengthening (see notes 5, 8, 11).

<sup>4</sup> Non-anastrophic, but presumably not specifically proclitic to Ζεύς. Examples recur.

<sup>5</sup> See note 8.

<sup>6</sup> Here treated as non-enclitic, following orthographic practice.—Enclitic pronominal forms beginning with σφ- show the following picture: ὅσσε δ' ἄρα σφέωνι υ 348; οὔνεκ' ἄρα σφέωνι *Th.* 144; οὔνεκ' ἄρα σφέας| θ 480; ἐννέα δέ σφεας| B 96; οὐ δύναται σφι Λ 116; πόλεμος τέτατό σφινι P 736; οὐδέ ποτέ σφινι θ 562; ἀμφὶ δ' ἄρα σφι N 704, P 268; ἥρχε δ' ἄρα σφινι Π 552, ω 9; ἐντα δέ σφινι K 471; ἡνία δέ σφι Π 470; δάκρυα δέ σφι P 437; ἔγχεα δέ σφινι K 152; ιστία δέ σφι ι 70; ἄχυντο δέ σφι Ξ 38; εἵσατο δέ σφι Ω 319; οὐδεῖ δέ σφι Ψ 283; one diphthong (δύναται Λ 116) against 16 short-vowel finals. This belongs in the context of Section 8.

30 ἄλλ' ἄρα μιν φθῆ| χ 91;

εὐρεῖα χθών| Δ 182, Θ 150, Λ 741, Φ 387, *Th.* 458; βέβριθε χθών| Π 384; αὐτὰρ ὑπὸ χθών| Β 465; πᾶσα περὶ χθών| Τ 362; αἵματι δὲ χθών| Ρ 316; εἴσατο δὲ χθών| ν 352.

There are, then, 36 different such cadences<sup>7</sup> in *Iliad*, *Odyssey*, *Theogony*, and *Works and Days*, ranging from νεφεληγερέτα Ζεὺς which recurs 32 times to 24 cadences occurring once each.

(b) Stop-and-liquid (29 different cadences):

ἐξερίπη δρῶς| Ξ 414; οὔρεσι δὲ δρῶς| *Op.* 232;

ἀνδρόμεα κρέα| ι 347;

40 ἄλλα πολὺ πρίν| Ι 250, Λ 236, Ν 161, β 167; οἷς ἔπι μὲν πρίν| γ 408;

οὐρανόθι πρό| Γ 3; Ἰλιόθι πρό| Θ 561, Κ 12, Ν 349, θ 581; ἡῶθι πρό| Λ 50, ε 469, ζ 36;

αἰ δ' ἄρ' ἔτι τρεῖς| Υ 269;

ἄσβέστη κέχυτο φλόξ| Π 123; παύσατο δὲ φλόξ| Ψ 228;

ἐτράπετο φρήν| Κ 45;

πόντον ἔπι φρίξ| Η 63;

50 ἦ τι μάλα χρεώ| Ι 197; τὸν δὲ μάλα χρεώ| Λ 409; οὐ τι μάλα χρεώ| Ψ 308; τίπτε δέ σε χρεώ| Κ 85, α 225; οὐδέ τί μιν χρεώ| δ 707;

οὐδέ τί σε χρή| Η 109, Ι 496, Κ 479, Π 721, Τ 420, Υ 133, Ψ 478, α 296, β 369, δ 492, κ 380, ο 393, σ 17, τ 500; λοχησάμενος τέο σε χρή| δ 463; ὅττεό σε χρή| α 124; οὐδέ τί με χρή| Τ 67, τ 118; ὅττεό με χρή| χ 377; 60 νῦν σε μάλα χρή| Π 492, Χ 268; ταῦτα δ' ἅμα χρή| Ν 235;

τήκετο δὲ χρώς| τ 204; ὀστεόφ| χρώς| π 145; πᾶσι δ' ἄρα χρώς| φ 412; τρέπεται βρότεος χρώς| *Op.* 416.

To these we must add

(c) (13 different cadences):

οὐ τι μάλα δήν [i.e. δφήν]| Α 416, Ν 573, χ 473; οὐδ' ἄρ' ἔτι δήν| Ζ 139, Θ 126, Υ 426, Ψ 690, β 296, 397, ρ 72;

τήν δὲ προτὶ οἶ [*< \*sw-*]| Φ 507;

τὸν δὲ ποτὶ οἶ [*< \*sw-*]| ω 347;

<sup>7</sup> A cadence is here arbitrarily taken as the string of words filling the adonius of the fifth and sixth foot and thus beginning at the bucolic diaeresis or before. The Rgvedic "cadence" is somewhat differently defined; see Section 7. Both are, however, terminal stretches.



70θυγατέρα ἦν [< \*sw-] E 371, Z 192, A 226, N 376, Th. 819;  
θυγατέρος ἦς| Φ 504, τ 400; καὶ πατέρι ῶ| γ 39; χαριζομένη  
πόσει ῶ| E 71; καὶ σθένει ῶ| Π 542; καὶ τέκει ῶ| Ω 36;<sup>8</sup>

οὓς τέκετο 'Ρέα| O 187;

οὐδέ κέ μιν ῥέα| M 381; οὐ κε μάλα ῥέα| Y 101.

3. The remarkable fact is that the word which precedes the terminal monosyllable in these 78 different<sup>9</sup> cadences almost invariably ENDS IN A SHORT VOWEL. In the first list, (a), the only two exceptions are αἶ κεν ἐμοὶ Ζεύς| X 256<sup>10</sup> and ἀλλ' ἄρα μιν φθῆ| χ 91, against 34 turns with short vowel final.<sup>11</sup> Even in the (b) list—less telling than the (a) list because of the possibility of “Attic” correction<sup>12</sup>—exceptions number only

<sup>8</sup> On the face of it, οὐ τι κράτει γελ H 142 is a case of metrical lengthening (Monro 1891: 83). It would seem, though, that it was at least helped along by the above cadences (see Meister 1921: 134–35). From the point of view of formula and of placement in the line it is instructive to look at ἄχει, proceeding from ἡ δ' ἄχει οὐ παιδὸς ο 358 through ἰὼ ἄχει σχομένη λ 279, ἰκῆρ ἄχει μεγάλω βεβολημένος κ 247, ἰ'Ατρείδης δ' ἄχει μεγάλω βεβολημένος ἦτορ| I 9 (cp. also ἰρήξόμεθα σθένει μεγάλω M 224, etc.), ἄχει φθινύθουσι παρειαῖ| θ 530 (cp. οὐδέ τί μιν σθένει ῥηγνῦσι ῥέοντες| P 751), το ἔθελον δ' ἄχει προτραπέσθαι Z 336 (cp. σθένει βλεμεαίνων| Θ 337, etc.), ὅ τε κράτει προβέβηκ| Π 54). For ἄχει this is the complete list. The -i is not “metrically lengthened” since the syllable may still be seen as simply long by position everywhere, including before (μ)μεγάλω and before προτραπέσθαι. Similarly, there are, by a conservative count, five different turns (including Π 542) with σθένει CC in all locations, against the one ἰκάρτει τε σθένει τε P 329; κράτει is found only in the two passages cited, Π 54 and H 142. The final syllable of 'Αχιλλῆῃ shows normal *Wortfugenposition* three times in the third and four times in the fifth arsis (A 283, N 324, P 575, P 121, Y 376, Ω 108, 110) and in this resembles 'Αχιλλῆα, while ἰδῶρα δ' 'Αχιλλῆῃ φερέμεν (Ω 119 = 147, 176, 196) may be another intriguing indication of the occasional position-making power of φ- (Korzeniewski 1968: 23; Hoenigswald 1968b: 253; 1972: 939 n. 29). The old true dative in -ει (Hom. δῖφιλος = Cypr. Διφίφιλος?) is hardly involved in any of this, not only because its use in Mycenaean does precisely NOT extend to the σ-stems.

<sup>9</sup> The differences among the cadences vary greatly in importance. Besides, there are many ways of counting (cp. note 7). If only the “word” (say, στεροπηγέρετα, ἄρα, δέ) immediately preceding the monosyllable is taken into account the figure drops to 67. The choice made here has seemed to us to be more in keeping with the workings of the poets' craft than some of the possible alternatives would have been. The phenomenon under study is so massive, however, that the decision hardly matters.

<sup>10</sup> The adonii αὐτὰρ ἐμὲ Ζεύς| Θ 364, Y 92 and αἶ κεν ἐμοὶ Ζεύς| X 256 are formulaically close.—Before enclitic σφι, δύναται (A 116) is the only instance of resulting overlength against 14 cases of simple length; see note 6 and Section 8.

<sup>11</sup> These include ἔλαθε, ἐξέλασε, βέβριθε, 'Αρτέμιδι. See notes 3, 5, 8.

<sup>12</sup> Allowing us to subsume the three exceptions above under Section 4. A similar observation applies to ἐμπλήιν, ἐμπρήσειν, ἐχρίμπτοντο vs. ἐνιπρήσειν, ἐνιχρίμφθέντα (Hoenigswald 1968b: 252; see note 17). For information on Attic correction in Homer see Chantraine 1942: 108–10, Allen 1987: 100–05. Wathelet 1966 considers that where spellings like πρV, τρV etc. do not simply conceal either a dialect form without the ρ (προσ- for ποτ- etc.) or an old VC *r*<sub>o</sub> = ~ (e.g. ἔτραπον) Attic correction

four: ἐξερύπη δρῦς| Ξ 414, οἷς ἔπι μὲν πρίν| γ 408, οὐδὲ τί μιν χρεώ| δ 707, and τρέπεται βρότεος χρώς| *Op.* 416, against 25 cases with short vowel final.<sup>13</sup> Still greater freedom might be expected under (c) where digamma is subject to various degrees of "neglect" and where gemination, when it becomes an alternative, is not mandatory. We do have θυγατέρος ἦς| Φ 504 = τ 400 (to be compared with the hiatus in ἐέλπετο ὄν κατὰ θυμόν| Ν 8, as if simply ἐέλπετο φόν, not \*\*φφόν [though not merely \*\*φόν, either, as in ὁ δ' οὐδ' οὐ παιδὸς ἀμύνει Π 522, corresponding to λαῦριον ἦν ἀρετήν Θ 535]), and οὐδέ κέ μιν ῥέα| Μ 381 (cp. ἰένθα κε ῥεῖα [ῥῆα] φέροι Ρ 70) but that—two cases against 11 short vowel finals with positional syllable length—is all.

In other words, word-initial consonant groups in this location are in order where they produce LONG syllables but NOT OVERLONG ones.

#### 4. On the other hand, consider the following sample.

(a) In the second or in the fourth thesis (biceps) and, more rarely, in the third, too, Ζεύς (nom. sg.) may stand after a word ending in a short vowel (with positional length of the syllable resulting); there are 35 different such passages (e.g. Ἰπάντες ἅμα, Ζεὺς δ' ἦρχε Α 495, and including Ζεύς after Ἀτρεΐδην θῆκε Β 482, ἐκ βελέων ὕπαγε Λ 163, βῶσιν καὶ σφι Ξ 86).

(b) In those same locations Ζεύς is, however, also found after a word ending in a long vowel or in a diphthong: μυθέομαι Ζεύς (Η 76), Πριαμίδης ὅτε οἱ (Θ 216 etc.), αἶ κέν μοι δῶη (Θ 287), καμμίζας δῶη (Ω 529), ἄναξ καὶ τοι (Ι 98), πρίν γ' ὅτε δῆ (Μ 437), καὶ τότε δῆ (γ 13), ὥς γάρ που (Ξ 120), οὕτω που (ι 262), δηϊόων τῷ γάρ (Ρ 566), ἀλλήλοισ ἐπὶ γάρ (γ 152), ἦ ἀγαθός (Ρ 632), ἀμφοτέροι (Υ 155), Θέτι καλέει (Ω 88), ἰέμενοι (γ 160), αὐτὰρ ἐμοί (Ξ 310 etc.), περὶ κῆρι φίλει (ο 245), πτολέμου εἰ μὴ (? ω 42), ἐν νόστῳ γάρ μοι (ω 96), μᾶλλον ἐπεὶ (? *Th.* 428), χωόμενος (*Th.* 561), ἀλλ' ἄρα μιν (*Th.* 899), τῷ δ' ἦ τοι (*Op.* 333), πλεόνεσσι πόροι (*Op.* 379), ἐκτελέσῃ (*Op.* 565), ἢ (? *Op.* 668); that is, about 26 passages with resulting overlength in the arsis that precedes.

(c) Finally, Ζεύς may follow a word-final sequence consisting of a long vowel or a diphthong and a consonant: αἰγίοχος Κρονίδης (Β 375), τοῦτ'ω Κρονίδης (Θ 141), ἐκ πασέων Κρονίδης (Σ 431), αὐτὰρ οἱ Κρονίδης (Φ 570), ὅτι μοι Κρονίδης (Ω 241), ψεύδεσσι πατήρ (Δ 235), ὅπποτέροισι πατήρ (Ε 33), Τρώεσσι πατήρ (Ρ 630), Ἀργείων (Ζ 159), ἴστω νῦν (Τ 258 etc.), οὕτω νῦν (θ 465 etc.), νῦν ἡμῖν πάντων (Ο 719), ὑπὲρ Κρήτης (Ξ 300), Ἰοῦς (ρ 597), κερτομέων (*Th.* 545), δολοφρονέων (*Th.* 550).

is limited to the female caesura or to recent, i.e. non-formulaic words; see notes 28, 43. On possible OVERLENGTH involving stop and liquid see Section 8 (g).

<sup>13</sup> Including ὀστεόφι.

These 16 passages show what might be called twofold overlength if the distinction were in any way useful.

There are, then, about 42 cases of overlength (b, c) against 35 cases of simple length (a). It will not do, therefore, to blame the near lack of word-seam overlength inside the sixth foot on any gross shortage of suitable turns in the diction.<sup>14</sup>

REGARDLESS OF LOCATION, ξύν,<sup>15</sup> πτόλεμος, πολεμίζω, πτόλις, πτολίπορθος occur only after a short vowel final where of course they produce positional length.<sup>16</sup> After the heavier word-finals these ancillary variants are not needed, and overlength is easily avoided even in locations in which it is otherwise tolerated. This has a mirror image in the ban on ἐνι-forming compounds with verbs that begin with a simple consonant (ἐν-δυνε but not \*\*ἐνί-δυνε even though this sequence is phonologically possible); before a cluster, ἐν- secondarily creates overlengths (ἐν-στρέφεται E 306 [second foot]).<sup>17</sup>

It is tempting to take comfort from the fact that θώρηξ (five different cadences, as well as αἰολοθώρηξ, λινοθώρηξ with two different cadences each), κήξ, πτώξ, σάλπιγξ, φόρμιγξ, (φρίξ ?) (these once each) with their fixed final overlengths occur only in verse-final ancipitia where quantity presumably does not matter at all, while πήληξ is found in that location in two different cadences, as well as once in the notoriously lax first foot. However, Κύκλωψ, in addition to occurring in three different verse-final cadences and in five different turns in the first foot (four of them vocatives), is also found positioned as | - υ υ Κύκλωψ V- in three different turns and once as | - υ υ - Κύκλωψ μεγάλην (i.e. with -ωψ in arsi; note the consonantal onset in μεγάλην), σκώληξ υ υ - x | (once) is placed before a vowel, and so is ἴρηξ (two different turns, λαὺτὸς δ' ὥς τ' ἴρηξ and ἰή δ' ἴρηξ ὥς) when not indeed verse-final (once). It is best to leave aside κήρυξ, φοῖνιξ, Φοῖνιξ, (φρίξ ?) and their problematic vowel quantities.

<sup>14</sup> To insure a minimum of outward comparability, internal passages counted as separate were given the same length as the terminal adonius (see note 7). It is clear, however, that this does not take us very far since spondaic substitution and caesura or word placement make for different vocabulary choices.

<sup>15</sup> Cp. Section 2 (a) and note 8.

<sup>16</sup> This does not hold for πτολίεθρον (cp. Section 8 [b]), (-)σκεδάννυμι, σκίδνημι (vs. κεδ-, κιδ-); κτείνω/-καίνω may be a special case.—Short scansion before Σκάμανδρος and a few such items with an iambic onset remains an isolated license.

<sup>17</sup> Hoenigswald 1968b on ἐ(ν)-, ἐνι-, ἐν, ἐνί; see note 12. The two processes mirror each other in the sense that in the case of ἐν-/ἐνι- it is the light variant (ἐνι-) which occurs only when the other variant is excluded while in the case of πτ-/π- it is the heavily consonantal variant (πτ-) which plays that role. The ancillary status of ἐνι- is evident from the fact that while ἔδυνε, \*\*ἐνίδυνε, ἐνιστρέφεται were anciently permitted phoneme sequences, and ἐνστρέφεται is a plausible innovation, \*\*ἐνίδυνε is in fact not used. On the other hand πτ- is ancillary to π- inasmuch as ἀμφί, κατά, ἔλοι πόλιν occur freely but \*\*ἔλοι etc. πτόλιν is not found though it is just as conceivable an innovation in itself as ἐνστρέφεται. That ξύν is etymologically prior to σύν is another matter.

5. True monosyllables beginning with a SINGLE consonant, when found at end of line, are no less consistently preceded by words that end in A SHORT VOWEL PLUS CONSONANT, OR IN A LONG VOWEL OR A DIPHTHONG (there are no instances of -α, -η, -ω). The few monosyllables beginning with a VOWEL (here included) naturally stand after words ending in a sequence consisting of long vowel and consonant:<sup>18</sup>

ἦλθε μὲν ἄρ βοῦς| (nom. sg.) γ 430; εἰλίποδας βοῦς| (acc. pl.) O 547, θ 60; εἰλίποδας ἔλικας βοῦς| I 466, α 92, δ 320, ι 46; καὶ ἔλικας βοῦς| Σ 524, μ 136, ω 66; νομῆσαι βῶν| H 238;

ἀλλ' ὁπότ' ἄν δῆ| Φ 340; ὁπότε κεν δῆ| Σ 115, X 365, β 357; εἰ δ' ἔτεδν δῆ| ψ 107; αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν δῆ| Op. 600, 614;

ἰοεῖς ἐγκέφαλον δῶ| Θ 85;

ἡμέτερον δῶ| H 363, Σ 385, 424, α 176, β 262, δ 139; ὑμέτερον δῶ| ω 115; υἱὸς ἐμὸν δῶ| δ 169; ἵκετ' ἐμὸν δῶ| θ 28; ἐρισθενέος πυκινὸν δῶ| T 355; χαλκοβατὲς δῶ| A 426, Ξ 173, Φ 438, 505, θ 321, ν 4; εὐρυπυλὲς Ἄϊδος δῶ| Ψ 74, λ 571; ὑπερεφὲς δῶ| κ 111, ο 424, 432; ἐς πατέρως δῶ| λ 501; 20αῖψά τέ οἱ δῶ| α 392;

ὅς κεν μὴ δῶ| Op. 354;

οὐδὲ κακῶν ἔξ| Ξ 472; ὅς τε θεῶν ἔξ| ρ 518;<sup>19</sup>

οὐδ' ἄρα πῶς ἦν| Π 60, Ψ 670;

ἄμφ' ὅστεόφιν θίς| μ 45;

οὐ γὰρ ἐμὴ ἴς [f]| Λ 668; κέλετο μεγάλη ἴς| μ 175; οὐδέ οἱ ἦν ἴς| σ 3 (also, ἴς| preceded by a de-facto proclitic καί, M 320);<sup>20</sup>

εἰναλίη κήξ| ο 479;

30έν δ' ὀλοή Κήρ| Σ 535; ἀλλ' ἐμὲ μὲν Κήρ| Ψ 78;

ἀμφ' ἀδινὸν κῆρ| Π 481, τ 516; ἐθέλεις τὸ δ' ἐμὸν κῆρ| Z 523; σὸν καὶ ἐμὸν κῆρ| O 52; αὐτὰρ ἐμὸν κῆρ| T 319, δ 259, μ 192; καὶ δέ κ' ἐμὸν κῆρ| ι 459; κυδάλιμον κῆρ| K 16, M 45, Σ 33, φ 247; Πυλαιμένεος λάσιον κῆρ| B 851; Πατροκλῆος λάσιον κῆρ| Π 554; 40Ἀχιλλῆος ὀλοὸν κῆρ| Ξ 139; εἰς ὃ κε σὸν κῆρ| χ 58; ἐγέλασσε φίλον κῆρ| ι 413; ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλον κῆρ| α 341, η 309; ἐπιγνάμψασα φίλον κῆρ| A 569; ἔσκε φίλον κῆρ| δ 270; μίμνε φίλον κῆρ| N 713; παραιπεπιθοῦσα φίλον κῆρ| Ξ 208; σὸν δὲ φίλον κῆρ| π 274; τεταρπόμενός τε φίλον κῆρ| α 310; 50φθινύθεσκε φίλον κῆρ| A 491; φθινύθουσι φίλον κῆρ| κ 485; ἀχνύμενος κῆρ| κ 67, μ 153, 270; ἀχνύμενον κῆρ| χ 188; ἀχνυμένω κῆρ| T 57, Ψ 284, 443; ἀχνύμενοι κῆρ| H 428, 431, Ψ

<sup>18</sup> See the end of this section on ἔξ|, ἦν|, ὦς|, as well as on ἴς| and ὡς|. There are no examples of words ending in two or more consonants preceding terminal monosyllables.—Inasmuch as *elisis non officii caesurae*, ὦς in οὐδ' ὦς| φ 246—the only example of elision in this location—is to be recognized as a monosyllabic word. See note 25. On καί see note 1.

<sup>19</sup> See note 18.

<sup>20</sup> See note 18.



165, μ 250, ω 420; ἀχνυμένη κῆρ| Ω 773; γηθόσυνος κῆρ| Δ 272, 326, Σ 557; ἐμπλησάμενος κῆρ| Χ 504; χωόμενος κῆρ| Α 44, Ι 555; 60χωόμενον κῆρ| Ψ 37; ἤχθετο γάρ κῆρ| Λ 274, 400; ἄλλα δέ οἱ κῆρ| σ 344; λύσσα δέ οἱ κῆρ| Φ 542; πολλὰ δέ οἱ κῆρ| η 82, ψ 85;

πανημερίη γλαφυρή νηῦς| δ 356; ἐρχομένη νηῦς| ξ 334, τ 291; ποντοπόρος νηῦς| μ 69, ν 95, 161, ξ 339; ὠκύαλος νηῦς| μ 182, ο 473;

ἄλλα δέ μοι νῦν| Σ 435; 70ῆδε δέ μοι νῦν| Φ 155; ὄν τινά οἱ νῦν| β 124; ὥς καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν| ε 448; ὅσπον ἐγὼ νῦν| τ 169; εἴ τι κακὸν νῦν| Δ 362 (also, νῦν| preceded by καί,<sup>21</sup> Ι 105, 111, 259, Λ 790, Ξ 234, Ψ 787, ω 186);

ἀμφιλύκη νύξ| Η 433; παροίχωκεν δὲ πλέων νύξ| Κ 252; ἀμβροσίη νύξ| δ 429, 574, η 283; οὐρανόθεν νύξ| ε 294, ι 69, μ 315; ἀμφὶ δέ μιν νύξ| *Th.* 726;

80θεσπιδαῆς πῦρ| (nom., acc.) Μ 177, 441, Ο 597, Υ 490, Φ 342, 381, Ψ 216, δ 418; ἀκάματον πῦρ| (nom., acc.) Ε 4, Π 122, Σ 225, Φ 13, 341, Ψ 52, υ 123, φ 181; ἀμαιμάκετον πῦρ| *Th.* 319;<sup>22</sup> αἰθόμενον πῦρ| Π 293; κηαμένω πῦρ| π 2; δῆτιον πῦρ| Ι 347, 674, Π 301, Σ 13; ἥ ὅλοδον πῦρ| Ο 605; δαίε δέ οἱ πῦρ| η 7; οἶσε δέ μοι πῦρ| χ 481; ἐν δ' ἔβαλον πῦρ| Ω 787;

90οὔτ' ἄρ' ἐγὼ σοῦς| Υ 205;

ἀνασχοίμην ὅτε μοι σύ| λ 375; ἔνθεν ὅθεν σοί| Δ 58;

ἡδὲ μέγας σῦς| δ 457; κατέκειτο μέγας σῦς| τ 439; φθάμενος ἔλασεν σῦς| τ 449;

ἡ κεν ἐγὼ τόνι| Φ 226, λ 565; ὥς καὶ ἐγὼ τήνι| Ι 342 (also καὶ τῶι| Ι 666, *Op.* 754; καὶ τόνι| Τ 96; καὶ τῆς| Δ 138; καὶ τά| *Op.* 684; καὶ τῶνι| *Op.* 513);

ἰσόθεος φώς| Β 565, Γ 310, Δ 212, Η 136, Ι 211, Λ 428, 472, 644, Ο 559, Π 632, Ψ 569, 677, α 324, υ 124; ἀλλότριος φώς| Ε 214, π 102, σ 219; 100ὥς ὅτε τις φώς| Π 406;

ἀμφὶ δέ μοι χεῖρ| Π 517;

ἀθάνατος ὥς| ζ 309; αἴγειρος ὥς| Δ 482; αἰγυπιὸς ὥς| Ν 531; ἡέλιος ὥς| Ξ 185, τ 234; ἡέλιον ὥς| σ 296; κασσίτερος ὥς| *Th.* 862; νηπύτιον ὥς| Υ 200, 431; νηπύτιοι ὥς| Ν 292, Υ 244; 110οίωνων ὥς| λ 605; ὄρνιθες ὥς| Γ 2; ὄρνιθας ὥς| Β 764; τηλύγετον ὥς| Ν 470; οἱ δὲ λύκοι ὥς| Δ 471, Λ 72, Π 156; Κρήτεσσι θεὸς ὥς| Γ 230; οἱ σε θεὸν ὥς| Ι 302, Χ 434; ὦρτο λέων ὥς| Λ 129, Υ 164; ἔπεσεν μελίη ὥς| Ν 178; φοβέοντο βόες ὥς| Λ 172;<sup>23</sup>

<sup>21</sup> See note 1.

<sup>22</sup> In violation of Hermann's Bridge.

<sup>23</sup> See note 18.



120 αἱ γὰρ ἐγὼν ὦσι| ο 156; ἀλλὰ μιν οὐδ' ὦσι| φ 246; ἀνέστησεν  
δέ μιν οὐδ' ὦσι| Ω 756.<sup>24</sup>

If the line-final monosyllable begins with one consonant, a sequence consisting of a long vowel or diphthong followed by a consonant, or of two or more consonants at the end of the word which precedes would again create overlength. This happens only once: παροίχωκεν δὲ πλέων νύξι| (vv.11. πλέω, πλέον!) K 252 (Doloneia) where the iteration -ν#ν- could play a role. As for ὤς, it occurs in three different cadences after a long vowel, but also in οὐδέ οἱ ἦν ὤσι| σ 3, with “neglected” digamma as we would like to think; the scansion matches that of ὄς τε θεῶν ἔξι| ρ 518, οὐδ' ἄρα πῶς ἦνι| Π 60, αἱ γὰρ ἐγὼν ὦσι| ο 156, ἀλλὰ μιν οὐδ' ὦσι| φ 246, ἀνέστησεν δέ μιν οὐδ' ὦσι| Ω 756, where *ϕ* was presumably never involved. The same as for ὤς may hold for the postpositive ὥς, “like,” (here included among the orthotones),<sup>25</sup> preceded as it most often is by -VC or by a diphthong or long vowel, but then also by -ων in ὦρτο λέων ὥσι| Λ 129 = Y 164, and οἰωνῶν ὥσι| λ 605. In short, out of 122 instances in this section, there is only one, and that a slightly doubtful one, in which overlength results. Altogether, in only two or three of the 200 different cadences that end in monosyllables do the latter generate overlength. ONLY LONG, and NOT OVERLONG syllables are permitted at word boundaries inside the sixth foot.

6. Most of this appears to have gone unnoticed. If questions are asked at all about *Wortfugenposition* of the kind -Ṽ#CC- they are likely to be aimed at the circumstances under which it is ALLOWED<sup>26</sup>—in arsi and in the first or the second thesis—than at those under which it is FAVORED or required because, given certain vocabulary choices, there is no other remedy against overlength. There are some uncertain hints at the role of overlength at word-boundary after the longum of the fifth foot: by Hilberg 1879, Drewitt 1908 (also Platt 1921), Parry 1928, and Pipping 1937; a more recent voice is that of West 1970, 1982. Drewitt observed the play between κρείων Ἀγαμέμνωνι and κρατερὸς Διομήδης| (not \*\*κρείων Διομήδης!). Parry discussed it in passing, in perceptive if somewhat ad hoc terms, as a characteristic of the seam between a hero's epithet and his name. A further search<sup>27</sup> reveals greater generality, however: in Δ (= 544 lines) only five times (including one repeated half-line, 232 ~ 257 [repeated six more times

<sup>24</sup> See note 18. On δῆν, οἶ, etc., see Section 2 (c) above.

<sup>25</sup> For the *ϕ* see Chantraine 1968–80: 1305. On ὥς, ὦς see Fernández-Galiano 1986: 248.

<sup>26</sup> West (1982: 37) remarks that it occurs only once (Θέμιν τε Μνημοσύνην τελ Th. 135) in the bucolic diaeresis, where all positional length is rare. On spondaic fourth feet see Meister 1921: 22–27.—Preference is not simply the obverse of exclusion in the sense that sequences not welcome in certain locations naturally accumulate in the others. Overlongs are not just dwarfed; they are nearly totally absent in some of the latter.

<sup>27</sup> Hoenigswald 1988.

elsewhere in the *Iliad*) does a word-end generate overlength in that location (χρυσέοις δεπάεσσιν Δ 3 [also γ 472], ἀναπλήσης βιότοιολ 170 [also ἀναπλήσας κακὰ πολλάι O 132], φρονέων πόρε Χείρωνι 219, Δαναῶν ταχυπῶλωνι 232 ~ 257), when the overall preponderance of words ending like πάρος, Κρόνου over words ending like Δαναῶν in a sample, Δ 73–84, is only 36/11, or 3.27. Nor is this all: along the lines of famous anomalies like μέροπες ἄνθρωποι (= ◡ ◡ --- × ◡, after μερόπων ἄνθρώπωνι), these overlengths may be credited with formulaic ties to variants with simple lengths—depending, to be sure, on one's view of what constitutes formula:

χρυσέοις δεπάεσσιν Δ 3 ~ γ 472: cp. ἐπαρξάμενοι δεπάεσσιν γ 340 = φ 272, ἐπαρξάμενος δεπάεσσιν η 183, ἐπαρξάσθω δεπάεσσιν σ 418 = φ 263, ἐγγεῖη δεπάεσσιν ι 10, χρυσέοισι νέφεσσιν N 523;

ἀναπλήσης βιότοιολ Δ 170 ~ O 132: cp. πολέος βιότοιολ β 126, λιλαϊόμενοι βιότοιολ μ 328 ~ ω 536, ἐνίπλειον βιότοιολ τ 580 = φ 78;

φρονέων πόρε Χείρωνι Δ 219: cp. φίλω πόρε Χείρωνι Π 143 = T 390 (v.l. τάμε X.), φρονέων ἐνὶ θυμῷ Θ 430, κακὰ φρονέων ἐνορούσηι K 486 ~ Π 783, μέγα φρονέων ἐβεβήκει Λ 296 ~ N 156 ~ X 21;

Δαναῶν ταχυπῶλωνι Δ 232 ~ 257: cp. Δαναοὶ ταχύπωλοι Θ 161, Ἰμυρμιδόνες ταχύπωλοι Ψ 6, Δαναῶν ἐδύναντο Μ 417, Δαναῶν ὑπὸ χερσίνι O 2.<sup>28</sup>

7. (a) In the SENTENCE—i.e. across word-seams—the incidence of overlengths is perforce uneven; we have noted the special role of the second and the fourth foot.<sup>29</sup> For the purpose of the substitution of spondees for dactyls overlongs are, or would be, longs. Therefore, their distribution, along with that of plain longs, among the metra of the hexameter and among their arses and theses cannot be independent of caesura and of the play of dactyls and spondees.

(b) WORD-INTERNAL overlength is rare IN THE LANGUAGE. This is connected with the massive, ancient constraints on the phonological structure of Indo-European and with the ubiquitous sound-laws that tend to

<sup>28</sup> Spot checks throughout the poems yield a rich additional harvest; cp. Hoenigswald 1988: 204. The strange reversal in the case of κραδίη (-ης, -ηι, -ην)—27 times (not counting repeated lines) in the *Iliad* after long vowel, diphthong, or short vowel followed by a consonant, as against only once, in the second arsis, ι - - ὅπη σε κραδίη N 783, after a short vowel—is only apparent if ρ [later > ρα] was still the equivalent, in the source formula, of a short vowel after the manner of ἀνδροτῆτα καὶ ἦβην (Wathelet 1966: 160–72, Hoenigswald 1968a: 20 [with earlier literature], West 1982: 15). This necessitates adjustments in our view of the relative chronology of certain processes in the prehistory of Greek.

<sup>29</sup> See Section 4.

reduce new overlengths by shortening long vowels, deleting consonants from heavy clusters, or giving rise to anaptyctic vowels. The new overlengths were typically created by vowel contractions (still few in Homer), "temporal" augments, and many other morphological constructions like affixation, compounding, and juxtaposition.

In  $\Xi$  1–150 there are 82 overlengths of BOTH kinds ([a] and [b]) in the first four feet, against nine in the fifth and sixth. This is no surprise, not only in view of the behavior of the monosyllables (see Sections 1 to 5) but simply as a general truth about Greek meters of all kinds, including the Aeolic meters which are often regarded as specific Indo-European inheritances. The coda of the line or metrical unit is built more tightly than is its initial portion.<sup>30</sup> In the Vedic poetry of India this is well known; here the "cadence" begins at the point in the verse at which syllables are no longer merely counted but also regulated with regard to quantity. If the avoidance of overlength is an aspect of line-end in Homer it is a welcome finding that the Rgveda exhibits something strikingly similar: Rgvedic cadences not only utilize the two traditional quantities, short and long (or "light" and "heavy"); they have also been found to be inhospitable, with certain interesting exceptions, to overlong syllables.<sup>31</sup> It seems that we have here a precious technical detail of Indo-European poetics.

8. It is possible that the observations about the fifth foot are unnecessarily restricted as offered (in Section 7), inasmuch as WORD BOUNDARY may not be crucial.<sup>32</sup> It could be that it is overlong quantity AS SUCH that is significantly rare near the end of the line (... - - - - x l, ... - - - - x l). Of the passages which would contradict this quite a few are independently suspect. The comments below cover the fifth and the sixth foot in five Homeric books, A,  $\Lambda$ , N,  $\Xi$ , and  $\xi$ , with recourse to other passages when convenient. They are only intended to call attention to matters in need of further study.

(a) ἄνδρα, ἄνδρῶν, etc. Between v- and -p the segment -δ- is automatic. The Rgveda treats the divine name, *indra-*, in strikingly analogous fashion.<sup>33</sup>

(b) ναίμενον πολίεθρον, etc.: see note 16.

(c) "Temporal" augment when followed by CC. Aristarchus prefers unaugmented forms; ὦρτο, ἦλθε, etc., while familiar, have no particular authority.<sup>34</sup> Is the accentuation of ἄλτο authentic?

<sup>30</sup> See, inter al., West 1982: 4 on Meillet, Jakobson, Watkins etc.

<sup>31</sup> Hoenigswald 1990.

<sup>32</sup> See note 6 on enclitic σφ-.

<sup>33</sup> Hoenigswald 1990: 561.

<sup>34</sup> Chantraine 1948: 483.—On the mandatory augment of "gnomic" aorists see, however, Platt 1891.

(d) Orthographically marked atticisms:<sup>35</sup> χαμᾶζε, ᾗσσον (? , Ven. A has ᾗσσον, anyway). Likewise, probably, πίπτε, πίπτον, where ῑ is perhaps attested or suggested for a later period (by accent, though this would in prose show only in 2 sg. impv. and in pres. part. neuter, by spellings with εῖ, and by Hdn. 2. 377 [?]<sup>36</sup>) but uncertain for Homer, as well as unetymological.

(e) ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε: just possibly a case of vowel shortening by "Osthoff's Law" but with the orthography normalized; cp. Προκόννησος < \*προκῶν νῆσος, Πελοπόννησος if < \*Πελόπων νῆσος,<sup>37</sup> Σαόννησος (cp. Σά[ι]οι). The period of these juxtapositions could have been that in which the formula became fixed.—By the same token στοναχάς τε ξ 39 etc., ὀλλυμένους τε Α 83 etc. could exhibit the word-internal treatment of (-ᾶνσ-) > -ανσ-*k<sup>w</sup>e*, -ονσ-*k<sup>w</sup>e* > -ασ-τε, -οσ-τε with an orthographic overlay. Word-final overlengths of more straightforward origin are not numerous. Their very rarity may be significant.<sup>38</sup>

(f) Mid. 3 pl. forms.<sup>39</sup> The turn μαχέοιντο Ἀχαιοί Α 344—the only serious such optative in or out of cadence—conceals μαχεοίαι' Ἀ.Ι (Bentley), without the hiatus. Forms in -υνται either have ῡ, Osthoff or otherwise, or occur in earlier locations in the verse or both. This leaves only μέμνηντο γὰρ αἰεῖ Π 364,<sup>40</sup> θύραι δ' ἐπέκειντο φαειναί ζ 19,<sup>41</sup> ἦντ' ἐπὶ πύργῳ Γ 153 anywhere in the poems.<sup>42</sup> (Distractions in -όωνται/ο [= -άονται/ο] naturally do not count.)

(g) Meillet thought that πτερόεντα προσηύδα Α 201 etc. with its glaring correction masks a non-Ionic ποτηυδ-.<sup>43</sup> The same could apply to stop-and-liquid overlengths<sup>44</sup> like ὀσσόμενος προσέειπε Α 105, μιν προσέειπε Α 441, etc.

(h) For δυσωρήσωνται ἐν ἀλγῇ Κ 183, ἀποστήσωνται Ἀχαιοί Ν 745 the manuscripts have variants of some prominence with -σονται.—The proper reading of ἀγλαιεῖσθαι etc. (always contracted) may be

<sup>35</sup> Wackemagel 1955: 1181–82. For other atticisms see below, 8 (f).

<sup>36</sup> Schwyzer 1939: 648.

<sup>37</sup> Schwyzer 1939: 386.—On φιλᾶνωρ vs. φίλᾶνδρος etc. see Wackemagel 1955: 925.

<sup>38</sup> It may be worth reporting that if we limit ourselves once again to the sixth foot verse-final monosyllabic enclitics or quasi-enclitics (cp. the τε in θεῶν τε) are almost never so preceded, Ἀτρεΐδης δέ Ζ 64, ἦ τοι ἔφης γε Χ 280, Ἀναβησίνεώς τε Θ 113, ὅς κεν ἐμῆς γε τ 27 (also μήτηρ τε πατήρ τε δ 224, θ 550, ἐνθα Λύκων μέν Π 337, οὐδέ τις οὖν μοι ξ 254?) being the only examples throughout. By contrast, -ων, -ους etc. are quite frequent. A comprehensive count covering other metrical locations as well as all kinds of word-interior position would be needed.

<sup>39</sup> Wackemagel 1916: 89–100, Chantraine 1948: 475–77.

<sup>40</sup> Zenodotus' athetesis is not relevant.

<sup>41</sup> "Parfois . . . condamné;" θύρη δ' ἐπέκειτο φαεινή?, Chantraine 1948: 476.—Wackemagel 1916: 89–100 speaks of an "Atticizing poet."

<sup>42</sup> Wackemagel 1916: 98–99 speaks of "an evident [Attic] neologism."

<sup>43</sup> Meillet 1918: 305, Severyns 1946: 40–41, Wathélet 1966.

<sup>44</sup> But cp. Section 3.



ἀγλαίεσθαι etc.<sup>45</sup>—In the Doloneia ἀτρεκέως κατάλεξον! K 384, ἀ. καταλέξω! K 413, 427 (vulgate) compete with the readings ἀ. ἀγόρευσον, ἀ. ἀγορεύσω.<sup>46</sup>

9. In sum, overlength and the escape from it were important factors for the early epic poets. In express parallel to the Rgveda, and quite in step with other, better-known fundamentals of Indo-European poetics—the relative laxity of the first two feet of the hexameter being a familiar example—incidence diminishes as the verse moves towards its coda.<sup>47</sup> At the rightmost word-boundary possible, inside the sixth foot, we have established near exclusion. As we retrace our steps leftward, observance is less and less strict. The Rgvedic analog is relevant since the metrically inert word accent, along with many other traits of the ancestral language structure that go with quantitative meter—relatively speaking a rarity on the face of the earth—are better preserved in India and in Greece than anywhere else.

Perhaps the ban on overlength fills its aesthetic role best in the situation where the poets have the greatest freedom of invention, namely at word-boundary. If, however, it is really significant that such word-internal overlengths as have gained and kept a foothold in the language are not more zealously kept out of the sixth foot at least,<sup>48</sup> there is still the possibility that word-boundary has some prosodic reality in the hexameter and can exert the same crowding effect which it seems to show here and there in other genres of versification.<sup>49</sup> Some will find this disquieting since it runs counter to the otherwise well-founded impression that while it is the essence of ancient Indo-European metrical prosody to idealize phonological build, lines of poetry function much as does the “word” of non-metrical language.

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<sup>45</sup> Chantraine 1948: 451.

<sup>46</sup> Whether the apparent rarity of perfect and pluperfect middle forms with overlength is significant needs to be investigated. Some PARTICULAR forms like ἐφήπται, λέλειπται, λέλειπτο recur precisely in the sixth arsis.

<sup>47</sup> See Section 7.

<sup>48</sup> It seems that the type ἐφήπται etc. (see note 46) is better entrenched than the types ἐμοὶ Ζεύς! (once, see Section 3), \*\*ἀγαθούς βοῦς! (no good examples; see Section 5).

<sup>49</sup> West 1982: 9. West also believes (1982: 36–37) that the thesis (biceps) is longer than the arsis (princeps).

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## Die Reise des Telemach

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Der unbefangene Leser der "Odyssee" hat mit der Reise des Telemach seine Schwierigkeiten, die schon mit deren erster Ankündigung durch Athene (1. 93 ff.) einsetzen. Die Reise scheint unnötig und für die Handlung nichts zu bewirken. Daß der heimgekehrte Odysseus vor dem Eintritt in sein Haus mit dem Sohn zusammentrifft, ist zwar geboten, aber dazu würde ein kurzer Auftrag der Göttin Athene an Telemach genügen, daß er den Schweinehirten aufsuchen solle, um nach dem Rechten zu sehen. Dann wäre die Handlung noch klarer eine "Odyssee," wie das Prooimion und die erste Szene des Epos sie kennzeichnen, und zwar die Heimkehr des Helden als letzter Abschnitt einer langen Folge von Irrfahrtenstationen, die schließlich an einen toten Punkt gelangen und eines neuen Anstosses bedürfen.

Auch in Athenes Programm, das die genauere Durchführung des Götterbeschlusses, Odysseus heimkehren zu lassen, entwirft, erscheint zuerst Kalypso, die von Hermes dazu gebracht werden soll, Odysseus in die Heimat zu entlassen. Dann aber springt Athene unerwartet zu dieser noch weit entfernten Heimat Ithaka hinüber und als Hauptperson dort erscheint völlig unvorbereitet der Sohn des Helden, der im eigenen Haus das selbstherrliche Gebaren von "Freiern" (um seine Mutter natürlich), die auch völlig neu auftreten, erdulden muß. Diesen Sohn will Athene selbst in Ithaka aufsuchen und durch bestimmte Anweisungen, darunter eine Reise nach Pylos und Sparta, dazu bringen, sich der Freier zu entledigen, und sie macht sich sofort auf den Weg. Die damit in Bewegung gesetzte Telemachhandlung bleibt die vier ersten Bücher der "Odyssee" ununterbrochen das Thema der Erzählung. Erst dann geht es an Hermes' Botengang zu Kalypso, mit dem Odysseus' Heimfahrt beginnt.

Schwierigkeiten machen weiter die Anordnungen der Athene an Telemach, die sie in ihrem Programm ankündigt (1. 90 ff.). Sie sind zwar viel ausführlicher gehalten als das, was Hermes für Kalypso aufgetragen werden soll, aber doch noch immer zu knapp, als daß deren Zweck einsichtig würde: Telemach soll erstens den Freiern das Haus verbieten, zweitens zu Schiff nach Pylos und Sparta fahren, um zu erkunden, was etwa von der Heimfahrt des Vaters bekannt ist. Das zweite scheint ohne erkennbaren Zusammenhang mit dem ersten zu sein. Das erste, das Hausverbot an die Freier durch den knapp zwanzigjährigen Odysseussohn, wird schwerlich ohne

Umstände befolgt werden. Die Reise müßte klären, ob der Vater noch lebt und also heimkehren kann oder tot ist. Lebt er noch und bringt Telemach diese Kunde zurück, müßten die Freier die Rache des Heimkehrers fürchten. Das könnte sie veranlassen, eher bereit zu sein, das Haus des Odysseus fortan unbehelligt zu lassen. Näher liegt freilich, daß sie dies gerade nicht tun, sondern sich eher auf Odysseus' Kommen vorbereiten, der sie seinerseits ungewarnt antreffen würde, was nahelegen würde, Telemach als möglichen Warner umzubringen. Zudem könnten sie bei bewaffnetem Zusammenstoß mit dem Heimgekehrten auf ihre weit größere Überzahl vertrauen. Ist aber Odysseus tot, hätten die Freier noch leichteres Spiel; Penelopes Entscheidung für einen von ihnen erschiene dann leicht erzwingbar.

Wenn schließlich Athene mit der Erkundungsreise Telemach "herrlichen Ruhm unter den Menschen" zu verschaffen gedenkt (1. 95), so ist das noch unverständlicher. Im Epos ist diese formelhafte Verbindung regelmäßig auf eine glänzende Waffentat bezogen, als welche diese Reise nicht gelten kann. Zwar mußte sie unter den damaligen Verhältnissen als beachtliche Leistung eines eben erwachsenen Angehörigen des Kriegeradels gelten, und man darf sogar annehmen, daß solche selbständig geleiteten Fahrten über See, besonders wenn es um Regelung privater oder öffentlicher Angelegenheiten ging, von denen wir im Epos öfter hören, geradezu eine Art Institution waren, durch die sich ein junger Adliger das Ansehen eines vollgültigen Standesvertreters bei den Mitmenschen erwarb.<sup>1</sup> Aber das kann noch nicht als κλέος ἐσθλόν, d.h. genauer: Ruhm einer großen Bewährung kriegerischer Tüchtigkeit (ἀρετή), bewertet werden. Wo sonst im Epos von solchen Reisen die Rede ist, erhalten sie eine so hohe Bewertung weder vom Erzähler noch den redenden Personen, ausgenommen die Waffentaten des jungen Nestor (Il. 11. 668 ff.). Aber hier sind es eben Kriegstaten, die gerühmt werden, und es geht auch nicht um eine (Schiffs-)Reise in die Fremde, sondern um die Teilnahme an einem Kriegszug gegen eine Nachbarstadt.

In den Zeiten der blühenden Homeranalyse lag eine Radikallösung all dieser Schwierigkeiten durch Annahme verschieden alter Textpartien nahe. Die vier Odysseebücher, die ein selbständiges Stück einer Telemachiehandlung durchführen, ehe es zu dem bereits in der Götterversammlung beschlossenen Botengang des Hermes zu Kalypso kommt, mit dem Odysseus' Heimkehr eingeleitet wird, dazu etwa auch die Herabstufung eines κλέος ἐσθλόν auf die Leistung einer bloßen Reise, schienen auf einen "jüngeren Dichter" einer "Telemachie" zu verweisen, die entweder ein zuerst selbständiges Einzelgedicht war, das ein Bearbeiter mit einer älteren Odyssee verband, der die Telemachie noch fehlte, oder der selbst

<sup>1</sup> S. Renate Zoepffel, "Geschlechtsreife und Legitimation zur Zeugung im alten Griechenland," in: Ernst Wilhelm Müller (Hrsg.), *Geschlechtsreife und Legitimation zur Zeugung* (Freiburg 1985) 326 ff.

zu jener älteren Odyssee eine Telemachie hinzudichtete.<sup>2</sup> Die homerische Textschichten-Analyse, die noch immer ihre Anhänger hat,<sup>3</sup> hat es jedoch nicht zu übereinstimmenden und allgemein anerkannten Ergebnissen gebracht. Das Unternehmen stand in der Tat unter der methodischen Gefahr, den zweiten vor dem ersten Schritt tun zu wollen, d.h. von einem ungesicherten Textverständnis auszugehen, das diejenigen Schwierigkeiten selbst erzeugte, die die Voraussetzung der analytischen Schlüsse bildeten. Der Homertext wird in der Tat von allen Analytikern "unbefangen" verstanden. Aber es ist die Frage, ob ein unbefangenes Verstehen homerischer Dichtung einem heutigen Leser oder Interpreten überhaupt möglich ist, selbst angenommen, der Text sei in rein sprachlicher Hinsicht einwandfrei verstanden.

Sehr einfache und naheliegende Überlegungen zwingen zu der Einsicht, daß dies nicht möglich ist. Die zeitgenössischen Hörer, die der Dichter mit seiner Dichtung allererst ansprechen wollte, verfügten über bestimmte, ihnen durch Überlieferung vorgegebene Verstehensbedingungen, die ihnen wie dem Dichter selbstverständlich und damit als solche gar nicht bewußt waren. Als historisch gewordene sind sie notwendig von den ebenso vorab gegebenen Aufnahmeweisen von Dichtung verschieden, die für einen heutigen Leser oder Interpreten aus dem europäischen Kulturkreis selbstverständlich und meist unbewußt gelten. Der "unbefangene" Leser ist also in Wahrheit der "befangene" und eben deswegen gehindert, einen ursprünglichen Zugang zu antiker Dichtung zu finden. Hierzu führt kein

<sup>2</sup> Eine bequeme Orientierung über die Geschichte der Odyssee-Analyse bietet Friedrich Klingner, *Über die vier ersten Bücher der Odyssee*, Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, Philologisch-historische Klasse, 96. Band 1944, 1. Heft (Leipzig 1944) = *Studien zur griechischen und römischen Literatur* (Zürich und Stuttgart 1964) 39–79. Kl. macht in seiner Arbeit (freilich nur für die vier ersten Odysseebücher in ihrem inneren Aufbau) eine Gegenprobe der aus dem überlieferten Text von den Analytikern als vermutlich älter abgegrenzten Textpartien im Hinblick auf deren dann sich ergebenden Kontext. Durchweg erweist sich die Dichtung so, wie sie uns überliefert ist, als überlegen oder sogar allein möglich.

Dasselbe Verfahren erweiterte Erich Seitz in seiner Untersuchung: *Die Stellung der "Telemachie" im Aufbau der Odyssee* (Diss. Marburg 1950) (masch.) auf den Bezug der Telemachiebücher insgesamt zur "eigentlichen" Odyssee. Es ergab sich die Unlösbarkeit beider Teile voneinander.

Herbert Eisenberger wird schließlich in seinen: *Studien zur Odyssee*, Palingenesia 7 (Wiesbaden 1973) eine sorgfältige Gesamtinterpretation der Odyssee verdankt, bei der die jeweils von Analytikern als von späterer Hand stammenden Partien einer Weglaßprobe unterzogen werden. Fast durchweg erweist sich eine Einbuße an notwendigen Aufbauelementen des dichterischen Logos im Verhältnis zum überlieferten Text. E.s Studien ergeben somit eine—man darf wohl sagen: abschließende—Gesamtbilanz der Odyssee-Analyse, die ihrer Aufhebung gleichkommt. Das bedeutet den Appell, zum überlieferten Text zurückzukehren und ihn mit größter Genauigkeit nach Maßstäben auszulegen, die allein das homerische Epos selbst an die Hand gibt.

<sup>3</sup> Z.B. Helmut van Thiel, *Odysseen* (Basel 1988) und Ders., *Iliaden und Ilias* (Basel 1982); vgl. dazu H. Eisenberger, *GGA* 234 (1982) 11 ff. und H. Bannert, *Gnomon* 59 (1987) 97 ff.



anderer Weg, als zuvor die dem antiken Hörer vorgegebenen und unbewußten besonderen Verstehensbedingungen zu erschließen, was nur mit den Mitteln der Wissenschaft (der Philologie) möglich ist, aber nicht nur zu erkennen, sondern anzudeuten und in Wirkung zu setzen, eine mühevoll Aufgabe.

Für die Dichtung des archaischen und klassischen Griechentums sind nun die bedeutendsten Verstehensbedingungen dieser Art bestimmte dichterische Formgesetze, die für jede Dichtungsgattung verschieden sind und sie kennzeichnen. Am homerischen Epos sind solche festen, ihm eigentümlichen Formen wie etwa die Gleichnisse, die Epitheta, die wörtlichen Reden der handelnden Personen immer aufgefallen und bis zur Trivialität allbekannt. Gleichwohl, vielleicht sogar deswegen, gibt es bis jetzt keine vollständige Bestandsaufnahme dieser Gattungsgesetze, erst recht ist nicht versucht worden, sie in eine systematische Ordnung zu bringen, ihre Bedeutung zu bestimmen und sie folgerecht in die Auslegung einzusetzen. Denn diese Gesetze und die Formen, die sie vorschreiben, sind dichterische Zeichen und haben ihre Bedeutung, ebenso wie die Regeln der Grammatik und des Lexikons der gewöhnlichen Sprache. Erst eine auf eine poetische Grammatik gegründete Textauslegung—denn Dichtung darf als Sprache höherer Ordnung verstanden werden—gewährleistet eine sichere Wegführung und schützt vor gar nicht bemerkbaren Irrgängen, die einem "unbefangenen" Aufnehmen homerischer Dichtung immer drohen.

Der Verfasser dieses Beitrags hat versucht, diese Aufgabe in Angriff zu nehmen und hofft, die Ergebnisse dieser Forschungen bald veröffentlichen zu können. Die Formgesetze des homerischen Epos wurden erschlossen aus dichterischen Gestaltungsweisen, die in "Ilias" und "Odyssee" durchgängig wiederkehren und eine bestimmte dichterische Bedeutung erkennen lassen. Für die Systematik gab ein bestimmter Begriff von "Dichtung" die Orientierung, der aus Ansätzen der aristotelischen Poetik (bes. cc. 1–3 u. c. 9, 1451a36–b11) entwickelt wurde und für den es genügen soll, wenn er sich in der Anwendung bewährt.

Danach läßt sich "Dichtung" definieren als: "Nachgestaltung (μίμησις) menschlicher Wirklichkeit im Medium der Sprache, eine Nachgestaltung, die für einen bestimmten Kreis von Aufnehmenden bedeutungsvoll, gültig und wahr ist." Daraus ergaben sich drei aufeinander aufbauende Geltungsbereiche der Formgesetze, und zwar die dichterische *Sprachgestaltung*, die *Darstellungsweise* und die in Sprache dargestellte (nachgestaltete) *menschliche Wirklichkeit*.

## I

Von diesen Formgesetzen sei nun hier für das Verständnis der Reise des Telemach in der "Odyssee" Gebrauch gemacht, und zwar indem deren erste Ankündigung im Programm der Athene (1. 93 ff.) im Textzusammenhang gemäß diesen Gesetzen interpretiert wird. Es wird sich daraus ergeben, ob die vorgeschlagene neue Methode sich insoweit bewährt, als die früher



entwickelten Schwierigkeiten, die die Telemachreise in der Odyssee dem unbefangenen Leser bietet, durch sie lösbar werden. Für diesen unseren Zweck genügt es, sich auf zwei dieser epischen Formgesetze zu beschränken (genauer je ein Hauptgesetz mit seinen untergeordneten Teilbestimmungen), die die Gestaltung unseres Textabschnittes vorwiegend bestimmen. Diese Gesetze betreffen 1) die *Exposition* des Epos, 2) die Eigenart der im Epos handelnden Personen.

1) Das für die Gestaltung der *Exposition* geltende Hauptgesetz: Der in der Erzählung vorgeführten Ereigniskette, die sich hierarchisch in Szenen und größere Szenengruppen gliedert und im ganzen eine stetig vorwärtsschreitende Handlung ergibt, gehen knappe Angaben über deren Ausgangslage voraus, die *Exposition*. Gewöhnlich erscheint auch von der Vorgeschichte der Ausgangslage so viel, wie es diese erklärt. Für diese *Exposition* gilt das Darstellungsgesetz einer möglichst knappen, zuerst unbestimmten Angabe des Wissensnotwendigen, die sich fortschreitend durch weitere beiläufig erscheinende fragmentarische Angaben präzisiert (dies in betontem Gegensatz zu dem Detailreichtum der eigentlichen Erzählung). Diese unscheinbar auftretenden sich allmählich ergänzenden Angaben können bis in die schon begonnene Erzählung hineinreichen (der Stil des "*in medias res*"-Gehens). Diese knappe Darstellungsweise setzt bewußt die implikatorische Phantasie des Hörers in Bewegung. Im Epos ist weiter die *Exposition* festgelegt auf die Folge von a) *Prooimion* (Vorsatzstück vor der eigentlichen Erzählung, der οἴμη) und b) *weiterführender Exposition*. Schon hier wirkt also das allgemeine Stilprinzip der fortschreitenden Präzisierung.

a) Für das *Prooimion* gilt ein besonders strenges Aufbauschema, das sogar noch die syntaktische Gestaltung festlegt. Es fordert die stichwortartige Angabe der beiden Kerndaten der *Exposition*: des Subjektes der Handlung (= der "Hauptperson") und der diesem zugehörigen Handlung. Beide erscheinen wiederum in einem kurzen Gebetsanruf an die Muse, der göttlichen Handwerkspatronin des Sängers, die ihm den Gesang eingeben soll. Schließlich muß die Erzählwürdigkeit der zu berichtenden Handlung durch die Vielheit (also die Größe) des von ihr ausgegangenen Leidens verdeutlicht werden.

b) Die *weiterführende Exposition*, die nun der von der Muse inspirierte Sänger übernimmt, strebt, noch immer mit knapp gehaltenen Expositionsdaten, auf die erste Erzählszene zu, die in sich noch weitere Präzisierungen in beiläufigen Angaben enthält.

2) Für die dichterische Gestaltung (Stilisierung) der handelnden Personen gilt folgendes Hauptgesetz: Handelnde Personen sind im homerischen Epos ausschließlich Angehörige des Kriegeradels einer Polis. Ihr Betätigungsfeld ist allein Krieg und Kampf. In ihm wird die höchste Lebenserfüllung gesucht, die in der unablässigen Bewährung der ausgezeichnet von diesem Adel besessenen menschlichen Fähigkeit (seiner ἀρετή) besteht. Die Angehörigen des homerischen Kriegeradels

kennzeichnet es weiter, daß sie einem in der Vorzeit lebenden vollkommeneren Menschengeschlecht zugehörten, den "Heroen." Damit sind bei ihnen die am gegenwärtig lebenden Kriegeradligen schon übergewöhnlichen Tüchtigkeiten bis zum Äußersten des dem Menschen Möglichen gesteigert. Dies ist mit "Idealisierung" nicht getroffen; gemeint ist nur eine Erhöhung des dem Menschen Möglichen im ganzen, sei es gut oder böse. Mit Sicherheit gehörte die ursprünglich vom Dichter angezielte Hörerschaft der homerischen Gesänge einem zeitgenössischen Kriegeradel an, der sich in den "Heroen" gespiegelt sah, und zwar in einem Vergrößerungsspiegel, der das, was die Hörer selbst waren, stärker konturiert zeigte. Um diesen Wirklichkeitsbezug gegenwärtig zu halten, ist hier vermieden, von "Helden" zu reden, wobei eine Menschenmögliches überschreitende mythische Ferne mitgedacht sein könnte.

Im festgehaltenen Blick auf diese beiden grundlegenden Formgesetze ist nun die Eröffnung der "Odyssee" bis zur zweiten Athenerede (1. 1-96) auszulegen. Die drei genannten Geltungsbereiche dieser Gesetze sind jedoch nur dem Begriff nach gesondert, im Dichtungstext selber sind sie immer miteinander wirksam. Es sei auch in dieser Auslegung versucht, sie in ihrem Zusammenwirken aufzunehmen, wie sicher auch der Urhörer tat. Ferner ist immer zu bedenken, daß die Formgesetze nur idealtypische Eingrenzungsmaßstäbe sind, innerhalb deren eine dem jeweiligen Anwendungsfall angemessene freie Ausfüllung geradezu mitgefordert ist. In ihr erst liegt die eigentliche Leistung dichterischer Gestaltungskraft, die als solche aufzunehmen das Ziel des Interpreten (wie des Urhörers) ist. Die Formgesetze sind dazu nur Wegweiser, freilich notwendige, ohne die das mit dem Gedichteten eigentlich Gemeinte nicht sicher erreicht würde.

## II

In den ersten Versen der "Odyssee," d.h. dem Prooimion, nahm der erste Hörer sofort das Miteinander von Bindung an ein vorgegebenes Gattungsschema und Freiheit seiner besonderen Ausführung wahr. Auch dem heutigen Leser fällt zunächst der sprachlich übereinstimmende und zugleich varierende Aufbau im Verhältnis zum Iliasprooimion ins Ohr: "den Groll singe, Göttin, des Peliden Achilleus, den unheilvollen, der den Achaern zehntausend Schmerzen brachte und viele usw.": "den Mann teile mir mit (?), Muse, den vielge-(?), der sehr viel in die Irre fuhr, . . . und der viele Städte . . . und viele Schmerzen auf dem Meer usw."

Gewöhnlich wird hier ein enger Anschluß an die "Ilias" gesehen, auf die sich der Dichter zurückbeziehe und auch den Hörer verweise. Es gibt tatsächlich Stellen in der "Odyssee," da ein solcher Rückbezug sicher ist. Aber hier ist eine Übereinstimmung und auch wieder eine freie Ausführung so weitgehend, daß auf ein gemeinsames Schema geschlossen werden muß, eben das Formgesetz der Gattung.

Zunächst der knappe Anruf an die Muse: "singē" und ἔννεπε. Dieses Odysseewort ist mit "nenne," wie oft übersetzt wird, ganz unzutreffend wiedergegeben. Es ist unglaublich, daß die Göttin des Gesanges gebeten würde, den "Mann," also die Hauptperson, nur zu "nennen," zumal sie, wie der Hörer erstaunt feststellen wird, dies viele Verse hindurch gerade nicht tut. ἔννεπεῖν ist ein dem Hörer des Epos sehr bekanntes altertümliches poetisches Wort für "in allen Einzelheiten berichten." Damit wird der eigenartige Darstellungsstil des Epos gekennzeichnet, der auch Formgesetz ist: "erzählen mit Detailgenauigkeit," wofür öfter das jüngere, sprachlich durchsichtige Synonym καταλέγειν = "aufzählen" steht, also gerade das Gegenteil von "nennen." Die Muse soll dem Sänger also Gelingen geben, wenn er Geschehen der heldischen Vorzeit, offenbar um dessen Erzählwürdigkeit willen, in allen seinen Einzelheiten vorführen wird. Dies eben ist es, was die Hörer "bezaubert," so wie einmal später Eumaios an den Erzählungen seines noch unbekannten Gastfreundes rühmen wird, daß er ihn mit der Fülle des Berichteten "wie ein (epischer) Sänger bezaubert habe" (17. 517). Also eine höchst sinnreiche Variante zum "singē, Göttin" der "Ilias."

Näher zugehört sind im Odysseeproimion der Abwandlungen noch mehr und bedeutendere. Zunächst ist es eine außerordentliche Kühnheit, von "berichte ausführlich" unmittelbar ein persönliches Objekt abhängen zu lassen statt des gewöhnlichen sachlichen der "Ilias" beim entsprechenden "singē." "Den Mann berichte" ist offenbar ein verkürzter Ausdruck, der die Handlung, die zu dem "Mann" gehört (nach dem Schema), gerade nur impliziert und unbestimmt sein läßt, so daß der Mann als er selbst eine Auszeichnung erhält. Dann ist weiter erstaunlich, daß als Subjekt der Handlung des Epos nur ein namenloser "Mann" erscheint, anders als der sofort genannte "Pelide Achilleus," und daß wir auch so bald seinen Namen nicht erfahren. Dies ist umso unerhörter, als der Hörer als Hauptperson des Epos keine andere Person erwarten kann als einen dem Kriegeradel der Vorzeit angehörenden Mann. Hier wird der schon angeführte epische Expositionsstil zunächst unbestimmter und erst im Fortschritt präziserer Angaben (und gerade bedeutender Angaben) stark in Wirkung gesetzt, und der Hörer weiß, daß dieser Name bald doch auftauchen wird.

Dieser Hörer versteht auch, daß der Sänger mit Fleiß den Namen seines "Helden" noch nicht nennt. Statt seines Namens erhält der "Mann" (also der "Held") sogleich Kennzeichnungen, die ihn als Angehörigen des Kriegeradels von höchsten Graden erkennen lassen. Auch hier folgt die "Odyssee" äußerlich dem Proimionsschema, wie die "Ilias" dies auf schlichte Weise ebenso tut, erst in Form eines Attributwortes, dann eines ganzen Attributsatzes: "den Groll, . . . den unheilvollen, der usw." Dort geschieht aber Kennzeichnung der *Handlung*, hier der *Hauptperson*, des "Mannes," und dort nur explizierend, hier aber eingrenzend (determinativ) = "*denjenigen* Mann, der . . .". Die zu erzählende Handlung kommt damit noch gar nicht in Sicht.

Weiter: Das kennzeichnende Attributwort πολύτροπος wird seiner Bildung nach vom Hörer sofort erkannt als "stehendes" ("festes") Epitheton, dessen Verwendung bei Homer eines der bekanntesten Formgesetze ist. Weniger bekannt ist (war es aber dem zeitgenössischen Hörer sicherlich), daß diese fest mit einem Heroennamen verbundenen Beiwörter einen "Adelstitel" bedeuten, den die Helden untereinander bei förmlicher Anrede als geradezu geschuldetes Ehrenzeichen verwenden. Mit πολυ- zusammengesetzte Epitheta bedeuten, wie sich versteht, daß irgendeine adlige Tüchtigkeit "viel" ("reich") von ihrem Träger besessen wird. Das zweite Glied steht also immer für eine solche Adelstüchtigkeit (ἀρετή), und zwar gibt es Epitheta, die allgemeine adlige Tüchtigkeit rühmen, wie z.B. "ruhmreich" (πολύαινος), und solche, die einen Helden über seine schon hohe Gesamtἀρετή hinaus wegen einer Tüchtigkeit rühmen, die ihm als besondere überragend zueigen ist, wie etwa der "fußschnelle Achilleus" oder der "weithin herrschende Agamemnon" usw. Der Hörer ist aber äußerst überrascht, den "Mann" des Odysseeproimions, d.h. den Kriegshelden, gerade mit dem Titel πολύτροπος ausgezeichnet zu sehen. Ein solches Epitheton ist im Kanon der stehenden Epitheta des Epos unbekannt (es erscheint nur noch einmal später in der Odyssee in offenbarem Anklang an unser Proimion, 10. 330). Auch das zweite Glied des Epitheton, τρόπος, ist als alleinstehendes Wort der epischen Sprache fremd. Es bedeutet die "Wendung" und ist später ganz üblich für die seelische "Einstellung" eines Menschen, seinen "Charakter," seine "Seelenhaltung." In der Tat ist die Fähigkeit, viele "Einstellungen" zu haben, d.h. sich auf jeweils neue Lagen "einstellen" zu können, also "vielwendig" zu sein, wie in der "Odyssee" genau zu übersetzen ist, gerade entgegengesetzt der vom epischen Kriegshelden geforderten Standfestigkeit (die sich sogar im Metron abbildet), mit der er sich im Kampf durchzusetzen hat. Doch setzt diese offenkundige und damit bedeutungsvolle Neubildung des Dichters für das Sprachbewußtsein des Hörers sicher an dem geläufigen Epitheton πολύμητις an (= "reich an μῆτις, praktischer Klugheit," einer kanonischen Tüchtigkeit des epischen Kriegeradels), und diesem Adelstitel steht weiter der ebenfalls gebräuchliche des πολυμήχανος "an Auswegen reich" nahe. Beide Epitheta sind in der "Ilias" fast nur mit dem Helden Odysseus verbunden. Der dem Kriegeradel zugehörige Mann, den das Odysseeproimion statt seines Namens mit diesem neuen Adelstitel ehrenvoll kennzeichnet, wird sich also in der neuen Tüchtigkeit eines "Vielwendigen" (nicht "Vielgewandten," wie oft übersetzt wird) bewähren und damit die adlige μῆτις um eine neue, ungewohnte Abwandlung, die Polytropie, erweitern.

Er wird weiter, wie wir sahen, dem Schema entsprechend noch durch ein Attribut in Satzform gekennzeichnet: "der . . . verschlagen wurde." Hierbei ist das Neutrum Pluralis μάλα πολλά als innerer Akkusativ zu verstehen, also genau: "der sehr viele Verschlagungen erlebte," d.h. der viele Irrfahrtenstationen durchlief. Nun erkennt man an diesem "viele" sofort das feste Proimienelement wieder, mit dem in der Regel die knapp angegebene



Handlung ausgezeichnet wird (der Groll Achills brachte den Achaïern "zehntausend Schmerzen"), also wird, wie es dem Schema gemäß scheint, nun auch die dem "Mann" der "Odyssee" zugehörige Handlung genannt, sein vielfaches Verschlagenwerden. Aber dies dient doch zugleich immer noch seiner rühmenden Kennzeichnung als Person, und es bleibt offen, ob eine solche Handlung wenigstens im ganzen auch erzählt werden soll.

Sein Verschlagenwerden wird nun aber weiter zeitlich bestimmt: "nachdem er das heilige Ilion (erobert und) zerstört hatte." Damit kennzeichnet zunächst den "Mann" ein Schicksal, und zwar ein für einen Mann des Kriegeradels absurdes und deswegen besonders schweres. Einen Helden, dem ein überragender Sieg zuteil wurde, traf es hier, statt wie üblich triumphal mit reicher Kriegsbeute als Siegeszeichen in die Heimat zurückzukehren, vielmehr in die Fremde verschlagen zu werden und dort lange, wohl jahrelang, umherzuirren. Das bedeutet einen tiefen Sturz in das Elend und die alltägliche Lebensbedrohung, also in die Entehrung, den Verlust der eben erst glänzend bewährten ἀρετή des zum Kriegeradel Gehörigen. Nun dient diese Kennzeichnung unseres "Mannes" eben auch seinem Preis als Mann seines Standes, d.h. soviel wie: Er wurde eben als solcher durch dieses unerhörte Schicksal herausgefordert zu neuer Bewährung seiner ἀρετή und bestand sie (denn irgendwie kehrte er am Ende in die Heimat zurück). Der Krieg ging für ihn also weiter, freilich in der besonders schweren Form, daß er verschlagen wurde auch aus dem gewohnten Betätigungsfeld des adligen Kriegers in ein fremdes unbekanntes Milieu, in dem jedenfalls die sonst für den Kriegeradel unangetasteten Wertsetzungen ungültig wurden und er seine ἀρετή gleichwohl auch jetzt wieder zu bewähren hatte. Es versteht sich nun, daß er nur überleben und seine bisher in seinem Milieu bewährte ἀρετή nur behaupten konnte, wenn sie die neue Form annahm, sich erfinderisch auf neue, unbekannte Lagen einzustellen, um sich so im ganzen bewähren zu können. D.h., er mußte auch πολύτροπος werden und sich immer wieder als ein solcher bewähren. Damit wird offenbar die Grundidee der Odysseehandlung sichtbar und auch verdeutlicht, daß das Epos "Odyssee" der Gattung völlig treu bleibt, indem es immer noch die große Bewährung eines überragenden Kriegers zeigen und verherrlichen wird, freilich in einer neuen Abwandlung seines Betätigungsraumes, der ja immer Krieg und Kampf ist, in der Weise, daß dieser sich um die außeradlige Welt erweitert, in der sich der adlige Krieger mit seinen angestammten Tüchtigkeiten und dem Zuwachs der Polytropie ebenso zu bewähren hat. Jetzt wird auch voll verständlich, weshalb der "Mann," d.h. der Kriegeradlige als Held der Irrfahrten, von dem die Muse erzählen soll, nicht mit seinem Namen erschien. Denn in der fremden außeradligen Welt gilt dieser Name nichts mehr, der in der vertrauten Gemeinschaft der Standesgenossen, die ja Freund und Feind gemeinsam umfaßt, zum Kostbarsten der Person gehört, da an ihm der Ruhm der ausgewiesenen kriegerischen ἀρετή hängt, mit der die ganze Adelstüchtigkeit erst vollständig wird. Der Held der "Odyssee" ist also

zurückgeworfen auf seine Polytropie, einem letzten unverlierbaren Teil seiner ἀρετή, mit dem ihm aufgegeben ist, sie im ganzen wiederzugewinnen.

Das Irrfahrtschicksal wird gekennzeichnet durch eine *Vielheit* der Erlebnisse, summarisch: *vielen* Irrfahrtenstationen, dann antithetisch unterteilt: Zu Lande erlebte er *vielen* (unbekannte) Menschen, zur See erlitt er *vielen* Schmerzen. Dieses "vielen . . . vielen" ist dem Schema gemäß Stichwort für die Angabe der Handlung des Epos und zeigt an, worin diese erzählwürdig ist. Hier aber geht es nicht um diese selbst, sondern insofern der Held all dieses erlebte. Damit bleibt es offen, was aus dem Kreis dieser vielen Abenteuer wirklich erzählt werden soll. Aber davon muß irgendwie berichtet werden, wenn von dem "Mann" berichtet werden soll, der durch diese Erlebnisse gekennzeichnet ist. Wir erfahren also zunächst im Prooimion nur etwas über den Handlungs*sumkreis* desjenigen, von dem dann wirklich erzählt wird. Genauer über den eigentlichen Gegenstand der "Odyssee" muß freilich noch erwartet werden.

Aber diese "vielen" Erlebnisse des "Mannes" sind nicht, wie die vielen Handlungsbegebenheiten des Schemas, durchweg leidvolle. Wir hören, daß der Held Wohnstätten (freilich nicht vertraute πόλεις) und Sinnesart unbekannter Menschen kennenlernte. Solche das Wissen vom Menschen erweiternde Erfahrung ist ein Gewinn und soweit erfreulich. Freilich müssen damit die einzelnen Begegnungen nicht durchweg leidlos oder gar erfreulich gewesen sein. Unverkennbar wird durch sie die neue Tüchtigkeit des πολύτροπος gefordert, wie sie zugleich Zuwachs erfährt. Es ging in jedem neuen Fall um die Frage, die später in der "Odyssee" in Erinnerung an die Irrfahrten mehrfach formelhaft wiederkehren wird: "sind hier (in diesem unbekannten Land, an das es uns verschlägt) Übeltäter und Wilde und nicht Gerechte oder Gastfreundliche, und ist deren Sinnesart (νόος wie 1. 3) gottesfürchtig?" Wie zur See, wo es neben dem Kampf gegen böse Naturgewalten immer auch den gegen "Wilde" geben konnte, so war fallweise auch auf dem Land bei der Berührung mit unbekannten Menschen das eigene Leben und damit zugleich die Kriegerehre zu behaupten. Im fremden Milieu taucht also immer auch die Grundsituation des adligen Kriegers auf, die ihm aus dem Lebensbereich der Kämpfe mit seinesgleichen vertraut war, nur sind die Umstände immer wieder neu und unbekannt und fordern die Polytropie heraus. In diesen Angaben erhalten wir, dem Expositionsstil des Epos gemäß, beiläufig die weitere Präzisierung, daß der "Mann" seit seiner Abfahrt von Troja wenigstens zunächst von "Gefährten" begleitet wurde, unter denen der Hörer sofort das Kriegerkontingent verstand, mit dem der Held als Herrscher und Befehlshaber nach Troja gezogen war. Der Hörer hat auch die ungefähre Vorstellung einer Flotte von etwa zwölf Schiffen mit also etwa sechshundert Kriegern, wie er später tatsächlich erfahren wird (9. 159). Wenigstens also dieses Bestandteil des altgewohnten Kriegerlebens war dem "Mann," als er verschlagen wurde, erhalten geblieben. Er hatte freilich auch die Fürsorgepflicht des



Kriegsherren für seine Leute zu erfüllen und außer seinem auch das Leben all dieser zu behaupten, wie er umgekehrt auch deren Hilfe zur Verfügung hatte. Freilich hören wir, daß sich diese Gefährten selbst Leben und Rückkehr verscherzten durch Freveltaten gegen den Sonnengott. Diese genauere Einzelheit ist nicht ein Verstoß gegen den Stil der nur knappen Angaben des Prooimions—sie sind noch immer sehr knapp und verlangen angesichts ihrer Bedeutung eine spätere Präzisierung—, sondern auch sie kennzeichnen noch immer den "Mann" selbst durch seine Schicksale, indem sie seine Lage als Irrfahrer noch wesentlich verschärften. Seine Anstrengungen, die hergebrachte ἀρετή auch in der neuen unbekannten Welt zu behaupten, scheiterten empfindlich, indem er einen wesentlichen Teil dieser ἀρετή verlor, nämlich die Herrschaft über Untergebene, und dazu war seine Tüchtigkeit, sie zu führen, widerlegt. Er zwar konnte, wie impliziert wird, sein Leben bis zur Rückkehr in die Heimat retten, aber für den Rest seines Irrfahrtschicksals mußte er sich, d.h. seine ἀρετή, aus tiefster Erniedrigung wiedergewinnen, ohne "Gefährten," Schiffe, und auch der in Troja erkämpften Kriegsbeute verlustig gegangen.

Die das Prooimion abschließende wiederholte Bitte an die Muse, die zum Anfang zurückführt, erstrebt nun endlich die Präzisierung der immer noch offen gebliebenen zu erzählenden Handlung. Die Muse selbst soll für das, was sie dem Sänger für seinen Vortrag eingibt, aus dem gesamten Umkreis der Geschichten um den Trojasieger, der zugleich Irrfahrer war, den Anfang auswählen. Das leitet zur "weiterführenden Exposition" über, mit der der Sänger selbst seinen Vortrag beginnt.

Mit dem zeitlich zu verstehenden "da" setzt die Erzählung genau an jenem Tiefpunkt ein, mit dem das Prooimion "schloß." Die Muse hat nun so entschieden, daß die eigentlich erzählte Handlung der "Odyssee" der letzte Abschnitt der Irrfahrten bis zur Heimkehr sein soll. Damit werden die nach dem Prooimion vorher durchlaufenen Irrfahrtstationen, die allermeisten also, zur bloßen Vorgeschichte, die die Ausgangslage der eigentlichen Handlung erklärt. Dies ist nun freilich eine Vorgeschichte, die das Gesamtschicksal des "Mannes" und damit ihn selbst zu grundlegend bestimmt, als daß auf sie nicht irgendwann und irgendwie zurückgekommen werden müßte, was damit der Hörer zu erwarten hat. Jetzt also finden wir den irrfahrenden Kriegerhelden, wie wir sahen, am tiefsten Punkt seiner Erniedrigung, ja, wie wir nun genauer hören, auch an einem toten Punkt. Eine göttliche Nymphe hält ihn zurück, ihn zum Gatten begehrend, also mit den freundlichen, aber umso mächtigeren Waffen der Verlockung, und zwar der Aussicht auf höhere Ehren als er je im gewohnten Milieu des Kriegeradels erreichen konnte. Doch das ist gerade seine Seelenqual, dies leidenschaftlich nicht zu wünschen, sondern nichts als Heimkehr und Gattin. Aber dem nun aller menschlichen Hilfe Beraubten und zumal diesen Mächten gegenüber Wehrlosen fehlt jede Aussicht, das, was ihm allein noch an ἀρετή geblieben ist, dafür einzusetzen, daß er jene geringeren, aber allein ersehnten menschlichen Ehren und Güter zurückgewinnt. Hilfe kann nur noch von

göttlichen Mächten kommen, und zwar so hochgestellten, daß sie den Willen der Nymphe brechen könnten. In der Tat wurden wunderbarerweise, wie wir hören, solche Mächte für ihn tätig. Nach Jahren leidvollen Wartens "spannen" ihm "die Götter" "zu" (d.h. lenkten das ihn betreffende Geschehen so), daß er nach Hause zurückkehrte. Der Hörer verstand sofort, was es mit einem solchen göttlichen Eingreifen im Epos auf sich hat. Wir Moderne, die wir diese Dichtung nicht einmal hören, sondern nur noch lesen können, müssen uns zuvor umständlich selber darüber belehren.

Auch hier waltet ein "Formgesetz" der Gattung, das die Stilisierung der vom Dichter nachgestalteten Wirklichkeit betrifft. Das oben umschriebene Gesetz, daß die handelnden Personen ausschließlich in ihren Kräften gesteigerte Angehörige des Kriegeradels sein müssen, die einer größeren Vorzeit angehörten, bedarf noch einer wesentlichen Ergänzung. Zum homerischen "Helden" gehört unverbrüchlich, daß er die Gunst der "Götter" besitzt, genauer: der auf dem Olymp residierenden Götter, einer bevorzugten Gruppe unter den göttlichen Mächten im ganzen. Ihr Amt ist im Epos ausschließlich, dem Helden bei der Bewährung seiner ἀρετή zu helfen. Helden und (olympische) Götter sind also nichts ohne einander. Diese höchsten Götter sind selbst hervorragende Krieger, jedoch in ihren Kräften noch einmal gesteigerte, nun über menschliches Maß hinaus bis zu kosmischem Umfang gesteigerte. Sie leben in einer Art Großfamilie, die von Zeus kraft seiner alles überragenden Körperstärke regiert wird. Er herrscht freilich als primus inter pares und wünscht in der Regel die Übereinstimmung mit der ganzen Gruppe, immer um Ausgleich zwischen den Interessen der einzelnen Götter bemüht, die jeweils ihren eigenen Machtbereich im gesamten Weltregiment haben. Die bevorzugte Gunst dieser Götter für die heroischen Kriegeradligen beruht auf deren überragender menschlicher ἀρετή, die sie den Göttern nahe bringt und die so weit geschätzt werden kann, daß es zu Liebesverbindungen zwischen Helden und Göttern kommt, aus denen zwar immer nur sterbliche Helden hervorgehen können, die aber doch das göttlich-heroische Zuneigungs- und Gunstverhältnis weiter steigern. Diese Götter wirken bei den Helden immer nur helfend und lenkend, greifen also nur ein, wo auch beim Helden das menschlich Verfügbare aufhört, also wo nach menschlichem Alltagsverständnis "Zufall" zu walten scheint, also besonders beim letzten Gelingen menschlichen Tuns, mag auch der Täter in seinem Bereich Meister sein, auch beim förderlichen Zusammentreffen von Menschen oder dem Entstehen hilfreicher Gedanken in der Seele (dem "Einfall"). Diese Götterhilfe läßt also dem äußersten Einsatz eigener menschlicher Kräfte allen Raum, ja fordert ihn, so daß die Leistung am Ende voll dem Menschen zugehört. Der homerische Held ist also einer solchen Hilfe, wo er sie nötig hat, sicher, es sei denn, er habe, auch ungewollt, einen Frevel gegen eine Gottheit begangen. Dieser wird mit dem Entzug der Götterhilfe vergolten, der in schweren Fällen bis zum tödlichen Scheitern gehen kann.

Eines Tages, freilich erst nach Jahren, gewährten also die Götter auch dem in die Fremde verschlagenen Trojaeroberer ihre Hilfe, daß er aus der Haft bei Kalypso frei kam und endlich zu seinem Haus auf Ithaka zurückkehren konnte. Der "Mann" erhält erste persönliche Konturen, indem wir seine Heimat mit Namen erfahren, wieder nur nebenbei. Der Satz, der uns die nun glücklich eröffnete letzte Wegstrecke der langen Stationenreihe unseres Helden meldet, bricht jedoch in sich selbst fast zum Erschrecken des Hörers um. Die Heimkehr nach Ithaka und zum Haus erscheint wieder nur beiläufig in einem zeitlichen Nebensatz und nur als Beschluß der Götter, der Hauptsatz läßt *dieses* Ziel schon erreicht sein und teilt mit, daß damit das eigentliche Ziel, die Rückkehr in das Haus des Helden, nicht nur noch nicht erreicht wurde, sondern daß er auch dort den "Wettkämpfen" noch nicht entronnen war, nicht einmal der "unter die Seinen" Zurückgekehrte. Diese ungeheuerliche Wendung wird freilich in rätselhafter Unbestimmtheit mitgeteilt, und der Hörer erwartet dringend bald genauere Aufklärung. Die "Wettkämpfe" können nur von der Art derjenigen sein, die er auf seinen Irrfahrten zu bestehen hatte und bis jetzt glücklich bestand, also um Tod und Leben gehende kriegerische Auseinandersetzungen. Unserem "Mann" war also zu guter Letzt noch das widersinnige Schicksal auferlegt, im eigenen Haus das Ausgeworfensein aus der Welt des Kriegeradels erleiden und Herausforderungen ähnlich denen einer unbekannten Fremde mit der Tüchtigkeit des "gewöhnlichen" adligen Kriegers bestehen zu müssen. Das wird, so knapp es sich hier auch erst andeutet, sogar das Hauptstück der in der "Odyssee" zu erzählenden Handlung sein, und der Held wird, zum zweiten Mal nach der Befreiung von Kalypso, göttlichen Beistandes bedürfen. Das ausdrücklich erwähnte Mitleid der Götter mit dem Irrfahrer, das nun zur Tat wird, schließt eine solche Hilfe erwartungsgemäß ein.

Zunächst freilich erfahren wir, daß aus dem nun Mitleid tätigen Kreis der Olympier sich einer ausschloß, der unserem "Mann" "mit Eifer" grollte—wir hören nicht, warum und müssen bald darüber Genaueres erwarten—, nämlich Poseidon. Er war es offenbar auch, der die längst von den übrigen Olympiern gewünschte Hilfe für den Irrfahrer hinauszögerte. Bei Erwähnung dieses Grolles von höchster Seite fällt beim Erzähler—wiederum beiläufig, doch auch wieder hörbar herausgehoben durch Versenjambement—endlich auch der Name dieses "Mannes": Odysseus, jetzt freilich am rechten Ort. Denn die von den Göttern den Angehörigen des homerischen Kriegeradels gewöhnlich gewährte Gunst, ebenso wie deren immer mögliche Verkehrung zum Göttergroll, kann nicht Namenlosen gelten. Ja Odysseus erhält hier sogar vom Erzähler auch seinen Adelstitel: "der göttergleiche," nicht ohne daß dabei der Widersinn mitklingt, daß ein solcher Göttergleicher von einem Gott einen ihn schädigenden Groll erleiden muß. Dem Hörer ist es immerhin tröstlich, auch zu erfahren, daß dieser Groll nur dauern wird, bis der Held sein Land erreicht hat, also sich beschränkt auf Poseidons Herrschaftsbereich, das Meer.



## III

Die erste Szene der "Odyssee" (1. 21–95), mit der die sich nun voll entfaltende Erzählung beginnt, kann hier bis auf die für unsere Ausgangsfrage entscheidende Programmrede der Athene (81–95) nicht genauer durchgegangen werden. Sie führt die Götterversammlung vor, in der es zu dem schon mitgeteilten Beschluß der Olympier kommt, die Heimkehr des Odysseus mit seiner Freigabe durch Kalypso ins Werk zu setzen. Sehr bald tritt Athene als diejenige hervor, die mit Leidenschaft und Energie die Initiative für ihren besonderen Schützling Odysseus ergreift. Zeus erklärt sich dafür (und die übrigen versammelten Olympier stimmen stillschweigend zu), daß die Götter die Heimkehr des Odysseus planen und in Bewegung setzen sollen, gegen den Willen des zur Zeit abwesenden Poseidon, dessen Groll auf Odysseus nun genauer begründet wird durch den Frevel, den dieser auf den Irrfahrten begangen hatte, indem er den Polyphem, einen Sohn des Poseidon, auf seinem einen Auge blindete. Aber es ist vorbestimmt, daß der Gott nicht bis zur Vernichtung des Schuldigen grollen wird, und dem Mehrheitswillen der Olympier wird er sich beugen.

Athene kann mit dem Einverständnis des Zeus und der übrigen versammelten Olympier rechnen, wenn sie die Durchführung dieser Götterhilfe übernimmt, und sie wird von jetzt ab in der Odysseehandlung unablässig als göttliche Helferin wirken, sie, deren ureigener Amtsbereich es ist, den adligen Kriegern des Epos bei der Bewährung ihrer Heldentüchtigkeit (ἀρετή) Gelingen zu geben. Sie entwickelt sofort ein Aktionsprogramm. Demgemäß soll an zwei weit voneinander entfernten Punkten angesetzt werden, bei Kalypso, wo Odysseus festgehalten wird, und auf Ithaka, im Haus des abwesenden Helden. Schon in der Exposition wurde, wie wir sahen, zu verstehen gegeben, daß dem Irrfahrer noch zwei Abschnitte seiner Heimkehr bevorstehen, die Fahrt von Kalypso bis Ithaka und der Entscheidungskampf "auch noch unter den Seinen." Für beides würde es also der Götterhilfe bedürfen. Dem entsprechen die beiden unterschiedenen und aufeinander bezogenen Punkte in Athenes Programm.

Beim ersten Punkt verweilt die Göttin nur kurz: Kalypso soll durch Hermes der "unfehlbare" Ratschluß (der Olympier) überbracht werden. Er ist einem Befehl gleich, gegen den von der dem Rang nach weit unterlegenen Göttin kein Widerstand zu erwarten ist. Das einzelne bleibt hier offen, etwa wann Hermes fortgeschickt wird, wie Odysseus die Seefahrt möglich gemacht wird, wie er sicher bis nach Ithaka gelangt. Das soll offenbar später präzisiert werden, und in der Tat wird zu Beginn des fünften Buches dieser Teil des Programms mit genaueren Angaben in Angriff genommen.

Der zweite Programmpunkt ist für Athene offenbar der weitaus schwierigere: die letzten entscheidenden Kämpfe des Heimgekehrten im eigenen Haus. Deshalb will Athene die Götterhilfe hier selbst übernehmen, und sie wird sofort nach ihrer Rede ans Werk gehen. Was hier zu tun ist, gibt sie zwar noch immer sehr knapp an, aber der erste rätselhaft vage

Hinweis in der Exposition: "Entscheidungskampf auch noch unter den Seinen" wird hier doch wesentlich genauer ausgeführt. Die Lage im Haus des Odysseus wird wiederum, dem Expositionsstil entsprechend, beiläufig in einer Handlungsanweisung mitgeteilt, die diese Lage schon verändern soll.

Der zeitgenössische Hörer deutete diese ihm gegebenen Stichworte müheelos. Wenn er von "Freiern" hört, die sich im Haus des abwesenden Odysseus festgesetzt haben und sich aus dem Viehbesitz des Hausherrn selbst bewirten, so wird ihm folgender Sachverhalt deutlich: Die "Freier," eine größere Zahl von Bewerbern, betrachten die Gattin des abwesenden Hausherrn, den sie für verschollen halten, als Witwe und bewerben sich förmlich um ihre Hand. Die Lage ist jedoch insofern labil, als die Frau bereit ist, sich wiederzuverheiraten, wie es offenbar dem Brauch entsprach (die Vielzahl der Bewerber bedeutete überdies eine hohe Ehrung), aber noch unschlüssig ist, da es von dem Tod ihres Gatten keine sichere Kunde gibt. Die Freier machen für sich nun offenbar Gebrauch von der Sitte, daß ein Bewerber um eine heiratsfähige Frau als Gastfreund des Hauses galt, in dem sie lebte, und also zusammen mit anderen Bewerbern bewirtet wurde, bis die Entscheidung für einen von ihnen fiel. Nun gab es für den Fall der Penelope keinen κύριος, d.h. obligatorischen männlichen Rechtsvertreter, der sie einem Bewerber rechtsgültig zu "geben" hatte (die griechische Frau besaß selbst keine rechtsgültige Geschäftsfähigkeit, konnte also nicht "sich" verheiraten). Der einzige Sohn hatte zu Beginn der Freite das Erwachsenenalter noch nicht ganz erreicht. Der Vater der Frau konnte diese Rolle, die bei einer Verheiratung die übliche war, solange nicht übernehmen, als die Frau nicht in sein Haus zurückging und sich damit unter seine Verfügungsmacht begab. Da aber in der Regel der Wille der Frau, zumal einer Witwe, respektiert worden sein dürfte, lag die erste, obwohl rechtlich noch unwirksame, Entscheidung bei Penelope, und die Freier konnten sich als Gastfreunde ihres Hauses betrachten, die also auf tägliche Bewirtung Anspruch hatten. Sie wird anfangs geduldet gewesen, dann aber zu einer Art Gewohnheitsrecht geworden sein.

Als erstes dringt Athene mit ihren angekündigten Weisungen an Telemach auf Beendigung des labilen Zustandes im Hause des Odysseus, indem sie ihm vorschreiben will, daß er, der inzwischen in das anerkannte Alter des erwachsenen Mannes eingetreten ist, seine Hausherrnenrechte wahrnehmen soll, indem er den Freiern förmlich sein Haus und damit den Verzehr seines οἶκος-Besitzes (91) verbietet. Dies soll öffentlich in einer Volksversammlung geschehen, um dem Akt des Hausverbotes, dem niemand mit Grund widersprechen kann, volle Geltung zu geben. Nun ist zu erwarten, daß die Freier dem sich nicht fügen werden, indem sie sich auf ihr Recht als Bewerber der Mutter berufen, das dauere, solange die Mutter die Entscheidung hinausschiebt (eine Lage, die freilich durch den erklärten Willen des nun mündig, Hausherr und κύριος der Mutter gewordenen Sohnes aufgehoben ist). Mit ihrer Weigerung aber werden die Freier zu Personen, die das Besitztum eines Adligen widerrechtlich aufzehren. Nach geltender

Rechtsauffassung ist damit der *casus belli* gegeben. Unrechtmäßige Aneignung von Land- oder Viehbesitz gilt als schwere Schädigung und damit Ehrverletzung eines adligen Hauses, die nur mit Waffengewalt vergolten werden kann.<sup>4</sup>

Ist aber diese Entscheidung durch das förmliche Hausverbot des Telemach an die Freier gefallen, wird es notwendig, daß er klärt, ob der Vater noch zurückerwartet werden kann oder ob er mit Sicherheit tot ist. Eben das bezweckt Athene mit ihrer zweiten beabsichtigten Anordnung, der Reise des Telemach nach Pylos und Sparta zu den dort ansässigen Kriegsgefährten des Vaters, die die authentischsten Zeugen für die Geschehnisse nach der Eroberung Trojas sind. Von dem Ergebnis dieser Erkundungsreise hängt also ab, ob der unausweichliche Entscheidungskampf mit den Freiern von dem zurückgekehrten Hausherrn selbst oder vom Sohn allein als seinem Erben ausgefochten werden muß. Im ersten Fall ist die Hilfe des Sohnes bei diesem Kampf unentbehrlich, als Warner, über die Lage Aufklärender und Planer; ferner, da es bei der zahlenmäßigen Übermacht der Feinde der Kriegslist bedürfen wird, also eines Trugspiels vor den Freiern im Haus, wird der Sohn auch als Mitspieler in einem solchen gebraucht werden müssen, und am Ende und nicht zum wenigsten muß er Kampfgenosse des Vaters sein. In beiden Fällen gibt es für den Sohn des Odysseus kein Zurück mehr davon, daß er so oder so mit der Waffe gegen die Freier antreten muß. Damit wird eine bedeutende Bewährung kriegerischer ἀρετή von ihm gefordert werden, für die jedoch am Ende bei dieser entschiedenen Hilfe der Kriegsgöttin Athene ein großer Sieg zu erwarten ist. In diesem Sinne kann Athene durch *diese* Reise für Telemach einen "edlen Ruhm" begründet sehen, also im ungeminderten Wortsinn der Wertsetzungen des Kriegeradels, den Ruhm einer großen Waffentat.

Schon wie Athene den Zweck ihres Ganges nach Ithaka bezeichnet, macht erkennbar, daß sie damit als Kampfhelferin gegen die Freier tätig werden will. Sie will "ihm" (d.h. dem Odysseus zuliebe) den Sohn noch mehr "anfeuern" und ihm μένος in sein Gemüt legen (88 ff.). Sie redet damit in Begriffen, die, wie der Hörer weiß, ihren festen Ort in epischen Kampfdarstellungen haben: ὀτρύνειν meint dort regelmäßig das "Anfeuern" der Kampfbegierde, und μένος steht für "Kampfleidenschaft," das Besessensein von einem Kampfdrang, der gesteigerte seelische und körperliche Kraft gibt (so meist vor Aristien wie z.B. Il. 5. 1 ff., dort auch das Verleihen von μένος durch Athene, um den Kämpfer "edlen Ruhm" gewinnen zu lassen). Zu beachten ist, daß Athene eine solche Kampfbegierde bei Telemach schon voraussetzt und sie nur noch steigern will (dies die Weise, wie homerische Götter helfen). Es hieße, diese Art zu reden um ihren Sinn bringen, wollte man darin nur den "Mut" sehen, dessen es bedarf, um gegen das Unrecht der Freier öffentlich zu protestieren oder zum ersten Mal eine Schiffsreise selbständig zu unternehmen.

<sup>4</sup> Vgl. Il. 1. 154 ff., 11. 671 ff., Od. 17. 470 ff.



Auch Athenes Aufbruch vom Olymp nach Ithaka wird nach epischen Formgesetzen unmißverständlich als schon beginnendes Wirken der Kriegsgöttin gekennzeichnet, wenn sie den im Detail beschriebenen Götterspeer mitnimmt, "mit dem die Reihen der heroischen Männer überwältigt, denen die vom gewaltigen Vater Stammende zürnt." Das ist eine aus Kampfschilderungen der "Ilias" geläufige, sicher gemeinepische "Dingsymbolik," die im Hause des Odysseus auf Ithaka noch weiter wirkt, wenn Telemach ihr diesen Götterspeer als vermeintlich dem neu gekommenen Gastfreund gehörige Waffe abnimmt und ihn in den Speerständer stellt, "wo auch andere Speere des duldemütigen Odysseus standen, viele" (Schadewaldt). Dieser Speer wird von Athene bei ihrem Weggang, der ein wunderbares Verschwinden ist, das Telemach die Göttin ahnen läßt, zurückgelassen. Die Dingsymbolik besagt hier, daß göttliche Wehrkraft und Kampfleidenschaft ( $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma$ ) in das Haus des Odysseus eingezogen sind und bald gegen die Feinde des Hauses tätig werden.

#### IV

Die Kriegsgöttin läßt nun zunächst durch ihren höchsteigenen Besuch bei Telemach programmgemäß ihre göttliche Gunst, die sie gleichermaßen dem Sohn wie dem Vater zuwendet, wirksam werden. Nachdem sie in der Gestalt eines väterlichen Gastfreundes das Treiben der Freier wahrgenommen und Näheres darüber erfahren hat, ruft sie den Odysseussohn in einer längeren Mahn- und Beratungsrede (einer "Paraenese") dazu auf, die Freier aus dem Haus zu vertreiben (1. 269 ff.). Sie gibt ihm dazu Anweisungen, die sie in derselben Reihenfolge wie in ihrer Programmrede wiederholt, nur freilich jetzt genauer ausgeführt (das Stilprinzip der "fortschreitenden Präzisierung" setzt sich also über den Gedichteingang hinaus fort). Damit bietet diese Rede geradezu einen Kommentar zu den ersten noch knappen Angaben ihres Programms. Er bestätigt aufs beste die von uns oben erschlossenen Implikationen, die der zeitgenössische Hörer mitdachte. Dies sei hier noch kurz angedeutet.

Zuerst sollte den Freiern, die unaufhörlich den Viehbestand des Hauses aufzehren, dies vor dem versammelten Volk von Ithaka verboten werden. Das wird Telemach so mitgeteilt: Er solle morgen die Ithakesier zur Versammlung laden und vor ihnen eine Rede halten, bei der er die Götter zu Zeugen anrufen solle. Darin solle er anordnen, daß die Freier sich auf ihre jeweils eigenen Häuser zerstreuen sollen. Dazu soll die Mutter, wenn sie geneigt ist, eine Ehe einzugehen, wieder in das Haus des Vaters zurückgehen, wo man ihr die Hochzeit ausrichten und die angemessene Mitgift zueignen werde. Das alles ist zusammenzunehmen und bedeutet: An die Stelle der bisherigen nicht rechtsgültigen Werbung soll die ordnungsgemäße treten (dies wird von Telemach in seiner Rede vor dem Volk ausdrücklich aufgenommen und erklärt, 2. 50 ff.; selbst der Führer der

Freier Antinoos gibt diese Auslegung der Rechtslage später vor dem Plenum der Freier zu, 16. 390 ff.).

Nun wird aber aus Athenes genaueren Anweisungen zu diesem Punkt offensichtlicher als in ihrer Programmrede (war aber auch dort bereits zu erschließen), daß die Freier auf dieses Gebot des nun als Hausherr redenden Telemach nicht eingehen werden. Wenn die Mutter (wie bisher) keine Neigung hat, sich zu verehelichen, wird sie nicht zum Vater zurückkehren. Dann wäre es mit dem Wohlleben der Freier auf Kosten des Odysseushauses zu Ende. Dadurch wird nun noch deutlicher—und erst unter der Voraussetzung der sicheren Weigerung der Freier—, daß Telemach als weiteren Schritt die Reise zur Aufklärung über den Verbleib des Vaters unternehmen muß (die, hätten die Freier das Hausverbot befolgt, sich erübrigt hätte).

Damit sind wir also beim zweiten Punkt von Athenes Programm. Zunächst werden jetzt die zu befragenden Personen in Pylos und Sparta genannt und Menelaos als der besonders für die Auskunft Geeignete gekennzeichnet, weil er der (vor Odysseus) letzte Heimkehrer ist. Nun werden genauer die Folgen der bei diesen Befragungen gewonnenen Ergebnisse vorgeführt und zwar alternativ, je nachdem sich der Vater als tot oder noch lebend herausstellt. Jeweils geht es um das, was Telemach dann zu tun haben würde. Ist der Vater noch als lebend gemeldet, soll Telemach noch ein Jahr warten und die Qual des Freiertreibens aushalten. Hiermit muß gemeint sein, daß in dieser Frist der Vater zurück erwartet werden kann. Dafür kann Telemach mindestens als Zeichen nehmen, daß "Mentes" 1. 194 ff. gehört haben will, Odysseus sei schon zurückgekehrt und werde wohl nur unterwegs aufgehalten, aber bei seiner Findigkeit werde er Mittel und Wege zur Heimkehr wissen. Dieser Fall ist nur knapp erwähnt, eben weil er, wie der Hörer schon weiß, der zutreffende ist. Für Telemach bedeutet dies, daß er sich dann darauf einrichten muß, Odysseus bei seiner Heimkehr gegen die von den Freiern drohenden Gefahren hilfreich zu sein. Der andere Fall (nach dem Wissen des Hörers der unwirkliche) wird länger ausgeführt. Hört Telemach, der Vater sei tot, soll er als der nun vollgültige Erbe und damit auch Hausherr handeln, d.h. dem Vater die schuldigen Totenehren erweisen und die Mutter "einem Manne geben" (d.h. in seiner Rolle als κύριος der Mutter), natürlich einem Gatten, den sie selbst wünscht, und sicherlich nicht einem der Freier, wie das folgende beweist. Denn die Freier würden weiter im Haus einsitzen und mit ihrer unrechtmäßigen Werbung fortfahren, die nun längst als Vorwand für ihr räuberisches Verzehren des Hausgutes des Odysseus entlarvt ist. Dann aber ist für Telemach der Augenblick gekommen, da er diese "Freier," sei es mit List, sei es offen, töten muß.

Dieses letzte begründet der Gastfreund damit, daß Telemach nunmehr das Alter erreicht habe, da er nicht mehr nur "Kindereien betreiben" dürfe, sondern—so ist zu ergänzen—sich durch eine große Waffentat, wie sie einem erwachsenen Angehörigen des Kriegeradels ziemt, Ruhm unter den Menschen erwerbe. Darin solle er sich Orest zum Vorbild nehmen, der

Aigisth, den Mörder seines großen Vaters Agamemnon, tötete, und damit Ruhm unter allen Menschen gewann. Denn Telemach sei an seinem großen und ansehnlichen Wuchs anzusehen, daß er so kampftüchtig sei, daß auch noch Spätgeborene lobend von ihm reden werden. Offensichtlich hat damit Athene den dritten und letzten Punkt ihres Programms wiederaufgenommen, den "edlen Ruhm," den Telemach mit seiner Reise gewinnen soll, und auch dieser wird nun genauer kommentiert. Er wird zwar ausdrücklich nur auf den Fall bezogen, daß der Vater tot ist und Telemach selbst an den Freiern die am Hausgut des Odysseus begangene Beraubung und Entehrung durch ihren Tod rächen wird, dazu natürlich auch, wie das Orestbeispiel zeigt, die Nebenbuhlerschaft um die Mutter durch die unrechtmäßige Werbung. Es ist jedoch offenbar für den "edlen Ruhm" auch der minder weitgehende Fall einzubeziehen, der, wie wir sahen nur kurz behandelt wurde, aber dem Hörer als der zutreffende bekannt ist, daß nämlich Odysseus lebt und heimkehrend den Rachekampf gegen die Freier selbst übernehmen wird. Auch dann wird Telemach, nun gemeinsam mit dem Vater als sein Waffengefährte, immer noch als eine Art zweiter Orest durch eine erste große Kampfbewährung "Ruhm unter allen Menschen" gewinnen. Das aber bedeutet, daß Telemach mit seiner Erkundungsreise sich für diese große Kampfleistung entschieden hat, ja schon den Weg zu diesem Ziel eingeschlagen hat. Bei Nestor und Menelaos wird dies seine Sache sein, die er zu vertreten hat, zunächst nur in der Erkundung, damit aber auch als Vorbereitung für die Tat selbst, geschehe sie nun so oder so. Orest gibt das große Vorbild, das ihn ausdrücklich auch bei seiner Reise leitet. Ähnlich wie Athene-Mentes stellt ihm auch Nestor dieses Vorbild vor Augen und hält, indem ihn der Erzähler zwei Verse aus Athenes früheren Mahnung wörtlich wiederholen läßt, nach seiner äußeren den adligen Krieger verratenden Erscheinung den Odysseussohn einer solchen Orestrolle für fähig (3. 199 f. = 1. 300 f.).

Das Fazit von all diesem ist: Die Reise des Telemach ist notwendiger Teil des Rachekampfes gegen die Freier, der Odysseus nach seiner Heimkehr von den Irrfahrten im eigenen Haus noch auferlegt ist, indem der Sohn die Freier zwingt, sich offen als Feinde des Hausherrn zu entlarven, und sich durch die Reise auf die Rolle als zunächst Helfer, später ebenbürtiger Kampfgefährte des Vaters vorbereitet und am Ende gemeinsam mit ihm als Krieger von adliger Art bewährt.

*Frankfurt a.M.*



## The Case of the Bald-Headed Lamplighter

R. D. DAWE

οὐκ ἄθεεῖ ὅδ' ἀνὴρ Ὀδυσσῆϊον ἐς δόμον ἵκει·  
ἔμπης μοι δοκέει δαΐδων σέλαις ἔμμεναι αὐτοῦ  
κάκ κεφαλῆς, ἐπεὶ οὐ οἱ ἔνι τρίχες οὐδ' ἡβαιαί.

(Homer, *Od.* 18. 353–55)

The most singular feature of the case of the bald-headed lamplighter was that he was not bald-headed at all. The evidence of 18. 355 with its joke about light reflected on the bald head had to be discarded at an early stage, for it robs the witticism of its point.<sup>1</sup> Monro made the same criticism in a curiously phrased note: "The joke about Ulysses as a self-luminous body is now improved upon by the remark that the light must come from himself, since he has no hair which could help to produce it." Hair does not produce light, but Monro correctly saw that the original jibe was not about Odysseus's baldness but an allusion to the incongruous sight afforded by a withered beggar as he discharges a role filled by "golden youths" in the palace of Alcinoos (7. 100) or by girls in Ithaca, fair-cheeked ones among them. The only other references to Odysseus's alleged baldness come at 13. 399 and 431, passages which describe his hair before he lost it as "fair," thus conflicting with 16. 176, which describes it as being of a deep hue. Whether 6. 230–31 (= 23. 157–58) imply previous baldness is a matter for sterile debate: the lines say simply that Athene, born of Zeus, made him bigger and more solid to look at, and from his head she caused curly hair to grow like the hyacinth flower. So far as 18. 355 is concerned it remains only to add that light reflected from a bald head does not travel downwards, and that an expression like "down from his head" is no more possible in Greek than in English when coupled with a verb like "be." In a word, v. 355 should not be here at all.

But the question whether Odysseus is actually bald is of no importance compared with the much bigger question, how and why did he ever put himself into a position whereby a jibe like that of 353–54 or 355 became possible? Chapter 18 of the *Odyssey* is, I suppose, the most *aufschlussreich* of all the Chapters in the whole poem, yet this episode of

<sup>1</sup> It "nimmt dem Witze seinen Stachel," as Ameis-Hentze put it.



Odysseus undertaking the menial role of providing light to the suitors is one which has received relatively little critical attention, perhaps because it has been forced to the sidelines by other problems, such as why Penelope flaunts herself before the suitors and why Odysseus rejoices as she solicits gifts from them.

Let us set the scene. We have just come to the end of Penelope's Appearance before the Suitors, the scene instantly and forever associated in the minds of all of us with Kayser's memorable criticism "*ad artes prope meretricias descendit*." The suitors have, with lightning speed, had brought to them presents which apparently were only awaiting collection. These they pass on to Penelope, who offers no comment on them; nor do the suitors say so much as, "Here you are then; I hope you like the colour." Instead the Queen retires to her bedroom, and it is at this point that the peculiar episode with which we are concerned supervenes. We are told that in the hall "they"—and there is nothing yet to indicate that "they" are anything but the suitors—set three braziers for the purpose of giving light, ὄφρα φαείνοιεν (308). Well-dried logs were piled around, καὶ δαΐδας μετέμισγον, which I take to mean, though opinions differ, they (surely now the maids must be meant, although the change of subject is not made until the next sentence) dipped portable torches into the main braziers and ferried them about to act as the ancient equivalent of standard or table lamps: a tiring exercise, the poet would have us believe, to be done ἀμοιβηδῆς, by people taking turns. Odysseus's offer to take the whole of this exhausting work off their hands is phrased as follows:

αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ τούτοισι φάος πάντεσσι παρέξω.  
εἴ περ γάρ κ' ἐθέλωσιν εὐθρονον ἦω μίμνειν,  
οὐ τί με νικήσουσι· πολυτλήμων δὲ μάλ' εἰμί.

(18. 317-19)

His words meet with a curious response. The maids exchange looks and giggle (320). Melanthe, the sauciest of them all, tells Odysseus that he is out of his mind (327). He ought, she suggests, to go and get some sleep at the smithy or club, instead of talking so much where he is. He must be drunk, or else just plain odd, to be talking such nonsense. Possibly his recent victory over Iros has gone to his head. He should be careful that some one stronger than Iros may not stand up to him and drive him out of the house.

Now these are very strange remarks to come from a serving girl, brought up, we learn here with some incredulity, by Penelope. One might expect her to jump at any chance of abandoning the tedious chore of tending fires. Odysseus's offer had not been couched in any long or rambling way, and we wonder why Melanthe criticises it for having characteristics which it has in fact not got. The violence of her response is, even for this high-spirited young woman, uncalled for. So too is the violence of Odysseus's reply to her. He calls her a bitch, and threatens to report her to Telemachos,

with a view to having him tear her limb from limb on the spot. The Telemachos he describes is clearly a different person from the Telemachos we are accustomed to think of, whose footing in the palace is precarious, and who may be murdered at any moment. We have not, up to now, been accustomed to think of him as a kindred spirit of King Echetos, mutilator of all men (85). But now the mere mention of his name is enough to send the mistress of Eurymachos, if you believe in v. 325,<sup>2</sup> flying in terror along with all the others out of the room (not but what they seep back in again at 19. 60). Odysseus is now left as the sole provider of light. Eurymachos makes the joke with which we began, and having made it "at the same time" (356) turns to Odysseus whom the poet now with deliberate care, for he has not read *L'Épithète traditionnelle*, describes as the sacker of cities. He issues a challenge to him, suggesting that he is work-shy. In 362-64 he states as a matter of ascertained fact that since Odysseus has learnt ἔργα κκάά, he will not be willing to go about real work, but prefer to slink among the people until he has the wherewithal to feed his insatiable stomach.

This response is, in its own way, as strange as Melantho's. To accuse a man of being of an idle disposition when he has just volunteered to take upon himself the work of relays of maidservants, if necessary all through the night, is to expose oneself to an instant and devastating rebuttal. Odysseus however meets the charge not by appealing to the evidence of the offer he has just made but by considering three possible contests between himself and Eurymachos, two from the life of a peasant, and one from the life of a noble warrior. Eurymachos is made so angry by this response that he throws a stool at Odysseus, an act plainly modelled on the similar throw by Antinoos in Chapter 17.<sup>3</sup>

We have seen enough to conclude that the theme of Odysseus providing light is one that the poet hardly knows how to integrate; yet he feels unable to dispense with it. We come back to our original question. Why did

<sup>2</sup> V. 324 is normally taken to mean, "She had no pity for Penelope in her heart." But the word in question never elsewhere means "pity," only "sorrow" or "grief." If the line were preserved by itself we would probably translate it, "Not even so did she check the sorrow Penelope felt in her heart." If we look at the passage again with that interpretation in mind, we may wonder if the sense originally intended was, "Although Penelope spent a lot of time playing with the child, she was not enough to make her forget her sorrow." If that view is right, v. 325 must be condemned as an addition based on a misunderstanding. It may be said that the ejection of v. 325, a belated attempt on our part to rescue a small fragment of Melantho's moral reputation, founders on the rock of 17. 257, the line which describes Melantheus as Eurymachos's particular friend. But it was long ago noted that although Melantheus and Melantho were under the same roof they seem to have no cognisance of each other and are never called brother and sister (I. Bekker, *Homerische Blätter* [Bonn 1863-72] I 110).

<sup>3</sup> Disputed of course by those who see *Steigerungen* everywhere. Much good sense in H. Reynen, "Schmähere und Schemelwurf im ρ und σ der Odyssee," *Hermes* 85 (1957) 128-46.

Odysseus ever make the offer in the first place? "It is not stated why he does it; but it only requires a bit of thought to see that the beggar wants to make himself useful so that he can remain in the house." So Wilamowitz, in his first Homer book.<sup>4</sup> Many years later he developed his explanation more fully. "Odysseus now has the task of securing his objective of remaining in the hall so that he can talk to Penelope later on. And so he volunteers to undertake the brazier duty by himself; he would do it well. He says it however in the form of a command, at which the maids may reasonably be surprised."<sup>5</sup> Neither Wilamowitz's first thoughts nor his second are entirely satisfactory. Making himself useful so that he can stay in the house may indeed have been part of Odysseus's motives in other versions of the story. But in the poem as we now have it the beggar's place in the palace has already been guaranteed by his victory over Iros (18. 46–49); while the threat to have him removed from the palace, guarantee or no guarantee, comes *after* Odysseus's offer to see to the lights. Wilamowitz's second thoughts, that the beggar wishes to stay behind in order to facilitate his meeting with Penelope, again does rather more than justice to the text in the form that we have it. Penelope has retired to her room, and Odysseus has sent the maids to her while he sits in the hall surrounded by suitors who may be there until dawn. The circumstances for a tête-à-tête with Penelope could hardly be less propitious.

A modern Unitarian, Eisenberger,<sup>6</sup> looks at things from an entirely different standpoint. He sees Odysseus's offer, which he describes as "excellently motivated" by 346 ff., as a means of liberating the maids so that they can go to Penelope to cheer her up. But what he describes as "the attractive trait of caring for his wife"<sup>7</sup> is something that most of us would put alongside Telemachos's brusque instruction to his mother to go to her room (1. 356–58 and 21. 350–53): the equivalent of "go somewhere else and leave me alone." Closest to the truth, I believe, come two scholars from the past, one the Analyst Seeck, whose belief that Odysseus was a solar myth does less damage to his work than one might think; the other the Unitarian Rothe, also not totally devoid of credibility notwithstanding his comparisons of Homer on one and the same page of his book to Jesus Christ and Bismarck. These two fearlessly independent thinkers held that the only reason for getting rid of the maids was to facilitate the removal of

<sup>4</sup> *Homerische Untersuchungen* (Berlin 1884) 35: "es ist nicht ausgesprochen, weshalb er das tut, aber es bedarf nur einiger Überlegung, um zu verstehen, dass der Bettler sich nützlich machen will, damit er im Hause bleiben kann." Slightly misquoted by Hennings in his commentary (p. 493).

<sup>5</sup> "Odysseus hat nun die Aufgabe, es zu erreichen, dass er in dem Saale bleiben kann, um nachher Penelope zu sprechen. Daher erbietet er sich, den Dienst an den Feuerstellen allein zu besorgen; das würde er schon leisten. Er sagt es aber in der Form eines Befehles, über den sich die Magde füglich wundern dürfen" (*Die Heimkehr des Odysseus* [Berlin 1927] 31).

<sup>6</sup> *Studien zur Odyssee* (Wiesbaden 1973) 250.

<sup>7</sup> "der schöne Zug der Sorge für die Gattin."

the armour (so Rothe) or at any rate to clear the decks for the death of the suitors (Seeck).<sup>8</sup>

Before we can assess the merits of this explanation, which as stated is still wide and unfocused, we must back-track. This apparently isolated theme of Odysseus as a provider of heat and light may reasonably be taken as a sequel to a passage occurring in Chapter 15. "I may go to the divine Odysseus's palace and tell my news to the wise Penelope, and mingle with the arrogant suitors to see if they will give me dinner, and with all the countless good things they have got. For I tell you this—and you mark my words and listen to me: by the grace of Hermes the messenger, who grants charm and glory to the works of all men, no other mortal can compete with me in hard work—heaping up a good fire and splitting dried logs, carving, cooking, and wine-pouring—the kind of thing that lesser men stand by to perform for the nobility" (313–24). It is line 322 that particularly attracts our attention. True it does not refer to light as much as to the provision of heat, but we are clearly in the same area of domestic service, a lowly one, as Iros doubtless knew when he insulted Odysseus as "like an old oven woman" at 18. 27. There are two points to make about this passage in Chapter 15 by comparison with 18. The first is that the emphasis on hard physical labour seems more justified. It is a more strenuous business to cut up logs of wood than it is to stand around holding a lamp. The second point is that the passage shows all the signs of forcible insertion. The deadly formula ἐκ γάρ τοι ἐρέω, σὺ δὲ σύνθεο καί μευ ἄκουσον, and the appeal to Hermes, who sheds grace and glory on men's works, even apparently a woodcutter's, is too portentous when the sequence of thought should be simply: "I will make myself useful; I am a hard worker." When one notices the asyndeton of the line before (317) one wonders whether the insertion may not have begun one line earlier. What does seem clear however is that we are not far away here from the bald-headed lamplighter, that theme which lives on without ever being perfectly integrated into its surroundings.

Having looked backward to Chapter 15 we may now look forward to Chapter 19. In the highly problematic scene of the removal of the armour Eurykleia puts a question which it would not have occurred to most of us to raise: "Who will come along and bring a light? You have not let the maids come forward, who would have lit your way" (19. 24–25). She receives the answer: "This stranger here will; I will not tolerate any one idle" (26–27). The provision of light is again linked, in a way we may find rather peculiar, with hard work. The armour is duly removed.

<sup>8</sup> "Die Magde, welche die Flammen unterhalten, weist Odysseus weg, um für den Freiemord reines Feld zu gewinnen . . .," O. Seeck, *Die Quellen der Odyssee* (Berlin 1887) 210. "Ihre Entfernung ist ausserdem notwendig, da sie bei dem Wegschaffen der Waffen nicht zugegen sein sollen," K. Rothe, *Die Odyssee als Dichtung* (Paderborn 1914) 141.



ἐσφόρεον κόρυθ' αὖτε καὶ ἀσπίδας ὀμφαλοέσσας  
 ἔγχεά τ' ὀξυόεντα· πάροιθε δὲ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη  
 χρύσειον λύχον ἔχουσα φάος περικαλλὲς ἐποίει. 35  
 δὴ τότε Τηλέμαχος προσεφώνεεν ὃν πατέρ' αἶψα·  
 "ὦ πάτερ, ἦ μέγα θαῦμα τόδ' ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ὀρώμαι·  
 ἔμπης μοι τοῖχοι μεγάρων καλάι τε μεσόδμαι  
 εἰλάτιναί τε δοκοὶ καὶ κίονες ὑπὸς' ἔχοντες  
 φαίνοντ' ὀφθαλμοῖς' ὥς εἰ πυρὸς αἶθομένοιο.  
 ἦ μάλα τις θεὸς ἔνδον, οἷ οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἔχουσι." 40  
 τὸν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη πολύμητις Ὀδυσσεύς·  
 "σίγα καὶ κατὰ σὸν νόον ἴσχανε μηδ' ἐρέεινε·  
 αὕτη τοι δίκη ἐστὶ θεῶν, οἷ Ὀλυμπον ἔχουσιν.  
 ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν κατάλεξαι, ἐγὼ δ' ὑπολείψομαι αὐτοῦ,  
 ὄφρα κ' ἔτι δμωιάς καὶ μητέρα σὴν ἐρεθίζω." 45  
 (19. 32-45)

Kirchhoff, in the course of defending this whole section and warning us of the dangers of assuming interpolation on subjective—I would prefer to say on poetic—grounds, none the less set out the case for the prosecution with a clarity that should be enough to convince us of the accused's guilt. It was not a particularly brilliant stroke, he thought, to have Athene, even if she did have a golden lantern, discharge the function of a maid (the old Alexandrian criticism), at a time when her protégés were in no immediate pressing danger; and in spite of Telemachos's answer to Eurykleia's question it appears that father and son begin their work *without* light, and then, quite unexpectedly, find their work illuminated from some mysterious source. Helpful, no doubt, but not essential; Odysseus could have stood by with the light while his son moved the armour. Like Bethe,<sup>9</sup> I believe that Athene has often been imported into scenes in the Odyssey which were originally conceived in purely human terms. That certainly seems to be the case here. But the interpolation has itself been subject to interpolation. The Athene who stands before us, providing her somewhat theatrical and quite superfluous piece of diffused lighting, did so with a luminescence which arose from her own person. A lantern would not have given off the kind of all-round lighting which Telemachos describes, and Odysseus's answer to his son, "This is the way of the gods who live on Olympus," makes sense only as testimony to the aura that surrounds them; he cannot possibly mean that the Olympians are well known for traipsing around carrying lamps. But some more literal-minded poet has insisted on equipping Athene with a lamp, and in doing so has spoilt the whole point of his predecessor's

<sup>9</sup> E. Bethe, *Homer. Dichtung und Sage II: Odyssee* (Leipzig and Berlin 1914) 336 on the use of Athene for "nichtigsten Dienstleistungen." Even Eurykleia's original jibe at Odysseus's baldness was the result of prompting by Athene so that even more pain might enter the heart of Laertes's son Odysseus (18. 347-48).



invention, just as the point about the luminosity of Odysseus was spoilt by the person who insisted on giving him a bald head.<sup>10</sup>

So out goes this lamp, the bane of many an archaeologist's life;<sup>11</sup> and out too, for the sterner breed of critic, goes Athene. But we have still to ask, why does Eurykleia raise the question of light in the first place? When we read a novel in which one of the scenes is set in the evening, we do not expect a great issue to be made out of who turned on the electric light. If the question is raised at all, it must be for a special reason. Some poet has evidently been anxious to continue with and strengthen his theme of Odysseus as a provider of light. Rival poets or successors have not wished to abandon this theme, but they have not fully understood it, and they have not been able to work it into their own poems without leaving rough edges at the joins. So here Odysseus and his son carry away the armour while Athene sheds light, *and then*— $\delta\eta\ \tau\acute{o}\tau\epsilon$  (19. 35) the words used often denote "then, at that late stage," which is hard to reconcile with another word in the same line, "swiftly"—Telemachos is made to remark on the supernatural light which seems to suffuse the whole building. Odysseus's reply to his son's question is, "Be quiet: keep it to yourself; that is the way with Olympians; cut along to bed, while I remain here for the purpose of irritating the servants and your mother still further." The language is abrupt, the transition inept, the psychology implausible; and it is not easy to see how servants are going to be further irritated when they are not even there. As well as all this we have the problem of timing. If Telemachos is going to comment on the strange light, he must surely do so at its first manifestation, when they begin to remove the armour. But Odysseus's words, "you go off to bed now," imply that the removal of the armour has been completed. This sudden jump from beginning to end, with no middle, is a further proof that Athene has no proper place in this episode. We would very much like to know too where the multiple blazing torches of v. 48 came from as Telemachos strode through the hall. Certainly from the hand of some one who did not know, ignored, or wished to obliterate Odysseus's monopoly in that field. Again, the provision of light, and now also heat, is seen to by the maids at vv. 63–64 without any attempt to make it clear that this was the resumption of a normal duty recently interrupted by the hero. The maids' release is not explained, and they have no comment to offer on their recent incarceration. Their appearance now belongs, we must infer, to a different way of telling the story.

<sup>10</sup> If only we could take Chapter 20 seriously which, as von der Mühl says, "gehört zum Minderwertigsten im Homer," we would add that the appearance of Athene "from heaven" (31) would be unlikely if she had just been in the palace: unless she likes duplicating her journeys like the eagle later in 19 which goes away for the sole purpose of coming back (540, 544).

<sup>11</sup> H. L. Lorimer, *Homer and the Monuments* (London 1950) 509–10.

Which raises another question. Why did those maids have to be shut up in their rooms? If an excuse was ready to meet any question from the suitors, that excuse would also serve to counter objections that might be put by the maids. Keeping them in the women's quarters makes sense only if recognition by Penelope and the killing of the suitors, or at any rate one of those two things, was meant to follow in short order. Even Homer's most ardent Unitarian apologist, Combellack, has to confess, "I suspect that no amount of ingenuity can make the shutting out of the maids plausible for the characters."<sup>12</sup> But if we do assume that the *dénouement* was to follow swiftly, removal of the maids makes good sense, and we would direct our suspicions not at the way they are taken from our sight, but at the way they are restored to it. They clear things away, which could well have waited until morning; in fact Chapter 20 does have them at work the following morning (149–54); and they provide light at the very time when most people would be thinking of dowsing the lights; and then what? Then nothing. We are never told that they went away, and yet one is reluctant to believe that the intimate conversation which is to take place between Penelope and the beggar is conducted under the gaze of many pairs of curious eyes. Bathwater may be spilt and basins clang; aged retainers may be throttled; but no word of comment issues from the lips of any white-armed serving women. As we shall learn at the very end of Chapter 19, Penelope does have her own personal attendants with her (601), presumably two in number as regularly elsewhere. But we surely do not believe in droves of young women being present throughout. Yet Homer, often punctilious on informing us of comings and goings, is on this vital occasion silent, leaving it to Wilamowitz and Franz Stürmer to tell us that of course they did actually depart at a fairly early stage. If so, they depart again, without having come back in the meantime, at 20. 6.

Pausing only for a moment to notice the highly specialised nature of the threat voiced by Melanthe at v. 69, that Odysseus may be driven out of the house *struck by a piece of burning wood*, a line which would not have been amiss in her earlier speech of 18. 327–36, let us just look at one other little problem, which the recent Italian commentary<sup>13</sup> is baffled by. The editor at this point, Russo, on reaching v. 183 writes: "It is probable that Homer chose this name (i.e. Aithon) with some precise idea in his mind, but is not clear what that could have been." He goes on to talk about the colour of lions, horses, oxen, eagles, tripods, basins, and iron, before concluding that here it just means generally "brilliant." But if a special meaning is to be sought, we might fancifully speculate it is because *aithon*

<sup>12</sup> CSCA 6 (1974) 16.

<sup>13</sup> Omero, *Odissea* (Milan 1981–86) V 235 f.

fits precisely with what Odysseus has insisted on doing. It is a sort of tongue-in-cheek joke. My name is Mr. Burns.<sup>14</sup>

Let us push speculation even further. The answer Telemachos is to return to the suitors if they ask where all the arms have gone is, "I have put them away from the smoke; they no longer look like the ones which Odysseus once left behind when he went to Troy, but have suffered harm, in so far as the breath of the fire has got to them" (19. 7–9). Any reasonably intelligent suitor would smell a rat at once, unless something had happened to make such an explanation colourable; and it would be colourable if there had just recently been an accident involving fire and smoke. Who better to engineer such an accident than the man who had the provision of fire under his sole control? To those who would soberly protest that this idea is wildly far-fetched, I would plead only that as such it does not stand alone in Homeric criticism. The scholar in whose honour this volume is published was no stranger himself to bold hypotheses on the *Odyssey*.<sup>15</sup>

Chapter 19 is a peculiar repository of disparate themes. One can strip it down until there is nothing left. The Removal of the Armour does not take place either as foreseen earlier or as events will show later. We must dispense with Melantho, long recognised as being, together with her brother of the indeterminate spelling, Melanthios/Melantheus, a late intrusion. In her four-line speech (66–69) she commits three linguistic solecisms.<sup>16</sup> The web story is repeated from elsewhere, and poses such chronological difficulties that many assume it has no rightful place anywhere in our poem.<sup>17</sup> The fictitious Cretan story should not have been told, since it is at variance with the story already communicated to Penelope by Eumaios. We must remove either the footbath, or Penelope's presence at the time, since her failure to notice all the excitement is explained with the utmost barefaced ineptitude by saying Athene diverted her mind. We deduct from the rapidly diminishing total of lines another one hundred and fifty for the scar and Autolykos story, not merely because Aristotle expressly denied the story was in the poem, but also because a point of grammar shows us exactly where it has been slotted in. The self-explanatory eagle is rightly said by von der Mühl to belong to the most tasteless offerings to be found anywhere in Greek literature. Nobody has the faintest idea what put into the Queen's mind the inscrutable burst of didacticism on the subject of dreams

<sup>14</sup> The name is known from real life, and seems to reach back to Mycenaean times: see K. J. McKay, *Mnemosyne* 12 (1959) 199. I forbear to mention that the name Ithaka was linked etymologically to αἶθω by L. von Schröder in *Kuhns Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung* 29 (1887–88) 199 f.; and Ὀλυττεύς with the root *lux* by Wüst in *RE* s.v. "Odysseus" 1907.

<sup>15</sup> I am thinking of his confident identification of three separate authors in the spurious end of the poem: *Poetry and Poetics from Ancient Greece to the Renaissance: Studies in Honor of James Hutton*, Cornell Studies in Classical Philology 38 (Ithaca 1975) 13–28.

<sup>16</sup> G. P. Shipp, *Studies in the Language of Homer*<sup>2</sup> (Cambridge 1972) 346.

<sup>17</sup> W. Kullmann, *Wiener Studien* 15 (1981) 35–38.

coming through gates of which horns (not horn) and ivory form part, and the timing of the bow contest is quite wrong. It is unmotivated, and inconsistent with the way it is introduced as an entirely fresh idea at the start of Chapter 21.

Such, in the barest outline, is the minefield of Chapter 19 through which the Analyst *incedit super ignes suppositos*, conducting controlled explosions as he goes, while the Unitarian prudently remains on the sidelines, hoping he will blow himself up. Does the bald-headed lamplighter help us to thread our way any more safely? Not if we pretend we can reconstruct some pure original story passing down through generations, of which our present text is a late debasement. Much damage has been done to the study of Homer by treating the poems as if they were transmitted in a vertical plane of time, being modified as they go, but essentially uniform if only you could arrest their descent at any given moment. Often we would do better to renounce words like earlier and later, and think more in terms of synchronous, competing versions. It is, at this late stage, usually impossible to disentangle whole versions from each other. But the separateness of component elements can often still be distinguished, and so can differences in quality. The lamplighter theme is in all probability not an *ancient* element of the *Odyssey*, since it seems linked with the recent import Melanthe, into whose province he intrudes (and perhaps even with her male counterpart Melantheus; for it is he, none other, whom the suitors order to light a fire at 21. 176). Our task is made the more difficult in that some poets have not known what to do with the lamplighter, and have sought to reduce his importance, by having first Athene, and then the maids, provide light themselves. But what might the lamplighter-poet have been after himself? At one point he seems to tell us in so many words: Odysseus used his newly acquired position to observe the suitors (18. 344).<sup>18</sup>

αὐτὰρ ὁ πὰρ λαμπτήρσι φαείνων αἰθομένοισιν  
 ἐστήκειν ἐς πάντας ὁρώμενος· ἄλλα δέ οἱ κῆρ  
 ὥρμαινε φρεσὶν ἧισιν, ἃ ῥ' οὐκ ἀτέλεστα γέγοντο.

(18. 343–45)

But at best this cannot be more than a minor motive, for Odysseus has had other opportunities already for becoming acquainted with the suitors' behaviour.

So we are left only with the two choices with which we began, the Removal of the Armour and the Interview with Penelope. We do not have

<sup>18</sup> This is not absolutely certain: πάντας could mean "all the braziers," and ὁρώμενος ("looking at") could mean "looking after," as ὁρώωσα does at 19. 514: "Looking at, i.e. seeing to, my work and that of my attendants." Similarly λεῦσσε at 23. 124. This gives us a more obvious contrast, no longer between providing light and thinking other thoughts, but between being ostensibly busy and having a mind running on quite different matters.



to accept in full the validity of the Armour scene as it stands, its appearance in this very place in Chapter 19, together with all the details that conflict with what is said in Chapters 16 and 22. But the link with *a* Removal of the Armour scene seems a good one. If you are going to fight one hundred and eight suitors in a confined space, you have to do all you can to even the odds first. The armour on the wall has got to go, and that can only be done in secret. The beggar has got to have a reason for being on the premises until late—even until dawn if necessary (18. 318). The provision of light is to be that reason, and the link of light with the actual removal is still visible in Telemachos's reply to Eurykleia, and in a twisted way is testified to by the unexpected overlay of Athene in her brief role as The Lady with the Lamp.

The connection with the Penelope interview is less obvious. Opinions about whether that interview should or should not lead up to recognition, itself the precursor to the bow contest and the revenge, are very sharply divided, and the language can become quite acrimonious. "Of course it was meant to lead to recognition," said Bethe, before proceeding to a Wilamowitzian, "Those who do not concede that are not people with whom one can discuss questions of style and poetry."<sup>19</sup> What seems plain is that no first-class minstrel would ever have arranged matters as we now have them, either within the interview itself, or with its positioning inside the poem as a whole. We have already touched on Penelope's failure to notice the spilt water and the clanging basin, and nothing could be more tasteless than that Odysseus should wish to re-establish contact with the wife he left behind twenty years ago by using a housekeeper as intermediary. The whole pack of cards collapses if we pull one out. We could begin with Melantho and her three mistakes in four lines. The content of those four lines matches their language in the problems they pose. The girl has inexplicably recovered all the confidence she lost at 18. 340, and accuses Odysseus of spying on women—a wholly implausible charge since he and his son have both exerted themselves to get the women out of the way. But if Melantho is eliminated, we lose most of our motive for having Odysseus ask for some older woman if his feet are to be washed. But in any case the most obviously available woman to do that washing was not Eurykleia but Eurynome.<sup>20</sup> With no Eurykleia, we have no scar. With no scar we have no recognition. In short, we run into the sand. We observe too that what Penelope had proposed was a bath. There was nothing to say that that bath would not be of the whole person. And she had proposed it now, with another bath to follow the next morning. Such an excess of cleanliness is suspicious, and when Odysseus replies he refers only to the first of the two

<sup>19</sup> "Wer es nicht zugibt, mit dem kann man über Stilfragen und über Poesie nicht rechten" (90).

<sup>20</sup> As A. Köhnken points out in his article in *A&A* 22 (1976) 101–14. It is Eurynome who bathes Odysseus at 23. 154.



washings. Suspicious too is the moralistic tone of the rest of Penelope's speech, a long section which Odysseus also ignores, a highly tactless thing to do if Penelope really had been drawing attention to herself as, in her own words, an intelligent woman and a generous host. As for the timing of this interview, we notice the curious mess—what more sympathetic spirits call a *Verzögerungstaktik*—at the end of Chapter 17. At 508 Penelope asks Eumaios to summon the beggar to interview. Eumaios's reply tails off into praise of him as an authoritative raconteur. At 529 she repeats her command, this time tailing off herself into a routine denunciation of the suitors. Then thirdly at 544 we have an inconsequential run of Telemachos's sneezing, the suitors' likely death, and the "another thing" which Penelope will tell Eumaios and which he is to take to heart, namely clothing the beggar if he tells the truth; all being left side by side, rather than reduced to order. Some one is clearly intent on seeing to it that the expected onward impetus of the story is held up, or perhaps one should say that no potentially Odyssean piece of poetry is left out of the Authorised Version. The arrangement finally made is that Penelope is to wait until sunset in the hall, or in the palace; the word is ambiguous. But when she does appear, nothing is said to indicate that she is keeping an appointment, and her arrival (19. 54), which should have been a simple enough matter, is marked by a textual problem, who "they" are (55) who set Ikmalios's elaborate chair for her; a problem serious enough for Kirchhoff to posit a lacuna at this point.

We have departed far from the original theme of this paper, the bald-headed lamplighter. What we may hope to have done is to show that the problems in this area of the poem are more complex than they are often represented as being, and to suggest that if one wishes to probe either further into the past, or sideways into competing versions, one must do so in a way which leaves the lamplighter as something more than, in the classic phrase, a transient and embarrassed phantom.

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## Proper Behavior in the *Odyssey*

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Homeric Greek has an extensive vocabulary of terms that reflect the characters' compliance with attitudes or behavior considered socially or personally acceptable by others.<sup>1</sup> This essay examines the use of seven of these terms, one adjective and six nouns, in order to learn what they can reveal about Homeric ideas of proper behavior. The words selected address this issue from a series of related but distinct perspectives. Some have been studied extensively before; others have not. I propose to show that they illustrate the need for good and proper behavior, "propriety," as viewed by society and the individuals involved. While propriety as such is never defined in the *Odyssey*, it is illustrated from a broad variety of perspectives by a large number of terms, each of which may reflect the general principle in varying degrees of intensity. Propriety represents a strong sense that, while success is always important, how something is done can also be of great significance. The examples used in this essay are all drawn from the *Odyssey*.<sup>2</sup> In the first section of the essay I will examine the basic ideas that are reflected by the selected terms, and in the second I will deal with selected aspects of the ways in which these terms are used.

<sup>1</sup> Proper behavior and manners are not coextensive, and this essay is not concerned with the latter. For a study of manners as such see I. M. Hohendahl-Zoetelief, *Manners in the Homeric Epic*, Mnemosyne Suppl. 63 (Leiden 1980). Hohendahl-Zoetelief's intention is to examine the views of A. Dihle, "Antike Höflichkeit und christliche Demut," *SIFC* 26 (1952) 169–90, H. Fraenkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums*<sup>2</sup> (Munich 1962) 92 and H. Strassburger, "Der soziologische Aspekt der homerischen Epen," *Gymnasium* 60 (1953) 97–114, that the Homeric heroes knew and abided by fixed social rules. While manners and proper behavior do overlap, they are also quite distinct from one another. M. W. Edwards, *Homer: The Poet of the Iliad* (Baltimore and London 1987) 152–54, offers some excellent remarks on the role of proper behavior in the *Iliad*.

All references to the *Odyssey* will be by the book and line number(s) alone.

<sup>2</sup> These terms occur with greater frequency and variety in the *Odyssey* than the *Iliad*. I concur with the view that the *Odyssey* reflects a "later" or "more advanced" state of moral consciousness, a perspective that has been a commonplace in Homeric criticism since antiquity; see J. S. Clay, *The Wrath of Athena* (Princeton 1983) 215–16 and W. Kullman, "Gods and Men in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*," *HSCP* 89 (1985) 1–23.

The first term to be considered is *aeikes*, which appears 27 times in the *Odyssey*. Usage throughout the epic makes it clear this adjective is a very potent term to describe departures from acceptable behavior. The strongest use of the word comes not from the *Odyssey* but the *Iliad* where the theme of improper behavior is especially important in the final books and the phrase *aeikea erga* is used to describe Achilles' mutilation of Hector's body (*Il.* 22. 395, 23. 34). The most frequent uses in the *Odyssey* are with *potmos* (e.g. 2. 250, 4. 339-40, 22. 317 = 416) to describe an inappropriate or unseemly death, with *ergon* to characterize an act (3. 265, 11. 429, 16. 107), and even to depict Odysseus' ragged wallet (13. 437, 17. 197, 18. 108).<sup>3</sup> The range of the other appearances is broad. In 4. 533 it describes Aegisthus' plots against Agamemnon, in 20. 394 the Suitors' designs, and in 22. 432 the behavior of the faithless maidservants. In Nestor's description of Clytaemnestra before Aegisthus' seduction of her (3. 265-66) there is a strong contrast made between an improper act and good sense; in this passage proper behavior is depicted as knowing what to do and what not to do. The range of these appearances of *aeikes* to characterize acts, individuals, and situations is considerable, but, even though the adjective appears in a broad variety of contexts, the term consistently depicts strong disapproval with an act or how it is performed.

The next two examples I have selected are *aidos* and *nemesis*. The basic ideas conveyed by these terms were well summarized by Gilbert Murray when he stated: "Aidos is what you feel about an act of your own. Nemesis is what you feel for an act of another."<sup>4</sup> The two terms are complementary. *Aidos* and the other terms derived from this root imply a sense of shame and an awareness of the demands of the social system upon the individual to perform.<sup>5</sup> The term appears in a broad range of contexts in the epic. It is often seen as emblematic of social restraint or good manners (3. 14; cf. 3. 22-24, 8. 324, 14. 505-06). An interesting play upon the idea of *aidos* as social restraint, manners, or even a virtue of the upper

<sup>3</sup> The use of the adjective to describe Odysseus' wallet is perhaps the most peculiar. In all probability it is used to convey both a sense of the wallet's wretched physical condition and to signal how Odysseus' disguise and squalor are completely out of line with his proper position.

<sup>4</sup> G. Murray, *The Rise of the Greek Epic*<sup>4</sup> (Oxford 1934) 83. On the two concepts see also: C. E. F. von Erffa, *ΑΙΔΩΣ und verwandte Begriffe in ihrer Entwicklung von Homer bis Demokrit*, *Philologus Suppl.* 30. 2 (1937) Chap. I; J. Ferguson, *Moral Values in the Ancient World* (New York 1979); J. M. Redfield, *Nature and Culture in the Iliad* (Chicago and London 1975); M. Scott, "Aidos and Nemesis," *AC* 23 (1980) 13-35; B. Snell, *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos* (Göttingen 1955-) s.v. αἰδώς; W. J. Verdenius, "ΑΙΔΩΣ bei Homer," *Mnemosyne* 12 (1944) 47-60. These studies bring out the close relationship of *aidos* and *nemesis*. Redfield 115-19 offers an excellent short discussion of the importance of *aidos* in Homer. One important quality of *aidos* is that it is externally oriented and directed by the individual's response to social situations and the opinions of others; it is *not*, in other words, what we might term "conscience."

<sup>5</sup> This is nowhere more poignantly illustrated in the epics than in Hector's refusal to withdraw into the walls, *Il.* 22. 104-15, which offer a moving echo of 6. 442.

classes is found when Telemachus tells Odysseus to beg from the Suitors because "*aidos* for a man in need is not good" (17. 347; cf. 17. 352). My final example comes from Odysseus' outburst of 20. 169–71 in which he forcefully comments on how the Suitors' execrable behavior can be explained by their lack of *aidos*. The frequent appearances of this term illustrate one of the most significant ways in which society's call upon the individual is expressed.

While there are few appearances of *nemesis* (1. 350, 2. 136–37, 20. 330, and 22. 40), they are significant in the way that they complement *aidos*. *Nemesis* is directed outward and conveys a sense of how an individual feels about an act of another.<sup>6</sup> In its simplest form *nemesis* conveys a sense of moral indignation. It reflects the moral and emotional sensitivity of the individuals who experience this sensation. The primary sense of *nemesis* is one of resentment at someone else's attitude or failure to perform worthily. The language of *nemesis* describes one of the ways the dictates of *aidos* are carried out. And, while *aidos* and *nemesis* also reflect what Adkins has termed the competitive values, they primarily mirror standards that are commonly accepted and shared by most men.<sup>7</sup>

*Atasthalia* and the parallel verb and adjective, *atasthallo* and *atasthalos*, are much more common. They have often been translated by such expressions as "presumptuous sin," "to be reckless," "wicked" and so have been given an undeserved moral stance that is more characteristic of later eras than that of Homer. Usage in the epics make it clear that the terms imply not only an attitude of wanton disregard or fixation implied by *ate* but also a certain exuberance suggested by *thallo*.<sup>8</sup> *Atasthalia* is often used to

<sup>6</sup> As R. Lattimore, *Story Patterns in Greek Tragedy* (London 1964) 24, observed, "... *nemesis* means, not an action or activity, or an agency, but a feeling of shock, outrage, indignation at *hybris* or any other misbehavior" (see also Scott [above, note 4] 25–27). There are a number of terms that reflect sentiments parallel to *nemesis*; see J. P. Holoka, "Looking Darkly (ΥΠΟΔΡΑ ΙΔΩΝ): Reflections on Status and Decorum in Homer," *TAPA* 113 (1983) 1–16. Holoka offers a very detailed examination of how the phrase reflects someone's (usually a superior's) indignation at being treated indecorously. Holoka shows how the expression conveys a sense of umbrage at a violation of the rules which govern the interactions at all levels of society.

<sup>7</sup> On the distinction between competitive and cooperative values see A. W. H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility* (Oxford 1960) Chaps. I–III and "'Honour' and 'Punishment' in the Homeric Poems," *BICS* 7 (1960) 23–32. These works offer a convenient epitome of Adkins' position; see also A. A. Long's criticism of Adkins' work, "Morals and Values in Homer," *JHS* 90 (1970) 121–39, and the latter's response, "Homeric Values and Homeric Society," *JHS* 91 (1971) 1–14. C. J. Rowe, "The Nature of Homeric Morality," in *Approaches to Homer*, ed. C. A. Rubino and C. W. Shelmerdine (Austin, TX 1983) 248–75, provides a thorough discussion of both Adkins' and Long's positions.

<sup>8</sup> On the concept of *ate* in Homer see: J. M. Bremer, *Hamartia* (Amsterdam 1969) 99–112; E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1951) Chap. I; R. E. Doyle, S.J., "ATH: Its Use and Meaning" (New York 1984) 1–22; H. J. Mette, *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos* (above, note 4) s.v. ἄτατος; W. F. Wyatt, Jr., "Homeric ATH," *AJP* 103 (1982) 247–76. See also R. D. Dawe, "Some Reflections on *Ate* and *Hamartia*," *HSCP* 72 (1967) 89–123.



describe the folly or the untoward conduct of the Suitors as individuals and as a group (e.g. 21. 146–47, 22. 317 [= 416], 23. 67, and 24. 458). Unlike Odysseus and Telemachus, who have a very keen sense of social order, the Suitors arrogantly flaunt the “normal” rules and expectations of society in the belief they can have the world on their own terms. Much the same attitude is displayed by Odysseus’ *hetairoi* and mirrored in Zeus’ complaints about mankind in general and Aegisthus in particular (1. 33–37). At the same time these and other passages imply the Suitors’ disregard of personal responsibility as well. This creates in turn a sense of a causal link between ignorance and misconduct that parallels the one found in the uses of *aeikes*. By the use of these and other terms the poet makes it clear that, while an individual may be ignorant of the causes behind certain acts, he is none the less responsible for them.

The use of *hybris* in the *Odyssey* is simple and direct. It refers to violent physical behavior in a number of different forms. By far the most frequent uses of *hybris* are to describe the activities of the Suitors and their almost total disregard for proper behavior and the rights of Odysseus’ house (e.g. 1. 368, 16. 86, and 410).<sup>9</sup> In the last two passages the noun is accentuated by the adjectives *hyperbios* and *atasthalos* which intensify and characterize the action in even more graphic detail. The adjective *hybristes* appears three times in the lines:

And are they violent (*hybristes*) and wild and not “just” or are they friendly to strangers and do they have a god-fearing mind? (6. 120–21 = 9. 175–76 = 13. 201–02)

In these lines *hybristes* is paired with “wild” and opposed to “just,” “hospitable,” and “god-fearing.” The lines make it clear that, even though a

Although the derivation has been doubted (e.g. by W. J. Verdenius, *A Commentary on Hesiod Works and Days 1–382*, Mnemosyne Suppl. 86 [Leiden 1985] ad 134), usage seems to suggest that the terms are derived from a combination of *ate* and *thallo*. The idea of extravagant behavior also helps us understand the parallel concept of *hybris*; see A. Michelini, ““YBPTE and Plants,” *HSCP* 82 (1978) 35–44. The passages in which *atasthalia* appear suggest, but do not demonstrate, a connection between *atasthalia* and ignorance.

<sup>9</sup> Many studies have examined the role of *hybris* in Greek tragedy and the concept has been extensively scrutinized in histories of Greek religion. My views have been shaped by the following: E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (previous note) Chap. II; C. Del Grande, *Hybris* (Naples 1947); N. R. E. Fisher, “Hybris and Dishonor,” *G&R* 23 (1976) 14–31 and 26 (1979) 32–49; J. T. Hooker, “The Original Meaning of ὑβρις,” *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 19 (1975) 235–37; Lattimore (above, note 6) 23–27; D. M. MacDowell, “Hybris in Athens,” *G&R* 23 (1976) 14–31; Michelini (previous note); Murray (above, note 4) 326–29; H. North, *Sophrosyne* (Ithaca 1966) Chap. I; L. Pearson, *Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece* (Stanford 1962) Chap. II; and T. G. Rosenmeyer, “Hubris and the Greeks” in *Hubris, Man and Education* (Bellingham, WA 1959) 19–30.



notion of "just" may not have been well defined, an antithesis of the concepts of the just and violence may have been significant from an early date.<sup>10</sup>

The final two terms, *moira* and *themis*, are much more positive in nature. *Moira* expresses a broad variety of ideas about order including lot, portion, procedure, fate (in a very loose sense), and very frequently, in both epics, death.<sup>11</sup> Adkins underscores an important characteristic of *moira* when he describes it as acting in accord with one's social position and status in society.<sup>12</sup> Thus, according to Adkins, Homeric man sees a close relationship between an individual's social position and how he is expected to behave. In this way *moira* becomes an embodiment of what is right and proper and these parameters are determined by an individual's social status. This idea can be clearly illustrated by the use of the expression *kata moiran* in a broad variety of contexts throughout the epic. These include the depictions of Polyphemus milking his goats (9. 245, 309, 342), the frequent descriptions of portions at meals as *moirai* (14. 448, 15. 140, 17. 258, the highly sarcastic remarks of Ktesippos 20. 293–95), and the frequent references to "correct" speech in a broad variety of social settings and contexts throughout the epic. The range as well as the variety of contexts in which the term figures make it clear that while "success" is a very important goal the manner in which it is achieved is also highly significant.

*Themis* is even more specific than *moira*. In Homer *themis* is a broad and diverse concept of order with constitutional as well as religious ramifications. Whereas *moira* sets limits to an individual in terms of his strength and position in society, *themis* is a representation of the social rules and categories within which the individual works. The appearances of the term in the *Odyssey* makes it clear that *themis* reflects the idea of order or principles of order.<sup>13</sup> In the personification of *themis* in 2. 68–69 there

<sup>10</sup> M. Gagarin, *Early Greek Law* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1986) Chap. II, stresses the importance of arbitration and the avoidance of violence in early Greek legal procedures. The question of justice (*dike*), its nature and role, is too complex to be dealt with in an essay of this length. From the extensive literature on the subject I found the following to be especially useful: M. I. Dickie, "Dike as a Moral Term in Homer and Hesiod," *CP* 73 (1978) 91–101; M. Gagarin (above) and "Dike in Archaic Greek Thought," *CP* 69 (1974) 186–97; E. A. Havelock, "Dikaio-syne," *Phoenix* 23 (1969) 49–70; K. Latte, "Der Rechtsgedanke im archaischen Griechentum," *A&A* 2 (1946) 63–76; H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1971); M. Ostwald, "Ancient Greek Ideas of Law," *Dictionary of the History of Ideas* (New York 1973) II 673–85. A convenient short discussion of the major issues involved is offered by J. E. Rexine, "The Nature and Meaning of Justice in Homer," *CB* 54 (1977) 1–6.

<sup>11</sup> *Moira* is frequently commented on in conjunction with other concepts noted before (e.g. Dodds [above, note 8] Chap. I, and Ferguson [above, note 4] Chaps. I–II); see also B. C. Dietrich, *Death, Fate and the Gods* (London 1965) and W. C. Greene's classic study, *Moira: Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek Thought* (Cambridge, MA 1944).

<sup>12</sup> Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility* (above, note 7) 17–23.

<sup>13</sup> On *themis* see R. Hirzel, *Themis Dike und Verwandtes* (Leipzig 1907) and M. Ostwald (above, note 10).

can be seen the beginnings of the process of abstraction that were to culminate in the concept of *themis* as "law" or "right." *Themis* is, in some ways, the mark of civilized society. Stanford argues that *themis* should be considered a personification of that part of primitive justice that is concerned with precedents; it is the established or right way of doing things (e.g. 3. 45, 187).<sup>14</sup> In many passages the term is equivalent to "right," "fitting," and "proper" procedures (e.g. 10. 73, 11. 451, 14. 56-57, 430). This emphasis on what are commonly accepted practices in society is even more apparent when the term appears in the plural. Commenting on the absence of civilization among the Cyclopes, Odysseus states (9. 112):

For they have no councils where they make plans and no *themistes*.

Here *themistes* imply established procedures founded on earlier practices and judgments. *Themis* and *themistes* appear in a variety of contexts. Odysseus invokes *themis*, *aidos*, and Zeus *epitimetor* in his attempt to obtain guest-friendship at the close of his first speech to Polyphemus (9. 267-71).<sup>15</sup> Nestor says that he will tell Telemachus "as is *themis*" (3. 187) what he has learned about Odysseus since they parted at Troy, and in Agamemnon's poignant description of Odysseus' return he describes how Telemachus will embrace his father "as is *themis*" (11. 451). In the final analysis, however, the evidence about *themis* is paradoxical for, while it is clearly an important term that reflects some of society's and the individual's most significant concerns, it is not a common term or a primary frame of reference by which the characters determine their action. In all likelihood the ambivalent status of *themis* points to the relative weakness of communal values when confronted with the demands imposed by the heroic individual.

The term that comes the closest to offering a definition of propriety is in the negative and that is *aeikes*, "unseemly." *Aeikes* is used in a broad range of contexts including a variety of departures from accepted behavior, from actions of Odysseus' faithless slave girls to the appearance of the ragged wallet he bears. The uses of *aeikes* suggest that propriety is most frequently seen as a check to excess rather than a positive inducement to good behavior. There is a much greater emphasis on what is not proper than on what is. Proper behavior is most frequently defined and illustrated from the negative. A substantial number of the most potent terms are in the negative, imply the negative, or concentrate on violations of accepted

<sup>14</sup> See W. B. Stanford, *The Odyssey of Homer*, 2 vols. (London and New York 1954-55) on 2. 68 and Gagarin, *Early Greek Law* (above, note 10) Chap. II, on the importance of procedural law in Homer.

<sup>15</sup> The effect of the appeal is intensified by the group of terms implying proper behavior at the close of the speech and there is no small irony in light of Odysseus' own conduct earlier when he helped himself to the Cyclopes' stores.

standards. It is important to recognize that it is the departures from rather than compliance with social and personal expectations that are the greatest concern to Homeric man.<sup>16</sup>

This does not mean that there are no goads to positive action: *aidos* and *nemesis* are powerful stimuli to proper behavior. Both reflect the demands of the social system on the individual to perform. *Aidos* illustrates the claims that an individual can place upon himself and *nemesis* how he can respond to the acts of another. Other terms characterize an act or attitude of a character in very specific ways. *Atasthalia* points to the almost mindless folly of the Suitors and the term brings out the link between their ignorance and misconduct (e.g. 1. 7–8, 34, 21. 146–47, 23. 67, 24. 458). Terms are often used in conjunction with one another for greater emphasis and to link the various ideas in different ways to one another. The implications of violence in *atasthalia* are quite explicit in *hybris*, which is used to describe the actions of the Suitors, their wanton behavior, and disregard of appropriate conduct. Descriptions of the Suitors using this term are important for the way in which they characterize the Suitors and cast doubt on their ability to perform in the “normal” heroic way. The final two terms considered, *moira* and *themis*, are much more positive in nature and express a sense of order in the life of an individual and society. *Moira* describes a broad sense of what is right and appropriate in a wide range of contexts. *Themis* is more abstract; it describes order, political order, procedure, and, as noted before, is an important antecedent to justice.

This examination of these terms is only a beginning; much more remains. There are many other terms and examples that should be considered. Verbs and adverbs as well as nouns and adjectives need careful scrutiny. A careful study of grammatical constructions and the formulaic qualities of the lines in which these terms appear needs to be made. Nevertheless there are some points that can be made on the basis of the preceding observations. The first is the appearance of “clusters” where three or more terms are concentrated in a few lines (e.g. 1. 227–29, 3. 205–07). Although clusters are relatively infrequent, they add an emphatic note. Their presence appears to be a very deliberate poetic act rather than a chance

<sup>16</sup> In many respects social roles and responsibilities are epitomized by adherence to the practices of guest-friendship. Since antiquity commentators and critics have noted the importance of the theme and its close connection with proper behavior. M. I. Finley, *The World of Odysseus*<sup>2</sup> (London 1977) has shown with particular clarity the importance of this theme and his work remains the best guide to the subject. Meals are one of the most important settings for the display of appropriate behavior and it is not accidental that much of the major action in the *Odyssey* takes place at meals. As has been often noted, the conventions of guest-friendship are sometimes manipulated by hosts and guests to their own advantage and one index of the Suitors' or Polyphemos' depravity is the travesty they make of the normal rites of guest-friendship. The importance of these practices is also indicated by the manner in which they are parodied in the epic; see F. Williams, “Odysseus' Homecoming as a Parody of Homeric Formal Welcomes,” *CW* 79 (1986) 395–97.

collocation of terms. The force of the individual terms may be strong, but the emphasis created by their juxtaposition is greater than the simple sum of their parts. The clusters are a very graphic device by which the poet underscores an element in the narrative. Another interesting phenomenon concerns the distribution of terms. The *Odyssey* is in this respect an "uneven" work; there are often extended gaps between appearances of a term even though situations occur where its use might seem entirely appropriate. There is virtually no term with which this phenomenon does not occur. To consider how many lines on an average separate appearances of a term can be very misleading. Three striking examples are the absence of *aeikes* from 4. 694 to 11. 429, of *atasthalos* from 8. 166 to 16. 86, and of *atasthalia* from 1. 34 to 10. 437. These gaps are striking and there seems to be no simple rationale that explains this phenomenon. Variety not consistency marks the language of the epic.

An examination of the repetition of individual terms, phrases, and lines suggests that the references to propriety had been part of the epic for some time. The language of propriety forms part of the formulae of the *Odyssey*. It is impossible to show that statements about proper behavior belong to any one stratum or social group of the epic. What, instead, is presented is a reflection of cultural principles that are important for all levels of society and the chaos that can result when they are challenged or disregarded. The characters, save for the Suitors and Polyphemus who interpret them solely according to their own interest, are aware of the demands of proper behavior and respond as well as circumstances allow.

Another significant feature of the epic's diction which sheds light on the concept of propriety concerns who uses the terms, the poet or his characters. While direct quotation or quotation of one character by another constitutes approximately two-thirds of the *Odyssey*, an even higher percentage of the more significant terms referring to propriety are spoken or quoted by the characters.<sup>17</sup> The figures for the seven words examined in this study are:

<sup>17</sup> I was first made aware of the importance of this distinction by Jasper Griffin in a paper entitled "Words and Speakers," delivered at the University of Pennsylvania, March 24, 1984. This paper has subsequently been published under the title "Homeric Words and Speakers," *JHS* 106 (1986) 36-57. The material Griffin has gathered proves that there is a sharp difference between the vocabularies used by the poet and his characters and crucial moral terms are reserved from the narrative to the speakers (40).



Term	Direct speech or quotation	Total number
<i>aeikes</i>	20	27
<i>aidos</i>	8	9
<i>nemesis</i>	4	4
<i>atasthalia</i>	8	9
<i>hybris</i>	11	14
<i>moira</i>	41	58
<i>themis</i>	12	12

What this table indicates is that, with the exception of *moira*, it is the characters and not the "invisible" poet who set the standards that shape the ideals and principles of the epic. There seem to be two closely related reasons for this habit of speech. The first is that this language most commonly occurs when there is a strong reaction to an action, situation, or another individual, and so it is natural for the characters to respond, and respond strongly. In this way the terms gain a greater potency from having been placed within the dialogue and in turn have greater weight in shaping the response of the audience to the poem. Secondly, because it is the characters and not the poet who employ more of the emphatic, "loaded" language, events and characters are given a greater immediacy than they might otherwise have possessed. There are, in effect, two languages in the epic, the restrained voice of the poet and the lively, vivid voices of the characters and it is the latter that prevail.

The strong concern for proper behavior that marks the *Odyssey* stems from the unsettled social and political conditions portrayed in the work as well as those of the eras of the epic's formation.<sup>18</sup> It is a world of lost and stolen children where piracy and brigandage are acceptable if not honored callings. The world of the *Odyssey* is one of change and uncertainty. There is a greater concern over class and distribution of wealth than in the *Iliad*. Finally, the environment of the *Odyssey* is a nervous one in which society is not sure whether or not violence is about to break out. There is little but brute force that can contain the individual who asserts himself and does not of his own volition acknowledge the rights of society. The emphasis on the active, competitive values makes violence a very real likelihood. As a result individuals and societies defend themselves with an elaborate series of social practices that are carefully fitted to personal as well as social circumstances. An awareness of propriety, fit and appropriate behavior, was at the core of these social conventions. Society depended on adherence to

<sup>18</sup> A good introduction to the complex question whether the epic reflects an actual historical period and, if so, which one is offered by the following studies: W. Donlan, "The Politics of Generosity in Homer," *Helios* 9 (1982) 1-5; M. I. Finley (above, note 16); J. Halverson, "Social Order in the *Odyssey*," *Hermes* 113 (1985) 129-45; "The Succession Issue in the *Odyssey*," *G&R* 33 (1986) 119-28; A. M. Snodgrass, "An Historical Homeric Society," *JHS* 94 (1974) 114-25.



these loosely interwoven conventions to survive. In the *Odyssey* the demands of proper behavior are acknowledged and supported on every social level from the loyal slaves Eumaios and Philoitios to King Alkinoos. The characters who subvert or pay the least attention to these fragile conventions pose the most danger. The threat they raise comes not just from their actions but also the challenge they pose against one of the few things that bind this society together. In the widest sense the best sign of a character's worth and merit is to be seen in his understanding of and adherence to his society's conventions. Achilles in the *Iliad* transcends the bonds and ties of his society; only at the end does he approach a fragile reconciliation with this world. The *Odyssey* begins with Odysseus set apart and ends with his full reintegration in society and the restoration of proper order on Ithaca. The epic is, in many respects, an account of the triumph of propriety.

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## Sappho the "Numinous"

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In the opening year of this century Friedrich Solmsen's father Felix accepted ψαφρός as providing a valid etymon for "Sappho," and that reading of the name's significance has since then held the field.<sup>1</sup> After nine intervening decades of progress in philology and linguistics, it may be thought no want of *pietas* towards Solmsen *père* if this brief contribution to a memorial volume in honor of Solmsen *fils* introduces a radically new interpretation of a name immortalized by the Muses' grace.

In any search for the meaning of "Sappho," one likely to have appealed to a prominent family of archaic Lesbos, Oswald Szemerényi's account of the lexical cluster including σαφής seemed upon publication to hold a valuable clue.<sup>2</sup> As Jacobsohn and Leumann had shown, the development of this adjective started from the adverb σάφα, transformed first to σαφέως, and reaching the full status of σαφής by the fifth century.<sup>3</sup> But the existence of σάφα itself remained unaccounted for until Szemerényi proposed to add it to the ever growing number of Greek words traceable to an Anatolian origin, a number that had already reached half a hundred in Günter Neumann's researches on the *Weiterleben* of Hittite and Luwian in the Greek lexicon.<sup>4</sup> Szemerényi's proposed source is the Hittite adjective *šuppi-* whose meaning he gives as "pure," "clear" and whose adverbial form would therefore be *šuppa* from *šuppaya*. The name of the greatest Hittite ruler, Suppiluliuma, which may be rendered "Clearwell" ("Pure-spring"), includes *šuppi-* in fact as its initial element. That the Hittite word means specifically "ritually pure" follows not only from the ritual context of its

<sup>1</sup> The etymology, which would suggest that the poet had been remarkable—even in her infancy—for rough, dry hair or skin, was first advanced in *Rh. Mus.* 56 (1901) 502 and n. 1; finally maintained in his posthumously published *Indogermanische Eigennamen als Spiegel der Kulturgeschichte*, edited by Ernst Fraenkel (Heidelberg 1922) 131.

<sup>2</sup> O. Szemerényi, "The Origins of the Greek Lexicon: *Ex Oriente Lux*," *JHS* 94 (1974) 154.

<sup>3</sup> H. Jacobsohn, *Philologus* 67 (1908) 494; M. Leumann, *Homerische Wörter* (Basel 1950) 112 n. 77.

<sup>4</sup> G. Neumann, *Untersuchungen zum Weiterleben hethitischen und luwischen Sprachgutes in hellenistischer und römischer Zeit* (Wiesbaden 1961).

regular uses, but from the coexistence of Hittite *parku-* for "physically clean."

Whatever hesitations on the semantic side one may feel at passing from the sacred sphere of *šuppi-* in Hittite to the profane of *σάφα* in Greek—and they need not prove insuperable, especially where language-loans are involved—, at least the case for affiliating *Σάπφω* to *šuppi-* would be in no way weakened by the religious associations of the parent word. For, after all, the largest single class of Greek personal names is comprised of the theophoric names—Apollodorus, Hecataeus, Diogenes—, to which must be added all those from common nouns of sacral import—Hagnon, Hieronymus, Semne. In the specific context of Sappho's naming, one must not construe the evidence of her devotion to Aphrodite's cult as if she were demonstrably a priestess or born into a priestly family.<sup>5</sup>

At the same time, when Alcaeus addressed to Sappho that remarkable invocation (which is what his famous pentapody, *ἰόπλοκ' ἄγνα μελλιχόμεϊδε Σάπφοι*, amounts to), one might be tempted to wonder whether he was not perhaps including *ἄγνα*, "revered," as exegetical commentary on her name.<sup>6</sup> Such play with words, of course, presumes a control of the relevant linguistic items by the speaker, not necessarily by his audience. Here it is important to recognize that, as fellow poets on high archaic Lesbos, Sappho and Alcaeus were heirs of a culture which had survived the Bronze Age's end possibly intact, like that of another offshore island, Euboea, whose now revealed prosperity none would have guessed a generation ago.<sup>7</sup> Lazpas, whose identity with Lesbos has been given a renewed measure of backing by Mellink and Güterbock, could furnish the Hittite king a healing cult-image already in the late fourteenth century B.C.;<sup>8</sup> in any case, Homer's references to well-developed Lesbos (*ἐὐκτίμενος*) are borne out by the rich finds in Bronze-Age levels there.<sup>9</sup>

So much for possible Hittite connections of Lesbos and its certain pre-Classical foundations. But the island had early and long-continuing links with Iron-Age Lydia as well, so that we should at least note the possibility

<sup>5</sup> W. Burkert, *Greek Religion*, transl. by J. Raffan (Cambridge, MA 1985) 187: "It is Sappho who speaks most naturally of meeting with gods, as if from her own experience; Aphrodite . . .".

<sup>6</sup> It is satisfying to note that Bruno Gentili, in an article on "La veneranda Saffo," *QUCC* 2 (1966) 37–62, argued—quite independently of etymological considerations—for the archaic connotation of Alcaeus' *ἄγνα* applied to Sappho. At the same time, one may recall D. A. Campbell's observation that Alcaeus here "speaks of her in terms fit for a divinity." Not just any deity, I submit, but Aphrodite, as word-by-word analysis would bear out.

<sup>7</sup> *Lefkandi I* (London 1979).

<sup>8</sup> H. Güterbock and M. Mellink in *Troy and the Trojan War: A Symposium Held at Bryn Mawr College*, October 1984, ed. M. Mellink (Bryn Mawr, PA 1986) 41 and 98, respectively; cf. F. Cornelius, *Geschichte der Hethiter* (Darmstadt 1973) 218: "Es besteht kein Grund, dies Land [sc. Lazpa] anderswo als auf der Insel Lesbos zu suchen."

<sup>9</sup> W. Lamb, *Excavations at Therme in Lesbos* (Cambridge 1936).

that a name ultimately traceable in the Hittite lexicon could have reached Sappho through her family's commercial or other ties with Lydia,<sup>10</sup> an Iron-Age state whose language preserved a dialect of Anatolian Indo-European.<sup>11</sup> On this view we could compare the naming of Sappho with that of the Kroisos who was commemorated by a late archaic *kouros* found at Anavysos in Attica.

Yet, granted that a cultural and linguistic context in which Sappho could have received a name of eventually Hittite origin was present, will the derivation of Sappho from *šuppi-* really bear scrutiny, formally and in detail? Here the signals must be termed mixed. As for the initial phoneme of "Sappho" at least, the correspondence seems exact; the initial sound in *šuppi-* is regularly thought to be the sibilant *sh*, and Günther Zuntz<sup>12</sup> has cogently demonstrated that the initial Ψ wherever the MSS preserve instances of Sappho using her own name are due to later misunderstanding of a letter-form current in several Greek epichoric alphabets.<sup>13</sup> Sappho would have intended it to represent the double-sigma sound in θάλασσα, Παρνασσός and those other shibboleths of pre-Greek speech. Zuntz traces the letter-form to the character in the Linear A and B scripts which is transliterated *se*, and he may well be right. What cannot be mistaken is his point that the metrics of the Sapphic pentapody in which Alcaeus invokes Sappho by name tells absolutely against a psi-sound as the original initial in "Sappho." Curiously enough, the MSS of Hephaestion, where alone Alcaeus' verse is attested, all preserve before Σάπφοι a supposedly extra sigma, a small mark of her fellow poet's respect for Sappho's own incomparable aural sensibilities . . . or a sign that Alcaeus too pronounced it "Shappho."

But to turn to the apparent development from a *u-* to an *a-* sound between *šuppi-* and σάφα or "Sappho," Szemerényi indeed calls this change characteristic of Luwian, a sister tongue that increasingly affected Hittite itself. But Sapalulme, which he cited as a Late Luwian form of Suppiluliuma, is actually attested only in an Assyrian document, while Szemerényi's other example of the change (Greek Πανύασσις versus Luwian Puna/ṽwassis) seems to instance a *metathesis* of the vowels in Puna- to Πανν-, instead. Moreover, Oettinger has made it highly probable that the Luwian verb *šappa-* is not related to our Hittite adjective *šuppi-* at

<sup>10</sup> A. J. Podlecki, *The Early Greek Poets and their Times* (Vancouver 1984) 82. Meanwhile, to P. Green, *The Shadow of the Parthenon* (Berkeley 1972) 170, the name of Sappho's father, Scamandronymus, points to his Asian origin from the Troad.

<sup>11</sup> According to my colleague Craig Melchert, due caution about affiliating Lydian more closely to Hittite than to Luwian is still in order. His good linguistic counsel must not go unacknowledged.

<sup>12</sup> "On the Etymology of the Name Sappho," *Mus. Helv.* 8 (1951) 12-35, esp. 21 n. 62.

<sup>13</sup> It was a similar misunderstanding of the Middle English thorn, whose shape approached a y-form, that led to the quaint error, "Ye Olde Tea Shoppe."



all.<sup>14</sup> In fact, the Luwian dialects, though closely akin to Hittite, seem never to use *šuppi-* for the concept "ritually pure," but another word (*kummai-*) altogether different.

That raw datum may be fatal to my initial thesis, especially if Calvert Watkins is right that the language of the Late Bronze Age Trojans and Lesbians was Luwian.<sup>15</sup> Yet I hope that it will prove possible to build on the groundwork so far laid down. One may ask whether Zuntz's own conclusion, reached at mid-century after wide-ranging, meticulous inquiry, that Sappho is an Asianic name may not rather point the way. He himself proposed as source the name *Šapōn* designating the holy mountain north of Ugarit together with its god. Though the Semites, borrowing from their Asianic predecessors in the land, called this mountain and its indwelling deity *Šapōn*, it was the same landmark that the Greeks knew as Mt. Kasios. Awkwardly for Zuntz's thesis, however, the name *Šapōn* seems to have entered the roster of Greek myths as *Τυφῶν*.<sup>16</sup>

For my own derivation of the name Sappho, therefore, I proffer another Asianic personal name that appears repeatedly in the Hittite texts, most often in the form *Šapalli-*, though variants containing as initial syllables *Za-* and *Ta-* are assumed by Güterbock to be the same word. All of these may be confidently linked to the name *Ashapala* (once *Ashupala*) held by half a dozen priests, scribes, and others, and listed in Laroche's great Hittite prosopography.<sup>17</sup> Even if the shorter forms should be kept distinct and are not simply variants more fully assimilated (by cluster-reduction) to Hittite, the *u/a* variation points to the foreign origin of the name. That origin should be specifically Hattian, the tongue of that people who exerted the profoundest influence on the early Hittites in the cultural and particularly in the religious domain. Now not even Kammenhuber or Schuster professes to know more than the rudiments of this ancient Anatolian language and culture, but its word for "god" is well established.<sup>18</sup> It is transliterated (*a*)*šḫap*, *šḫab*, or *šḫav*- depending on its immediate phonetic environment. Thus *Šapalli-/Ashapala* with suffix of *appurtenance* in Hittite *-(a)la-* and "Luwian" *-(alli-)* form, respectively, should mean "devoted to the god," "belonging to the god," or the like.

If, then, as I am assuming, this name of centuries-long currency and cross-cultural spread in Asia Minor has issued in our "Sappho," it has done so by dint of typical Greek shortening into a *Kurzname*. The spelling *-πφ-*,

<sup>14</sup> N. Oettinger, *Das Stammbildung des hethitischen Verbums* (Nuremberg 1979) 383.

<sup>15</sup> "The Language of the Trojans," in *Troy and the Trojan War* (above, note 8) 45–62.

<sup>16</sup> See J. de Sauvignac, "Le sens du terme *Šapōn*," *Ugarit-Forschungen* 16 (1984) 274 for relevant bibliography.

<sup>17</sup> E. Laroche, *Les noms des hittites* (Paris 1966) 44, no. 162.

<sup>18</sup> H.-S. Schuster, *Die hattisch-hethitischen Bilinguen* I (Leiden 1974) 79–81, 1. 1. 11–14, where, too, the presence of *A-* in the Hittite personal name *Ašḫapala* is charged to scribes unable to write the consonant cluster *sh-* initially in cuneiform.



however, shows not only the usual expressive gemination, as in *Ξενοκκῶ* with double kappa from *Ξενόκριτος* or *Νικοττώ* with double tau from *Νικότιμος*, but also the aspirated form of the final labial of the base on which "Sappho" was built. Thus, while misled by the poet's apparent spelling of her own name with initial *Ψ*, Felix Solmsen was entirely justified in deriving "Sappho" from a base in final phi (*ψαφ-*). Schwyzzer, indeed, cites this case along with others including "Pitthon" from *πίθηκος*.<sup>19</sup> It only remains to note that though the orthography of the Hittite scribes does not always enable us to be certain either of the voicedness or of the aspiration of their consonants, the alternation of the labial in (*a*)*šhab/šhap* with a *v*-sound in certain case forms led Kammenhuber to distinguish it from a straight unvoiced *p* and in fact to represent it phonetically as *f*: [*šhaf*].<sup>20</sup>

With that detail I hope to have accounted linguistically for the earlier history of the name in question—which is all, essentially, that an etymologist aims to accomplish. Of course, he may hope that in the process he has traced for the relevant name a plausible evolution in terms of cultural context. That has meant, in the present instance, interpreting "Sappho" approximately as "Numinous" and tracing it from an early Hattian-derived personal name for one placed under the aegis of the gods, through variants among Anatolian Indo-European dialects, down to the late seventh century. Then it was that the name Sappho, retaining still—I submit—something of its original religious aura, caught the fancy of Aeolian aristocrats wondering what to call a girl-child small, dark, and ever mysterious.

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<sup>19</sup> E. Schwyzzer, *Griechische Grammatik* I (Munich 1939) 636–37.

<sup>20</sup> A. Kammenhuber, *Hethitisch, Palaisch, Luwisch, Hieroglyphenluwisch und Hattisch, Münchener Studien zur Sprachwissenschaft, Beiheft 4* (Munich 1969) 97, 99.



## Who was Corax?

THOMAS COLE

Posed a thousand or so years ago, the question would have seemed easy, almost insultingly so. Corax—as any Byzantine schoolboy could have told you—was a Sicilian from Syracuse, the inventor of rhetoric (defined by him as the art of persuasion). He taught his discovery to another Sicilian, Tisias; and their doctrines (or textbooks) were later taken to Athens, perhaps through the activity of a fellow countryman, Gorgias of Leontini, during the course of a famous embassy there on behalf of his native city. The original discovery was a response to the challenges of democratic politics after the popular revolution which deposed the last of the Syracusan tyrants, Hieron's brother Thrasybulus. Corax's notion of persuasion as an art, capable of being taught, and the mixture of fact, argumentation and appeals to audience sensibilities allowed by the different parts in the canonical order of presentation which he first devised (proem, demonstration [or narrative followed by demonstration], epilogue), helped make public speaking an indispensable tool in the process of guiding and controlling popular deliberative bodies. (Guiding and controlling were Corax's specialities, since before the revolution he had been a counsellor and close associate of Hieron's.) The tool, however, like all tools, was subject to misuse—as Corax found out to his own cost. When he brought suit against Tisias for refusal to pay the prearranged fee for instruction in the new art, the latter impudently claimed that even if he lost the case he could not be held liable: Losing the case would mean that he had failed to persuade the jury—hence had not been taught the art of persuasion as per agreement. Corax responded by turning the argument around against his opponent: Even an unsuccessful prosecution would require payment, since it would show that the defendant had in fact been taught the art, just as per agreement. At this point there were cries of “Bad crow [*corax*], bad egg,” on the part of jury and/or bystanders and the case had to be dropped.

The story with minor variations appears in six texts dating from the 5th century A.D. (Troilus' *Prolegomena to the Rhetoric of Hermogenes*) to the 13th or 14th (the *Prolegomena* of Maximus Planudes).<sup>1</sup> Since there is no

<sup>1</sup> Most fully in the *Prolegomena* printed as numbers 4 (anonymous) and 17 (Marcellinus?) in H. Rabe's *Prolegomenon Sylloge* (Leipzig 1931) and in C. Walz, *Rhetores Graeci* (Stuttgart and Tübingen 1833–35) VI 4–30 and IV 1–38. The best survey

strikingly different rival account from those ten centuries we may conveniently call the one just presented the Byzantine answer to our initial question about Corax.

Most modern answers reveal in varying degrees the influence of this Byzantine prototype, but the question itself has come to seem much more problematic. If one looks for clear traces of the story in the millennium (roughly) between the time of Corax himself and that of his earliest biographers, the results<sup>2</sup> are disappointingly meagre. Plato (*Phdr.* 273c) is the first writer to mention Tisias by name; Aristotle the first to know of Corax himself (*Rhet.* 2. 24, 1401a17); and Theophrastus the first to attribute to him the discovery of a new art (Radermacher 18, A. V. 17). Dionysius of Halicarnassus is the first to connect him, via Tisias, with a prominent representative of the Athenian rhetorical tradition (Isocrates: cf. Radermacher 29, B. II. 4). Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. Math.* 2. 96) or, conceivably, Cicero,<sup>3</sup> is the earliest source for the lawsuit over Corax's fee. The only notice, outside the *Prolegomena* and one late commentary,<sup>4</sup> that identifies Corax and Tisias as master and student, is from the fifth-century Platonist Hermias (*ad Phaed.* 273c = p. 251. 8-9 Couvreur, though there it is Tisias who is the master and Corax the student).<sup>5</sup> Ammianus Marcellinus (30. 4. 3) is the first to attribute a definition of rhetoric ("the artificer of persuasion") to Corax or Tisias.<sup>6</sup> Preoccupation with the politics of

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of the tradition is that of S. Wilcox, "Corax and the 'Prolegomena'," *AJP* 64 (1943) 2 ff. (cited hereafter by author, as are the editions of Rabe and Walz; P. Hamberger, *Die rednerische Disposition in der alten τέχνη ρητορική* = *Rhetorische Studien* II [Paderborn 1914]; G. Kowalski, *De artis rhetoricae originibus* [Lwow 1933] and *De arte rhetorica* [Lwow 1937]; W. Stegemann, "Tisias," *RE* V A 1 [1934] 140-46; D. A. G. Hinks, "Tisias and Corax and the Invention of Rhetoric," *CQ* 34 (1940) 61-69; and L. Radermacher, *Artium scriptores* [Vienna 1951]). For the versions of Troilus and Planudes see, respectively, Rabe 5 = VI 52-54 Walz and Rabe 7 = V 212-21 Walz. (The six texts referred to here do not include Rabe 6a = II 682-83 Walz, or the one from which it is abridged, V 5-8 Walz, a portion of Sopater's commentary to Hermogenes that contains the Corax-Tisias story but nothing about the content of Corax's teaching or the nature of his pre- and post-revolutionary political activities.)

<sup>2</sup> Well summarized in Rabe viii-xi.

<sup>3</sup> *De or.* 3. 81 (*Coracem . . . patiamur . . . pullos suos excludere in nido, qui evolent clamatores odiosi et molesti*) is generally taken as an allusion to the "Bad crow, bad egg" phrase, but Cicero did not need to be familiar with the Tisias story to apply the proverb in this context (cf. Radermacher 29, ad B. II. 6). Corax's chicks and the bad eggs that hatched them could be any or all of those speakers who claimed to owe something to the tradition of formal instruction in rhetoric thought to derive from him.

<sup>4</sup> That of Sopater (above, note 1) on Hermogenes, usually dated, like Troilus, to the fifth century A.D.

<sup>5</sup> Spengel's καθηγητῆς Τισίου for the transmitted μαθητῆς Τισίου will "correct" the text at this point—but need we assume that it was a copyist rather than Hermias himself who was unfamiliar with the details of the story in its Byzantine version?

<sup>6</sup> Several *Prolegomena* (Radermacher 30, B. II. 13) offer the same formulation but attribute it to οἱ περὶ Τισίαν καὶ Κόρακα, by which they may be referring in a vague way to the whole tradition which Corax and Tisias were thought to have founded. "The

fledgling Syracusan democracy and the proper order of presentation (*dispositio*, τάξις) in an oration only comes in the *Prolegomenon* of Troilus and the later works already mentioned.

Piecemeal attestation of the Byzantine tradition in earlier sources need not mean piecemeal origin over the course of the preceding millennium, but the possibility must obviously be reckoned with. And possibility begins to become probability once two further phenomena are taken into consideration—the frequency with which certain components of the traditional account are associated with figures other than Corax, and the contradiction between parts of the tradition and what is known from other—and often better—sources about early writers on rhetoric. The dispute over payment of a fee—minus, obviously, the concluding dictum on crows and their eggs—appears first (Apuleius, *Flor.* 18 = p. 30 K., Aulus Gellius 5. 10) in connection with Protagoras and his student Euathlus<sup>7</sup> and may even have been familiar to Plato in a Protagorean context.<sup>8</sup> “Artificer of persuasion” is a definition of rhetoric attributed by Plato (*Gorg.* 453a) to Gorgias and considered by many<sup>9</sup> to be original with Plato himself; and the quadripartite oratorical *divisio* (proem, narrative [*diēgēsis*], argument [*agōnes*], epilogue) attributed to Corax in three Prolegomena<sup>10</sup> is associated alternatively with “Isocrates and his followers” (Radermacher 160, B. XXIV. 29) or his (and Aristotle’s) friend Theodectes (Aristotle, fr. 133 Rose).

The last-named bit of rhetorical doctrine is not only credited to figures other than the “Byzantine” Corax but also—fairly clearly—much more plausibly credited to them. It is judicial oratory, not the political persuasion with which Corax is associated in the Byzantine tradition that requires the Theodectean–Isocratean tetrad. *Diēgēsis*, the straightforward presentation of the speaker’s view of what has happened, is, as theoreticians from Aristotle (*Rhet.* 3. 12, 1414a36–38) on down are in the habit of pointing out, likely

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power of persuasion” appears as Corax’s definition in Athanasius’ *Prolegomenon* to Hermogenes (p. 171. 19 Rabe = Radermacher 30, B. II. 14).

<sup>7</sup> Already known to Aristotle (fr. 67 Rose) as someone involved in a prosecution of Protagoras; but it need not follow, as Radermacher assumes (“Studien zur Geschichte der griechischen Rhetorik 1: Timaeus und die Ueberlieferung über den Ursprung der Rhetorik,” *Rh. Mus.* 52 [1897] 413), that the case involved payment of a fee (see Rabe xi).

<sup>8</sup> Protagoras’ statement, at the end of the long speech ascribed to him in the *Protagoras* (324b–c), that any student who feels the fee charged for his course of instruction to have been excessive can go to a temple and, upon swearing an oath, pay no more than what he declares the instruction to have been worth, suggests the possibility that disagreement over the payment and proper amount of fees was either a subject considered by Protagoras himself or one that provided the content of stories told about him—as would be natural in the case of the man who either was, or was thought to be (Diog. Laert. 9. 52), the first person to teach in return for pay.

<sup>9</sup> See H. Mutschmann, “Die älteste Definition der Rhetorik,” *Hermes* 53 (1918) 440–43, who cites the parallel Platonic formulations at *Charm.* 174e (medicine as ὑγιείας δημιουργός) and *Symp.* 188d (prophecy as φιλίας θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων δημιουργός).

<sup>10</sup> Rabe 7, p. 67. 6–7 = V 215. 22–23 Walz; Rabe 9, p. 126. 5–15 = II 119. 10–26 Walz; Rabe 13, p. 189. 16–17 = VII 6. 9–10 Walz.



to be unnecessary in a political case, where the audience is assumed to be well aware of the facts of the situation.<sup>11</sup> The one author (Rabe 4, pp. 25. 17–26. 6 = VI 13. 1–11 Walz) who does attribute to Corax a *divisio* (proem, argument, epilogue) suited to political oratory writes as if he had begun with the judicial tetrad and then combined its second and third members into what counts as a single section dedicated to *agōnes*, but whose purpose is narrative as well: *περὶ ὧν ἔδει συμβουλεύειν τῷ δήμῳ λέγειν ὡς ἐν διηγήσει*.<sup>12</sup>

The same incompatibility exists between the Byzantine version of Corax's activity and Cicero's summary report (*Brut.* 46–48 = Radermacher 13–14, A. V. 9) of what he claims<sup>13</sup> to have been the account of Corax and Tisias that appeared in Aristotle's famous compendium—the *Synagōgē Technōn*—of early writings on rhetoric. There the new art is linked in a totally different way to conditions at Syracuse following the fall of the tyrants. It is not the requirements of democratic debate that inspire Corax and Tisias, but lawsuits over property, once the original owners began to claim land confiscated by the tyrants and then given or sold by them to others (*cum sublatis . . . tyrannis res privatae longo intervallo iudiciis repeterentur*). This account—whether or not it corresponds to anything in Syracusan history—certainly accords better than the Byzantine one with the testimony of Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle, who complain consistently that writers on public speaking concentrate on dicanic oratory to the total or nearly total exclusion of political oratory.<sup>14</sup> And the one Byzantine account of Corax (V 5–8 Walz, from Sopater's Hermogenes commentary) that fails to assign him any role in politics<sup>15</sup> is also the only one that contains a passage (V 6. 20–24) close enough in phraseology and organization of material to *Brut.* 46 to suggest the possibility of derivation from a common, Aristotelian source:

<sup>11</sup> When narrative is included in the *divisio* of political orations (see, for example, Anaximenes (?), *Rhet. ad Alex.* 30–31 and Syrianus, in *Hermogenem* II 170. 14–19 Rabe), it tends to be conceived as limited in scope (as in Anaximenes' rules for reporting an embassy) or tendentious in character (the *katastasis* of imperial rhetoricians—see below, note 43).

<sup>12</sup> That tripartition in this passage derives in some sense from an original quadripartition is very likely even if, as Wilcox argues (15–16), its author here preserves the Byzantine tradition in its original form. In replacing the triad with a tetrad or some other scheme suitable only to judicial oratory, later writers would have been simply spelling out what was implicit in their model.

<sup>13</sup> On the general accuracy of the claim, see—against the doubts of Solmsen (*Gnomon* 26 [1954] 218)—A. E. Douglas, "The Aristotelian *Synagōgē Technōn* after Cicero *Brutus* 46–48," *Latomus* 14 (1955) 536–39.

<sup>14</sup> See Hamberger 12–16, with the concurring judgments of Hinks 62–63 and Stegemann 143–44.

<sup>15</sup> Corax's political role is also missing from Rabe 6a = II 682–83 Walz, but that text is simply an abridgement of Sopater.

tum primum [after the fall of the Sicilian tyrants] . . . artem et praecepta Siculos Coracem et Tisiam conscripsisse: nam antea neminem solitum via nec arte, sed accurate tamen et de scripto plerosque dicere

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα [the age of the tyrants] Κόραξ πρῶτον ἀπάντων συνεστήσατο διδασκαλίαν περὶ ῥητορικῆς. οἱ γὰρ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἐπιτηδεύοντες τὴν τέχνην ὡς ἐμπειρία τινὶ καὶ ἐπιμελείᾳ χρῶμενοι ἐπετήδευον, καὶ οὕτως<sup>16</sup> μὲν οὐ μετὰ λόγου καὶ αἰτίας οὐδὲ τέχνης τινός<sup>17</sup>

—as do the similar lists of fifth- and fourth-century rhetoricians that follow, both in this account and in Cicero:

scriptasque fuisse et paratas a Protagora . . . disputationes qui nunc communes appellantur loci; quod idem fecisse Gorgias . . . huic Antiphontem Rhamnusium similia quaedam habuisse conscripta quo neminem umquam melius oravisse capitis causam . . . scripsit Thucydides; nam Lysiam primo profiteri solitum artem esse dicendi, deinde . . . artem removere; similiter Isocrates . . . se ad artes componendas transulisse.

τούτου δὲ τοῦ Κόρακος Τίσιας γέγονε μαθητής . . . καὶ Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντίνος κατὰ πρεσβειάν ἐλθὼν Ἀθήνησι τὴν τέχνην συγγραφεῖσαν παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐκόμισεν καὶ αὐτὸς ἑτέραν προσέθηκε καὶ μετ' αὐτὸν Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Ῥαμνούσιος, ὁ Θουκυδίδου διδάσκαλος λέγεται τέχνην γράψαι· μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ Ἰσοκράτης ὁ ῥήτωρ . . .

V 6. 24–7. 14 Walz

*Brutus* 47–48

(Note that both lists end, as one would expect in Aristotle, with Isocrates—not, as in the Prolegomena [Rabe 17, p. 273. 18–22 = IV 15. 17–20 Walz; Rabe 4, p. 28. 12–16 = VI 15. 19–16. 2 Walz], with the Hellenistic canon of Attic orators.<sup>18</sup>)

<sup>16</sup> οὕτως (Radermacher) or οὔτοι (Gercke) seems a necessary emendation for the transmitted οὔτος, which would make οὐ μετὰ τέχνης a description of Corax's own method and leave the nature of the contrast with earlier "empirical" rhetoricians completely unclear.

<sup>17</sup> The parallel (first pointed out by A. Gercke, "Die alte Τέχνη ῥητορική und ihre Gegner," *Hermes* 32 [1897] 344–45) would, of course, be more compelling were it possible to get any sense out of *de scripto* (often emended, not very satisfactorily, to *descripte*) in Cicero's text or from the equally puzzling καὶ αἰτίας in Sopater. In general, however, scholars have given it less attention than it deserves.

<sup>18</sup> The value of the parallels is not lessened by the illegitimate conclusions which Hamberger sought to draw from them (below, note 40). It would certainly be less if, as is

The difficulty of accommodating the "non-Sopatran," political Corax within either his immediate (textual) or larger (historical) context poses the problems raised thus far in their acutest form. One has the choice of radically recasting his role, or largely rejecting the entire Prolegomena tradition. Scholars in this century have opted, by and large, for the first alternative. There is widespread agreement on jettisoning everything we are told about the biography of Corax: both his preoccupation, before and after the revolution, with political manipulation and persuasion (incompatible with the *divisio* he is said to have devised and with fourth-century testimony about the overwhelmingly dicanic orientation of early writing on rhetoric)<sup>19</sup> and his lawsuit with Tisias (a floating story of indeterminate origin eventually attached to Corax because "Bad crow, bad egg" provided such an effective piece of closure).<sup>20</sup> The relationship between Corax and Tisias thereby becomes the purely generic one between two collaborators. The former is to be credited with a discussion of persuasive techniques organized and presented in the order in which they would appear in a "normal" dicanic speech of four (or more—see below) parts; the latter with expanding and improving the collection, or perhaps, in the event Corax's teaching was purely oral, with setting it down for the first time in writing. The second hypothesis has the advantage of explaining a further inconsistency between the Byzantine Corax and his predecessors. There is no hint, at any point before Hermias and the Prolegomena, of contrasting characters or separate

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generally assumed (cf., for example, Wilcox 9–10), the lines (V 7. 15–18 Walz) immediately following in Sopater maintained—against Aristotle and all other fourth-century sources—that the rhetorical works of Corax, Tisias and their immediate successors were exclusively concerned with political oratory. But what the lines in fact say is that these works were *δημαγωγικαὶ τέχναι*, devoting no space to *stasis* theory and preoccupied with *πιθανότητος* . . . *τινος*, *πῶς δὲ δῆμον ὑπαγαγέσθαι*. Since there is, so far as I know, no parallel for *dēmagōgikos* as a synonym for *dēmēgorikos* or *sympouleutikos*, the normal adjectives used in reference to political oratory, it is perfectly possible that the word means nothing more here than "popular" or "calculated to appeal to a large audience" (*ὑπαγωγίμος τοῦ δήμου*, as the phrase immediately following might suggest) whether in a popular law court or a popular assembly. If so, there is a possible parallel—and a further argument for derivation from the *Synagōgē*—to the contrast drawn in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* between the author's own conception of the discipline and that of his predecessors. Aristotelian rhetoric is centered around the study of the enthymeme; that of his predecessors is directed at the *akroatēs* and framed with his shortcomings (*mochthe'ria*, *phortikotēs*, *phaulotēs*) in mind (*Rhet.* 2. 21, 1395b1–2; 3. 1, 1404a8; 3. 14, 1415b5; 3. 18, 1419a18). What appears in Sopater may be nothing more than a "Hermogenized" and simplified version of this contrast. Enthymeme study is Hermogenized into *stasis* theory (compare *Rhet.* 1. 1, 1354a14–15 *περὶ* . . . *ἐνθυμημάτων οὐδὲν λέγουσι* with Sopater's *οὐδὲν περὶ στάσεων ἔχουσαι κεφάλαιον*, both in reference to the same body of texts); and Aristotle's intellectually limited audience (*akroatai phauloi*) is presented, more simply, as a lower-class one (*dēmos*).

<sup>19</sup> G. Kennedy is virtually alone among contemporary writers in his inclination to make Corax "a political speaker" and attribute to him "a division of speech suitable to deliberative oratory" (*The Art of Persuasion in Ancient Greece* [Princeton 1963] 60–61).

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Kowalski 1937, 47.

achievements for Corax and Tisias. We are always told what Tisias did (and taught),<sup>21</sup> or what Corax did,<sup>22</sup> or (beginning with Cicero in the *De oratore*)<sup>23</sup> what Tisias and Corax did—never what Corax, unlike Tisias, did, or the different things which each of them did.<sup>24</sup> The two figures seem to have been interchangeable—so much so that, as pointed out earlier, they are in fact interchanged in Hermias' text, the only one (outside the Prolegomena) which refers to them explicitly as master and student. This suggests that the ultimate source of all our information was a single report or a single set of documents in which the contributions of the two men were not clearly distinguished from each other.

So far the new consensus. A minority of scholars, however, among them the one to whose memory this collection of essays is dedicated, has explored, at least tentatively, the first, more radical alternative suggested above. In 1934 Friedrich Solmsen drew attention<sup>25</sup> to a "wichtiges, nicht genug ausgewertetes Zeugnis" of Aristotle concerning the character of "the art [of rhetoric] before Theodorus." According to *Rhet.* 2. 24, 1400b15–16, a certain type of argument from probability constituted "the entirety" of this art (πᾶσα ἡ πρότερον τοῦ Θεοδώρου τέχνη). Since Theodorus was the second after Tisias in the canonical succession of early writers on rhetoric, the statement, if true, makes it highly unlikely that Corax or Tisias dealt with anything but the proofs section of the four-part oration. Any kind of argumentation from probability (*eikos*) is largely excluded from the narrative

<sup>21</sup> Plato, *Phdr.* 267a, 273c, Aristotle, *Soph. El.* 32, 183b29, Theophrastus (*ap.* Radermacher 18, A. V. 17).

<sup>22</sup> Aristotle, *Rhet.* 2. 24, 1402a17, "Aristotle" in the anonymous preface to the spurious *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, Cicero, *De inv.* 2. 2. 6.

<sup>23</sup> 1. 91; cf. *Brut.* 46.

<sup>24</sup> Τεισίας μετὰ τοὺς πρῶτους heads Aristotle's list of contributors to the development of rhetoric at *Soph. El.* 32, 183b29 ff., and Corax is sometimes assumed (e.g., by Hinks 65–66) to be included among, or identified with, the πρῶτους. If so, Aristotle may be implying some sort of contrast between Corax's achievements and the more solid or clearly identifiable ones of his successor. But it is much more likely that the πρῶτοι are Empedocles (called the inventor of the discipline in Aristotle's *Sophist* [fr. 65 Rose = Radermacher 28, B. I. 1] and/or the divine patrons or mythical masters of effective speech—Hermes, Nestor, Odysseus—with whom the Prolegomena regularly begin and who probably played some role even in fourth-century accounts (Wilcox 8, with note 10) of the pre-history of the discipline: cf. *Crat.* 407e (Hermes), 398d (Greek ἥρωες so called because they were ῥήτορες τινες καὶ ἐρωτητικοί, *Phdr.* 261b (Nestor, Odysseus, Palamedes), and for what may be a distant echo of one of Aristotle's own formulations, Quintilian 3. 1. 8: *primus post eos quos poetae tradiderunt movisse aliqua circa rhetoricen dicitur Empedocles*. G. Kennedy ("The Ancient Dispute over Rhetoric in Homer," *AJP* 78 [1957] 23 ff.) regards the last passage quoted as Quintilian's own attempt to strike a compromise between those who categorically affirmed, and those who categorically denied, the existence of rhetoric in the age of the heroes; but this sort of compromise is typically Aristotelian. If primitive maxims and proverbs can count as philosophy (fr. 13 Rose = *De philos.* fr. 8 Ross), one would expect primitive eloquence and figures of speech to count as rhetoric.

<sup>25</sup> "Theodorus," *RE V A 2* (1934) 1842–44; cf. Hinks 68–69.



of a speech, and rarely if ever forms part of a proem or epilogue.<sup>26</sup> This, combined with Tisias' general addiction, well attested in Plato (*Phdr.* 267a, 272e, 273c–d) to *Eikostechnik*, and Theodorus' equally well attested (*Phdr.* 266d; Arist. *Rhet.* 3. 13, 1414b13–15) obsession with subdividing oratorical structures into their component parts (narrative, preparatory narrative, supplementary narrative, proof, supplementary proof, supplementary refutation, etc.) naturally points to the strong possibility that the entire topic of oratorical *divisio* was Theodorus' innovation.<sup>27</sup>

Solmsen's general doubts about the modern consensus—though not his views on Theodorus—were seconded several years later by Kroll,<sup>28</sup> and they have been carried a step further in two works completed in 1990—E. Schiappa's "The Beginnings of Greek Rhetorical Theory"<sup>29</sup> and my own *The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece*.<sup>30</sup> The starting point for both investigations is the contention—advanced as a surmise by me,<sup>31</sup> proved in so far as such things can ever be proved by Schiappa<sup>32</sup>—that the word "rhetoric" (first attested in the *Gorgias*) is Plato's own term, coined sometime in the 380s, for a set of techniques not hitherto seen as constituting a separate, definable discipline. Schiappa argues the unlikelihood of Tisias' having come up with anything like the systematic presentation of rhetorical techniques or theories which the notion of a definite art of *rhētorikē* suggests, and is inclined to doubt the tradition which

<sup>26</sup> Solmsen's own conclusion is more cautious, allowing for the possibility that there were pre-Theodoran discussions of other parts of the speech but that Aristotle chose to ignore them here because he is using *technē* to mean "der eigentliche Inhalt der τέχνης"—i.e., enthymeme or *Argumentationstechnik*. But he cites no parallel for this use of *technē* when what is meant is merely τὸ ἐντεχνον τῆς τέχνης.

<sup>27</sup> Solmsen's conclusion follows for Corax and Tisias even if, as I think rather more likely, ἡ πρότερον τοῦ Θεοδώρου τέχνη is a reference, not to "the art of rhetoric before Theodorus," but to "the earlier art of Theodorus," i.e., an earlier work of Theodorus written before the interest in *divisio* for which he was famous became apparent (cf. the variant reading προτέρα, which would, of course, require that the phrase be so translated). This interpretation, unlike Solmsen's, does not eliminate the possibility that *divisio* was already a concern of Thrasyarchus, Tisias' immediate follower in the sequence of early writers on rhetoric; but whatever the situation was with him, such concern is excluded for Corax by Aristotle's further observation (*Rhet.* 2. 24, 1402a17) a propos of another type of argument from probability, that it was "what the art of Corax is composed of" (*synkeimenē*).

<sup>28</sup> In "Rhetorik," *RE* Suppl. 7 (1940) 1046. The general difficulty of reconciling Corax's *Eikostechnik* and his supposed preoccupation with *dispositio* was first pointed out, to my knowledge, by W. Süss, *Ethos: Studien zur älteren griechischen Rhetorik* (Leipzig and Berlin 1910) 74.

<sup>29</sup> To appear in D. Zarefsky (ed.), *Rhetorical Movement: Essays in Honor of Leland M. Griffin* (Evanston 1992).

<sup>30</sup> Baltimore 1991. See, especially, Chapter 5, with the works of the earlier scholars (Gercke, Radermacher, Lesky, Barwick, Koch, Havelock) cited in nn. 11–12. To that list (on pp. 168–69), add Kowalski 1933, 37–38 and 44; Kowalski 1937, 85; and Solmsen's review of Radermacher (above, note 13) 214–15.

<sup>31</sup> *Origins* (previous note) 2 and 98–99.

<sup>32</sup> "Did Plato Coin *Rhētorikē*?" *AJP* 120 (1989) 460–73.

credits him with a written rhetorical handbook. My own reconstruction accepts the existence of the handbook but posits a collection of model pieces, analogous to those found in the *Tetralogies* of Antiphon and based on the principle of *eikos*: pleadings pro and con (or, more likely, compressed summary versions of such pleadings) on topics likely to come up in court cases—not an analytic set of precepts. The famous pair of arguments (associated with Tisias at *Phaedrus* 273b3–c4 and Corax at *Arist. Rhet.* 2. 24, 1402a18–21), in which a defendant's superior strength is adduced to establish first the likelihood and then the unlikelihood of his being guilty of having assaulted the plaintiff as charged, will have come from this collection—and perhaps the debate over non-payment of a teacher's fee as well.<sup>33</sup> Though not based on probability, the latter illustrates a similar process of turning an argument around against its original propounder.

My own reconstruction is less radical than Schiappa's and, unlike Schiappa or the Byzantine tradition or the modified version of it which constitutes the modern "consensus," it is compatible with all the fifth- and fourth-century evidence.<sup>34</sup> But neither reconstruction addresses itself to the problem of how and why the Byzantine tradition came into being in the first place. A partial explanation has been suggested by some of the architects of the modern consensus, but their arguments must be carried further if the de-Byzantinization process under way here is really to work.

It is generally agreed that the transfer of the activity of Corax from the dicanic to the political sphere is a post-Aristotelian development in the tradition, and it is fairly easy to see why the transfer took place. Political rhetoric, in the view of Isocrates (*Antid.* 46, *Paneg.* 4), followed here by Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1. 1, 1354b17 ff.), is a higher, more significant form than dicanic; that it should replace dicanic rhetoric in the discipline's foundation myth was almost inevitable once the view of Isocrates became authoritative, and once rhetoric itself had ceased to be, as it often was for Plato and Aristotle, a suspect discipline whose claims were to be disputed or curtailed, and had become, along with philosophy, the central ingredient in higher education. Its finest achievements were expected, quite naturally, to be

<sup>33</sup> *Poterat in arte sua . . . Tisias . . . ingenii ostendandi causa μελέτας componere in quibus talia perlustrarent unde ad ipsum auctorem fabula translata videatur* (L. Spengel, *Artium scriptores* [Stuttgart 1828] 33–34). Cf. Kowalski 1933, 43.

<sup>34</sup> For those portions of the evidence that are usually taken (erroneously, I believe) to point to the existence of organized collections of rhetorical precepts before the handbook of Theodectes and the earliest version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, see *Origins* (above, note 30) 130–33. One possible testimony not discussed there is *POxy* 410 (= Rademacher 231–32, D) an analysis, in Doric, of stylistic *megaloprepeia*, which its first editor believed to be "considerably influenced by Tisias' τέχνη" or even taken from a summary of the "productions of Tisias and his school" (cf. W. Rhys Roberts, "The New Rhetorical Fragment in Relation to the Sicilian Rhetoric of Corax and Tisias," *CR* 18 [1904] 18–21). But with the exception of Drerup (cf. Stegemann 142), Roberts' view has found no followers.

present, at least *in nucleo*, in the work of its *prōtos heuretēs*; and it is even possible that Corax's role in controlling and directing the passions of the Syracusan populace has arisen, ultimately, through a transfer into a particular historical situation of the civilizing, organizing role in the pre-history of the human race which certain laudatory texts assign either to eloquence (Isocrates 3. 6–9) or the first person to master it (Cicero, *De inv.* 1. 2. 2, *De or.* 1. 30 ff.).

A similar tendency to attribute everything that was basic in the discipline to its founder will explain why Corax came to be credited with the—ultimately—canonical Gorgianic or Platonic definition of rhetoric as the power or artifice of persuasion. Having invented for the benefit of his contemporaries the art of rhetoric, it was inevitable that Corax should have told them in briefest possible compass what it was.

It is impossible to pinpoint the period(s) or author(s) in which Corax began undergoing this metamorphosis, though Timaeus of Tauromenium—our earliest authority (cf. D. H. *De Lys.* 1, p. 11. 3 Us.–Rad.) for Gorgias' embassy to Athens—has often been suggested as its ultimate source.<sup>35</sup> The shifts involved, whether of scope (from minor achievement to major), venue (from courtroom to popular assembly) or narrative mode (from history to fiction) certainly point to the work of someone who, like Timaeus, was simultaneously Sicilian patriot, Sicilian “democrat”<sup>36</sup> and, if Polybius is to be believed, congenital liar.

On the other hand, neither patriotism nor republicanism nor general mendacity will explain Timaeus' concern with the technicalities of *divisio*, and he does not in fact figure in the modern consensus in this connection. The assumption is, rather, that one at least of the various *divisiones* (four in all) attributed to the Byzantine Corax must be an isolated remnant of the real Corax, faithfully recorded in Aristotle *Synagōgē*, but later transferred inappropriately from its original dicanic context into a political one.

There is little justification, however, for the separation thus posited between one aspect of Corax's traditional role as a *prōtos heuretēs* and all the others. Like all the others, this aspect is missing from the one Byzantine text (above, pp. 68–69) which shows a close verbal parallel to Cicero's summary of the *Synagōgē*. More important, the tetradic *divisio* encountered in three Prolegomena (above, pp. 67–68) is so canonical a feature of ancient rhetoric as a whole that it can, when linked to a listing of the presumed

<sup>35</sup> Radermacher (above, note 7) 412–19, followed by Hamberger 12–18 and Wilcox 20–23. Rabe ix and Schiappa (above, note 29) n. 51 remain unconvinced, perhaps with good reason: see text, p. 70.

<sup>36</sup> I.e., anti-monarchist, as may be inferred from his hatred of Agathocles. Wilcox (21–22) draws attention to the close parallels between Rabe 4, p. 25. 3–8 = VI 12. 6–10 Walz (the vowing of a cult in honor of *Zeus eleutherios* to be instituted once the dynasty of Hieron is expelled from Syracuse) and Diodorus' account, in a passage often thought to derive from Timaeus, of the actual institution of the cult after the expulsion had taken place (11. 72–73).

tasks (*erga*) or purposes of each of its four parts, function as a kind of alternative or supplementary definition. Rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion and, more particularly, the art of “proemizing” for good will and attentiveness, narrating for clarity and believability, arguing for proof and refutation, and “epilogizing” for summary and reminder (or perorating for pathos). To say that Corax invented rhetoric was tantamount to saying that he invented this four-fold way of conceiving his task and implementing its operation. The ease with which definition can become foundation myth is particularly clear in Rabe 9, pp. 125. 22–126. 18 = II 119. 18–29 Walz, which first describes how Corax produced his rhetorical inventions:

... φασιν εὐρετὴν πρῶτον γενέσθαι τὸν Κόρακα ... τὸν δῆμον ... συγκεχυμένον εὐρόντα καὶ ἵνα μὲν τὸ θορυβοῦν παύσῃ καὶ πείσῃ προσέχειν [1] τοὺς τῶν προοιμίων τόπους ἐπινοήσαντα· ἵνα δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ πράγματος σαφῶς διδάξῃ καὶ πιθανῶς [2] ... τὴν διήγησιν ἐπικατανοήαντα· ἵνα δὲ καὶ ... πείσῃ καὶ ἀποτρέψῃ [3] τοῖς ἀγῶσι χρησάμενον· ἵνα δὲ ... ἀναμνήσῃ πληρώσῃ δὲ καὶ τοῦ πάθους [4] ... καὶ τοὺς ἐπιλόγους καταστησάμενον,

and then goes on to add

τινὲς δὲ φασιν ἔργα τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἶναι τὸ προοιμιάσασθαι πρὸς εὐνοίαν ἢ προσοχήν ἢ εὐμάθειαν [1], τὸ διηγῆσασθαι πρὸς σαφήνειαν [2], τὸ πρὸς πίστιν ἀγωνίσασθαι [3], τὸ πρὸς ἀνάμνησιν ἐπιλογίσασθαι [4],

which is practically identical with the same author's formulation (Rabe 4, p. 32. 6–9 = VI 19. 5–8 Walz) of the Theodectean (above, p. 67) tetrad:

προοιμιάσασθαι πρὸς εὐνοίαν [1], διηγῆσασθαι πρὸς πιθανότητα [2], ἀγωνίσασθαι πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν [3], ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι πρὸς ἀνάμνησιν [4].<sup>37</sup>

It is just conceivable that the reverse process has occurred, and the definition has been generated from a genuine tradition about Corax's *divisio*. But this is highly improbable, given the fact that, though the *divisio* is basic to the organization of the third book of his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle never suggests that it is the work of any one writer from an earlier generation.

<sup>37</sup> = Aristotle, fr. 133 Rose. Cf. the alternative formulation in Rabe 13, p. 216. 1–4 = VII 33. 5–7 Walz: προοιμιάσασθαι πρὸς εὐνοίαν [1], διηγῆσασθαι πρὸς πιθανότητα [2], πιστώσασθαι πρὸς πειθῶ [3], ἐπιλογίσασθαι πρὸς ὀργὴν ἢ ἔλεον [4]. The same definitional tetrad may be used equally well to produce an anti-foundation myth—cf. Cicero's contention (ascribed to the Academic Chamaeas at *De or.* 1. 90) that it is ridiculous to posit a *prōtos heurētēs* for rhetoric, since it was perfectly within the capacity of anyone of us, as normal human beings, to *blandire* [1] *et rem gestam exponere* [2] *et id quod intenderemus confirmare et quod contra diceretur refellere* [3], *ad extremum deprecari et conqueri* [4], *quibus in rebus omnis oratorum versaretur facultas*. Quintilian makes the same point more briefly at 2. 17. 6.



What applies to the "historicization" of the Theodectean tetrad will also apply to the triadic *divisio* attributed to Corax in one of the Prolegomena. The latter, as was pointed out (above, p. 68), seems to have arisen through the minimal change necessary to accommodate the tetrad to a political context. The same cannot be said, however, for the pentadic and heptadic *divisiones* found in two of the Prolegomena: proem, narrative, *agōnes*, *parekbasis* (digression)<sup>38</sup> and epilogue (Rabe 17 [Marcellinus?], pp. 270. 22–271. 20 = IV 12. 17–13. 19 Walz), or the same, with narrative called *katastasis* instead of *diēgēsis*, and with the insertion of *proparaskeuē* (preliminary presentation) and *prokatastasis* (preliminary narrative) between it and the proem (Rabe 5 [Troilus], p. 52. 8–20 = VI 49. 1–20 Walz). It is clear that both Troilus' heptad and Marcellinus' pentad result from insertions into a tradition that elsewhere derives from the same source as do the Prolegomena with a briefer *divisio*. The extra parts required to produce them are simply named and defined, with no effort, as there is for the four parts shared with the other *divisio*, to indicate the purpose which they serve in the process of political persuasion (digression and *proparaskeuē* are assigned a purely dicanic function [see below], and *prokatastasis* has the merely formal one of preparing the way for the *katastasis* itself). But what is to guarantee that this different source is a later source? The tetradic *divisio* itself may be an insertion into a tradition that originally contained the triadic adaptation of it found in one text (above, p. 68, with note 12); only its widespread use elsewhere and the existence of independent testimony linking it to Theodectes prevents us from seriously entertaining the possibility that its ultimate source is Corax himself. Since the pentad and heptad are so rarely encountered,<sup>39</sup> the most economical explanation for their presence in the Prolegomena is that one or the other of them derives from a genuine report or memory of the actual content of Corax's text.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>38</sup> The reading in all but one of the passages where this section is mentioned and presumably to be read there (p. 52. 14–15 Rabe = VI 49. 8 Walz) in place of the transmitted *parekthesin*.

<sup>39</sup> The heptad only in Troilus and the set of *confuse annexae . . . definitiones, divisiones, interpretationes* (Rabe lxiii) adjoined in one set of manuscripts (cf. p. 212. 17–19 Rabe = VII 25. 8–10 Walz) to what now appears as Rabe 13. For the pentad, see text, p. 79.

<sup>40</sup> The seven parts of Troilus, in particular, "are to a certain degree recommended by their singularity," whereas "the four canonical . . . *partes orationis* we suspect just because we should expect to find them referred back to the inventor of the Art" (Hinks 68). Hinks, like several others, seems unable either to accept, or find decisive considerations against, the authenticity (argued at length in Hamburger, 31–38) of Troilus' heptad. Cf. Radermacher 34, ad B. II. 23 (*ea . . . fortasse ex Aristotele provenit memoria, scimus autem in terminis technicis inveniendis primos auctores quasi delirasse*) and Stegemann 146. Hamberger has, however, found no followers (cf. Hinks 68) in his attempt (7–8 and 31 ff.) to establish an Aristotelian origin for the *context* within which the heptad appears. (The argument rests on supposed parallels with the remarks on the beginnings of rhetoric in Sopater's scholia to Hermogenes [V 5–8 ff. Walz], the only late rhetorical text which has been thought [see text, pp. 68–69] to contain close echoes of the *Synagōgē Technōn*.)

Though the possibility can obviously not be excluded, it seems to me to be, on balance, a fairly unlikely one. There is no reason to disbelieve Cicero when he says (*De inv.* 2. 2. 6) that Aristotle's *Synagōgē* drove all the works it summarized out of circulation. Authentic notice of a five- or seven-part system of Corax would have had to be taken directly from some Aristotelian *Mittelquelle*, and then reinserted by Troilus and Marcellinus into an account derived indirectly—via Timaeus or whoever—from the same Aristotelian source. And it is hard to see any reason either for the original division of the two transmissions—direct and indirect—or their later reunification.

There are, moreover, clear difficulties in both the pentadic and heptadic *divisiones* which make it unlikely that either could ever have been intended as the basic organizing system for a course of practical instruction in public speaking. Digression (*parekbasis*) as defined by both Troilus and Marcellinus is an excursus on the prior life of the accused (ἀπόδειξιν . . . τοῦ κρινομένου βίου [Troilus] ≈ τὴν προτέραν τοῦ ἐναγομένου διαγωγὴν [Marcellinus]) designed to ensure conviction even if the case immediately at hand fails to do so. As such it is relevant to only half the judicial cases—those for the prosecution—with which the student is likely to be confronted. As if to correct this fault the longer *divisio* of Troilus balances *parekbasis* with an exact counterpart: the *proparaskeuē*, dedicated to removing a (presumably) preexisting charge that is doing the speaker harm (αἰτίαν λυποῦσαν αὐτόν). The result, however, is a model oration plan which by virtue of including both *proparaskeuē* and *parekbasis* presupposes a speech that is simultaneously for the prosecution and for the defense. We seem to be dealing with a tradition that is Byzantine in more ways than one.<sup>41</sup>

Comparable difficulties attend the *katastasis* and *prokatastasis* in the heptadic *divisio*. Both terms are well attested in the imperial rhetoricians, but Troilus' definition of the former (ψιλὴν τῶν πραχθέντων ἔκθεσιν) makes it exactly what the imperial *katastasis* is not. Bare narrative is regularly *diēgēsis*, *katastasis* being the term used when some sort of slanting, or coloring, or skewing is called for.<sup>42</sup> Troilus' point of departure may have been the tradition, attested in a single source (Syrianus in *Hermogenem* 2, p. 127. 4 Rabe = Radermacher 35, B. II. 24) that *katastasis*

<sup>41</sup> A section, toward the beginning of a speech for the defense, countering *aitiai* of the sort Troilus refers to is frequent enough, both in fourth-century oratory and fourth-century rhetoric: cf. the suggestions for dealing with *diabolai* in Arist. *Rhet.* 3. 15 and Anaximenes (?), *Rhet. ad Alex.* 29, pp. 61. 11–64. 23 Fuhrmann. But Hamberger's attempt (105 ff.) to detect its presence in the three earliest surviving pieces of fifth-century oratory (Antiphon 1, 5 and 6) seems to me to involve an artificial *Gliederung* which isolates from their surroundings sections that in two cases are better taken with the introduction, and in the third with the narrative.

<sup>42</sup> See D. A. Russell, *Greek Declamation* (Cambridge 1983) 88, with n. 6, and Kowalski 1933, 45–50.

was Corax's word for "proem." He reconciles this with the usage with which he was more familiar by assuming that Corax must have recognized two subspecies: a "proemic" or "pro-"*katastasis* (cf. his definition: εἰσβολὴν καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ προοίμιον . . . ἐπὶ τὴν κατάστασιν) and a "diegetic" *katastasis*, which he inaccurately identifies with what went by that name among his own contemporaries. Whether the tradition about Corax that inspired this subdivision was correct or not, Troilus' use of it tells us nothing about the original organization of Corax's text.<sup>43</sup>

Even granting, however, that the *divisiones* including *prokatastasis*, *parekbasis* and *proparaskeuē* are unlikely to be much older than the texts in which they are attested, one may still wonder what impelled their authors to seek out a five- or seven-part system in the first place. A possibility worth considering is that Troilus and Marcellinus were influenced here by another multi-partite classification which they share, and which appears nowhere else in the Prolegomena. Both authors present their account of Corax's invention of rhetoric as an illustration of the way any act of creation can be described and accounted for in terms of the particular "determining circumstances" (*peristatika*) that accompany it. These are five in number: the where, when, who, why and how of its coming into being. In the case of rhetoric the "where" is Sicily, the "when" the period following the fall of the tyrants, the "who" Corax, the "why" the desire to control the process of popular decision-making, the "how" the five or seven parts of an oration. It is conceivable, therefore, that the number of subdivisions in the "how" was regulated at some point in the development of the tradition in such a way as to make it equal to the number of *peristatika*. The suggestion is supported by the fact that Troilus actually mentions—though he does not accept—a variant list of seven *peristatika* (pp. 51. 26–52. 2 Rabe = VI 48. 22–25 Walz) which would match his own heptadic *divisio*, and refrains—as if

<sup>43</sup> If *katastasis* was in fact the word Corax used for the first part of a speech, it may have been used, along with *agōnes* (the only other piece of terminology in the passages on *divisio* under examination here that has a fifth-century ring about it), to refer to the essential recurring components of the sort of collection of model pieces which, it was suggested in the text (p. 73), Corax produced. Arguments pro and con (*agōnes*) would have to be preceded in every instance by a "setting up" (*katastasis*) of the basic facts of the situation which the arguments presupposed (cf., in the most famous collection of model rhetorical pieces surviving from antiquity, the two- or three-line settings of the stage which introduce individual items in the *Controversiae* of Seneca, and—for the fifth-century texts which support this meaning of *katastasis*—*Origins* [above, note 30] 83, with n. 14). Later usage may derive from the meaning suggested here, normally identifying *katastasis* (as what precedes the arguments section of a speech) with the *diēgēsis*, but occasionally (as what begins a speech) with the proem (cf. *Rhet. ad Alex.* 29, pp. 64. 24 and 65. 9 Fuhrmann). Like Troilus, the author of Rabe 15, p. 247. 21–22 = VII 43. 1–2 Walz (τὰ . . . προοίμια καταστατικά τοῦ ἀγώνος λαμβάνομεν) may be attempting to reconcile the two senses, but through elimination of the *diēgēsis* rather than addition of a proemic *katastasis*.

seeking to avoid a clash with the five *peristatika* he does accept—from ever explicitly mentioning the number of parts in that *divisio*.<sup>44</sup>

The longer list of *peristatika* is derived from the shorter (by including, illogically, raw material [*hylē*] and product [*pragma*] among the *peristatika* that attend the conversion of the one into the other); and the same may hold true, as was suggested earlier, for the longer list of speech parts: *Proparaskueē* is a *parekbasis* for the defense, and *prokatastasis* is produced by mating the *katastasis* attributed to Corax with its imperial counterpart. As for the shorter list, *parekbasis* would have been a natural candidate for inclusion once the original decision to convert the standard tetradic *divisio* into a pentad had been made. It is the extra ingredient—a *digressio* comprising an *orationem a causa atque iudicationem remotam* introduced between argument and conclusion<sup>45</sup>—in the five-part system best known to Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic writers, that of Hermagoras (F 22a–d Matthes); and it might have been considered a speech part with which Corax had a special affinity. Small wonder—so the reasoning would have gone—if the creator of a tradition stigmatized by Aristotle for dwelling on *ta exō tou pragmatos*<sup>46</sup> decided, once he had devised the four-part system, that there was still need for a special spot in each speech set aside exclusively for such irrelevancies.<sup>47</sup>

Other reconstructions are obviously possible, but their possibility does not in itself justify tracing the five- and seven-part oratorical models found in the Prolegomena to anything but some sort of later variant on the four-part form that characterizes most of the tradition. The modern consensus that strips Corax of all but the authorship of a handbook defining rhetoric and analyzing the form of the juridicial oration on the one hand and, on the other, some sort of preoccupation with arguments based on probability

<sup>44</sup> Contrast the concluding reference to the “how” in Marcellinus (τὰ μέρη πέντε τοῦ λόγου, echoing πέντε δὲ εἰσὶ τινα περιστατικά five lines earlier [p. 271. 21–26 Rabe = IV 13. 19–25 Walz]) with its counterpart in Troilus (διὰ τῶν ἐπινοηθέντων αὐτῶν μερῶν τοῦ λόγου taking up the earlier διὰ τῶν πέντε περιστατικῶν [p. 52. 20–27 Rabe = VI 49. 15–20 Walz]). Note also that Troilus does not mention the six-part “how” known to Syrianus (*ad Hermogenem* 2, p. 39. 17–19 Rabe)—perhaps because it has no parallel in either of the *divisiones* found in the branch of the Prolegomena tradition to which he and Marcellinus belong.

<sup>45</sup> Cic. *De inv.* 1. 51. 97; cf. Radermacher (above, note 7) 414 n. 2.

<sup>46</sup> *Rhet.* 1. 1, 1354a12 and b23. Cf. in Marcellinus (p. 271. 2–3 Rabe = IV 13. 1–2 Walz) the unintelligible phrase καὶ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος διηγείται (a definition of what the *parekbasis* does). Here the simplest emendation is an inserted πρό (Rabe) or (more in line with the meaning of *parekbasis*) ἔξω or ἐκτός. Either of the latter would result in a duplication (τὰ (ἔξω) τοῦ πράγματος) or approximation of Aristotle’s own phrase.

<sup>47</sup> That either Hermagoras or Marcellinus took his pentad from the *Rhet. ad Alex.*—or earlier texts drawn on by its author—is unlikely, given the different terminology used there for the five parts (proem, *diēgēsis*, *bebaiōsis*, *ta pros tous antidikous*, and *palilogia*) and the fundamentally different character of the section corresponding to *parekbasis*: an anticipation of one’s opponent’s arguments, not a digression into *ad hominem* irrelevance.



should be revised in favor of one which leaves him with nothing but the latter. And Timaeus' role should be similarly reduced—to that of (at most) replacing Aristotle's dicanic context for Corax's invention of rhetoric with a political one: the situation following the fall of the Syracusan tyrants when ἐπεπόλαζε . . . δημαγωγῶν πλῆθος . . . καὶ λόγου δεινότης ὑπὸ τῶν νεωτέρων ἡσκεῖτο (Diodorus 11. 87. 5). Diodorus may well derive at this point from a Timaeian account in which Corax was named as one of the *plēthos* or, more likely, as the first teacher of *logōn deinotēs* to the young; but his political preeminence, before and after the revolution, and his role as discoverer and definer of rhetoric and its basic parts, make far more sense as inseparable components of a coherent foundation myth than either does as the invention of a Sicilian historian.<sup>48</sup>

As for Corax himself, or what is left of him, it is natural to wonder whether continued existence in histories of ancient rhetoric is desirable at all, stripped as he has been of most of the *chorēgia*—offices, political status, pupils, progeny intellectual and literary—without which living, or at any rate living well, is impossible. Antiquity records, to my knowledge, only one other Corax from the historical period: the man who killed the poet Archilochus in a battle fought on the island of Naxos at some point toward the middle of the seventh century.<sup>49</sup> Plutarch, along with Aelian (fr. 80 Hercher) and, later, the *Suda* (s.v. Ἀρχίλοχος), says that Corax was an epithet: The man's real name seems (ἔοικεν) to have been Calandes.<sup>50</sup> One naturally wonders how Plutarch came to be informed so exactly on such a matter—probably not through independent research into the prosopography of seventh-century Naxos. Name as well as epithet may have been preserved on some document kept in the Archilocheum on Paros and available for consultation there. It is just as likely, however—since the real name merely “seems” to have been Calandes—that Plutarch (or his source) found earlier accounts in disagreement on this point<sup>51</sup> and simply assumed on the basis of

<sup>48</sup> Those inclined to go along with V. Farenga's deconstructionist reading of the myth (“Periphrasis on the Origin of Rhetoric,” *Modern Language Notes* 94 [1979] 1033–53) will have even less reason to attribute any of it to Sicilian invention. Essential to Farenga's interpretation is the story—present in two Prolegomena (Rabe 4, pp. 24. 16–25. 3 and 17, pp. 269. 25–270. 3 = VI 11. 12–12. 5 and IV 11. 18–24 Walz)—of how Hieron's suppression of free speech forced his subjects to communicate through gestures and dance steps; and this is surely too preposterous, even for Timaeus.

<sup>49</sup> Aristotle, fr. 611. 25 Rose = fr. viii (FHG II 214) in the collection of excerpts from Aristotle's *Politeiai* erroneously transmitted under the name Heraclides Ponticus. The phrase mentioning Corax is missing in some manuscripts, and Rose prints it in his apparatus, evidently assuming that it has been added from elsewhere to fill a lacuna in the text of “Heraclides” himself. Cf. Müller ad loc.

<sup>50</sup> *De sera num. vind.* 17, 325d–e.

<sup>51</sup> Eusebius (*Praep. Ev.* 5. 93. 9) gives a third variant, Archias (usually assumed to be a corruption of Kalandas). In other passages mentioning the poet's death (listed in Lasserre's edition, cvii–cviii) no name is given at all.

his own experience that Corax had to be the nickname: Greek parents were not in the habit of calling their children crows.

This rule may have admitted of exceptions in the Sicilian context with which we are concerned, but assuming an exception in the present case requires an additional, equally questionable assumption. Would any Greek named Crow—especially if he were a Siceliot (*acuta illa gens et controversa natura*)<sup>52</sup>—be ill-advised enough to try to make a living by teaching the art of public speaking? Even if it did not occur to his compatriots themselves to identify lessons in eloquence from the Crow with lessons in cawing and squawking they had only to recollect Pindar's famous lines, from a poem premiered at Agrigentum in 476 B.C., when Corax was a boy or young man, in which an unidentified group of lesson-takers—cacophonous rivals (or, perhaps, inept imitators and explicators) of the poet—are compared to a pair of crows who chatter fruitlessly against or about the eagle of Zeus (μαθόντες . . . κόρακες ὥς ἄκραντα γαρύετον Διὸς πρὸς ὄρνιχα, *Ol.* 2. 86–88).

That Pindar's simile is not irrelevant to the tradition about Corax was surmised over a century ago by Verrall.<sup>53</sup> Verrall's own version of the connection—that the two crows are literally the "two" Coraxes, Corax and his pupil Tisias—has the disadvantage of being incompatible, both with the Pindaric context of the passage<sup>54</sup> and the tradition, at least as old as Aristotle, which places Corax's activity as a teacher after the fall of Hieron and his dynasty (466/5). What the passage does show is how natural it would have been, in fifth-century Sicily, to associate loud and frequent, or inept and unwelcome, discourse with the chatter of crows; and so, as a consequence, how unlikely it is that Corax was anything but a name bestowed after—not before—its bearer had started to teach people how to speak.

The epithet may have been totally derisive and contemptuous, or derisive and affectionate at the same time. The question cannot be answered. But if one asks what Corax was called before he got his new name, the answer is almost inevitable: Tisias. Much that is puzzling in the earlier stages of the tradition is thereby explained—the inability on the part of any sources earlier than Sextus to distinguish the one figure from the other, the frequency with which the name Corax carries overtones of uncertainty or contempt (*Coracem istum veterem* [Cic. *De or.* 3. 81], *usque a Corace nescioquo* [ibid. 1. 91], τὴν τοῦ Τισίου τέχνην . . . τὸ δυσκόρακος ἔργον

<sup>52</sup> Cicero's own explanation (*Brut.* 46) for why rhetoric should have arisen in Sicily rather than somewhere else.

<sup>53</sup> "Korax and Tisias," *Journal of Philology* 9 (1880) 197 ff., developing a suggestion offered (p. 130) in an earlier article, "ΤΟΠΟΣ, ΤΟΠΗ (?), and ΤΟΠΑΩ," published in the same issue.

<sup>54</sup> Whatever the exact point being made, it is clear that the crows in some sense want their cawing to be attended to along with, or instead of, the eagle's light; and it is hard to

[Lucian, *Pseudolog.* 30],<sup>55</sup> τί θαυμαστὸν εἰ Κόρακος ἐφευρόντος τὴν ῥητορικὴν οἱ ἄπ' ἐκείνου κόρακες εἰσιν;<sup>56</sup>) and—most tellingly perhaps—the peculiar language in the earliest surviving reference to either man:

δεινῶς γ' ἔοικεν ἀποκεκρυμμένην τέχνην εὐρεῖν ὁ Τεισίας ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις δὴ ποτ' ὦν τυγχάνει καὶ ὀπόθεν χαίρει ὀνομαζόμενος (Plato, *Phdr.* 273a).

In the light of the Byzantine tradition and its immediate forerunners, Socrates' reference at this point to "Tisias or someone else, whoever he is and whatever he likes to be called" is usually taken, following Hermias,<sup>57</sup> as a way of indicating that credit for the "art" of Tisias was disputed between him and another older, more obscure figure. But if the later tradition did not exist—and there is no independent evidence to suggest that it did exist in Plato's day—the most natural way of taking the passage would be as a reference to uncertainty about the identity of Tisias himself, not his collaborator: "Tisias or whoever else he [the man sometimes known as Tisias] happens to be and whatever the source of the name he prefers to go by." One would not necessarily suspect a further, malicious reference to the fact that anyone in his right mind would prefer *not* to have got a nickname in the way Tisias did; but if the nickname was Corax and Plato knew it, the reference is almost certain to be there. Onomastic precision is surely the last thing Socrates is aiming at in this passage.<sup>58</sup>

That "How to Speak as Taught by Tisias" (ἡ τοῦ Τισίου λόγων τέχνη) should become so widely known by the alternative title, "How to Speak as Taught by the Crow" (ἡ τοῦ κόρακος λόγων τέχνη), as to lead to ignorance of the author's real name and, later, to positing the existence of two authors would not be surprising, even today, in certain parts of the Mediterranean world. And what applies there now applies a fortiori to that world in antiquity:

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see any comparable relationship between Pindaric song and the teachings of Corax and Tisias.

<sup>55</sup> Lucian's apparent equation of the "art" of Tisias with the activity (*ergon*) of the "damnable Crow" is even more suggestive of the view of Corax proposed here, as is Corax's appearance as an emblematic *corvus* atop a standard carried by Tisias at Martianus Capella 5. 433–34, p. 150 Willis. Both passages, however, are too vaguely allusive to allow any firm conclusions as to the form in which the story was familiar to their respective authors.

<sup>56</sup> Isocrates' supposed reply (Apophtegmata δ' 1, p. 278 Blass-Benseler) upon being asked why the populace is in the habit of being robbed and cheated by its rhetors.

<sup>57</sup> Ad loc., p. 251. 8–9 Couvreur.

<sup>58</sup> Knowledge of the epithet may also have been one of the things that suggested to Plato the prominent and contrasting role assigned in the *Phaedrus* to another famous Tisias with an alias. Tisias the Chorus-Master—i.e. Stesichorus (cf. the Suda, s.v.)—is as surely a patron saint of "good" rhetoric in the first part of the dialogue as Tisias the Crow is of "bad" rhetoric in the second.

Anyone familiar with the village life of central and southern Italy knows how difficult it is to identify a person by his name but how easy it is to locate him through the nickname known to the people of the area in which he lives—

from which the author<sup>59</sup> rightly concludes, inferring ancient practice from modern, that the appearance in archaic Greek poetry of what are obviously *redende Namen* need not mean that the persons who bear them are fictitious. Alessandro Manzoni had presumably made the same observation about village life in the 1820s; and he, too, drew inferences about an earlier period, when he came to write his famous novel of seventeenth-century Lombardy:

Fate a mio modo [Agnese is launching Renzo on his ill-fated attempt to seek out the services of a lawyer/*rhētôr* to counter the designs of Don Rodrigo] . . . andate a Lecco . . . cercate del dottor Azzecca-garbugli,<sup>60</sup> raccontategli. Ma non lo chiamate così, per amor del cielo: è un soprannome. Bisogna dire il signor dottor— Come si chiama, ora? Oh to'! non lo so il nome vero: lo chiaman tutti a quel modo. Basta, cercate di quel dottore alto, asciutto, pelato, col naso rosso, e una voglia di lampone sulla guancia. . . . quello è una cima d'uomo! Ho visto io più d'uno ch'era più impiccato che un pulcino nella stoppa, e non sapeva dove batter la testa, e, dopo essere stato un'ora a quattr'occhi col dottor Azzecca-garbugli (badate bene di non chiamarlo così!) l'ho visto, dico, ridersene . . .<sup>61</sup>

A certain “tio Buscabeatas, aunque no era este su verdadero nombre . . .” is the protagonist of a story of village life near Cádiz by a Spanish contemporary of Manzoni<sup>62</sup>—and the examples could doubtless be multiplied. Tisias was probably as powerless as Doctor Azzecca-garbugli to suppress the name to which local reaction to the infancy of rehearsed courtroom eloquence was condemning him and his fledglings. Only the published version of his model pieces, informing readers, at least down to Aristotle's day, of the author's identity, and preserving some true memory of ὁπόθεν χαίρει ὀνομαζόμενος, ultimately saved him from the fate of his Manzonian counterpart—though at the price of condemning historians of ancient rhetoric to a bimillenary case of seeing double.

Many of those historians will doubtless continue to prefer the double vision. But even if they do, they may well find that this “antonomastic” accounting for Corax is at least *ben trovato*. What more appropriate fate for the putative founder of the entire rhetorical tradition, with the centuries-long

<sup>59</sup> B. Gentili, *Poetry and its Public in Ancient Greece* (Engl. transl. Baltimore 1988) 294–95.

<sup>60</sup> Dr. Shystermeister (lit., “Spy out the ploy”) is surely—ὁπόθεν χαίρει μεταφραζόμενος—a spiritual as well as onomastic analogue to Corax.

<sup>61</sup> *I promessi sposi*, cap. 2.

<sup>62</sup> Pedro Antonio de Alarcón, *El libro talonario*.



study of figural speech it incorporates, than to be finally revealed as nothing more—or nothing less—than a figure of speech himself?

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## The Creatures and the Blood

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One cannot read the *Oresteia* without being haunted by the theme of perpetually shed blood or without being struck by the prevalence in it of animal imagery.<sup>1</sup> One cannot read that trilogy either without a sense not only of an archaic style but of an atmosphere that is more than archaic, that is in the *Choephoroe* primitive, in the *Eumenides* almost primeval.

The primordial atmosphere of the *Oresteia* is created in large part by the style, for a characteristic of the archaic style is the technique of juxtaposition.<sup>2</sup> Just as Aeschylus uses one or two nouns or even a compound of two nouns to modify another noun and so multiplies the value of each element,<sup>3</sup> just as he uses compound nouns with both active and passive meanings and so creates deliberate ambiguities,<sup>4</sup> so he also juxtaposes words, themes, and images so that his audience in a subconscious but stereoscopic perception acquires an uncanny sense of some primeval significance in the *Oresteia*. The significance of the animal imagery lies in its constant juxtaposition to the factual or metaphorical mention of blood. If this juxtaposition were limited to scenes of sacrifice,<sup>5</sup> it would be neither surprising nor perhaps of particular import. Since, however, it is not so limited but occurs throughout in both the thought and the underthought of the trilogy,<sup>6</sup> it is extremely important: It is in fact the

<sup>1</sup> On the theme of ever-flowing blood see A. Lebeck, *The Oresteia* (Cambridge, MA 1971) 80–91. On animal imagery in the trilogy see R. Latimore, *The Oresteia* (Chicago 1953) 16–17 and B. H. Fowler, "Aeschylus' Imagery," *C&M* 28 (1969) 23–74.

<sup>2</sup> B. A. van Groningen, *La Composition littéraire archaïque grecque* (Amsterdam 1958) 29–33; R. A. Prier, *Archaic Logic* (The Hague 1976) 11.

<sup>3</sup> E.g., *Agam.* 403–04: ἀσπίστορας / κλόνους λοχισμούς τε καὶ ναυβάτας ὀπλισμούς.

<sup>4</sup> For a detailing of this technique see K. A. Kelley, *Aeschylus' Use of Compound Adjectives* (Diss. University of Wisconsin–Madison 1975).

<sup>5</sup> On the imagery of sacrifice see especially F. Zeitlin, "The Motif of the Corrupted Sacrifice in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*," *TAPA* 96 (1965) 463–508 and "Postscript to Sacrificial Imagery in the *Oresteia* (*Agam.* 1235–37)," *TAPA* 97 (1966) 645–53. On the interlacing of animal and sacrificial imagery see P. Vidal-Naquet, "Chasse et sacrifice dans l'*Orestie* d'Eschyle," *PP* 24 (1969) 401–25.

<sup>6</sup> I take the expression from Gerard Manley Hopkins, who on January 14, 1883, wrote to Alexander William Baillie, "My thought is that in any lyric passage of the tragic poets (perhaps not so much in Euripides as the others) there are—usually; I will not say always,

clue to the most profound meaning of the *Oresteia*. That meaning lies in the presence, from the very beginning, of the Erinyes.

The Erinyes developed from the winged spirits or "bacilli" that caused old age, death, and disease.<sup>7</sup> Originally they were the Keres-Erinyes, "death-spirits angered," and their anger usually arose from the fact that they belonged to persons who had been murdered. They were in fact the outraged souls of the murdered dead. By the time of Homer, however, they were no longer the souls themselves but rather the avengers of souls. In the *Iliad* (9. 571) Althaea calls upon the Erinyes to avenge the death of her brothers. Since the Erinyes is female and single, she is clearly not the ghosts or souls of both or either of the brothers. Elsewhere in Homer the Erinyes are avengers of crimes against blood relatives on either the mother's or the father's side (*Il.* 19. 454; 21. 412), and at last, in the case of Achilles' horses (*Il.* 19. 418), they have become the agents of the fates or even the fates of death itself.<sup>8</sup> In Aeschylus' *Oresteia* we have Erinyes who are at one level avengers in the Homeric sense but who in many respects revert to the more primitive pre-Homeric concept of them as the outraged souls of the dead.

In the first chorus of the *Agamemnon* Agamemnon and Menelaus are described as shrieking (κλάζοντες) Ares, like eagles that wheel high over the nest because they have lost the tendance of their nestlings. Some god, Apollo, Pan, or Zeus, hears their shrill bird cry (οἰωνόθροον γόον ὄξυβόαν) and sends a late-avenging Erinyes (ὑστερόποινον . . . Ἐρινύν) against the transgressors (48-59). The image refers most immediately to Helen, but the

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it is not likely—two strains of thought running together and like counterpointed; the overthought that which everybody, editors, see (when one does see anything—which in the great corruption of the text and original obscurity of the diction is not everywhere) and which might for instance be abridged or paraphrased in square marginal blocks as in some books carefully written; the other, the underthought, conveyed chiefly in the choice of metaphors etc used and often only half realised by the poet himself, not necessarily having any connection with the subject in hand but usually having a connection and suggested by some circumstance of the scene or of the story. I cannot prove that this is really so except by a large induction of examples and perhaps not irrefragably even then nor without examples can I even make my meaning plain. I will give only one, the chorus with which Aeschylus' *Suppliants* begins. The underthought which plays through this is that the Danaids flying from their cousins are like their own ancestress Io teased by the gadfly and caressed by Zeus and the rest of that foolery. E.g. διάν δὲ λιποῦσαι / χθόνα σύγχροτον Συρία φεύγομεν: the suggestion is of a herd of cows feeding next a herd of bulls. . . . Then comes δέξαιθ' ἰκέτην / τὸν θηλυγενῆ στόλον αἰδοίφ / πνεύματι χάρας: this alludes to the ἐπίπνοια by which Eraphus was conceived—ἀρσενιοπληθῆ δ' / ἑσμὸν ὑβριστὴν Αἰγυπτογενῆ etc: this suggests the gadfly. Perhaps what I ought to say is that the underthought is commonly an echo or shadow of the overthought, something like canons and repetitions in music, treated in a different manner, but that sometimes it may be independent of it." (*Further Letters of Gerard Manley Hopkins*, ed. C. C. Abbott [Oxford 1956] 252-53).

<sup>7</sup> J. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* (Cambridge 1903) 165-75.

<sup>8</sup> Harrison (previous note) 213-17.

fact that the nestlings are plural (παίδων) and that the Erinyes is late-avenging makes the figure refer to the children of Thyestes as well. The Atreidae in their expedition for Helen are fulfilling Thyestes' curse upon the house of Atreus. The concept of a nestling child also suggests Iphigenia whose loss, another result of the curse, will in time be avenged.<sup>9</sup> The verb κλάζω is frequently used for the shrieking of birds (e.g. Hom. *Il.* 10. 276; 17. 756; Soph. *Ant.* 112) and, in the *Odyssey*, of the baying of hounds (14. 30). The Erinyes as developments of the winged Keres were akin to the Sirens and Harpies, bird-women.<sup>10</sup> The priestess at *Eumenides* 50–51 describes the Erinyes as Harpies without wings (Φινέως γεγραμμένας / δειπνον φερούσας· ἄπτεροί . . .), and Orestes at *Choephoroe* 1054 calls them his mother's wrathful hounds (ἔγκοτοι κύνες).

Calchas interprets the omen of the eagles devouring the hare together with her young before their birth (*Agam.* 119–20) as the taking in time of Troy. That may be its immediate meaning, but his very next words suggest other, more ominous meanings. May no malice from the gods, he prays, darken the mighty bit forged for Troy by the army, "for holy Artemis is angry at the winged hounds of her father for sacrificing a wretched, trembling creature together with her young before their final course; she loathes the eagles' feast" (*Agam.* 131–37).<sup>11</sup> The alternate translation of αὐτότοκον πρὸ λόχου, "his own child on behalf of the army," makes the omen predict the sacrifice of Iphigenia,<sup>12</sup> who, sacrificed as a virgin, will be deprived of children. That the fetuses are plural makes the portent also recall the feast of Thyestes, which is the cause of all the action that follows.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>9</sup> B. M. W. Knox, "The Lion in the House," *CP* 47 (1952) 18; R. J. Rabel, "The Lost Children of the *Oresteia*," *Eranos* 82 (1984) 211–13.

<sup>10</sup> Harrison (above, note 7) 176–79; 197–206.

<sup>11</sup> Among the many interpretations of this omen see W. Whallon, "Why is Artemis Angry?" *AJP* 82 (1961) 78–88; H. Lloyd-Jones, "The Guilt of Agamemnon," *CQ* 56 (1962) 187–99; J. J. Peradotto, "The Omen of the Eagles and the ΗΘΟΣ of Agamemnon," *Phoenix* 23 (1969) 237–63; A. H. Sommerstein, "Aesch. *Agam.* 126–30," *CR* 21 (1971) 1–3; A. Woolley, "Aesch. *Agam.* 126–30," *CR* 24 (1974) 1–2; S. E. Lawrence, "Artemis in the *Agamemnon*," *AJP* 97 (1976) 97–110; A. H. Sommerstein, "Artemis in *Agam.*: A Postscript," *AJP* 101 (1980) 165–69; H. Neitzel, "Artemis und Agamemnon in der Parodos des Aischyleischen *Agamemnon*," *Hermes* 107 (1979) 10–32; L. Bergson, "Nochmals Artemis und Agamemnon," *Hermes* 110 (1982) 137–45; H. Lloyd-Jones, "Artemis and Iphigenia," *JHS* 103 (1983) 87–102; E. Belfiore, "The Eagles' Feast and the Trojan Horse: Corrupted Fertility in the *Agamemnon*," *Maia* 35 (1983) 3–12; W. D. Furley, "Motivation in the Parodos of Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*," *CP* 81 (1986) 109–21.

<sup>12</sup> W. B. Stanford, *Ambiguity in Greek Literature* (Oxford 1939) 143–44.

<sup>13</sup> Lebeck (above, note 1) 34.



Artemis in the following lines is the goddess who is tender toward the dewy whelps of ravening lions and kindly to the nursling young of all wild beasts: τόσον περ εὐφρων ἅ καλὰ / δρόσοις ἀέπτοις μαλερῶν λεόντων / πάντων τ' ἀγρονόμων φιλομάστοις / θηρῶν ὀβρικάλοισι τερπνά 140–43. She is Potnia Theron.

The Potnia Theron, originally a winged Earth-Mother goddess of the Near East, represented in the iconography as flanked by wild beasts, travelled early to Greece, for she appears in Minoan and Mycenaean art. By the archaic period she had become, in part at least, identified with Artemis, for Homer at *Iliad* 21. 470–71 calls her πότνια θηρῶν, "Ἄρτεμις ἀγροτέρη,"<sup>14</sup> and on black-figure vases Artemis is winged and carries or is accompanied by animals. The Potnia Theron on the François Vase is, for instance, assumed to be Artemis. A proto-Attic vase shows the Potnia Theron as a Gorgon, and Chryssanthos Christou in his study *Potnia Theron* demonstrates that the gorgon on the temple at Corfu and elsewhere is the nether aspect of the Earth-Goddess become Artemis–Hecate.<sup>15</sup> As such, she is, like the Harpies, the Sirens, and the Sphinx, akin to the Erinyes, for all are derived from the winged Keres or death-spirits.<sup>16</sup> Both Orestes in the *Choephorae* (1049) and the priestess in the *Eumenides* (48) describe the Erinyes as "like gorgons." In the *Oresteia* then Artemis as Potnia Theron has a dark as well as a tender side. As an avenging Erinys she demands the sacrifice of Iphigenia as payment not only for the eating of the pregnant hare but as vengeance for the children of Thyestes.<sup>17</sup> By forcing Agamemnon to pollute himself with the slaughter of his own child she is causing him to fulfill the curse upon the house of Atreus.

Calchas prays to Apollo that Artemis not send contrary winds to delay the ships and so force another sacrifice, uncustomary, uneaten (θυσιάαν ἑτέραν ἄνομόν τιν' ἄδαιτον *Agam.* 150), for there remains in the house a treacherous fear, ready to rise again (παλινόρτος 154), a mindful child-avenging (τεκνόποινος 155) wrath. Such was the warning that Calchas shrieked out (ἀπέκλαγξεν 156). He too has become a bird (or a hound), an Erinys, a means to the fulfillment of the curse upon the house.

The word ἄδαιτον, "uneaten," means that the sacrifice of Iphigenia was a σφάγιον, an offering to the chthonic deities, and that she was first butchered, then burned in a holocaust. Such sacrifices were made before going into battle.<sup>18</sup> Ἄνομον, "uncustomary," means that she was a human rather than an animal sacrifice. When later the chorus says that it cannot mention what happened next, they are undoubtedly referring to the

<sup>14</sup> W. Burkert, *Greek Religion*, transl. J. Raffan (Cambridge, MA 1985) 149.

<sup>15</sup> C. Christou, *Potnia Theron* (Thessaloniki 1968) 136–42; 170–210.

<sup>16</sup> Harrison (above, note 7) 176–79; 197–212.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Harrison 72: "It is probable, though not certain, that behind the figure of the Olympian Artemis, of the goddess who was kindly to lions' cubs and 'suckling whelps,' there lay the cult of some vindictive ghost or heroine who cried for human blood."

<sup>18</sup> Harrison (above, note 7) 65; Burkert (above, note 14) 60.

butchering of Iphigenia.<sup>19</sup> The σφάγιον was also an offering made to the souls of the dead to make them avengers, and that is the hidden meaning here.<sup>20</sup> Iphigenia's blood is poured to the outraged souls of Thyestes' children to make them Erinyes. Her sacrifice is a part of the fulfillment of Thyestes' curse.

There are hints even in the Hymn to Zeus of the presence of the Erinyes. The chorus tells of Uranus being overthrown by Cronus. The Erinyes in the Hesiodic tradition were sprung from Earth impregnated by the drops of Uranus' blood when he was castrated by Cronus.<sup>21</sup> The man who "shrieks" (κλάζων 174) for Zeus' victory usurps the bird- (or hound-) cry of the Erinyes. He celebrates the triumph of the Indo-European, Olympian, male god over the probably pre-Greek, chthonic, female goddesses.<sup>22</sup> In the following strophe the grief of memory that drips (σταῖζει 179) in sleep against the heart recalls the drops of blood from which the Erinyes sprang. It also anticipates the blood that will drip, especially from the Erinyes themselves, throughout the trilogy. The πόνος that is μνησιπήμων (180) again suggests the memory of Thyestes' children.

At line 201 Calchas shrieks out (ἔκλαγξεν) another remedy, more grievous than the bitter storm, proffering Artemis as its cause. Once more he, like Artemis, acts as an Erinyes. He has become her agent, and as a bird-or animal-man.

In the lines describing the events at Aulis, blood and animal imagery are, not surprisingly, intermingled. The first mention of blood is factual. How, Agamemnon asks, can he stain the altar with virgin-slaughtered streams (παρθενοςφάγοισιν ρεῖθροισι 209-10)? At 215 he speaks of a

<sup>19</sup> R. Lattimore, *Story Patterns in Greek Tragedy* (Ann Arbor 1964) 40-41, makes the point that Iphigenia's rescue "was acknowledged in both the Homeric and Hesiodic lines of epic, by Sophocles and Euripides, by Polyidos, and probably by Aeschylus himself in his lost *Iphigenia*," and that only Pindar (*Pyth.* 11. 22-23), probably in 474 B.C. said that she was slaughtered. He contends therefore that Aeschylus' audience would *assume* that she was rescued. Pindar, however, who uses the word σφαχθεῖσα, is powerful evidence for Aeschylus, for both work in the archaic, as opposed to either the epic or the classical, tradition, and I see no hint at all in the *Agamemnon* that she was rescued. In an unpublished 1977 paper, "The Eating of Iphigenia," Laura Ward contended that the use of words like θυσία and βωμός would have put the audience in mind of a sacrifice to the Olympians and so have hinted at the possibility that she was actually eaten. On θυσία as opposed to σφάγιον see Harrison (above, note 7) 63.

<sup>20</sup> Harrison (above, note 7) 64-65.

<sup>21</sup> Hesiod, *Theogony* 178-85.

<sup>22</sup> This may well be an oversimplification. Recent scholarship has challenged so set a pattern. See, for instance, Burkert (above, note 14) 18-19: "Global dualisms which exaggerate the distinction between Indo-European and non-Indo-European assert themselves all too easily: male and female, patriarchy and matriarchy, heaven and earth, Olympian and chthonic . . . The myth of the generations of the gods comes from the ancient Near East, as does the idea of the opposition between the sky gods and the earth gods. It is the chthonic *choai* which are related to Indo-European, whereas the Olympian sacrifice has connections with Semitic tradition." Nevertheless, the traditional antitheses do seem to hold good for the *Oresteia*.

virgin's blood (παρθενίου θ' αἵματος) in a sacrifice to stop the winds (παυσανέμον . . . θυσίας 214). The winds are also ghosts, the souls of the dead, and the Harpies, kin to the Erinyes, were winds.<sup>23</sup> Here they double as avenging Furies for Artemis, who used them to force the sacrifice. They help to fulfill the curse upon the house of Atreus.

Iphigenia was held above the altar like a goat, face downward. This again indicates a σφάγιον, a sacrifice to the chthonic powers.<sup>24</sup> Her garments fell round about her (232–34). She shed her saffron-dipped robes to the ground (κρόκου βαφάς δ' ἐξ πέδον χέουσα 239). Here, juxtaposed to the animal image, is an instance of underthought. The words denote garments falling to the ground, connote blood shed to the ground.<sup>25</sup> At *Agamemnon* 1121–22 κροκοβαφῆς σταγῶν will refer to blood,<sup>26</sup> and will twice more in this play suggest dippings into blood. A few lines later Iphigenia is described as ἀταύρωτος (245) and as one who was present at the pouring of the third libation (τρίτοσπονδον 246) at her father's table. Here is an animal image immediately juxtaposed to a word suggesting the pouring of blood.<sup>27</sup> Ἀταύρωτος, "unmounted," therefore "virgin," suggests Artemis Tauropolos whose rite at Halae Araphenides included the drawing of blood from a man's throat.<sup>28</sup> Κρόκου, referring to Iphigenia's saffron-dipped robes, suggests and may actually refer to the cult of Artemis at Brauron, where little girls in yellow dresses performed a bear dance and where a goat was sacrificed.<sup>29</sup> In the aetiological legend a man had angered Artemis by killing a bear. She, in turn, sent a plague upon his people. To placate her the offender sacrificed a goat dressed in his daughter's clothes. Clearly the goat is a substitution for a virgin child. In later legend a bear (or deer) was substituted for Iphigenia upon the altar, and in time Iphigenia at Brauron became a goddess.<sup>30</sup> The description in Aeschylus of the sacrifice clearly owes something to the ritual of the darker Artemis, the chthonic aspect of the Potnia Theron, at Brauron and at Halae Araphenides.

<sup>23</sup> Harrison (above, note 7) 179–83.

<sup>24</sup> Harrison (above, note 7) 63.

<sup>25</sup> Lebeck (above, note 1) 81–86. For other recent interpretations of these lines see N. B. Booth, "Two Passages in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*," *Eranos* 77 (1979) 85–95; M. L. Cunningham, "Aesch. *Agam.* 231–47," *BICS* 31 (1984) 9–12; D. Armstrong and E. A. Ratchford, "Iphigenia's Veil: Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 228–48," *BICS* 32 (1985) 1–12.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. W. G. Thalmann, "Aeschylus' Physiology of the Emotions," *AJP* 107 (1986) 503. R. B. Onians, *Origins of European Thought* (Cambridge 1954) 84, thinks that κροκοβαφῆς σταγῶν refers to bile. E. Fraenkel, *Aeschylus. Agamemnon* II (Oxford 1950) 507–08, on *Agam.* 1122, thought it referred to blood. (Cf. *Choeph.* 183–84, where bile is near the heart.)

<sup>27</sup> Cf. P. Burian, "Zeus Soter Tritos and Some Triads in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*," *AJP* 107 (1986) 332–42.

<sup>28</sup> Burkert (above, note 14) 59, 152.

<sup>29</sup> H. Lloyd-Jones, "Artemis and Iphigenia," *JHS* 103 (1983) 87–102.

<sup>30</sup> Burkert (above, note 14) 151–52.

There is another juxtaposition of blood and animal in underthought and in open metaphor at lines 392–94. The chorus says that the evil of the man who spurns the altar of Justice is not hidden but like base bronze when put to the touchstone is proved “black-clotted” (μελαμπαγής), since he is like a child that chases after the flying bird (ποτανὸν ὄρνιν). Words formed from πήγνυμι will occur throughout the trilogy to denote or connote the clotting of blood.<sup>31</sup> Here the image refers to Paris who will bring bloodshed to his people and looks forward to the parable of the lion cub that will soak the house in gore.

The figure of the dog occurs in underthought in a number of minor, perhaps faded, expressions throughout the *Oresteia*. Certainly they recall Clytemnestra who claimed to be a watchdog to the house, her master’s faithful hound (*Agam.* 607). Perhaps they also anticipate her actual role as an avenging hound-Erinyes. Later in the same chorus the elders mingle creatures and blood in underthought. People mourn the man who fell nobly in the gore (τὸν δ’ ἐν φοναῖς καλῶς πεσόντ’ 447) for the sake of another man’s wife. One meaning of φονή is “blood shed by slaying” (*LSJ s.v.*), and the participle πεσόντ’, though it modifies the man rather than the blood, reinforces that particular sense here. Next they say that some “bark” (βαύζει 449) in secret and resentful grief “creeps” (ἔρπει 450–51) against the Atreidae. Here are the figures of the dog and the viper. Both are associated with the Erinyes.

There is another juxtaposition of animal and blood imagery in lines 595–614. Men, Clytemnestra sarcastically says, in woman’s wise, were “barking” (ἔλασκον 596) the celebratory song throughout the town. Λάσκω, like κλάζω, is a word used of screaming birds (*Il.* 22. 141; *Hes. Op.* 207) and of the howling of dogs (*Od.* 12. 85). It is not in the *Oresteia* a faded metaphor. At 607 Clytemnestra calls herself the dog (κύνᾱ) her husband left at home. A few lines later she declares that she knows no more of another man than she does of dipping (βαφάς 612) bronze. It is not, she (or the herald) then states, shameful for a noble wife to “bark” (λακεῖν 614) such a boast. Βαφάς, after the lines above describing the sacrifice of Iphigenia, certainly suggests, indeed predicts, Clytemnestra’s dipping a bronze sword in Agamemnon’s blood. Her description of herself as a dog is meant to suggest to the chorus a watchdog, but it also predicts the metaphorical pack of hounds that are to appear as avenging Furies. Λακεῖν makes Clytemnestra the animal she is to become, an Erinyes.

In the strophe (α) that begins at 681 we also see juxtaposed in metaphor animals and blood. Many men, bearing spears, hunting with packs of hounds (κυναγοί 694) down the vanished oars’ trail have beached their ships on Simois’ eternally leafing shores because of a bloody (αἱματόεσσιν 698) Strife. The Greek host itself has taken on the role of the Erinyes.

<sup>31</sup> *Agam.* 1198, 1509; *Choeph.* 67, 83; *Eum.* 191.



In the following strophe and antistrophe (β) we have in the parable of the lion cub an obvious intermingling of blood and animal imagery that refers primarily to Helen, who is described in strophe γ as the thought of a windless calm entering Ilium, and also perhaps to Paris, described in the preceding antistrophe (α) as fatally wedded (αἰνόμετρον 712). Because of him Priam's city endured wretched blood (μέλεον αἶμα' 716). The lines that contain the parable itself (717–36) abound in language that recalls and anticipates other characters and actions of the drama which also combine blood and animal imagery.<sup>32</sup> For instance, προτελείοις at 720 echoes προτέλεια at 227, where it is used of Agamemnon's preliminary offerings, that is, the sacrifice of his daughter, for the sailing of the ships.<sup>33</sup> The word usually means the sacrifices made to Artemis before a marriage for protection against the dangers of childbirth.<sup>34</sup> Iphigenia, in the *Cypria*, was brought to Aulis, as she thought, for her marriage to Achilles,<sup>35</sup> and in the *Oresteia* the sacrifice of the virgin who shed her saffron-dyed robes to the ground is a travesty of a marriage. Σαίνων (725–26) recalls the watchdog (607) that Clytemnestra declared herself to be and anticipates the hateful dog (κυνὸς μισητῆς 1229–30) that Cassandra will later call her.<sup>36</sup> Φιλόμαστον (719) recalls Artemis as the Potnia Theron or Erinys who was lovely and kind to the whelps of ravening lions and tender to the breast-loving (φιλομάστοις 142) young of all wild beasts.<sup>37</sup> The house that was soaked with blood (αἵματι δ' οἶκος ἐφύρθη 732) refers most immediately to the house of Priam but suggests very vividly the house of Atreus that will at 1533–34 be shaken by a bloody beat of rain that does not come in drops (ὄμβρου κτύπον δομοσφαλῇ / τὸν αἵματηρόν· ψακὰς δὲ λήγει) and that Cassandra describes as breathing blood-dripping slaughter (φόνον . . . αἵματοσταγῇ 1309). The priest of Ruin (ιερεὺς τις Ἄτας 735–36) that had been reared in the house recalls Agamemnon, the priest who was the butcher at Aulis. Finally, the lion cub itself predicts all those other human beings who will become lions: Aegisthus, the strengthless lion that rolled in the master's bed (1224); Clytemnestra, the lioness that slept with the wolf while the noble lion was away (1258–59); Orestes and Electra, the double lion that came to Agamemnon's house (*Choeph.* 938).<sup>38</sup> More immediately it foreshadows Agamemnon as the Argive beast (δάκος), nestling of the horse (ἵππου νεοσσός), the raw-meat-eating lion (ὠμηστής λέων) that leapt the wall and licked its fill of royal blood (ἄδην ἔλειξεν

<sup>32</sup> Knox (above, note 9) 17–25 for a detailed treatment of the parable.

<sup>33</sup> Knox (previous note); Lebeck (above, note 1) 18, 70–73.

<sup>34</sup> Burkert (above, note 14) 151.

<sup>35</sup> Such was the tradition, though Aeschylus makes no mention of it. Cf. *Cypria* apud Proclus *Crestomathy* I and Euripides, *Iphigenia at Aulis*.

<sup>36</sup> Gilbert Murray's text (Oxford 1955) temptingly reads λείξασα κάκτεινάσας φαιδρὸν οὗς δίκην, which makes the figure of the dog even more vivid.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Knox (above, note 9) 20.

<sup>38</sup> Knox (above, note 9) 22–23 and Lebeck (above, note 1) 50–51.

αἵματος τυραννικοῦ) at Troy (824–28). Agamemnon's licking of the royal blood makes him too an avenging Fury, for one of the most significant facts about the Erinyes is that they drink, suck, lick, and vomit blood. They are, in effect, vampires. When at line 1188 Cassandra declares that the inharmonious chorus that does not leave the roof of the house has drunk human blood to embolden itself the more (πεπωκώς γ', ὥς θρασύνεσθαι πλέον, / βρότειον αἷμα), she does not speak metaphorically. The Erinyes, who are the outraged souls of the murdered dead, must enliven themselves with human blood to wreak vengeance. At *Choephoroe* 577 Orestes says that the Erinys, not stinted of gore, will drink her third draught of blood unmixed (φόνου δ' Ἑρινὺς οὐχ ὑπεσπανισμένη / ἄκρατον αἷμα πίεται τρίτην πόσιν). This too is more than metaphor. At *Eumenides* 183–84 Apollo says to the Erinyes, "You disgorge in agony the black foam from men, vomiting clots of gore you sucked" (ἀνῆις ὑπ' ἄλγους μέλαν' ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ἀφρόν, / ἐμοῦσα θρόμβους οὐς ἀφείλκυσας φόνου). At 264–65 the Erinyes themselves threaten to suck the ruddy clot of gore from Orestes' living limbs (ἀπὸ ζώντος ῥοφεῖν / ἐρυθρόν ἐκ μελέων πελανόν). Here there is no question at all of metaphor.

Clytemnestra also becomes her own avenging Fury. At 958–60 she says, "There is the sea—Who will drain it dry?—fostering ooze (κηκῖδα), costly as silver, ever refreshed, of plenteous purple dyes for our robes (πολλῆς πορφύρας . . . εἰμάτων βαφάς)." The ooze of purple, actually the color of congealed blood,<sup>39</sup> in itself foretells blood. Εἰμάτων βαφάς, close in sound to αἰμάτων βαφάς,<sup>40</sup> recalls the shedding of Iphigenia's robes (κρόκου βαφάς 239) and of her blood and Clytemnestra's own remark that she knows no more of another man than she does of dipping (βαφάς 612) bronze. Once more she foretells the murder she is about to commit because of Iphigenia.

After Clytemnestra has murdered Agamemnon, she exults in being spattered by her husband's blood (1388–92):

οὕτω τὸν αὐτοῦ θυμὸν ὀρμαίνει πεσὼν  
 κάκφυσιῶν ὀξεῖαν αἷματος σφαγὴν  
 βάλλει μ' ἐρεμνῇ ψακάδι φοινίας δρόσου, 1390  
 χαίρουσαν οὐδὲν ἦσσαν ἢ διοσδότῳ  
 γάνει σπορητὸς κάλυκος ἐν λοχεύμασιν.

The image is primarily sexual, but the word σφαγὴν makes Agamemnon another sacrifice to the underworld,<sup>41</sup> and Clytemnestra, "spattered with dark drops of bloody gore," has "drunk" his blood and so become the avenging Erinys of Iphigenia, while Agamemnon has drunk to the dregs in his house the mixing bowl that he himself had filled with accursed evils (1397–98):

<sup>39</sup> Pliny, *NH* 9. 135.

<sup>40</sup> Stanford (above, note 12) 156.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Lebeck (above, note 1) 60–63.

τοσῶνδε κρατῆρ' ἐν δόμοις κακῶν ὄδε  
πλήσας ἀραίῳν αὐτὸς ἐκπίνει μολῶν.

He was his own Erinys. He punished himself for his own wrongdoing. There is no word for blood in the particular passage, but lines 970–71, in which Clytemnestra says that when Zeus makes wine from the unripe grape (ἀπ' ὄμφακος πικρᾶς / οἶνον), then there is straightway a chill in the house (ἐν δόμοις) when its rightful master roams its halls (δῶμ'), are often taken to refer to Iphigenia. They establish an association of blood, wine, and the house which echoes here.

The chorus, horrified at Clytemnestra's deed, asks her what potion (ποτόν 1407) drawn from the sea has caused her to make this sacrifice (θύος 1409). In murdering Agamemnon, she has poured his blood to the avenging spirit of Iphigenia. The expression ῥυτᾶς ἐξ ἁλός (1408) in recalling the earlier passage in which purple ooze was drawn from the sea makes ποτόν in 1407 suggest that Clytemnestra here drinks blood and so becomes an Erinys herself.

At 1427 the chorus says, "You barked overweeningly" (περίφρονα ἔλακες). Λάσκω is not here and not elsewhere a faded metaphor. Clytemnestra as an Erinys does "bark" like a dog or "shriek" like a bird. "Even as your mind," the elders say, "is maddened by this blood-dripping (φονολιβεῖ 1428) act, so a drop of blood (λίβος . . . αἵματος 1429) is plain upon your face" ("eyes": ὀμμάτων 1429). This is to be taken literally.<sup>42</sup> Clytemnestra, the dog-Erinys, has drunk blood. Her face is smeared with it. So the Pythia says of the Erinyes: ἐκ δ' ὀμμάτων λείβουσι δυσφιλῇ λίβᾳ (*Eum.* 54). She herself then says that she slaughtered (ἔσφαξ') Agamemnon to Justice exacted for her child, to Ate, and to the Erinyes (1433).

A similar combination of blood and animal imagery continues to define Clytemnestra as an avenging Fury. At 1460, speaking of Helen, the chorus says that she has crowned herself with long remembrance because of blood that cannot be washed away (αἶμ' ἄνιπτον). Clytemnestra tells the chorus not to turn their wrath against Helen as though she alone were the slayer of many Danaan men, the worker of woe past all cure (ἄξύστατον 1467). The word is used of milk that will not curdle and suggests here blood that will not clot.<sup>43</sup> The ancients apparently thought of clotting, curdling, and

<sup>42</sup> Fraenkel (above, note 26) III 672–73, on 1428, takes it to refer to her maddened bloodshot eyes.

<sup>43</sup> Aret. *CD* 1. 13. Jennifer Smith, in a paper read on April 5, 1990 at a meeting of the Classical Association of the Midwest and South, "Miasma and Medicine in the *Oresteia*," suggests that the expression ἀξύστατον ἄλγος means a wound that will not heal because its edges will not come together. "This problem," she says, "was typical of the chronic ulcer (τὸ ἔλκος πεπαιώμενον) and was sometimes solved by incising the wound so that the shape was more elongated (*Ulc.* 2)."

freezing as similar processes, for they used the same word, πήγνυμι, for all three phenomena.<sup>44</sup>

At 1468 the chorus addresses the demon that has fallen upon the house and the twin descendants of Tantalus, wielding a sway that bites to the heart (καρδιόδηκτον 1471) and matches the temper of women. Here is the figure of the viper or perhaps the dog. Clytemnestra, the elders then say, stands like a crow (δίκαν κόρακος 1472–73) over her husband's corpse. She is not only the raven that feeds on carrion but a bird-woman, another aspect of the Erinyes.

Clytemnestra next tells the chorus that they have correctly named the thrice-gorged demon of the house, for the lust for licking blood (ἔρως αἱματολοιχός 1478) is nourished in the maw. Before the old agony leaves off, fresh blood (νέος ἰχώρ 1480) spills. Here again is the vampire Erinyes, the curse of the house, in its most recent epiphany Clytemnestra herself.

At 1492 the chorus addresses the dying Agamemnon. "You lie," they say, "a spider (ἀράχνης) in this web." He is the victim of the spider that murders in its mating. At 1501 Clytemnestra, the spider-woman, tells the elders that the ancient harsh avenger (ἀλάστωρ) of Atreus, that grim banqueter, taking the form of the corpse's wife, has repaid him, sacrificing (ἐπιθύσας 1504) a full-grown man for the babes. Clytemnestra and the avenging Fury have become one. She is avenging the death of Thyestes' children as well as that of Iphigenia. She is the demon that fulfills the curse upon the house. The chorus does not quite believe her, but grants that the avenger might well be from the father (πατρόθεν 1507), for black Ares with streams of kindred blood (ὁμοσπόροις / ἐπιρροαῖσιν αἱμάτων 1509–10) forces his way forward to where he will offer justice for the clotted blood of children served for meat (πάχυναι κουροβόρῳ 1512). This is a clear reference to Thyestes' children. In the following stanza the chorus repeats its address to Agamemnon as the spider dying in the web (1516). Thyestes who ate the roasted flesh and "drank" the clotted blood of his own children became, in Aeschylus, the first of the Erinyes in the Tantalid house. At the end of the *Agamemnon* Aegisthus describes that banquet. Like the Furies themselves, who vomit clots of blood, Thyestes as his own Erinyes vomits back the slaughtered flesh (ἀπὸ σφαγῆν ἐρῶν 1599).

In the first chorus of the *Choephoroe* we have a now familiar intermingling of blood and animal imagery. The women with their nails cut bloody furrows in their cheeks (πρέπει παρῆς φοίνισσ' ἀμυγμοῖς / ὄνυχος ἄλοκι νεοτόμῳ 24–25). In the following antistrophe the dream-interpreter "barked" or "shrieked" (ἔλακε) for terror from the innermost chamber, and the dream-interpreters "shrieked" (ἔλακον) that those beneath the earth (τοὺς γᾶς νέρθεν) were exceedingly angry at their slayers (35–41). The dream-interpreters who are under pledge to the gods (θεόθεν . . . ὑπέγγυοι 39) abet the Erinyes, the gods below, who, since they are plural,

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Lebeck (above, note 1) 99.



are not just Agamemnon but also Iphigenia and the children of Thyestes. The dream-interpreters partake now of the cycle of vengeance.

In the next strophe the women say that Clytemnestra has sent them forth to perform an *ἀπότροπον κακῶν* (44). She is attempting a riddance ceremony, offerings to placate the ghosts of the dead. But what redemption is there, the chorus asks, for blood once it has fallen to the ground (τί γὰρ λύτρον πεσόντος αἵματος πέδοι 48)? So in the *Agamemnon* the elders had asked, "Who could with charms call up again the black blood of a man once it has fallen in death to the earth?" (1019-21):

τὸ δ' ἐπὶ γᾶν πεσὼν ἅπαξ θανάσιμον  
πρόπαρ ἀνδρὸς μέλαν αἷμα τίς ἂν  
πάλιν ἀγκαλέσαιτ' ἐπαείδων;

The expression is not entirely metaphorical, for the answer is, no one: The Erinyes have drunk it to enliven themselves for revenge. The blood of the victim nourishes those who have been murdered before him in this chain of violence. So in the next strophe (γ) the women say that because of blood drunk to her fill by nourishing earth the vengeful gore clots and does not drain through (66-67):

δι' αἵματ' ἐκποθένθ' ὑπὸ χθονὸς τροφοῦ  
τίτας φόνος πέπηγεν οὐ διαρρύδαν.

There is more blood now than even the Erinyes can drink.

The next two lines are corrupt but seem to say that the guilty man suffers calamity and "teems with sickness" (νόσου βρούειν 69). This may refer to the Erinyes in their most primitive guise: when they still were disease-causing Keres.

The chorus goes on to say that for him who has violated a bridal chamber there is no cure, and all streams though they flow in one course rush on in vain to cleanse the hand that is polluted with gore (χερομυσῇ φόνον 73). The passage refers to Thyestes, who had seduced Atreus' wife, and so makes clear that the Erinyes in this play are not just Agamemnon's avenging spirits but those of the victims who preceded him. Finally, in a fine example of underthought the chorus says that it is itself chilled, i.e. "clotted" (παχυνόμενα 83) with hidden grief.

In the scene that follows this choral passage Electra is occupied in the actual performance of the riddance ceremony, and there are a number of instances of the forms of the verb *χέω* (87, 92, 95, 109, 129) and the noun *χοάς* (149). At 155 the chorus specifically calls the "pouring" an *ἀπότροπον*, and at 164 Electra calls the libations (*χοάς*) earth-drunk (*γαπότους*). This is not just a metaphor. The spirits of the murdered dead beneath the earth have drunk them.

The interchange between Electra and Orestes which occurs later in the same scene contains a number of animal images, preceded by Electra's saying that thirsty drops (*σταγόνες* 186) fall from her eyes (*ἐξ*

ὀμμάτων . . . πίπτουσι 185) at the sight of Orestes' lock. The many occurrences throughout the trilogy of the word πίπτω to denote or connote the shedding of blood to the ground make these lines also suggest blood, and in their anticipation of the Erinyes, who will at the end of the play "drip hateful blood from their eyes" (κάξ ὀμμάτων στάζουσιν αἷμα δυσφιλέες 1058), make Electra another, albeit paler, avenger, a weaker Erinyes. At lines 400–03 the chorus will say that it is the law that drops of murder-blood (φονίας σταγόνας) poured upon the ground will demand other blood (ἄλλο . . . αἷμα).

Not many lines later Electra declares that she fawns (σαίνομαι 193) on hope. Orestes calls himself and Electra the bereaved brood of the eagle-father (αἰετοῦ 247) who died in the woven nets and spires of the dread viper (δεινῆς ἐχίδνης 249). Orphaned and pressed by hunger, they are not full grown to bring to the nest their father's quarry (θήραν 251). "If you destroy," he prays to Zeus, "these nestlings (νεοσσούς 256) of a father who made sacrifices and held you in high honor, from what like hand will you receive the homage of fine feasts?" Once more he calls his sister and himself αἰετοῦ γένεθλ' (258). The chorus' caution to the two to be discreet lest someone repeat their words to their master ends in the wish that they may see Clytemnestra and Aegisthus dead in the pitchy ooze of flame (θανόντας ἐν κηκίδι πισσήρει φλογός 268). Κηκίδι suggests here, as it did before (*Agam.* 960), indeed predicts, blood. At 275 Orestes speaks of himself as "made bull" (ταυρούμενον) by the loss of his possessions. This too is an expansion of the animal imagery—of birds, dogs, snakes—that defines the characters of the drama as avenging Erinyes.

At 420–23 Electra says of Clytemnestra that she may fawn (σαίνειν), but the miseries that she and Orestes have endured from her will not be soothed, for the temper they have from their mother is like a savage wolf (λύκος . . . ὠμόφρων) and implacable (ἄσαντος). At 446 Electra declares that she has been kennelled like a vicious dog (πολυσινοῦς κυνὸς δίκαν) and that she pours forth tears (λίβη χέουσα 447–48). This again anticipates the real Erinyes who will distil from their eyes δυσφιλή λίβα (*Eum.* 54).

At lines 525 ff. Orestes does unequivocally become an Erinyes. Clytemnestra, the chorus says, explaining the riddance ceremony that she is having Electra perform, dreamed that she gave birth to a snake (τεκεῖν δράκοντ' ἔδοξεν 527). It drew clotted blood with her milk (ἐν γάλακτι θρόμβον αἵματος σπάσαι 533). Then she, an Erinyes herself, shrieked (κέκλαγγεν 535) from out her sleep. Orestes interprets the dream so that it fits (clots?, συγκόλλως 542) at every point. If it mixed clotted blood with her own milk (θρόμβωι τ' ἔμειξεν αἵματος φίλον γάλα 546), then he, turned serpent (ἐκδρακοντωθεὶς 549), will kill her as the dream declares. He has drunk blood, become an avenger. He could not more clearly be an Erinyes, a vampire-snake.

Aegisthus, referring to the reported death of Orestes, says that this would be a burden dripping fear (†δειματοσταγές† 842)<sup>45</sup> to lay upon a house already wounded and bitten (δεδηγμένοις 843) with former gore (φόνωι 842). Here in underthought is a fine mixture of blood and animal imagery. The Erinyes lurk behind this as behind so many other passages. Orestes the avenger is already at hand.

At 924 Clytemnestra warns Orestes, who is about to kill her, "Beware a mother's wrathful hounds" (μητρὸς ἐγκότους κύνας). It is not clear that she is speaking metaphorically, for when Orestes does see the Erinyes, he calls them exactly that (μητρὸς ἔγκοτοι κύνες 1054).<sup>46</sup> A few lines later she calls him the snake that she suckled (ὄφιν ἐθρεψάμην 928). At 938 the chorus, referring presumably to Orestes and Electra, say that a double lion (διπλοῦς λέων) has come to Agamemnon's house. The lion is not associated with the Erinyes, but it was a common attribute of the original Potnia Theron, and it is one of the creatures that Artemis as Potnia Theron cherishes.<sup>47</sup> At 994–95 Orestes calls Clytemnestra a sea-serpent and a viper whose very touch without her bite would rot (μύραινά γ' εἴτ' ἔχιδν' ἔφν / σήπειν θιγοῦσ' ἂν ἄλλον οὐ δεδηγμένου). At 1047 the chorus tells Orestes that he has freed all the city of the Argives by lopping off the heads of the two snakes (δυοῖν δρακόντοι). Immediately afterward he sees the Erinyes, like Gorgons, black-robed and braided about with swarming snakes (δράκουσιν 1050). Clytemnestra and Aegisthus, avenging the wrongs done them, become serpent-Erinyes. Orestes, born a snake, takes vengeance, as Agamemnon's Erinys, upon them. Now he is pursued by his mother's snake-women avengers, the wrathful hounds (ἔγκοτοι κύνες 1054) whose eyes drip blood (στάζουσιν αἶμα 1058); here in a culmination of the blood and animal imagery are the Erinyes made manifest.

At the opening of the *Eumenides* the priestess sees Orestes, now an Erinys himself, sitting, a suppliant at her shrine with blood-dripping hands (αἶματι / στάζοντα χεῖρας 41–42). There follows soon after her description of the Erinyes as like Gorgons (48–49) or Harpies (50), loathsome, black, snorting women whose eyes ooze disgusting drops (ἐκ δ' ὀμμάτων λείβουσι δυσφιλή λίβα 54).

When the ghost of Clytemnestra appears, she says to the Erinyes that they have often licked (ἐλείξατε 106) the wineless libations (χοάς 107) that she has poured to them. These were not literally of blood, for she goes on to describe them as μειλίγματα, offerings presumably of milk, water, and honey, but the words she uses by the associations they have accumulated throughout the two previous plays certainly suggest blood. Only a few lines later, in the image of the hunt that is in this play to be

<sup>45</sup> Page's daggers. "Vix tolerabile," he says. M has -στάγ' ἔς.

<sup>46</sup> On what Orestes actually does see, cf. A. L. Brown, "The Erinyes in the *Oresteia*: Real Life, the Supernatural, and the Stage," *JHS* 103 (1983) 13–34.

<sup>47</sup> Christou (above, note 15) 138.

sustained, she says that Orestes, like a fawn (νεβροῦ δίκων 111) has leapt from their nets and got away.

At 128 Clytemnestra clearly states that she is herself an Erinyes. She refers to herself as the wrath of the dread snake (δεινῆς δρακαίνης . . . μένος). The earlier snake and viper imagery comes now to fulfillment in this appearance of the avenging ghost of Clytemnestra. She was in life and is now in death an animal-woman, a vindictive Fury.

Apollo, when he addresses the Erinyes, in instances of underthought as well as in the plain statements he makes, creates that primeval atmosphere that is so peculiar to the *Eumenides*. He threatens to shoot them with a winged, glistening snake (ὄφιν 181) to make them vomit the clotted gore (θρόμβους φόνου 184) that they have sucked from men. They belong, he tells them, where there are sentences of beheading, the gouging out of eyes, slitting of throats, mutilations, stonings, and where men are impaled (παγέντες 190) beneath their spines. Παγέντες here means "stiffened" in a sense other than "frozen" or "clotted," but the association with blood is there. The Erinyes belong, Apollo then says, in the den of a blood-gulping lion (λέοντος ἄντρον αἱματορρόφου 193). This too harks back to the *Agamemnon*, where Agamemnon, himself a lion, lapped the royal blood at Troy and so became an Erinyes.

At 245 ff. the Furies declare that they like a hound pursue the fawn and track him down by drops of blood (αἷμα . . . σταλαγμόν 247). The smell of human blood makes them laugh with joy (ὁσμὴ βροτείων αἱμάτων με προσγελαῖ 253). The dog that was in the earlier plays Clytemnestra has now become the bloodthirsty hound of her avenging spirit. Once more the imagery has come to fulfillment in the actual appearance of the Erinyes.

At 478–79 Athene does not speak metaphorically when she says that if the Erinyes lose their suit, venom (ἰός) from their hearts falling upon the ground (πέδοι πεσών) will bring perpetual pestilence (αἰανῆς νόσος) to the land. She predicts their own threat. The venom which will "fall to the ground" suggests and probably meant blood which will quite literally devastate the land. At 782–83 the Erinyes call the venom a drop from the heart (ἰὸν ἰὸν . . . καρδίας σταλαγμόν) that will blight both leaf and child. These creatures, born of drops of blood, curse of a house that drips blood, themselves threaten to drip blood to destroy the land, its creatures, and its crops. In the end, however, they pray that the dust not drink the black blood of its citizens (πιούσα κόνις μέλαν αἷμα 980) and consent to don robes, reddened not with blood but "dipped" in a "crimson dye" (φοινικοβάπτοις 1028), of celebration.

The power of the juxtaposition of the creatures and the blood throughout the *Oresteia* lies in the fact that it is not completely metaphorical. The human beings who drink blood do, almost literally, become their own Erinyes. Just as the Erinyes, snake-women, are not entirely human, so the characters of the trilogy are in part animal. It is only when they, like the Furies of the *Eumenides*, have abandoned the concept of



δίκη as Vengeance for the concept of δίκη as Justice that they will take their proper and human place in the order to be established by the anthropomorphic Olympian deities.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> P. Vellacott, "Has Good Prevailed? A Further Study of the *Oresteia*," *HSCP* 81 (1977) 113-22, challenges this traditional interpretation of the *Oresteia*. Cf. D. Cohen, "The Theodicy of Aeschylus: Justice and Tyranny in the *Oresteia*," *G&R* 33 (1986) 129-41. I concede that Orestes "gets away with murder" but think that Aeschylus for dramatic purposes intended his trilogy to end in a resolution which he calls δίκη.

Order and Disorder in Sophocles' *Antigone*

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In the *kommos* at the end of the play, Creon, in his last utterance, laments in dochmiacs, "Everything in my hands is aslant (πάντα γὰρ / λέχρια τὰν χερσῶν) and a fate that is hard to bear has leaped upon my head" (1344–46). The final words resemble the question asked by the chorus of *Oedipus* in *Oedipus Tyrannus*, when he enters from the palace: "What *daimon* has made so great a leap upon your unhappy fate?" (1300–02). These words too are in dochmiacs, and while I do not want to press the analogy unduly (the verbal similarities are not extensive), the parallels and contrasts between the passages are rather striking. Oedipus is an object of horror and pity combined (ὦ δεινὸν ἰδεῖν πάθος 1297) as a result of what has happened to him and what he has done to himself; the chorus's reproach of Creon is for what he has done to others and is unmixed with pity (whatever the audience may feel). But it is to the preceding phrase, πάντα . . . λέχρια τὰν χερσῶν, that I wish to call attention. Λέχριος, "aslant," "leaning sideways," is a striking word in this context, though it is not in itself remarkable. Its one other use in extant Sophocles is in *Oedipus at Colonus*, describing Oedipus's uncomfortable sideways shift in obedience to the demand of the chorus that he remove himself from the forbidden area of the shrine of the Eumenides (195). Usually it merely suggests a "leaning" position and is fairly colorless. In Euripides, however, where it occurs twice, both occasions are sinister. One is the ominous moment, in *Medea*, when the young princess, as she walks daintily, enjoying her new finery and admiring herself, suddenly begins to feel the effects of Medea's poison and tilts sideways and staggers back (λέχρια πάλιν / χωρεῖ 1168–69). The other is in *Hecuba* (1026), in a metaphor of falling overboard; the text of the passage is not entirely certain (though the word λέχριος is), but there is no doubt that it, like the *Medea* passage, depicts a situation out of control.

At *Antigone* 1344–45, it is reasonable to think that as Creon utters these words he is holding the corpse of Haemon in his arms. As he enters, at line 1257, the words of the chorus can be taken to indicate that he has Haemon in his arms (μνήμ' ἐπίσημον διὰ χειρὸς ἔχων 1258). It is doubtful whether the actor would continue to hold this load for the nearly

one hundred following lines,<sup>1</sup> but there is nothing to prevent our supposing that at both 1285 and 1345 the body is in Creon's arms, whatever may have been its placement in between. So far as visual impact is concerned, it is unquestionably more effective for Creon to have the body in his arms as he enters. It is uncertain that the phrase διὰ χειρός, especially in the singular, can confidently be taken to mean "in his arms," and διὰ χειρῶν at 916 has a different force.<sup>2</sup> But if we accept the tableau of the father with his son's dead body aslant in his arms, the position of Haemon's body is strikingly like that of the son in the traditional *pietà* of Christian art. The grouping, with the dead body aslant, occurs also in ancient Greek art, in the vase-painting by Douris that depicts Eos holding her dead son Tithonus.<sup>3</sup> The scene at the end of *Antigone* gains in pathos by its simultaneous evocation and implicit parody of the maternal protectiveness portrayed by the *pietà* and the vase painting. Even without our assuming the physical enactment, the phrase alone suggests this irony.

From this last picture of Creon let us move back to his first appearance. The gods have set the city upright, he declares, after shaking it with a great shaking. The metaphor in πολλῶι σάλωι σείσαντες (163) is either of an earthquake or, more probably, in view of other Sophoclean usage (especially the metaphor later in this speech, at 190), of a ship in heavy seas. The language of regained stability continues: The city was formerly set upright by Oedipus (ὥρθον 167). Creon goes on to say that the chorus gave their support to him, as they later did to the sons of Oedipus "with steadfast thoughts" (ἐμπέδοις φρονήμασιν 169). This theme of stability appears in this speech once again (182-83), when Creon enunciates his belief that citizens must put the safety of the state before personal friendships, because "we make our friends when we are sailing in an upright . . .," where we can supply either "ship" or "city" to complete the picture in ταύτης ὀρθῆς (189-90). Political stability is a precondition of friendship, and Creon will make the city flourish by laws that accord with

<sup>1</sup> Most critics, including Jebb (*Sophocles. The Plays and Fragments* III: The Antigone, 3rd ed. [Cambridge 1900] 223), take 1258 to mean that as Creon enters his attendants are carrying the body on a bier. Kamerbeek, however, in his note ad loc. (*The Plays of Sophocles* III: The Antigone [Leiden 1978] 201), holds that Creon is carrying the corpse, which he then sets down, to be carried by attendants at the end of the play. Rather confusingly, his note to 1345-47 mentions "the corpse in his arms." G. Müller simply says that Creon enters "mit der Leiche seines Sohnes auf den Armen" (*Sophokles. Antigone* [Heidelberg 1967] 264) and makes no further mention of the matter, thus presumably supposing that Creon continues to hold the corpse. D. Seale (*Vision and Stagecraft in Sophocles* [Chicago 1982] 105) is ambivalent, first stating that Creon enters "actually bearing the 'body' of his own son in his hands," but adding at once that "the other possibility" is that the body is on a bier.

<sup>2</sup> The very ambiguity of the phrase has an ironic effect. At 916 it clearly means "under his control"; at 1258 the same meaning can well apply, whether or not the literal meaning is assumed. The dead son is no longer in rebellion against his father.

<sup>3</sup> Paris, Louvre, G115.

this principle (τοιούσδε νόμοισι 191). It is on these practical grounds of civic safety and stability, he goes on to explain, that he has decreed honorable burial for Eteocles and the dishonoring of the body of Polyneices, who threatened the city and its gods with fiery, bloody ruin.

Creon has thus established himself as the very embodiment of order in the state, at least in his own eyes. But the ominous tone of the prologue must surely affect our reception of Creon, even though the *parodos*, with the choral song of rejoicing in the surcease from confusion and terror that the morning has brought, suggests restored order. The prologue puts before us both the audacious proposal of Antigone and Ismene's response, which expresses the very soul of orderly female behavior (58–64): "Now that we two are left alone you must see that we shall bring utter ruin on ourselves if in spite of *nomos* we transgress the vote of rulers or their power. Moreover, we must remember, first, that by our very nature we are women, not meant to fight against men, and, secondly, that because we are ruled by those who are stronger we must give ear to these commands and worse."<sup>4</sup>

Following Creon's opening speech the chorus, with what I suppose may be called ἔμπεδα φρονήματα, declare (211–14), in effect, "Anything you say, Creon; you can make any law you like, about the dead or about us who are still alive." The chorus are stolidly for authority, no matter what; they will obey any law Creon imposes. Their subservience is understandable. The attack of the Seven is still a terrifying presence in their minds, as the *parodos* has shown, and Creon's address is formidable.<sup>5</sup> Yet there is in their immediately following words, when they misunderstand Creon's order and demur at standing guard over the body (216), and perhaps also in the emphatic σοί (211), a suggestion of reserve, if not dissent.

Order apparently reigns, then, for everything and everybody, except, of course, Antigone. Though she has for now disappeared from the action, she is as a result of the prologue very much a presence. Her reference to the ills of foes coming upon friends (10) is especially relevant to my topic, introducing as it does a specific note of "disorder." But so far as Creon and the chorus are concerned, the air of stability is first threatened by the arrival of the guard, with his shuffling, irresolute, sub-comic manner and his disturbing report. The façade of orderliness totters a little under the impact of the guard's behavior, so strongly in contrast with Creon's authoritarian manner, and the initial response of the chorus, who wonder if the reported burial of Polyneices might not have been "divinely impelled" (θεήλατον 278), brings further disturbance. Θεήλατον is a strong word and it shakes Creon, who has assumed and continues to assume, in his angry reply to the

<sup>4</sup> While Ismene here accepts Creon's *kerugma* as *nomos*, Antigone never so refers to it except in scorn (452, 847).

<sup>5</sup> The mood of the chorus and the motivation of its subservience are well described by E. Viketos, "A Study of ΔΕΙΝΟΣ (Sophocles, *Antigone* 332–333) in its Dramatic Context," *PLATON* 40 (1988) 79–81.



elders, that he is the protector of the gods as well as of the citizens of Thebes. He is the bulwark of Thebes against the danger of fire to the "pillared shrines" of the gods, and against the "scattering" of the laws of Thebes that Polyneices and his allies threatened (280-88). Later in the same speech Creon makes it clear, by his reference to dissenters within the city, that the order he has established is after all not very firm, even in his mind. Also, the fact that the guard, for all his shuffling manner, bests Creon in their verbal exchanges undermines the impression of firm decisiveness that Creon sought to project.

In the great scene of confrontation between Creon and Antigone, in the next episode, the contrast between Creon's *nomoi* and the *agrapta nomima* that command Antigone's loyalty finds its most decisive statement, and it is this scene above all, I believe, that has created the long-prevalent but difficult belief that these two positions represent two interpretations, both partially valid and both inadequate, of what is right in the apparent dilemma which the play presents. These are the two "fragile goodnesses" that Martha Nussbaum describes in her examination of the play in her study of Greek morality in the drama and philosophy of the fifth and fourth centuries.<sup>6</sup> She regards the play as constituting a prime example of fifth-century discussions of human conduct, with both the principal characters seeking in vain to find moral safety in inadequate concepts of right conduct. Both are fragile goodnesses because both antagonists are intransigent, unable to bend to the exigencies of a complex situation. I shall return to Nussbaum's analysis later, because I think that the persistent theme of order in the play suggests that this view does not adequately describe the behavior of Creon.

A brief exchange the interpretation of which is important for my argument occurs later in this episode. Antigone asserts (504-07) that "these men" (by which she can only mean the chorus) would agree that what she has done is properly a cause for *kleos*, not punishment, if they were not afraid to say what they think. Not so, Creon answers: σὺ τοῦτο μούνη τῶνδε Καδμείων ὀρᾷς (508). I take this to mean, "You alone have this view, differing from these Thebans present." Creon cannot mean all the Thebans; the word τῶνδε indicates "those present," and since we are told, in the first episode, that the meeting of Creon and the chorus is private (ἐκ πάντων δίχα 164) we are not to suppose that those present represent the general populace of Thebes. They are a group distinguished by their loyalty to the dynasty (165-74). Antigone's rejoinder (509) is: "These men too have this view, but they keep their mouths shut for you." Whereupon Creon answers, in what I think can be taken as genuine astonishment, "Are you not ashamed to judge differently from them?" The question is not a repetition of what he has said, namely that only Antigone, of those present, judges it glorious to have buried Polyneices. Creon is here concerned not

<sup>6</sup> M. Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy* (Cambridge 1986).

about the morality of burial but about obedience. Antigone's defiance contravenes the *peitharchia* Creon has earlier stressed and anticipates the emphasis on *kosmos* that is a feature of the encounter between Creon and Haemon. Creon is characterizing not the act of burial but Antigone's disobedience; it is in this that he finds a lack of *aidos*. This part of the episode ends with Creon's angry declaration that "No woman shall rule as long as I am alive" (525), a resolve that is a part of Creon's fear of disorder. Antigone's unfeminine audacity, in such strong contrast with Ismene's proper outlook, provokes Creon's anger because it is an offense against his sense of order.

The first overt questioning of Creon's order, apart from Antigone's disobedience, comes in the next episode, the confrontation with Haemon. The pattern of the incident is like that involving Creon, the chorus, and the guard, in Episode One. In Episode Three, Haemon's opening words (635–38) create, on the surface, an initial presumption of wisdom on Creon's part, obedience on Haemon's. Haemon tells Creon, *σύ μοι γνώμας ἔχων / χρηστὰς ἀπορθοῖς*. These words mean, literally, "having good counsels you set them out straight before me," or, possibly, "you set me straight." The verb *ἀπορθόω*, "set straight," is rare. Its infrequent other uses show that it can mean to "set" either "straight up" or "straight on." There are no examples elsewhere in which the meaning is to set a person straight, and it seems more probable, therefore, that the implied object here is *γνώμας* rather than *με*. "Straight up" is the commoner meaning, as it is with *ὀρθόω*, and the noun *ἀπόρθωμα*, in its one appearance, in an inscription,<sup>7</sup> refers to setting something up in a temple.<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless, "straight on" seems to be the meaning here, in view of the following words, *αἷς ἐφύεσμαι*.<sup>9</sup> In either case, Haemon is declaring that his father's *gnomai* are "straight," and that is doubtless what Creon wants to hear. A note of doubt is introduced by Haemon's closing phrase in this opening speech, *σοῦ καλῶς ἡγουμένου* (638). Jebb, among others, refuses to see this hint, insisting that Haemon's "deference is unqualified,"<sup>10</sup> but the suggestion is there, whether or not Haemon intends it, since we have some grounds for doubting the absoluteness of Creon's wisdom, not only from Antigone's contrary view but also from the uneasiness expressed by the chorus.

But Creon is satisfied with his son's answer and proceeds to lecture him on the merits of obedience. His emphasis is on the need of order within the family, on the grounds that "If I nurture disorder within the *genos*, I shall certainly nurture it in those outside the *genos*" (659–60). From the family Creon's lecture proceeds to the city, and his authoritarianism becomes ever more dominant, one might even say more obsessive: "Whomever the city

<sup>7</sup> *IG* 9(1). 691. 2, a third century B.C. Corcyrean inscription.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *ἐξόρθου* (83) and *τύχη ὀρθοῖ* (1158).

<sup>9</sup> In general, however, the concept of "straightness" in the language of the play is "straight up," as in the ship in Episode One (162–63) and the ship that appears later in the present episode (715–17).

<sup>10</sup> Jebb (above, note 1) note ad loc.

may appoint, he must be obeyed in all matters, be they small and just or the opposite" (666–67). Whether Creon is justified in calling himself appointed by the city may be doubted, in view of his statement (173–74) that he holds all power by virtue of his relationship to the dead brothers. (There is no suggestion in this passage of appointment other than by himself.) Creon continues his lecture (675 ff.), inveighing against the destructiveness of anarchy and extolling the virtues of *peitharchia*, to which most of those who enjoy stable lives (τῶν ὀρθομένων) owe their safety.<sup>11</sup> One more word of Creon's speech is relevant to my topic; Creon draws the following conclusion: We must defend τὰ κοσμούμενα, i.e. the orderliness of obedience to Creon. And, finally, says Creon, we must keep women in their place. This is an integral part of Creon's κοσμούμενα.

There is irony in the grave reply of the chorus, though they perhaps do not intend it, when they declare that Creon seems to them to have spoken φρονούντως, "unless we are being deceived by our old age." We may recall that their first effort in judgment, when they suggest that the burial may have been θεήλατον, is greeted by Creon's enraged taunt that their words are showing them to be foolish as well as old.

Haemon's response begins mildly, as he takes up his father's theme of uprightness, averring that he can in no way find that Creon has not spoken ὀρθῶς; but the agreement does not last long. After declaring that the city as a whole supports Antigone, Haemon lectures his father: Do not keep within you one *ethos* alone, namely that what you say, and nothing else, ὀρθῶς ἔχει. The illustrative images that he proceeds to introduce, the unbending tree and the ship with sail unslackened, emphasize the danger of loss of stability: The tree is destroyed root and branch (αὐτόπρεμνα), and the ship's captain ends his voyage capsized (712–17).

But Creon has not yet changed his sense of what is orderly. His reply to Haemon's urging that he examine not his age but his *erga*, i.e. his action in defending Antigone as he has just done, is the rhetorical question (730), "Is it an *ergon* to revere those who are disorderly (τοὺς ἄκοσμοῦντας σέβειν)?" In other words, in Creon's eyes Haemon is now guilty of supporting disorder, the very fault that in his preceding lecture to his son he said that he was determined not to nourish: τὰ ἐγγενῇ ἄκοσμα θρέψαι (659–60). Creon has, after all, nourished disorder within the family.

The exchange between father and son leads next into the related imagery of disease, and the two images, of health and order, continue to be linked in Creon's scene with Teiresias. To the stern warning of Teiresias that Creon had better listen to him, Creon dutifully answers that he has not in the past rejected the seer's wisdom. The answer of Teiresias to this is in terms of the stable ship (994): "It is thus that you have steered the city on a straight

<sup>11</sup> Jebb (ad loc.) translates τῶν ὀρθομένων by "whose course is fair." But the metaphor more probably suggests staying "upright" rather than "straight on," and in Haemon's rejoinder to this lesson in politics the opposite case is stated in the same language.



course (δι' ὀρθῆς)," with its echo of Haemon's metaphor of the capsized vessel.

After the initial exchange, Teiresias gives his report of the ill-omened behavior of the birds (999–1011) and the failure of his burnt offerings. He begins his interpretation of these signs with the declaration (1015–22), "The city is sick, because of your way of thought (*phren* 1015)." He goes on to describe how the altars and hearths of the city are filled with carrion, from the rotting corpse of Polyneices; the gods refuse sacrifices, no bird gives a clear call. All is in confusion; the whole of nature, it seems, is out of order. In short, Teiresias makes it inescapably clear that the law imposed by Creon, who thought that he was acting on behalf of the gods of Thebes by bringing just vengeance on one who meant to scatter (διασκεδῶν 287) their laws, is an offense against the gods of Thebes.

After an angry exchange, in which Creon rejects the advice of Teiresias to bury the body, Teiresias utters what he has just described as τὰκίνητα διὰ φρενῶν (1060), "what is in my mind and ought not to be stirred," i.e., what ought not to have to be said and would not have been said were Creon less intransigent. Some parts of Teiresias's speech beginning at 1064 present incidental problems of interpretation,<sup>12</sup> but the general meaning is clear. Creon has got matters out of order. He has cast down below what belongs above, by housing Antigone in a tomb, and has kept in this world a corpse that belongs to the nether gods. This is a matter, Teiresias continues, in which neither Creon nor the upper gods have any place; by his action (*tade*) Creon has violated them. Creon, the would-be man of law and order, has turned basic natural order upside down. Almost as devastating, for one who wants to bring order to his city, is what Teiresias goes on to say (1080–83), that all the cities around are hostile, because animals or birds have carried the unholy stench of carrion to their city hearths. There could be no more complete rejection of Creon's sense of order.

<sup>12</sup> Most of these problems have no specific relevance here, but the following points should be noted. Dawe's text at the end of 1070 has his conjecture θυῶν for the MSS' θεῶν. His arguments for this reading (*Studies in the Text of Sophocles* III [Leiden 1978] 113–14) are, first, that "it is impossible that ἄμοιρον can stand for ταφῆς ἄμοιρον," and, secondly, that 1068 and 1070 "were clearly designed to be" parallel; θεῶν, of course, interferes with the parallel. But ἄμοιρον does not create any real problem; the context is enough to suggest that the corpse is without a share of what is proper for the dead. The parallel would be appropriate, but Dawe's way of achieving it is not. Θύος and the verb θύω are appropriate for sacrificial offerings to a god or, possibly, to a hero, but not for an ordinary mortal. The evidence presented in J. Casabona's comprehensive *Recherches sur le vocabulaire des sacrifices en grec* (Aix 1966) 85, 110–11, 116–17, appears to rule out the use of θύος in this context. (I am indebted to Professor Kevin Clinton for advice on this point.) A. Brown, *Sophocles. Antigone* (Warminster 1987) proposes σχεθῶν, but while this has the merit of providing a parallel to βαλῶν in 1068, the combination ἐχει . . . σχεθῶν is too unattractive to attribute to Sophocles.

Dawe's athetesis of 1072–73 is not necessary. The meaning of these lines seems clearly enough to be that οἱ κάτωθεν are properly assigned to the nether gods and are not the business of Creon or the gods above; the subject of βιάζονται is easily supplied from ὧν.



The note of disorder continues. When Creon, cowed at last by Teiresias's ominous words, turns to the chorus for advice they tell him to go and release the girl and build a tomb for Polyneices, and the episode ends as Creon charges off, fearing that he would have done better to preserve the established laws (τοὺς καθεστῶτας νόμους 1113-14) throughout his life. But he proceeds to put matters in reverse order, building the tomb for Polyneices first and then moving to Antigone's place of entombment. Many critics defend this "order" of events, on the grounds that it is the non-burial of Polyneices that angers the gods. But in fact Teiresias's words concerning the disorder that Creon has created condemn both sides of the disorder, and it is therefore not thematically insignificant that Creon proceeds to do the reverse of what the chorus advise.<sup>13</sup>

By the end of the play, the disorder of Creon's intended order is revealed in all its disastrous consequences. The picture that emerges is of course only one thread in the rich and complex web of this play's imagery, but it is a continuing presence, and the final picture of Creon with everything askant in his hands is an appropriate seal for this theme.

I have mentioned Martha Nussbaum's analysis of the play in her book entitled *The Fragility of Goodness*. At the heart of her thesis about the play is the idea that both Creon and Antigone cling to too narrow a concept of what is right, and while both have a degree of rightness both are unwilling to compromise and hence both are shown to be wanting in practical morality. Their goodness is fragile. Nussbaum recognizes that Creon's stand is more open to criticism than Antigone's, but she allows him, as do most critics, a measure of genuine patriotism that commands respect. And there no doubt was, in Sophocles' audience, some tendency to regard Creon's decree as politically acceptable. There seems little doubt that non-burial as a punishment for certain heinous crimes was not unusual in fifth-century Athens, as Martin Ostwald has recently argued.<sup>14</sup> We can readily agree with Robert Garland that "the degree of enlightenment shown by Sophocles was not necessarily shared by his contemporaries."<sup>15</sup> Yet the

<sup>13</sup> While it is true, as critics have observed, that it is dramatically essential for the discovery of Antigone to come after the burial, this fact does not negate the significance of the order of these events. In a play in which the theme of order is prominent, it is hard to suppose that this instance of order is without meaning. The playwright was not obliged to have the chorus give the advice they do. At the same time, it would be wrong to think that if Creon had followed the advice of the chorus all would have been well. Teiresias's prophecy could not go unfulfilled. Kamerbeek (above, note 1) has good comments on this passage.

<sup>14</sup> *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law* (Berkeley 1986).

<sup>15</sup> R. Garland, *The Greek Way of Death* (Ithaca 1985) 103. Nevertheless, I cannot agree with the view of D. Hester on this point, in "Sophocles the Unphilosophical," *Mnemosyne* 24 (1971) 11-59, an extensive and generally valuable analysis of the play and its criticism. Hester insists that Sophocles cannot have been so out of step with contemporary attitudes as to regard Creon's decree as unacceptable. The evidence of the play is overwhelmingly against this point of view.

severity of the punishment first proposed by Creon and the decision to leave all the enemy dead unburied seem excessive, even for a time of crisis. The assertion of Albin Lesky, that "Creon's decision is arrogant and evil," is perhaps too severe, but he is surely correct in stating that the laws for which Antigone fights are laws with which "the *polis* ought never to be in conflict."<sup>16</sup> Lesky's statement is brief and somewhat over-simplified. Antigone's motives are complex, and Creon is no doubt patriotic within his limited understanding. But his patriotism consists of a determination to maintain order in the city by a rigid requirement of obedience to himself. This is a matter not so much of goodness or evil as of comprehension. An ill-conceived decision is maintained stubbornly in the face of mounting proof that it is disastrous for all concerned. Creon's order proves to be disorder, not because Antigone challenges it but because it was only an illusion of civic order, imposed by Creon alone, acceded to in private by the elders, objectionable to the city at large, who approve of Antigone's action, and finally exposed by Teiresias as a prime example of disorder.

Throughout the play the theme of order and disorder is repeatedly expressed in metaphors having to do with spatial positions and forms. The prominence of this language suggests that *παρείρων* (368) may have more probability than it has usually been granted. The chorus, after singing the praises and the dangers of human ingenuity, declare that νόμους *παρείρων* *χθονὸς / θεῶν τ' ἔνορκον δίκαν / ὑψίπολιν*. Most recent editors change the striking word *παρείρων* to *γεραίρων*, conjectured long ago by Reiske. The verb *εἴρω* means "string" or "weave" together; Pindar uses it for creating a wreath of song (*N.* 7. 77). *Παρείρω* is rare; Xenophon uses it meaning "insert" (*Symp.* 6. 2), and it occurs in an Aeschylean fragment (fr. 281 Radt), where the meaning appears to be similar. *Γεραίρων* certainly simplifies matters, but it does so by reducing the passage to a tameness that is no credit to Sophocles and by falsely stressing the doubleness of the obligation.<sup>17</sup> It is precisely the failure of Creon to see that the two obligations the chorus speak of here are not in conflict but must be woven together as a single tissue. The laws of the city and the justice of the gods are not divisible.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> *Greek Tragedy*, trans. by H. A. Frankfort (London 1965) 108. B. Vickers, *Towards Greek Tragedy* (London 1973) 526 ff. expresses the same view.

<sup>17</sup> *Παρείρων* is retained in the new OCT of Sophocles by H. Lloyd-Jones and N. G. Wilson (Oxford 1990), and is defended by them in *Sophoclea* (Oxford 1990) 124.

<sup>18</sup> I am indebted to several University of Toronto classicists for helpful criticism offered when I gave an earlier version of this paper at a seminar of the University of Toronto Graduate Department of Classics. I am grateful also to Professor Phillip Mitsis and to Patricia Kirkwood for their careful reading and their efforts (not entirely in vain, I hope) to correct flaws in my arguments and their presentation.



## Pericles Among the Intellectuals<sup>1</sup>

PHILIP A. STADTER

Φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας. These words, put into Pericles' mouth by Thucydides, suggest Pericles' interest in σοφία. Unfortunately the historian gives no other indications of Pericles' involvement with the dynamic intellectual currents of his day.<sup>2</sup> Many modern scholars have attempted to fill this lack. The sophists, according to G. B. Kerferd, "owed much to individual patronage, and above all to the patronage of one man, Pericles. This is something which has not been recognized as fully as it should in accounts of the sophistic movement. Lack of evidence makes it difficult for us to form any clear and reliable judgment about the personality of Pericles. But his intellectualism is not to be doubted."<sup>3</sup> Such an assertion invites reexamination of our admittedly thin evidence, for in fact Pericles' intellectualism was frequently doubted in his own time and subsequently. What exactly was his relation with the intellectual and artistic movements of his time, especially with the sophists? Who were the intellectuals closest to him, and what was his relation to them?

In what follows I will examine Pericles' associations, recorded or imagined, with a number of intellectuals—Protagoras, Parmenides and Zeno, Pythoclides, Damon, Anaxagoras, Sophocles, Phidias, and Aspasia. In so doing, I will pay especial attention to the temporal and literary context in which our notices appear. I believe that it is seriously mistaken to make Pericles the central figure of intellectual life at Athens. That view is founded upon an incautious and unskeptical reading of Plutarch's *Pericles*

<sup>1</sup> It is a pleasure to explore again in a volume dedicated to his memory a topic that I discussed several years ago with Fritz Solmsen. Conversations with him always revealed new aspects of old problems.

<sup>2</sup> The speeches Thucydides attributes to Pericles cannot be taken as a direct statement of Pericles. They indicate Thucydides' respect for his intelligence, but give no indication of his training or intellectual milieu. The sophistic figures occasionally employed (as at 2. 40. 1) belong to Thucydides' own style.

<sup>3</sup> G. B. Kerferd, *The Sophistic Movement* (Cambridge 1981) 18. Cf. also F. Schachermeyr, *Perikles* (Stuttgart 1969) 142–49 on Pericles' *Kulturprogram*, D. Kagan, *Pericles of Athens and the Birth of Democracy* (New York 1991) 171 and 185 on "the intellectualism and rationalism" of Pericles.



and other late sources, and does not sufficiently attend to the tradition of the fifth and fourth centuries. Like Plutarch, I will give particular importance to the statements of contemporaries, despite the obvious bias and even hostility they often show. This reexamination will reveal a Pericles rather different from some standard presentations. Stripped free of the anecdotal rhetoric of later centuries, Pericles emerges as a powerful orator and dynamic politician, but not a participant in the sophistic revolution. Let us start with the evidence for Pericles' contact with the most famous of the sophists.

"Close personal relations existed at least with Protagoras," Victor Ehrenberg writes.<sup>4</sup> The chief evidence comes from an anecdote in Plutarch's *Pericles*. Pericles is said to have spent the whole day with Protagoras, trying to establish who should be held responsible for the accidental death of a participant in the games—the javelin which killed him, the thrower of the javelin, or those managing the games (*Per.* 36. 4–5). The source and value of the story are problematic. It is often considered as contemporary, deriving from Stesimbrotus. Yet Plutarch does not attribute the passage on Pericles' dispute with Protagoras to Stesimbrotus, as he does the immediately following story of Pericles' seduction of Xanthippus' wife.<sup>5</sup> In fact, the story does not fit Stesimbrotus' purposes, as far as we can establish them. Stesimbrotus, a Homeric rhapsode and explicator, tried to show, in his book deriding the politicians Themistocles, Thucydides, and Pericles, the weaknesses in the education and training of these leaders. It would not have been to his advantage to show Pericles debating on an equal footing with Protagoras, the wisest of the sophists. If anything, he would have wished to show Pericles demolished by the brilliance of the expert.<sup>6</sup>

Plato in his dialogue *Protagoras*, written almost five centuries earlier than the *Pericles*, has an illuminating passage which serves as a counterbalance to Plutarch, and warns us not to overinterpret his anecdote. Xanthippus and Paralus, the two sons of Pericles, are discovered by Socrates at the house of Callias, following Protagoras about as he holds forth. But

<sup>4</sup> V. Ehrenberg, *Sophocles and Pericles* (Oxford 1954) 96.

<sup>5</sup> This is the apparent interpretation of Plutarch's discrete and shocked reference to this story at *Per.* 13. 16 and 36. 6.

<sup>6</sup> Note how, in Plato *Prot.* 339a–c, Protagoras' statements on Simonides are meant to leave Socrates reeling and unable to reply. In such a case, one would imagine that Stesimbrotus presented a satirical picture of Xanthippus' report of Pericles' encounter with Protagoras. The source of the account of Xanthippus' quarrel may well be comedy. On Stesimbrotus' pamphlet, see F. Schachermeyr, "Stesimbrotos und seine Schrift über die Staatsmänner," *SAWW* 247, 5 (1965), K. Meister, "Stesimbrotos' Schrift über die athenischen Staatsmänner und ihre historische Bedeutung (*FGrHist* 107 F 1–11)," *Historia* 27 (1978) 274–94, and H. Strasburger, "Aus den Anfängen der griechischen Memoirenkunst," in *Forma et Subtilitas: Festschrift für Wolfgang Schöne zum 75. Geburtstag* (Berlin 1986) 1–11.

they have not been sent there by Pericles.<sup>7</sup> As Socrates notes, Pericles has neither trained them himself in political wisdom, nor entrusted them to others, but rather "left them to graze for themselves, like free-ranging sheep" (319e–20a). Now they are listening to Protagoras, but soon—the implication is—they will move on. Moreover, Socrates observes, Pericles has also refused to entrust his ward Cleinias to Protagoras: after a brief period in the care of his uncle Aripbron, Pericles has once more put Cleinias in the rather dubious care of his brother Alcibiades (320a–b).<sup>8</sup>

It is clearly Plato's view that Pericles had no special faith in Protagoras' teaching, or that of other sophists, but expected that his sons and wards would grow up naturally, with no special training, in the companionship of their older relatives and fellow citizens. How different Pericles is from Callias, who spent a fortune on the sophists! Far from spending money on sophists, Pericles, as Plato reports elsewhere, put his ward Alcibiades in the care of a paedagogue, a certain Zopyrus, a Thracian slave in his household, who had grown too old for other duties (*Alc.* I 122a).<sup>9</sup> Plato's scorn for Pericles' attitude toward education is palpable.

If we are to believe Plato, then, Pericles did not think that Protagoras was a good or necessary educator for the young people in his charge. What then of Plutarch's report that Pericles spent a whole day discussing with Protagoras the case of the contestant in the pentathlon? The story, if true, would be indicative of Pericles' interest in considering legal problems at length, though not necessarily of his enthusiasm for sophistic disputations. But there is little reason to consider it authentic: A similar case in Antiphon, *Tetralogies* 2, concerns a boy killed by a javelin thrown in a gymnasium. The problem, while undoubtedly the subject of discussion in the fifth century, was also a standard rhetorical challenge concerning responsibility, into which teachers could introduce real names to enhance vividness. By Plutarch's day, it must have been a common *topos*, like the story of the slave of Pericles, who fell from the roof of the Propylaea while sleep-walking.<sup>10</sup> The story probably belongs to the pedagogical tradition of the rhetorical or philosophical schools, as do several others in the *Pericles*.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Pace Schachermeyr (above, note 3) 148.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. also *Meno* 94d: Pericles has trained them in μουσική, ἀγωνία, and τὰλλα . . . ὅσα τέχνης ἔχεται, but not in virtue.

<sup>9</sup> Zopyrus—if it is the same one—apparently became an example in Socratic circles: Phaedo wrote a dialogue named after him, and he was said to have been interested in physiognomy (Diog. Laert. 2. 105; cf. also Cic. *Tusc.* 4. 37. 80; *De fato* 5. 10).

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Plut. *Per.* 13; Pliny, *NH* 22. 44; Diog. Laert. 9. 82; Hieronymus fr. 19 Wehrli.

<sup>11</sup> Cf., e.g., the story of Pericles and the eclipse (*Per.* 35. 2), ascribed to the philosophical schools. For Antiphon as a predecessor of the later rhetoricians' treatment of stasis theory, cf. D. A. Russell, *Greek Declamation* (Cambridge 1983) 17 and 40; for Pericles as an example in declamations, 121. Even if the story goes back to Stesimbrotus, its veracity would hardly be assured, since Stesimbrotus' anti-Periclean brief led him to report or invent even the story of Pericles' lust for his daughter-in-law. Jacoby, *FGH Hist*

A second ground for connecting Protagoras and Pericles is that Heraclides Ponticus reports that Protagoras went as lawgiver to Thurii.<sup>12</sup> The notice itself is unreliable, since Diodorus speaks at great length of Charondas as the lawgiver who revised the ancient laws of Zaleucus for use at Thurii (12. 11–21). Moreover, we are by no means certain that Pericles played a determining role in the foundation of Thurii and in the appointment of the lawgiver. Of all the sources referring to the founding of the new city, only Plutarch presents Thurii as a Periclean project. The context in Plutarch's *Pericles* does not encourage belief: our notice appears in a list of Athenian initiatives of all sorts (*Per.* 11. 4–6), which Plutarch has assembled to glorify Pericles. The list includes projects which are clearly non-Periclean, such as Tolmides' cleruchy to Naxos.<sup>13</sup> Thurii thus offers no support for a tie between Pericles and Protagoras. Quite simply, we do not know Pericles' role in the foundation of the city, nor in the choice of Protagoras as lawgiver, if indeed he was chosen, nor the motivations Pericles might have had in urging the appointment if he did so.

In sum, Plato assures us that Pericles conspicuously avoided the one service which he might reasonably have entrusted to Protagoras, the training of his own legitimate children, Xanthippus and Paralus. Anecdotes connecting the two men are highly dubious. The silence of the fifth and fourth century sources points to the conclusion that Pericles' circle never included Protagoras.

Nor is this surprising. Although an excellent orator, Pericles had little in common with the sophists. Exactly because of his gifts as a speaker, he did not need to go to them for rhetorical training. By the time the first sophists became active in the 440s, Pericles had been a leading figure in Athenian politics for two decades. In addition, he presented himself to the Athenians as a champion of religious orthodoxy. We cannot pass over casually the fact that he instituted an extraordinarily ambitious and expensive program of sacred buildings, whose manifest purpose was to

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107 F 11 prints the whole passage, but marks with large print 36. 6 as the section actually ascribed by Plutarch to Stesimbrotus. An unauthentic work found in the Plutarchan corpus, the *Consolatio ad Apollonium*, reports that Protagoras praised Pericles' self-control at the funerals of his sons (*Cons. ad Apol.* 118e = FVS 80 B 9, cf. also Val. Max. 5. 10. ext. 1, Aelian VH 9. 6). Even if the anecdote were genuine, it would tell nothing of Protagoras' personal contact with Pericles.

<sup>12</sup> Quoted by Diog. Laert. 9. 50.

<sup>13</sup> The seer Lampon, a *mantis* whom Plutarch elsewhere considered a friend and agent of Pericles (*Praec. ger. rep.* 812d), was the chair of the Athenian commission sent to establish the city. But a cross-examination of Lampon by Pericles in a trial for *asebeia* is recorded by Aristotle (*Rhet.* 3, 1419a), which indicates that Lampon at that time was not a friend of Pericles. Plutarch's description of Lampon as Pericles' agent is most probably a deduction from his presence on the Thurii commission. See for a full account of the evidence for the foundation of Thurii D. Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, NY 1969) 154–69, 382–84.

honor the gods of the city. We may find it easier to consider the Parthenon or Propylaea as aesthetic monuments, but the Athenian people, led by Pericles, saw them first of all as dedications to their patron goddess. Moreover, Pericles was willing to make a *casus belli* of the religious sanctions against the Megarians for working land sacred to the Eleusinian goddesses. Protagoras' view of the gods was that "concerning the gods I cannot know either that they exist or do not exist, nor what sort they are in appearance: many things hinder knowing, the obscurity [of the subject] and the brevity of human life."<sup>14</sup> Pericles' public life utterly contradicted that opinion. On the contrary, Pericles devoted a substantial part of his energy and political capital to seeing that Athens honored the gods as they had never been honored before, with buildings, festivals, and processions.

The tenuous evidence for Pericles' contact with Protagoras depends on traditions elaborated after the fourth century. A similar late elaboration also lies behind Plutarch's statement that Pericles heard Parmenides and Zeno when they were at Athens (*Per.* 4. 5). A meeting of the two Eleatics with Pericles would indeed have been chronologically possible, but no other writer suggests any such contact. In this case the argument from silence is especially important: Plato has Socrates refute the notion that Pericles has any real knowledge by showing that he has taught no one. In the course of the argument he notes particularly two men whom he knows to have profited from contact with Zeno. Socrates pointedly omits listing Pericles as a student, although he is the subject of the argument at this point (*Alc.* I 119a).<sup>15</sup> Plutarch or his source has misremembered Plato, and made Pericles one of Zeno's students.<sup>16</sup> There is no other evidence for Pericles' contact with these men.

In fact, neither fifth-century writers nor Plato, our chief source for the sophists and their friends, ever suggests that Pericles had contact with any philosopher except Anaxagoras, or with any sophist at all, unless Damon is included in that category. The comic poets, so hostile to his other friends, say nothing about sophists.<sup>17</sup> This silence is echoed by the other Socratic writers and by Aristotle. Our conclusion must be that Pericles had no interest in the sophists, and gave them no support. The sole exception—and he is in fact not an exception—is Damon, son of Damonides.

<sup>14</sup> H. Diels and W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*<sup>9</sup> II (Berlin 1959) 265 (80 B 4).

<sup>15</sup> Grote's reference to this passage as evidence for Zeno's teaching of Pericles is mistaken (*History of Greece* VIII [London 1869] 145, c. LXVII).

<sup>16</sup> There is no reason to assume another source: such casual errors are not infrequent, even in material Plutarch knows well; cf. e.g. the conflation of the campaigns of Epidaurus and Potidaea at *Per.* 35.

<sup>17</sup> Note that Aristophanes does not mention Pericles in the *Clouds*, except for a political action unrelated to sophistry (*Nub.* 859).



Damon, an undoubted associate of Pericles, is often considered a sophist, but he is a unique representative of the species. First, he was an Athenian, and one prominent enough in political life to be ostracized. Second, there is no record that he received payment for teaching others. He is first mentioned in our literary sources by the comic poet Plato, quoted by Plutarch in the *Pericles*. This poet, writing after Pericles' death, has a character address Damon with these words: "You, as they say, were a Chiron in bringing up Pericles."<sup>18</sup> Clearly the poet suggests that Damon taught or influenced Pericles in some way, as Chiron was said to have done for Achilles and other heroes. Unfortunately the nature of the activity is not specified. Several references from the fourth century supplement this intriguing notice. Plato informs us that Damon was especially expert in music (*Rep.* 3, 400a; 4, 424c), and had been influenced by Prodicus (*Lach.* 197d). According to Plato Damon had an effect on Pericles (*Alc.* I 118c, where he is coupled with Pythocles and Anaxagoras) and on Nicias (*Lach.* 197d). Isocrates, in the 350s, considers him a teacher of Pericles, along with Anaxagoras, and most sensible (φρονιμώτατος) of the Athenians (*Antid.* 235). Finally, the *Athenaion Politeia* tells us that Damonides, the father of Damon, was a political adviser to Pericles, especially in suggesting public payment for jury duty (27. 4), and was ostracized by an annoyed *demos*. An ostrakon apparently dating from the 440s, "Damon Damonidou," indicates that Aristotle or the papyrus text is mistaken, and that not Damonides but his son Damon was ostracized, although the ostrakon which survives was not necessarily cast on the occasion of his ostracism.<sup>19</sup> Then, sometime in the late fourth century, as Wallace has argued, Heraclides Ponticus or another writer composed a philosophical dialogue containing Damon as a character, in which the educative value of

<sup>18</sup> *Per.* 4. 4 = fr. 191 K.: σὺ γὰρ / ὥς φασι Χείρων ἐξέθρεψας Περικλέα. Although Plutarch refers to "comic poets," he probably knew only this one citation. On this fragment, cf. J. Schwarze, *Die Beurteilung des Perikles durch die attische Komödie und ihre historische und historiographische Bedeutung*, *Zetemata* 51 (Munich 1971) 160–64. Schwarze's attempt to fix a date, however, cannot be accepted.

<sup>19</sup> The ostrakon might have been cast when another person received the "winning" vote. An alternate interpretation of *Ath. Pol.* 27. 4 corrects the *Ath. Pol.*'s Damonides to Damon, and argues that Damon was older than Pericles, being born about 500, adviser to Pericles in the 450s, and ostracized ca. 430: see K. Meister, "Damon, der politische Berater des Perikles," *Rivista storica dell'antichità* 3 (1973) 29–45, P. J. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia* (Oxford 1981) ad loc., and R. W. Wallace, "Damon di Oa ed i suoi successori: un'analisi delle fonti," in *Harmonia Mundi*, ed. R. W. Wallace and B. MacLachlan, *Quaderni Urbinati*, Suppl. 4 (forthcoming) 30–53, at p. 50. This does not seem to take account of the testimony in Plato, *Alc.* I 118c, that Pericles associated particularly with Damon as an old man, and that Damon figures in a play of Plato Comicus, who first began producing plays in the 420s. As Wallace notes (p. 52), the earlier dating would make Damon one of the earliest sophists, if he can be called such, well before Protagoras. This seems highly improbable.

music was discussed.<sup>20</sup> Later notices are not useful in establishing Damon's role as associate of Pericles. Even the rather detailed comments of Plutarch, *Pericles* 4. 1–4 and 9. 2, are derived entirely from the notices in Plato, Aristotle, and Plato the comic poet. The apparent additions, where Plutarch speaks of Damon as a top-notch sophist (ἄκρος σοφιστής) who used the lyre as a shield, are a reworking and elaboration of Plato's description, through the mouth of Protagoras, of how sophists had protected themselves from hostility, and provide no new information.<sup>21</sup>

What then is Damon's position with regard to Pericles? He was considered extremely smart, and was an adviser to Pericles, as his father had been before him. It is quite likely, given the fact that he was ostracized, that he was politically active and belonged to a well-to-do family, with the wealth if not the lineage of other leading figures in mid-fifth-century politics. His Athenian birth and apparently continuous residence in Athens set him off from other sophists, who came from minor cities, traveled through the Greek world to earn money and build their reputation, and considered a profitable stay at Athens a high point of their activity. Damon, according to Plato and later writers, was especially interested in music, in particular the different harmonies and their effects on the psychology or behavior of listeners or performers.<sup>22</sup> If we were to relate his musical interests with any political initiatives of Pericles, we might expect them to be the increase in the number of festivals (Plut. *Per.* 11. 4), the reestablishment of the musical agon in the Panathenaia shortly before 446 (*Per.* 13. 11), and especially the construction of the Odeon (*Per.* 13. 9–10).<sup>23</sup> Such an emphasis on music as a proper activity of government would well fit Damon's interests, and not be different in kind from his father's recommendations regarding jury duty: both initiatives won influence for Pericles by distributing public money to the citizens. It would also explain why Damon might be seen by Pericles' opponents as a dangerous element, worthy of ostracism: his advice would be directly related to Pericles' power in Athens, and to the use of the *phoros* from the Delian league, which was also the basis for the objections against the Periclean

<sup>20</sup> Wallace (previous note) 32–42.

<sup>21</sup> Plato, *Prot.* 339a–e. Wallace (above, note 19) 50, cites also Olympiodorus, *In Alc.* ed. Westerink, 137. 20–38. 11, as furnishing information that Damon taught Pericles the songs "which harmonized the city," but this is simply Olympiodorus' interpretation of the passage in *Alc.* I 118c, filled out with the discussion of Damon in the *Republic*. I disagree with Wallace's assertion (51) that as scientific researcher on human subjects and as political adviser, "Damon fu un sofista tipico." His interests were similar to those of some sophists, but the defining quality of the sophist is not scientific research but teaching to those who will pay.

<sup>22</sup> On Damon as music theorist see W. D. Anderson, *Ethos and Education in Greek Music* (Cambridge, MA 1966) 74–81, Wallace (above, note 19) 44–53.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. F. Schachermeyr, "Damon," in *Beiträge zur alten Geschichte und deren Nachleben: Festschrift für F. Altheim I* (Berlin 1969) 192–204, at 199–200.

building program. Damon, then, should be seen as an intellectual Athenian, who had given thought to music and its effects, as well as to political actions which would strengthen Pericles' position, not least to those favoring the celebration of musical events in the city.<sup>24</sup> There is no evidence in our sources that he ever taught for money as a professional sophist.

According to Plato, *Alc.* I 118c, Damon was preceded as teacher of Pericles by Pythoclides of Ceos, whom the scholiast to the passage identifies as a teacher of the *semnos* style of music and a Pythagorean. Our only other information is Protagoras' assertion in Plato, *Prot.* 316e, that he "hid his sophistry" under the cloak of music.<sup>25</sup> Pericles, like every Athenian gentleman, studied music as a youth; his teacher, it would seem, was Pythoclides, someone better known than the ordinary music teacher, as befitted Xanthippus' wealth and social status.

Pericles' contact with Damon raises the question of his personal contacts with other Athenians who might be considered intellectual leaders. Two acquaintances stand out, Sophocles and Phidias. Sophocles and Pericles shared the generalship in 441/40, at the time of the Samian War (Androton, *FGrHist* 324 F 38; cf. Plut. *Per.* 8. 8). They undoubtedly spoke to each other on this occasion, as on others when the limited social and political world of Athens brought them together.<sup>26</sup> However, we have no way of knowing whether the two men found each other's company congenial, or whether Sophocles ever chose to discuss his poetry or the views expressed in his tragedies, rather than, say, the nature of the Persian threat, the problems of imperial administration (Sophocles had been a *hellenotamias*), or the competitors in the upcoming Olympic games. On the contrary, their contemporary, Ion of Chios, suggests just the opposite. Ion, who reports with delight a dinner conversation with his fellow tragic poet Sophocles, found Pericles' company boorish and arrogant. One suspects that Ion avoided Pericles when he could, and tolerated his presence when he had to (*FGrHist* 392 F 6, F 15). Sophocles may have done the same. Plutarch records an anecdote in which Pericles prudishly tells the poet to keep his eyes to himself, and not on pretty boys (*Per.* 8. 2).<sup>27</sup> The

<sup>24</sup> Although in this discussion it has been presumed that Damonides and Damon were both advisers to Pericles, the force of the present argument does not depend on that assumption. It would be possible for Damon to have advised Pericles both on jury pay and later on musical festivals and building the Odeon, before being ostracized.

<sup>25</sup> Plutarch's citation of Aristotle for Pythoclides at *Per.* 4. 1 apparently represents a confusion with the passage from the *Protagoras*, which is paraphrased immediately after.

<sup>26</sup> Note that Sophocles was active in governmental roles: *hellenotamias* in 443/2, perhaps general in the 430s (*Vita Soph.* 9). For the questions concerning Sophocles' civic career, see P. Karavites, "Tradition, Scepticism, and Sophocles' Political Career," *Klio* 58 (1976) 359-65, with earlier bibliography.

<sup>27</sup> Again, this seems a standard story which was ascribed to Pericles and Sophocles for vividness; cf. the other versions in *Arist.* 24. 7 and [Plut.] *Vitae dec. or.* 839a.

story is of dubious value, but does suggest that Sophocles, who at a dinner party chuckled over his successful "generalship" in winning a kiss from a pretty wine-pourer (Ion 392 F 6), would hardly have sought out Pericles' company and subjected himself to such puritanical observations. The feeling was no doubt mutual. Plutarch reports that Pericles, unlike earlier politicians, avoided dinner parties, and concentrated on state business.<sup>28</sup>

A third Athenian with whom Pericles is associated in our literary record is Phidias, sculptor of the Athena Parthenos as well as of earlier statues, the Lemnian Athena and the Athena Promachos. Phidias was undoubtedly known to Pericles. However, when we compare the early notices with the later tradition, it is apparent that these ties have been expanded far beyond what was actually known. In particular, there is no evidence that Phidias ever "managed and oversaw the whole building program," as stated by Plutarch.<sup>29</sup> Nor can we assert that Pericles' involvement with Phidias' trial for embezzlement extended beyond the political realm to personal friendship and a shared artistic vision.

Our first report of Pericles' ties to Phidias comes from certain unnamed comic poets cited by Plutarch: Phidias, according to these anonymous mockers, was furnishing a rendezvous on the Acropolis for Pericles to meet freeborn women.<sup>30</sup> The comic scene exploits the sacrilegious contrast: Phidias working on the statue of the virgin goddess, under whose aegis Pericles is seducing the wives of citizens. In simple terms, Pericles is accused of using the building program for his own (in this case, lecherous) ends. The only other fifth-century notice is in Aristophanes, who has Hermes affirm that Pericles was frightened by the accusations against Phidias, and therefore, to distract his enemies, began the Peloponnesian War (*Peace* 605–11). This reference to Phidias' troubles is confirmed by the decree of Glaucon cited by Plutarch (*Per.* 31. 5) and in the fourth century by Philochorus (*FGrHist* 328 F 121) and perhaps by Ephorus, since it appears in Diodorus.<sup>31</sup> Philochorus has Pericles involved not as a friend but as *epistates*, a public commissioner responsible for the statue. Diodorus mentions Pericles' position as commissioner also, and adds that the prosecution was led by Pericles' enemies, who charged both Phidias and Pericles.

The story of Pericles' friendship with Phidias develops much later, partially as an expansion of Aristophanes' explanation for the war. Plato and the orators are silent on the relationship of the two men. Subsequent

<sup>28</sup> *Per.* 7. 5; cf. W. R. Connor, *The New Politicians of Fifth Century Athens* (Princeton 1971) 121–28.

<sup>29</sup> *Per.* 13. 6.

<sup>30</sup> *Per.* 13. 15. As in the case of Damon, Plutarch uses the plural, but may well be generalizing from a single notice that came to his attention.

<sup>31</sup> Presuming that Diod. 12. 39. 1–2 accurately reflects Ephorus. Diodorus' word for Pericles' position is ἐπιμελητής.



tradition on the trial of Phidias employs no new evidence, and is no more reliable than the stories that Phidias had carved his and Pericles' portraits on Athena's shield, or had died in an Athenian prison.<sup>32</sup> Plutarch's notion that Phidias was overseer of the building program is contrary to all we know of Athenian building practice.<sup>33</sup> Phidias, like Ictinus, Metagenes, and Callicrates, was simply a prominent artist in the execution of the building program. He became especially tied to Pericles because of the fame of his statue and of the trial for embezzlement which threatened Pericles' political position.<sup>34</sup> When a faction attacked a leading artist in the building program, they also threatened Pericles, the chief proponent of the program. Pericles acted to preserve his position, and would have done the same whether Phidias was a friend or an enemy. Politically, it would have been absolutely necessary to take steps to defend himself in this dangerous climate.

Two foreign intellectuals remain to be considered, who in their diverse ways were said by writers of the fifth and fourth centuries to have influenced Pericles. The less well documented relationship was that with Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, the physical philosopher and exponent of mind as an underlying principle in the universe. Our information on Pericles' relation to Anaxagoras begins with Plato and Isocrates.<sup>35</sup> No fifth-century author thought it worth noting. Isocrates in his *Antidosis* (235) mentions Anaxagoras along with Damon as a teacher of Pericles. His information may well derive from Plato, who in the *Phaedrus* (269e–70a), and again in *Alcibiades* I (118c), says that Pericles learned from Anaxagoras. The *Phaedrus* passage is worth quoting for the ironic tone in which it comments both on Pericles' success as an orator and on Anaxagoras' philosophy. Socrates speaks to Phaedrus (269e–70a):

Pericles was probably the most complete orator in regard to rhetoric.—  
What then? [Phaedrus asks]—All the major arts (τέχναι) require

<sup>32</sup> I do not wish to discuss here the host of problems connected with Phidias' trial, or that of Anaxagoras, but merely review the early evidence for Pericles' involvement. For recent work on the two trials, see P. A. Stadter, *A Commentary on Plutarch's Pericles* (Chapel Hill, NC and London 1989) 284–305, on *Per.* 31. 2–32. 6.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Stadter (previous note) 166–67, on *Per.* 13. 6, and W. Ameling, "Plutarch, Pericles 12–14," *Historia* 34 (1985) 47–63, at p. 57.

<sup>34</sup> Diodorus says that Pericles, as *epistates* of the Parthenos statue, also was accused of sharing in Phidias' crime. This may be true.

<sup>35</sup> For accounts of Anaxagoras' life and thought, see G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers*<sup>2</sup> (Cambridge 1983) 352–84; M. Schofield, *An Essay on Anaxagoras* (Cambridge 1980); J. Mansfeld, "The Chronology of Anaxagoras' Athenian Period," *Mnemosyne*, ser. 4, 32 (1979) 36–69, 33 (1980) 17–95; D. Sider, *The Fragments of Anaxagoras* (Meisenheim 1981); and L. Woodbury, "Anaxagoras and Athens," *Phoenix* 35 (1981) 295–315. For the later traditions on Anaxagoras, see D. E. Gershenson and D. A. Greenberg, *Anaxagoras and the Birth of Physics* (New York 1964); for his use by Plutarch, J. Hershbell, "Plutarch and Anaxagoras," *ICS* 7 (1982) 141–58.

prattling and abstract talk (ἄδολεσχίας καὶ μετεωρολογίας) about nature. From this seem to come highmindedness and effectiveness. Pericles had this quality, in addition to his talent. I think it was because he had fallen in with (προσπεσών) Anaxagoras, who was like that. So Pericles was filled with talk about the heavens and arrived at the nature of sense and nonsense, of which Anaxagoras spoke a great deal. From this Pericles drew what was profitable for him for the art of speaking.

Plato here does not speak of serious studies of astronomy or physics, but rather of a certain high-sounding and powerful style, full of inflated words, which Pericles picked up after meeting Anaxagoras.<sup>36</sup> Contact with someone like Anaxagoras who concerned himself with abstract matters gave Pericles a loftiness which was most effective in persuading the *demos*. Plato alludes to a feature of Pericles' style which reminded him of Anaxagoras' thinking. He explains this style by contact of some sort, but suggests neither that Pericles was an intimate of Anaxagoras nor that he seriously considered the philosophical or physical questions examined by Anaxagoras. But it is this passage from the *Phaedrus* which Plutarch exploits to paint his vivid picture of Anaxagoras' influence on Pericles, reflected not only in the statesman's political restraint, but even in his gait and posture.<sup>37</sup> Neither Plutarch nor the other authors who enhance and expand Plato's notice in the later tradition add to our knowledge of Pericles' relationship with the philosopher.<sup>38</sup>

A second strand involving Anaxagoras is represented by the stories of Pericles' defense of the philosopher at his trial, or his rescue from prison before or after trial. These may begin as early as Ephorus (cf. Diodorus 12. 39. 2), but become prevalent in the Hellenistic period: Diogenes Laertius 2. 12–14 gives four different versions of Anaxagoras' trial, as reported by four authors. The trial tradition is not helpful in establishing Pericles' relation

<sup>36</sup> Cf. C. J. Rowe, *Plato. Phaedrus* (Warminster 1986) 204–05. We perhaps have an example of this style in a conceit from one of his speeches, reported by Plutarch (*Per.* 8. 9 = Stesimbrotus 107 F 9). "Those who have died for their country," Pericles said, "are like the gods. We cannot see them, but we consider that they do not suffer death on the basis of the honors they receive and the benefits they bestow."

<sup>37</sup> *Per.* 4. 6–6. 3, 8. 1.

<sup>38</sup> E.g. [Dem.] 61 (*Erot.*) 45. 3, Plut. *Them.* 2. 5, Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 1. 32. 6, Libanius, *Or.* 1. 1, Themist. 26, 329c, Olympiodorus, *In Alc.* I, p. 135. The reference in the *Pericles* to Anaxagoras' disinterest in money (16. 7) derives from Plato, *Hipp. Mai.* 283a. The scene of Pericles with the starving Anaxagoras (16. 8–9) seems to be an anecdote developed in the philosophical schools, again on the basis of the contact of the two recorded by Plato. Compare the similar story of Pericles offering to maintain the shoemaker-philosopher Simon, only to be rejected by the freedom-loving sage (Diog. Laert. 2. 123). The anecdote describing the diverse interpretations of the ram prodigy (*Per.* 6) is almost certainly a late invention; among other things, the account of the dissection is impossible. Theophrastus' story of the amulet, found in *Per.* 38. 2, does not seem to indicate any special philosophical influence, merely the intelligence Pericles was noted for.

to Anaxagoras. First, as Dover has noted, the very variety of tales indicates that there was no accurate information about the trial.<sup>39</sup> It is quite possible that the whole trial is an invention of philosophical biography. The second Platonic epistle (311a) noted that the relation of Pericles and Anaxagoras could be assimilated to the standard *topos* of the statesman and his philosophical adviser, connecting such men as Periander and Thales, Croesus and Solon, and Hiero or Pausanias and Simonides.<sup>40</sup> The numerous versions of the trial story concentrate on how Anaxagoras was protected by his powerful student, not on the learning of the student or the political context. The story would be useful to any philosopher dependent on a powerful patron.<sup>41</sup> Only Plutarch supplements this edifying story with new evidence, Diopetithes' decree against atheism (*Per.* 32. 2), but the connection of the fifth-century decree with an attack on Pericles probably is Plutarch's own inference.<sup>42</sup> Second, even if we accept the existence of the trial and Pericles' role in it, the precise political and juridical situation remains unclear. Pericles might, for instance, have protected Anaxagoras as part of his general policy of encouraging metics in Athens,<sup>43</sup> or for political reasons, rather than as a friend. Pericles' defence of Anaxagoras would confirm his acquaintance with the philosopher, but does not reveal his intellectual views or debt to him.

In brief: On the basis of Plato and Isocrates we can argue that in the fourth century Pericles was thought to have had some intellectual contact with Anaxagoras, probably in the area of high-sounding cosmological theories. There is no indication of the period at which this contact took place. Plato's brief and ironic ascription of Pericles' eloquence to Anaxagoras' influence grew into a tradition exemplifying the relation between sage and statesman, the major feature of which became Pericles' role in protecting Anaxagoras from an accusation of atheism.

The other non-Athenian associate of Pericles was the Milesian courtesan, Aspasia. Attic comedy often mocked Pericles' liaison with Aspasia as lustful, uxorious, or a cause of war, but one comic writer of the fifth century, Callias, in his *Pedetai* (*The Men in Fetters*) apparently

<sup>39</sup> K. J. Dover, "The Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society," *Talanta* 7 (1975) 24–54, at 27–32.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. also Plut. *Max. cum prin.* 777a. Plutarch's reference in the same work to Socrates' meeting with Pericles at the house of Simon the shoemaker (776b) also reflects the *topos*.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Diog. Laert. 2. 12–14, Plut. *Nic.* 23. 4, Lucian, *Tim.* 10. 11, Olymp. *In Meteor.* 17, *Anth. Pal.* 7. 95. Note also the anecdote encouraging the support of the philosopher at *Per.* 16. 8–9. If the story of a trial developed later, then the notice in Diodorus would not be from Ephorus, but later tradition.

<sup>42</sup> Even Plutarch implies in the same passage (*Per.* 32. 5) that Anaxagoras never came to trial.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. his encouragement of Cephalus to emigrate to Athens, [Plut.] *Vitae dec. or.* 835c. He may have been Anaxagoras' *prostates* (as he apparently was of Aspasia) and thus required to speak on his behalf.

presented their relationship as intellectual. Callias stated that Aspasia was the teacher of Pericles, as Socrates had been of Euripides.<sup>44</sup> This tack was continued by Plato and other Socratic writers, who attributed Pericles' skill at oratory to the coaching of this disreputable female intellectual. In the *Menexenus*, Socrates is able to deliver a funeral oration because he has just had the advantage of the tutoring which previously Aspasia had given to Pericles (*Men.* 235e). Both Aeschines and Antisthenes wrote dialogues featuring Aspasia's relation to Pericles. The former seems to have seen her as a good influence, a teacher of political *arete*, whom Pericles defended when she was put on trial, while the latter apparently took the line of the comic poets, that their relation was lustful, and that Pericles was merely yielding to pleasure. Xenophon has Aspasia teaching Socrates the art of matchmaking (*Mem.* 2. 6. 36, *Oec.* 3. 14), but does not bring in Pericles.<sup>45</sup>

Aspasia's liaison with Pericles is of those we have examined by far the most fully reported in the fifth and fourth centuries. She was associated with Pericles from contemporary writers on; she was admitted to be the mother of Pericles' son and namesake. Comic writers presumed that she influenced Pericles' foreign policy, and in the fifth and fourth centuries she is presented as a powerful intellectual force as well. It is only her sex and her profession which have kept her from being recognized as a major intellectual and cultural influence on Pericles. Or rather, we immediately recognize as comic exaggeration or Platonic irony the notion that a woman might have influenced Pericles, but do not see the same elements at work in the case of Anaxagoras or Damon. Do we have any right to argue that her ideas on persuasion, on art, on foreign policy, or internal politics were any less important to Pericles' than those of Anaxagoras and Damon? Can we rely more on Plato's words in the *Phaedrus* than those in the *Menexenus*? Aspasia did not write a book, like Anaxagoras: but Antisthenes said that Pericles kissed her every day, coming and going.<sup>46</sup> If she was as intelligent as the Socratics suggest, she may have had a major influence on Pericles' thinking with regard to rhetoric, aesthetics, and politics. As Xenophon noted, she would have known a lot about human psychology, which might have been of more practical use to Pericles than all Anaxagoras' talk.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Schwarze (above, note 18) 91–93.

<sup>45</sup> For the fragments of Aeschines, see H. Dittmar, *Aeschines von Sphettos*, *Philologische Untersuchungen* 12 (Berlin 1912), and on the Aspasia, B. Ehlers, *Eine vorplatonische Deutung des sokratischen Eros: Der Dialog Aspasia des Sokratikers Aischines*, *Zetemata* 41 (Munich 1966). For Antisthenes see F. Caizzi, *Antisthenis Fragmenta* (Milan 1966) and G. Giannantoni, *Socraticorum Reliquiae* II (Rome and Florence 1983). The role of Aspasia in Plato's *Menexenus* is at least partially playful, as Plutarch saw (*Per.* 24. 7), but no full explanation has been offered: see W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* IV (Cambridge 1975) 312–23 and the observations of N. Loraux, *The Invention of Athens* (Cambridge, MA and London 1986) 323.

<sup>46</sup> Plut. *Per.* 24. 8, Athen. 13, 589e.



In conclusion, let me review briefly the ancient evidence for Pericles' non-political interests. His contemporaries do not speak of his enlightenment. On the contrary, the poet and belletrist Ion of Chios found him an arrogant boor. The comic poets of the thirties presented him as a lecher, desecrating the Acropolis by his assignations with the wives of prominent Athenians. They mocked his political power and his liaison with Aspasia under a number of mythological guises: Zeus with Hera, Heracles with Omphale or Deianeira, and Paris with Helen. Aspasia's pernicious influence, according to the comedians, led to two wars, against Samos and Sparta. Stesimbrotus reports Pericles' seduction of his daughter-in-law, the wife of Xanthippus. The writers of the last quarter of the fifth century are slightly more favorable. They continue to play on his relationship to Aspasia, but they mention also Phidias and Damon. His extraordinary oratorical power is noted by both comic poets and Thucydides, but only the latter praises as well his judicious control of passion, his honesty, and his foresight. Thucydides, however, is silent on the training which might have prepared him for this role. Rather, the implication of the encomium of Themistocles at 1. 138 seems to be that Pericles, like Themistocles, relied on natural genius.

In the fourth century, Plato associates him with Aspasia, Anaxagoras, Pythoclides, and Damon, but notes that as a speaker he antedated the *technai* which prescribed rules for rhetoric (*Phdr.* 269a). Isocrates repeats the names of Damon and Anaxagoras; Aeschines and Antisthenes think rather of Aspasia. Ephorus appears to have mentioned Phidias and Anaxagoras. Down through the fourth century, therefore, Pericles is considered a compelling orator and a powerful political leader, but not a man particularly intellectual or given to philosophy. He is not associated with the "new intellectuals" of his day, Euripides and the sophists, nor with Socrates. The intellectual influences on him are three: Damon, the political adviser and theorist of the psychological effects of music; Anaxagoras, the physical philosopher who gave loftiness to his oratory; and Aspasia, who taught him the art of persuasion. Later stories seem to grow from this base, especially from the notices in the comic poets and in Plato. Pericles was not at the center of intellectual life at Athens in the 440s and 430s, and certainly not the patron of the sophists.

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## Strepsiades as a Comic Ixion

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Many readers of Aristophanes' *Clouds* have regarded Strepsiades as a disappointing as well as disappointed hero. Unlike Dicaeopolis, Trygaeus, Peisthetaerus, and Lysistrata, who sweep away all obstacles to their Pgreathearted schemes, Strepsiades goes from helpless to humiliated: from family and money problems, through academic failure, to the final indignity of being beaten and out-argued by his own son. Even his revenge against Socrates has seemed more bitter than triumphant, an inadequate reply to so many failures. In Whitman's influential view, Strepsiades' *πονηρία* was flawed, his ambitions too petty to warrant success. He was just not up to the requirements of a comic hero.<sup>1</sup>

My arguments for raising Strepsiades' grade (and with it, that of the play itself) require time and space not presently available. To read the *Clouds* is not always to see it; and I would suggest that performance brings out Strepsiades' comic strengths—among them, his engaging simple-mindedness, his openness to experience, his resilience, and what we might call his sheer survivability—in ways the unadorned text does not. I would also suggest that Strepsiades, more than most protagonists, exemplifies comedy's gift of enduring frustration, surviving humiliation, persevering through failure to try and try again. "I may have fallen, but I won't just lie there," is his watchword. He is descended not from Achilles or Ajax, who cannot endure indignity, but from Odysseus, who can. He exemplifies, not the self-assertion of the tragic hero transposed to comedy's metaphysical universe, but the even greater strength of *not needing* to be a tragic hero in the first place.

The point may seem obvious, but its application to Strepsiades has mostly been ignored. That is, in part, because his style and fortunes have no obvious tragic counterpart. Dicaeopolis, in the *Acharnians*, is played

<sup>1</sup> C. H. Whitman, *Aristophanes and the Comic Hero* (Cambridge, MA 1964) 119–20. Cf. the recent condemnation of Strepsiades by T. K. Hubbard, "Old Men in the Youthful Plays of Aristophanes," in *Old Age in Greek and Latin Literature*, edd. T. M. Falkner and J. deLuce (Albany 1989) 103: "Whereas the old men of Aristophanes' other plays in this period are all essentially sympathetic characters, despite their flaws and obsessions, Strepsiades is a malign parody of the usual comic hero—stupid rather than clever, socially

against the "miserable Telephus," whose persona he borrows from Euripides' rag-and-mask shop, but whose tragic rhetoric and pathos he ultimately throws off, in Odyssean fashion, to resume his own comic way.<sup>2</sup> Trygaeus, in the *Peace*, takes a loathsome dung-beetle for his paratragic steed, rides to Olympus, and recovers the lovely goddess Peace—as against Euripides' Bellerophon, who tried to ride Pegasus to Olympus and was struck down by Zeus' thunderbolt for his presumption. There is no comparable role-model for Strepsiades. I do have one, less obvious, in mind; but let me prepare the way with two blatantly paratragic passages from the *Clouds*. The first is Strepsiades' lament at 717–22:

ΣΤ. Καὶ πῶς; ὅτε μου  
 φροῦδα τὰ χρήματα, φρούδη χροιά,  
 φρούδη ψυχή, φρούδη δ' ἐμβάς·  
 καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι τοῖσι κακοῖς  
 φρουρᾶς ἄδων  
 ὀλίγου φροῦδος γεγένημαι.

The anaphora, the anapaestic rhythm, the pathetic evocations of φροῦδος are probably derived from Euripides. Rau compares Hecuba's lament at *Hec.* 159–61 (her aged husband is gone, her children are gone—more than she yet realizes), and also Peleus' lament at *Andr.* 1070 [actually, 1078]—his voice is gone, his limbs are gone—as he collapses on learning of his grandson's assassination at Delphi.<sup>3</sup> The two passages have much in common, and Aristophanes may be conflating them intentionally. He enjoys the Euripidean term φροῦδος, savors it, and by the heavy-handed play on φροῦδος/φρουρᾶς, builds it into a brief comic aria whose force might be conveyed by a modern parody to the tune of "Old Man River" (from Jerome Kern's "Showboat"):

Lost my money,  
 I've lost my color,  
 I've lost my spirit,  
 I've lost my sneakers . . .

The tragic possibilities are real enough, for Aristophanes as well as for Euripides. Strepsiades has ventured into the (literally and figuratively) mist-en-shrouded world of the Phrontisterion, where Socrates guides, or misguides, souls. It is a tricky atmosphere, one in which values and possessions tend to disappear. The absurd juxtapositions, the culmination of the lament's first section in ἐμβάς, bypass high tragic pain. Strepsiades worries more about losing his money and shoes than about losing his soul,

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destructive rather than constructive, and totally unsuccessful in achieving any transcendent vision."

<sup>2</sup> Cf. K. J. Reckford, *Aristophanes' Old-and-New Comedy* (Chapel Hill 1987) 172–86, 194–96.

<sup>3</sup> P. Rau, *Paratragodia, Zetemata* 45 (Munich 1967) 190.

and rightly so; he is too earthbound to suffer the alienating enchantment of the philosopher's Siren song, to "vanish" into the invisible world of Socratic abstraction. His problem for now is bedbugs. He is not a tragic hero(ine)—is not Hecuba or even old Peleus, nor meant to be. And that is, despite his discomfort and humiliation, wonderfully reassuring.

Strepsiades' self-laudatory triumph song at *Clouds* 1154–66 is another, more ambitious pastiche of tragic tags and motifs. The opening lines come from a lost *Peleus* of (the scholia say) Euripides; Rau argues persuasively that they come from one of those Sophoclean hyporchemes that raise high, delusive hopes just before the catastrophe.<sup>4</sup> But lines 1165–66,

ΣΤ. ὦ τέκνον, ὦ παῖ, ἔξελθ' οἴκων,  
ἄγε σοῦ πατρός,

are certainly taken (as the scholiasts observe) from Euripides' *Hecuba*, as that *mater dolorosa* calls forth her daughter Polyxena to tell her of her fate (171–73):

ὦ τέκνον, ὦ παῖ  
δυστανοτάτας—ἔξελθ' ἔξελθ'  
οἴκων—ἄγε ματέρος αὐδάν.

The verbal and musical echoes of tragedy carry, at least implicitly, evocations of pain and loss. Like the brave hopes of Sophocles' hyporchemes, Strepsiades' enjoyment of triumph proves short-lived (even though the catastrophe is deferred until after the two outrageous scenes with the creditors). There may be a further hint that his loss of a son to the new education is comparable, in its way, to Hecuba's demoralizing loss of her daughter (and later, of her son). The themes of demoralization, loss of innocence, and the disappearance of traditional values are prominent and disturbing in *Hecuba*, and they supply a partial backdrop to the *Clouds*, along with the unmediated social and historical changes to which Euripides and Aristophanes (and Thucydides) were alike responding. We should, I think, admire Aristophanes' courage in taking on so much tragedy—the pain of the aging Hecuba or Peleus as they lose their human props and supports, and the underlying pain of an Athens that has been losing its moral and spiritual bearings under pressure of war, suffering, and change. But, still more, we should enjoy the sureness with which Aristophanes transmutes tragic pity and terror into comic laughter and comic reassurance. For Strepsiades never yields to misfortune. He always bounces back. He survives, that is, in ways that Peleus, Hecuba, and the others never can.

Two of the most important things, then, that we can say about Strepsiades are: (1) that he is not a tragic hero(ine) out of Euripides, and (2) that he comes perilously close to being one. Words and phrases, songs and

<sup>4</sup> Rau (previous note) 148–50. Scholia are cited from D. Holwerda and W. J. W. Koster (edd.), *Scholia in Aristophanem* I. 3. 1–2, in *Nubes* (Groningen 1977).



scenes, enforce this point throughout the *Clouds*, much as they will do throughout the *Wasps*, where Philocleon is like and yet unlike a tragic heroine consumed by unrequited love or a defeated tragic hero who must fall upon his sword. But what we miss in the *Clouds*, as in the *Wasps*, is a certifiable tragic foil for our paratragic or "trygic" hero. The suggestion that Strepsiades plays a comic Ixion cannot (because no Ixion-tragedy is extant) fill the gap; but it may help. By reminding us, once more, of what Strepsiades is not, it may add somewhat to our appreciation of what, in vital and comic terms, he is.

The Ixion legend, of uncertain origins,<sup>5</sup> is best known from Pindar's Second Pythian Ode. (1) This version presupposes, but barely alludes to, Ixion's treacherous murder of his father-in-law and his subsequent purification by Zeus himself. (2) As Pindar tells it, Ixion proved ungrateful (much like Tantalus in *Olympian* 1); he conceived a mad passion for Hera, whom he tried to assault. "His hybris roused him to arrogance, blind infatuation and ruin." (3) His sins bore fruit. He lay with a cloud in Hera's shape; their offspring was Kentauros, who sired the hybristic race of centaurs on Magnesian mares. (4) And now Ixion is bound to the four-spoked wheel, on which he forever turns.

Aristophanes may well have known and used *Pythian* 2 (I shall return to the parallels). He may also have been influenced by an Aeschylean trilogy, including *Perrhaebides* and *Ixion*, and perhaps involving the tragic sequence of murder, alienation, forgiveness, new crime, and new punishment. Whether Aeschylus included Zeus' (earlier) seduction of Ixion's wife Dia, who bore Perithous to him, we do not know. Euripides' Ixion, as Plutarch reports, was a "vile and impious" man: The audience was scandalized, "but I didn't remove him from the stage," said Euripides, "before nailing him to the wheel."<sup>6</sup> The story sounds apocryphal, but the scandal was likely enough, to judge from other plays and other reports. In two surviving fragments, Ixion apparently rejects counsels of moderation, asserting his drive for power and fulfillment.<sup>7</sup> Did he justify his criminal behavior later, in familiar rationalizations? "I can't help my nature," he might have said; or else, "that is how Zeus behaved—and how can I, a mortal, be stronger than Zeus?" The Oedipal wishes, thinly disguised, the fear of punishment, and the modern, sophistic arguments by which moral inhibitions are waived: All this would be very Euripidean, and very powerful. I am tempted to claim Euripides' Ixion as a forerunner of

<sup>5</sup> For the development of the Ixion legend and its representations in literature and art, see J. L. Boyce, *Ixion. Origins and Meanings of a Myth* (University of N.C. dissertation: Chapel Hill 1974). Citations by courtesy of the author.

<sup>6</sup> Plut. *De aud. poetis* 19c.

<sup>7</sup> Euripides, frs. 425, 426 in *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, ed. A. Nauck, suppl. by B. Snell (Hildesheim 1964): first a plea against greed (and perhaps tyranny), then a defense of risk-taking for "great results" (including tyranny). The parallel with Eteocles in *Phoen.* is striking.

Pheidippides, who comes very close (in comic terms) to parricide and incest; but unfortunately, there is no evidence either that the play was produced before 423 or that Aristophanes referred to it. We must therefore return to Pindar's cloud-centaur combination, as it evokes the inner nature of Ixion's sin, and as, very differently, it heralds Strepsiades' comic enterprise and fall.

For what Pindar emphasizes, what he so emphatically rejects in telling Ixion's story, is vanity. The delusion inflicted on Ixion, of lying with a cloud, at once reflects his crime, punishes it, and bodies forth the sinner's spiritual and psychological state, much as the punishments in Dante's *Inferno*, from drifting on the winds (Paolo and Francesca) to being changed into serpents (the thieves), mirror that loss of human freedom and integrity which, for Dante, results from the increasing compulsions of sin. Ixion's intercourse with a cloud, an image, marks the degrading and unreal essence of ἄτη, blind infatuation and delusion. It focuses our attention on the negative, the sheer emptiness of Ixion's wish and act. Here Pindar draws on many sources in folklore and legend. Gods often deceive mortals with images, in dream or waking vision, on the battlefield or in the bedchamber. Sexual impulses are strangely disguised, and strangely frustrated, from Menelaus' dream-image of Helen in the sad *Agamemnon* ode (414–26) to the nightmare figures of incubus and succubus surviving into modern Greek folklore. As for the monstrous Κένταυρος, Pindar may already have known his derivation in popular etymology from κεντεῖν + αὔραν, to "stab the air."<sup>8</sup> He is the very embodiment of lying with a cloud.

Pindar draws a threefold moral in *Pythian* 2. One should show gratitude to benefactors, realize that the gods bring hopes to accomplishment, and avoid vain thoughts. (The latter are characterized as deceptions, ἀπάται, and also as empty, κενεά. Pindar suggestively links κενεός with κένταυρος, offspring of vanity.)<sup>9</sup> Scholars have debated the ode's more particular applicability to Pindar or Hieron. It may be that, as Finley suggests, Pindar is himself the chief recipient of his own warning to avoid vain thinking, to remain grateful, not resentful.<sup>10</sup> (Was he passed over in

<sup>8</sup> P. Von der Mühl, "Weitere pindarische Notizie," *MH* 25 (1968) 226–29, argues that the *Volksetymologie* κένταυρος < κεντεῖν αὔραν probably formed a bridge between Ixion and the centaurs, influencing the legend's development in the direction inherited by Pindar. Although this smacks of later Hellenistic rationalizing, it suits Pindar's fondness for significant word-play (e.g., κένταυρον 44 / κενεά 61) and Aristophanes' (cf. below, notes 14, 19, 20). Cf. also Sophocles' poetic association of κένταυρος, νεφέλη (here = "net, trap"), and κέντρα in *Trach.* 831–33, 839–40. Later, Euripides will make Pentheus "stab the air" at *Bacch.* 629–32 as he attacks the false image of Bacchus. (There are sexual overtones, here as elsewhere.)

<sup>9</sup> Cf. the companion-poem, *Pythian* 3, where Coronis ἦρατο τῶν ἀπεόντων (20), as many do "who hunt windswept aims, whose hopes are unfulfilled"; she fell into great disaster (29), yet her child Asclepius was preserved and given to the good centaur Chiron to rear.

<sup>10</sup> John H. Finley, Jr., *Pindar and Aeschylus* (Cambridge, MA 1955) 92–98. For a somewhat different reading, cf. R. E. Grimm, "Pindar and the Beast," *CP* 57 (1962) 1–9.

favor of Bacchylides?) Yet the lesson remains general. We are all called to show gratitude and accept mortal limits (the two go together). Success requires restraint, requires acceptance of reality. All genuine achievement, from statecraft to chariot-racing to poetry, must depend on the gods' gifts and the sense and skill with which we embrace those gifts. Anything else is folly.

I return to Strepsiades, who in true comic fashion refuses to accept life's ordinary restraints and limits, such as the payment of debts incurred through his son's horse- and chariot-racing. His first scheme failing, he ventures himself into the Phrontisterion, beholds its wonders, and is initiated shortly by Socrates into the mysterious and delusive realm of celestial matters (τὰ μετέωρα), scientific ideas, and novel deities such as the Clouds (250–59):

- ΣΩ. βούλει τὰ θεῖα πράγματ' εἰδέναι σαφῶς  
ἅττ' ἐστὶν ὀρθῶς;  
ΣΤ. Νῆ Δί', εἵπερ ἔστι γε.  
ΣΩ. Καὶ ξυγγενέσθαι ταῖς Νεφέλαισιν εἰς λόγους,  
ταῖς ἡμετέραισι δαίμοσιν;  
ΣΤ. Μάλιστά γε.  
ΣΩ. Κάθιζε τοῖνυν ἐπὶ τὸν ἱερὸν σκίμποδα.  
ΣΤ. Ἴδοὺ κάθημαι.  
ΣΩ. Τουτονὶ τοῖνυν λαβὲ  
τὸν στέφανον.  
ΣΤ. Ἐπὶ τί στέφανον; Οἷμοι, Σώκρατες,  
ὥσπερ με τὸν Ἀθάμανθ' ὅπως μὴ θύσετε.  
ΣΩ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πάντα τοὺς τελουμένους  
ἡμεῖς ποοῦμεν.  
ΣΤ. Εἴτα δὴ τί κερδανῶ;  
ΣΩ. Λέγειν γενήσῃ τρῖμμα, κρόταλον, παιπάλῃ.

Socrates' *double entendre* at 252 was unintentional. Being much concerned with sex, as with food, Strepsiades joyfully accepts the invitation to "have intercourse" with the Clouds—which may have prompted Socrates to add the qualifying εἰς λόγους ("verbal intercourse, I mean") after a pause.<sup>11</sup> The audience will enjoy his naive, sensual reaction. Soon afterwards, they will be amused by his literal-minded fear of being sacrificed "like Athamas." The allusion, as Dover observes, is on target, for Phryxus and Helle were Athamas' children by his consort Nephele, or Cloud.<sup>12</sup> Strepsiades has his moments. His characteristically associative thinking here lights, most appropriately, on that hero who slept with Cloud and got himself and his family into all kinds of trouble.

After summoning the Clouds, Socrates explains to the puzzled Strepsiades why they look like women (345–55):

<sup>11</sup> Translators usually miss the joke; William Arrowsmith is a happy exception.

<sup>12</sup> *Aristophanes. Clouds*, ed. K. J. Dover (Oxford 1968) 132, 257.

- ΣΩ. Ἀπόκριναί νυν ἄττ' ἂν ἔρωμαι.  
 ΣΤ. Λέγε νυν ταχέως ὅ τι βούλει.  
 ΣΩ. "Ἦδη ποτ' ἀναβλέψας εἶδες νεφέλην κενταύρῳ ὁμοίαν,  
 ἥ παρδάλει ἢ λύκῳ ἢ ταύρῳ;  
 ΣΤ. Νῆ Δί' ἔγωγ'. Εἶτα τί τοῦτο;  
 ΣΩ. Γίγνονται πάνθ' ὅ τι βούλονται· κᾶτ' ἦν μὲν ἴδωσι κομήτην  
 ἄγχιόν τινα τῶν λασίων τούτων, οἰόνπερ τὸν Ξενοφάντου,  
 σκώπτουσαι τὴν μανίαν αὐτοῦ κενταύροις ἥκασαν αὐτάς.  
 ΣΤ. Τί γάρ, ἦν ἄρπαγα τῶν δημοσίων κατίδωσι Σίμωνα, τί  
δρῶσιν;  
 ΣΩ. Ἀποφαίνουσαι τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ λύκοι ἐξαίφνης ἐγένοντο.  
 ΣΤ. Ταῦτ' ἄρα ταῦτα Κλεώνυμον αὐταὶ τὸν ῥίψασπιν χθὲς  
ἰδοῦσαι,  
 ὅτι δειλότατον τοῦτον ἑώρων, ἔλαφοι διὰ τοῦτ' ἐγένοντο.  
 ΣΩ. Καὶ νῦν γ' ὅτι Κλεισθένη εἶδον, ὀρᾶς, διὰ τοῦτ' ἐγένοντο  
γυναῖκες.

The passage works on several levels. First, as a metatheatrical joke, for the representation of comic choruses requires theatrical convenience even more than symbolic appropriateness. It is difficult for choreutai to represent clouds "floating in the blue." It is easier to represent clouds who, for their own purposes, present themselves as seductive women—with, most likely, touches of "cloud" about their drapery and headdresses. (Strepsiades' protest earlier that "these have noses," whereas real clouds resemble "spread-out wool," plays on slang terms for the penis and for sexual intercourse, hence reminds us that the real-life choreutai were male. The joke focuses our minds, if not Strepsiades', on disguise and the multiple interpretation of disguise.)<sup>13</sup>

Second, Aristophanes scores extra points by indulging in some old-fashioned εἰκασμός, a primitive form of satire. Its riddling guise invites the audience to play along. Why do the Clouds appear as centaurs? To ridicule some pederast, like Xenophantus' son.<sup>14</sup> Why as wolves (we would say, sharks)? Some embezzler of public funds: Simon, maybe. Why deer? Some coward: Cleonymus, of course. And now Strepsiades, catching on, completes the argument himself (he is quick enough when it comes to personal insults): So why women? The Clouds must have noticed—Cleisthenes.

<sup>13</sup> The argument of C. Brown, "Noses at Aristophanes' *Clouds* 344?" *QUCC* 14 (1983) 87–90, is not really refuted by G. Mastromarco, "Il Naso Delle Nuvole (Aristofane, *Nuvole* 344)," *QUCC* 23 (1986) 121–23; for although the Clouds present themselves basically as human (Mastromarco), Aristophanes cannot resist confusing levels of make-believe further by alluding to the masculinity of the actual choreutai (Brown). On noses and penises, cf. also M. Davies, "The Tickle and Sneeze of Love," *AJA* 86 (1982) 117 and nn. 15, 16.

<sup>14</sup> Dover cites a scholion to Aeschines 1. 52 but fails to follow up the joke, whose point lies in an obscene pun: The compulsive pederast is a κέντροπος, or "butt-fucker": cf. Von der Mühl (above, note 8) 228, with refs., including *Nub.* 350.



And third: Socrates' account suggests an aspect of the Clouds' ever-shifting nature that goes well beyond Socrates' own limited and limiting comprehension.<sup>15</sup> For as they assume various shapes in order to expose, through satiric "likenings," the personality traits and obsessions of particular men, the Clouds resemble nothing so much as—the poets, actors, and choruses of Old Comedy. Like Aristophanes himself, they are experts at indecent exposure. Through taking on disguises, they reveal the shameful truth beneath ordinary appearances. But they are also (again, like the comic poet and his troupe) free agents, mischievous self-willed players. If they assume the likeness of seductive women, they may do so, not just because of the effeminate Cleisthenes, but because of the would-be cheater Strepsiades, whom they visit, in time-honored fashion, with delusion—or for that matter, because of that other cheater, Socrates, who also wrongly believes that he can control the Clouds' comic mimicry, fun, and delusiveness in the service of his own inferior and limited purposes.

Many years ago, venturing a descriptive account of "Aristophanes' Ever-Flowing Clouds," I said that they were (among other things) natural symbols of confusion and deception.<sup>16</sup> Instances of the latter included Hera's seduction of Zeus in *Iliad* 14, where their divine lovemaking is concealed, together with Hera's purposes, in a golden cloud, and Ixion's infatuate intercourse, in *Pythian* 2, with the cloud-image in Hera's shape. Strepsiades misbehaved, or was mistreated, "like a comic Ixion." But his disaster was more a comic ἀπάτη than a tragic ἄτη—more like the comic deception of Zeus than like the tragic infatuation of Pindar's Ixion.

The Strepsiades-Ixion comparison is mentioned in Dover's commentary (we came to it independently), and it is developed by Köhnken in his careful 1980 article on the *Clouds*.<sup>17</sup> Dover uses Ixion and the phantom Helen (especially in Euripides' *Helen*) to illustrate the mythic and poetic linkage of clouds with deception; and Köhnken argues at length for Aristophanes' conscious evocation of *Pythian* 2: The collocation of clouds, women and centaurs, mockery and madness, is strikingly similar. I am not altogether convinced that Aristophanes is alluding to Pindar's version, which we have, rather than to the lost Ixion-tragedies or to the legend generally. I shall, however, argue that the case for Strepsiades as a comic Ixion can be strengthened, by the "intercourse with clouds" joke that I discussed earlier,

<sup>15</sup> On the function and meaning of the cloud chorus, see H.-J. Newiger, *Metapher und Allegorie* (Munich 1957) 50–74; P. Pucci, "Saggio Sulle Nuvole," *Maia* 12 (1960) 31–42; P. Händel, *Formen und Darstellungsweisen in der aristophanischen Komödie* (Heidelberg 1963) 234–38; K. J. Reckford, "Aristophanes' Ever-Flowing Clouds," *Emory Univ. Quarterly* 22 (1967) 222–35; C. P. Segal, "Aristophanes' Cloud-Chorus," *Arethusa* 2 (1969) 143–61; A. Köhnken, "Der Wolken-Chor des Aristophanes," *Hermes* 108 (1980) 154–69; D. Ambrosino, "Nuages et sens. Autour des Nuées d'Aristophane," *Quaderni di Storia* 18 (1983) 3–60.

<sup>16</sup> Reckford (previous note) 231–34.

<sup>17</sup> Dover (above, note 12) lxviii; Köhnken (above, note 15) 162–63 and, on the likelihood of a conscious Pindaric reminiscence, n. 27.

and also by a concatenation of words and images that are especially prominent in the latter part of the *Clouds*: twisting and turning (στρέφειν and related terms), chariot and wheels, the horse-goad (κέντρον), sexual passion (ἐρᾶν, ἐραστής), and lifting someone "up in the air," literally or figuratively (ἐπαίρειν). The combination is striking. It evokes Ixion's punishment, while reminding us, again, that Strepsiades is not Ixion.

In Hellenistic and Roman times, Ixion's wheel became one of the great *Sehenswürdigkeiten* of the underworld, along with Tantalus' feast (or impending rock), Sisyphus' boulder, and Tityus' vulture. Earlier, though, Ixion was depicted as revolving in mid-air.<sup>18</sup> Euripides' Heracles laments that, for his sins, he will be banished from earth and sea, and "will imitate the wheel-driven Ixion in his bonds" (*HF* 1295–98). On a fourth-century Campanian neck-amphora, two winged figures set Ixion's wheel in motion. Are they Aurai, or perhaps Nephelai? In everyday Greek life, the bodies of slaves or criminals undergoing torture were attached to wheel rims (ἐπὶ τροχοῦ στρεβλοῦσθαι), lashed with whips or prodded with goads (κέντρα). Aristophanes often mentions these tortures.<sup>19</sup> But the juxtaposition on the vase of lovely female figures and the mid-air wheel brings us back more particularly to Strepsiades, the "son of Twist."

His name, as many have observed, suits his nature.<sup>20</sup> It also suits the near-Euripidean reversal plot on which he revolves. At the play's beginning we find him twisting and turning in bed, anxious about his debts. His goal is to twist out of debts and lawsuits somehow, like a successful wrestler, or like Odysseus πολύτροπος, the "man of many turns." Socrates and the *Clouds* encourage his day-dreams of becoming a super-successful lawyer and scoundrel—a κέντρων and στρόφις, among other things.<sup>21</sup> He fails, of course. He cannot, any more than others, harness the intellectual and cultural revolution (Δίωτος) to his private purposes. The reversal plot makes him a victim, whether of bedbugs on the "mystic cot" (twisting and turning again beneath the bedclothes, in comic counterpoint to the gracefully

<sup>18</sup> Berlin F 3023, listed in A. D. Trendall, *The Red-Figured Vases of Lucania, Campania and Sicily* (Oxford 1967) 338, no. 787. On this point, and for the following references to Ixion in myth and art, see Boyce (above, note 5) 33–40, 92–99 and notes.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *Pax* 452, *Lys.* 845–46 (and J. Henderson's commentary [Oxford 1987] *ad loc.*), *Ra.* 620, *Pl.* 875.

<sup>20</sup> Cf., among others, B. Marzullo, "Strepsiade," *Maia* 6 (1953) 99–124; Pucci (above, note 15) 15–18. Although the name Strepsiades is not introduced until line 134, I take Aristophanes' uses of στρέφω and related terms at 36, 434, 776, 792 and 1455 as strongly thematic, together, probably, with forms of τρέπω (40, 88, 813, 1263) and τρέφω (927, 1158, 1206, 1208).

<sup>21</sup> Although we might expect an active meaning for κέντρων here (= κεντροτύπος, "one that strikes with the goad"; cf. the scholia), κέντρων normally denotes a low, vicious person: "one that bears the marks of the κέντρον, a rogue that has been put to the torture" (LSJ). The term στρόφις, "a slippery fellow, or twister," is more clearly suited to Strepsiades. Its fuller implications are wonderfully suggested by the French *roué* which Ambrosino (above, note 15) 12 uses of Strepsiades in another connection, at line 260.

dancing chorus), or of his all too sophistically educated, father-beating son. He is more twisted about than twisting. And yet (this is a chief difference to tragedy), Strepsiades retains the clown's basic resiliency, the ability to bounce back from defeat. "I may have fallen [been thrown], but I won't just lie there."

I give, for language, imagery, and tone, the end of the second creditor scene and the beginning of the chorus's little teasing song that precedes the catastrophe (1296–1306):

- ΣΤ. Οὐκ ἀποδιώξει σαυτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκίας;  
Φέρε μοι τὸ κέντρον.  
ΔΑ. Ταῦτ' ἐγὼ μαρτύρομαι.  
ΣΤ. Ὑπαγε. Τί μέλλεις; Οὐκ ἔλῃς, ὦ σαμφόρα;  
ΔΑ. Ταῦτ' οὐχ ὕβρις δῆτ' ἐστίν;  
ΣΤ. Ἄξεις; Ἐφιαλῶ  
κεντῶν ὑπὸ τὸν πρωκτόν σε τὸν σειραφόρον.  
Φεύγεις; Ἐμελλὸν σ' ἄρα κινήσειν ἐγὼ  
αὐτοῖς τροχοῖς τοῖς σοῖσι καὶ ξυνωρίσιν.  
ΧΟ. Οἷον τὸ πραγμάτων ἐρᾶν φλαύρων· ὁ γὰρ  
γέρων ὅδ' ἐρασθεῖς  
ἀποστερησάι βούλεται  
τὰ χρήμαθ' ἀδανείσατο.

The association of goad (κέντρον), wheels, and passionate love is telling. Strepsiades got into trouble, of course, through Pheidippides' horse- and chariot-racing. He owed twelve mnae to Pasias for a horse, three to Ameinias for a little chariot and wheels (τροχοῖν 31). Now the second creditor has come, a natural enemy and oppressor, masquerading pathetically as a figure out of Euripidean tragedy, smashed up in a racing accident. Strepsiades sees through the act and the false pathos (much as Dicaeopolis rejected the "desolated" farmer in *Acharnians* 1018–36) and, with splendid appropriateness, he converts his creditor into a racehorse to be driven—away. The comic business with the κέντρον is sexual aggression too, the dramatic equivalent of a simple "Fuck you!"<sup>22</sup> It also links up with the κένταυρος motif earlier and with the chorus' teasing remarks about this "great lover," which are more than a warning, in colloquial terms, not to "like trouble." Strepsiades is a lover at heart, a *senex amator*. Infatuation comes naturally to him, as to Pindar's Ixion, or to Ixion's sister Coronis, who "was in love with the impossible" (ἦρατο τῶν ἀπεόντων, *Pyth.* 3. 20). Should a comic hero desire anything less?

The turning of Strepsiades' wheel of fortune is marked most emphatically at 1452–64:

<sup>22</sup> For κέντρον = phallus, cf. J. Henderson, *The Maculate Muse* (New Haven 1975) 122; for the phallic "sting" of the wasp-chorus, K. J. Reckford, "Catharsis and Dream-Interpretation in Aristophanes' *Wasps*," *TAPA* 107 (1977) 305–07 and n. 22.

- ΣΤ. Ταυτὶ δι' ὑμᾶς, ὦ Νεφέλαι, πέπονθ' ἐγώ,  
 ὑμῖν ἀναθείς ἅπαντα τὰμὰ πράγματα.  
 ΧΟ. Αὐτὸς μὲν οὖν σαυτῷ σὺ τούτων αἴτιος,  
 στρέψας σεαυτὸν εἰς πονηρὰ πράγματα.  
 ΣΤ. Τί δῆτα ταῦτ' οὐ μοι τότε ἡγορεύετε,  
 ἀλλ' ἄνδρ' ἄγροικον καὶ γέροντ' ἐπήρετε;  
 ΧΟ. Ἡμεῖς ποιοῦμεν ταῦθ' ἐκάστοθ', ὅταν τινὰ  
 γνῶμεν πονηρῶν ὄντ' ἐραστήν πραγμάτων,  
 ὅπως ἂν αὐτὸν ἐμβάλωμεν εἰς κακόν,  
 ὅπως ἂν εἰδῇ τοὺς θεοὺς δεδοικέναι.  
 ΣΤ. Ὡμοι πονηρά γ', ὦ Νεφέλαι, δίκαια δέ·  
 οὐ γάρ μ' ἐχρῆν τὰ χρήμαθ' ἀδανεισάμην  
 ἀποστερεῖν.

It was, the Clouds insist, Strepsiades' own silly fault. He "twisted" himself into bad trouble. The collocation of words, στρέψας-ἐπήρετε-ἐραστής, balancing the Clouds' earlier warning, once more might recall Ixion as the lustful man caught up in delusion and punished on the airborne wheel. For Strepsiades' "airborne" adventures in the realm of ideas, clouds, and τὰ μετέωρα have belied his passionate hopes, bringing him to reversal, recognition, and punishment, as on the wheel of time. He comes perilously near to becoming an Ixion, a tragic hero, perhaps a Euripidean one. Perilously near: But there are differences, and they are crucial.

For Strepsiades, though humiliated, is not finally hurt. His repentance is comic repentance, in the manner of Verdi's Falstaff: He may speak ruefully, may admit (as beasts often do in Aesop's fables) that "it served me right"; but that is quite enough, and he will move quickly to new resolution and new action: the burning of the Phrontisterion. As for the Clouds' judgment on him, Strepsiades (by now) recognizes teasing, recognizes comic moralizing when he hears it. He insists, quite rightly, that the Clouds' alleged justice was as "naughty" in its way as his own attempt to evade paying his debts. Not only, that is, are the Clouds not representatives of the old morality and religion: They are irresponsible spirits, independent comic agents in their own right, who serve only their own wilful sense of play. (I have compared them elsewhere to Shakespeare's fairies in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*.)<sup>23</sup> Although their trickery towards Strepsiades was evoked in part by their observation and comic mimesis of Strepsiades' own tricky nature, and in part by their patronage of Socrates and related intellectual frauds (who may, however, become victims in their turn), still this little ἀπάτη is only one manifestation of their immortal, illusionary, ever-changing playfulness.

Strepsiades, then, is like Ixion—and unlike. The cumulative similarities of word and act, the clouds, centaurs, and turning wheels, lead us finally to appreciate the comic hero's strength in not being, precisely, a

<sup>23</sup> Reckford (above, note 15) 222.



tragic hero. The *Clouds* has painful moments. It flirts with tragedy, even as it parodies it (the second creditor). There are paratragic laments, very close to Euripides. The reversal plot itself is very Euripidean, very close to *Hecuba* and *Andromache*. The audience may have felt the closeness, may have been disturbed by it—and by other serious implications of the *Clouds*. And yet, it is not a tragedy, as Strepsiades is not Ixion. He survives humiliation. He refuses to accept defeat. He is resilient, as clowns and Athenians should be. In the end, he may claim rightful (or wrongful) descent from Odysseus, “man of many turns,” and from Pindar’s victors in the chariot race and the wrestling match. Is it a coincidence, after all, that the champion of *Isthmian* 7 (the pankration) is named Strepsiades?<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> This essay is submitted in grateful memory of Friedrich Solmsen, who read Pindar with me in 1978–79 and provided much scholarly counsel over the years. He approved the present thesis *in embruo*, referring me to Von der Mühl, and led me on with sherry, cookies, and encouragement. But I must admit, despite Aristophanic temptations to the contrary, that the responsibility for any subsequent faults is my own.

## Herodotus and Athens

MARTIN OSTWALD

"Because of the greatness of our city there is an influx of all things from the entire world, with the result that the enjoyment of goods produced at home is no more familiar to us than the produce of other men" (Thuc. 2. 38. 2). Pericles' words, as recorded in the Funeral Oration Thucydides attributes to him, are often taken as characterizing the age over which he presided. There are good reasons in abundance for doing so. But they can be faulted for an egregious omission: The influx of the material goods and the prosperity they signal also brought to Athens an influx of foreign artists and intellectuals. The Funeral Oration makes only passing reference, if any, to them in Pericles' boasts that Athens is hospitable to foreigners (2. 39. 1) and that the entire city is "an education for Greece" (τῆς Ἑλλάδος παιδείουσιν 2. 41. 1). Like Pericles, we tend to be so blinded by Athenian achievements in tragedy, comedy, and historiography in the fifth century that we lose sight of the large number of foreigners who contributed to Athenian culture at this time. Pericles was himself closely associated with at least two of them, Aspasia and Anaxagoras. In his lifetime, too, Protagoras, the first of the foreign sophists, came to Athens from his native Abdera, and Hippodamus was invited from Miletus to design a new plan for the bustling and expanding Piraeus. Prominent foreign artists were active in Athens about this time: Polygnotus of Thasos, Agatharchus of Samos, Zeuxis of Heraclea, Agoracritus of Paros, and others; tragedies were performed of Aristarchus of Tegea, Archaeus of Eretria, and Ion of Chios; most of the dithyrambic poetry the Athenians heard was composed by foreigners (Melanippides of Melos, Phrynus of Mytilene, Timotheus of Miletus, etc.), and among prose writers we find Stesimbrotus of Thasos and Hellanicus of Lesbos.

Foremost among the prose writers attracted to Athens in the fifth century was one of the foremost writers of Greek prose of any period, Herodotus of Halicarnassus. What attracted him to Athens can only be conjectured: It may have been merely part of his passion for travel, it may have been the intellectual climate of the Periclean Age, or it may have been a desire to visit the focus of resistance against the Persians in the previous generation. In view of the prominence given to Athens in his narrative, it is surprising how little about his relation to Athens has been preserved in

the ancient traditions about his life. The most detailed account, that in the *Suda* (s.v. Ἡρόδοτος), mentions his birth in Halicarnassus—presumably in the mid-480s—, his exile in Samos, his return to his home to help overthrow the tyrant Lygdamis, and his participation in the Athenian settlement of Thurii, where he is said to have spent the rest of his life. It says nothing about his travels and nothing about his stay in Athens. For the latter we depend on a few scraps of information which tell us that in 445/4 B.C. “he was honoured by the Athenian Council for having read his books to them” (Eus. *Chron.*, Olymp. 83.4); we are told, further, that “on the motion of Anytus, he received from Athens a gift of ten talents” (Diyllus, *FGrH* 73 F 3); and elsewhere we learn that Thucydides was reduced to tears by one of his lectures (Marcellin. 54).<sup>1</sup> That Thucydides attended lectures by Herodotus in Athens is chronologically improbable: He will have been no more than ten to fifteen years old in the 440s, and after his stay in Athens Herodotus settled in Thurii. But when we combine this story with the dated tradition that Herodotus was honoured for his reading, it remains credible that Herodotus visited Athens and delivered lectures in the mid-440s; the fact that he was publicly honoured is corroborated by the tradition, whose general accuracy is guaranteed by the name of Anytus associated with it, that he received a gift from the state. However, the sum of ten talents is somewhat high to deserve credence, considering that a similar gift by the Athenians to Pindar is said to have amounted to only one talent and two thirds (10,000 drachmas).<sup>2</sup> Perhaps we may assume, without support from any ancient source, that in addition to his readings Herodotus had performed other meritorious services for the city.

We are even in a position to form a reasonably accurate idea of the kind of readings he gave in Athens. The “books” from which he read at that time cannot have been his work in the shape in which it has come down to us. At least negatively we can be fairly sure that they cannot have included the narrative of the Persian Wars now to be found in Books 6–9, because these books contain references to events which did not take place until the late 430s: The expulsion of the Aeginetans from their homes, referred to at 6. 91. 1, did not occur until 431 B.C.; incidents of the Peloponnesian War, which broke out in 432/1 B.C., are mentioned at 7. 137. 1 and 9. 73. 3; and the Theban attack on Plataea, which started that war, was known to him when he wrote 7. 233. 2.

But there are also positive pointers and they suggest that he lectured on his travels and on the people and places he had encountered. I am thinking of four instances in which he adduces Athenian parallels to explain foreign

<sup>1</sup> On Herodotus and Athens, see F. Jacoby, “Herodotos,” *RE Suppl.* II (1913) 226–42; H. Kleinknecht, “Herodot und Athen,” *Hermes* 75 (1940) 241–62; H. Strasburger, “Herodot und das perikleische Athen,” *Historia* 9 (1955) 1–25; C. W. Fornara, *Herodotus: An Interpretative Essay* (Oxford 1971) 37–58.

<sup>2</sup> *Isoc.* 15. 166; cf. [Aesch.] *Ep.* 4. 3.

phenomena: In discussing the outer circuit wall of Ecbatana, he compares its size with the circumference of the walls of Athens (1. 98. 5); when he refers to the Persian cubic measure *artabē* (1. 192. 3), he gives its equivalent in Attic *medimnoi* and *choinikes*; to give an idea of the distance of Heliopolis from the sea, he relates it to the distance of the altar of the Twelve Gods in Athens from Pisa and the Temple of Zeus at Olympia (2. 7. 1); and when he speaks of the shape of the Tauric peninsula (the Crimea) he compares it with the peninsula on the point of which Sunium is located (4. 99. 5). These analogies, it seems to me, make sense only to an audience as intimately familiar with Athens and Attica as only the Athenians are likely to have been; they therefore permit the inference that they formed part of Herodotus' Athenian lectures. Some corroboration of this is the comparison of the Tauric peninsula with features of the region between Brindisi and Taranto in Southern Italy, which immediately follows the analogy with the Sunium peninsula. The guess is not unreasonable that this addition was made in a later revision of this part of his work, in order to adapt his example to the experiences of an audience he was addressing in Magna Graecia. Although this does not constitute irrefutable proof of anything, it makes it extremely likely that he introduced local comparisons to make his presentation of foreign peoples and places more graphic to whatever audience he was addressing. If this argument is sound, we may conclude that he lectured in Athens on sites he had visited in Persia, Egypt, and Scythia—all places which, as we know from other evidence, he had visited before he came to Athens.

Was Herodotus already interested in "history" in the sense in which we, following in his footsteps, understand the term, when he lectured in Athens? Certainly, the fact that traces of only geographical and ethnographical lectures have survived does not mean that he had nothing to say on the history of the places he had visited. On the contrary, it is unthinkable that his accounts of Persia, Egypt, and Scythia should not have included what he had seen and heard about important events which these places had experienced in the past and which we find embedded in his narrative. But it is questionable whether the conception of the work as a whole, integrating as it does the Persian Wars with the events in different parts of the world that led up to it, which constitutes Herodotus' claim to the title of "father of history,"<sup>3</sup> was already present in his mind when he visited Athens. In the absence of any evidence, it is at least plausible that this conception was stimulated by his stay in the city, which had roused itself from the rubble in which the Persians had left it to become an imperial and cultural centre second to none in the Greek world.

<sup>3</sup> On this point, see especially Jacoby (above, note 1) 467–86. The arguments of D. Fehling, *Die Quellenangaben bei Herodot* (Berlin and New York 1971; English tr. by J. G. Howie [Leeds 1989]), contrived to deny that claim, are unconvincing, despite their occasional insights; see the review by J. Cobet in *Gnomon* 46 (1974) 737–46.



Herodotus is even more reticent about himself and his life than is Thucydides, and this reticence extends also to the names of his informants. The crucial role played by the Athenians in the battles of Marathon, Artemisium, Salamis, and Mycale makes it a priori likely that a large number of his informants were Athenians, who would supply him with tales of the glorious exploits of their ancestors in these engagements, but also with accounts of earlier events in Athenian history, such as the Cylonian revolt (5. 71), the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons, its overthrow, and the establishment of the Cleisthenean democracy (1. 59–64, 5. 55–97). The Athenians are more frequently mentioned as a source of information than any other Greek people and are exceeded only by the Egyptians.<sup>4</sup> To identify individual informants is impossible even in those cases where individual experiences are related, such as Dicaeus' vision on the Thriasian plain (8. 65) or the exploits of Sophanes of Deceleia (6. 92. 2, 9. 73–74). However, there is so much detailed and often intimate information on a number of noble families that the inference is inevitable that Herodotus had free access to members of the upper classes and enjoyed their confidence. The complexity of the relationship of Peisistratus to the Philaïdae, the family of which Miltiades and Cimon were members, is such that one is tempted to assume that Herodotus learned of it from a family member, who also showed him the tomb of Miltiades' father Cimon (6. 34–41, 103. 2–4, 136. 3). He is so well informed about the history of the Alcmeonids (6. 125–31) and so anxious to clear them of responsibility for the traitorous shield-signal given to the Persians at the time of Marathon (6. 121–24) that close personal connections between him and one or more of their number have been inferred. A similarly cordial relation to the Kerykes, one of the families in charge of the sanctuary of Demeter at Eleusis and its mystery cult, can be inferred from the details he knows of their ancestor Callias under the tyrants (6. 121–22). He knows what the Gephyraei believe about their own provenance and what other Athenians believe about it (5. 57. 1), indicating acquaintance with living Gephyraei as well as with their opponents. Further, the numerous anecdotes told to denigrate the moral qualities of Themistocles (8. 4. 2, 57–58, 112. 1, 124. 1–2) are likely to come from descendants of Athenians prominent at the time of Salamis who opposed the policies of the man who made Athens a naval power. Yet hostile and complimentary strands are so tightly interwoven with one another that we must assume that Herodotus integrated the family traditions he had learned with more general popular traditions current about the past.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> See the list in Jacoby (above, note 1) 398–99.

<sup>5</sup> See the excellent discussions of R. Thomas, *Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens* (Cambridge 1989), esp. 171–73 on the Philaïdae; 247–51 and 264–81 on the Alcmeonids; 109 and 252 with n. 34 on the Gephyraei; and 206 n. 37 and 224 on Themistocles.

Modern scholars have often interpreted Herodotus' work as an encomium on Athens, on democracy, on the Alcmeonids, and on their most illustrious scion, Pericles.<sup>6</sup> Of Herodotus' respect and admiration for all of these there can be no doubt, but his admiration was neither blind nor confined to Athens, and above all it did not make Herodotus an apologist for Athens *tout court*.<sup>7</sup> Herodotus recognized that the deployment of sea power was the single most decisive factor in the victory of the Greeks over the Persians, to whom they were inferior in manpower and in materiel. It is for realizing this fact, for acquiescing in the abandonment of their city to be ravaged by the Persians (8. 40–41) and for relinquishing the command of the allied navy to the Spartans lest divisiveness undermine Greek survival (8. 3) that Athens is praised as the "saviour of Greece" (7. 139). But note the preface to this praise: "At this point, I am constrained by hard facts to state publicly a judgment which will be invidious to the majority of mankind; none the less, I shall not hold back what seems to me to be true" (7. 139. 1). This statement shows that he is writing not a panegyric nor a defence of Athenian policy at the time of writing, but a fact about the past which contemporaries did not like to hear. Moreover, Herodotus' admiration for Athens did not make him blind to the fact that the Spartan contribution to the victory was no less decisive than the Athenian. Even though their stand at Thermopylae was doomed to failure, the fact that it was made under the command of their king Leonidas gave an example to the rest of the Greeks which evoked Herodotus' unbounded admiration (7. 204 and 220). Further, it is at Plataea, not at Salamis, that the Greeks won what Herodotus calls "the noblest victory of any that we know," a victory credited to the leadership of the Spartan Pausanias (9. 64. 1).

Similarly, Herodotus' praise of the Athenian democracy is no simple encomium on a particular form of government or on a particular state. In fact, he never praises democracy as "democracy," but applauds it where he does under names which suggest his admiration of a particular aspect of it. In the Constitutional Debate which he places in Persia after the overthrow of a usurper, he praises popular rule as "government by the people which has the fairest name of all, political equality (ἰσονομίη)" (3. 80. 6); and he extols its Athenian variety as "right of free speech (ἰσηγορίη)," which the Athenians acquired after they had expelled the tyrants. But that does not mean that he is blind to its shortcomings. Some of these are summed up in Megabyzus' statement in the Constitutional Debate that "there is nothing more devoid of insight or more prone to arrogance (*hybris*) than a useless mob" (3. 81. 1); another in Herodotus' comment on Aristagoras' success in Athens after his failure at Sparta to enlist support for the Ionian Revolt, that "it seems easier to hoodwink many than one, since he was unable to

<sup>6</sup> E.g., F. D. Harvey, "The Political Sympathies of Herodotus," *Historia* 15 (1966) 254–55.

<sup>7</sup> Strasburger and Fomara (above, note 1).

hoodwink one man, the Lacedaemonian Cleomenes, but managed to do so in the case of thirty thousand Athenians" (5. 97. 2); and yet another in how the clever Athenians were duped to accept Peisistratus as tyrant (1. 60. 3-4). However, Herodotus does not praise ἰσηγορίη for its own sake but as having given Athens the freedom (ἐλευθερίη) which she had not enjoyed under the tyranny and through which a great city became even greater (5. 78; cf. 66. 1). The winning of this freedom for themselves enabled them later "to choose that Greece should survive free" and thus "to arouse the entire rest of the Greek world which did not medize and to repel the King of Persia with the help of the gods" (7. 139. 5).

There is no need here to demonstrate that for Herodotus the issue in the Persian Wars was the affirmation of freedom against the threat of slavery. But it must be pointed out that, whatever Herodotus' own attitude toward democracy may have been, he praised ἰσηγορίη only for having given Athens that liberty which enabled her to lead the Greeks in the fight for their freedom, even if initially the Spartans regarded the newly won Athenian freedom as a challenge to their own supremacy in Greece (5. 91. 1). Nevertheless, the Athenians had no monopoly on freedom. The most rousing treatment of this theme is put into a Spartan context, when the exiled Spartan king Demaratus explains to an incredulous Xerxes at the crossing of the Hellespont that the Spartans, "though free are not free in every respect: law (*nomos*) is master over them, and they fear it far more than your subjects fear you" (7. 104. 4). What this means is strikingly illustrated by the behaviour of the Spartans Sperthias and Boulis who had volunteered to be sent as hostages to Persia (7. 134-36, esp. 135. 3). After explaining at the Persian court that the Spartans will never surrender to Persia, because they have tasted a freedom alien to the Persian slave mentality, they refuse to do obeisance to the Persian king on the ground that their customs (*nomoi*) enjoin them from bowing down before a human being. Evidently, love of freedom is Herodotus' primary concern; whether it was exemplified in ἰσηγορίη or in obedience to the law was of secondary importance to him.

There can be no doubt that Herodotus was aware of the prominent role the Alcmeonids had played and were still playing in the history of Athens. The fact that the birth of the most prominent Alcmeonid of his own time, Pericles, was prefigured by his mother's dream of giving birth to a lion is neither ominous nor complimentary, but simply indicates that Pericles was a man to be reckoned with (6. 125-31). Herodotus' defence of the family against the charge of treason at the time of Marathon (6. 121-24) is often taken as a sign of partiality for them. But since there is little other evidence for such partiality, Herodotus may simply have found it difficult to believe that a family which had rendered such outstanding service to the state in the past could have been responsible for the shield-signal which, he knows for sure, was given to the Persians. It is commonly thought that this defence is evidence for an Alcmeonid source for Herodotus. That is plausible and



perhaps even probable, but it does not rest on firm foundations: Herodotus may well have learned of the charge from sources hostile to the Alcmeonids and may have rejected it on the basis of his own judgment of what this prominent family would or would not be capable of doing.

Our difficulty in this regard is due to Herodotus' failure to mention even a single Athenian informant by name. But we know from other sources the name of one prominent Athenian with whom he must have established a close personal relationship, and that is the tragedian Sophocles. The external evidence for this relationship consists in the opening of an epigram quoted by Plutarch (*Mor.* 785b): "Sophocles at the age of fifty-five composed a song for Herodotus" (ᾠδὴν Ἡροδότῳ τεῦξεν Σοφοκλῆς ἑτέων ὧν / πέντ' ἐπὶ πενήκοντα, Page, *Epigrammata Graeca* 466–67), which was evidently written as a dedication to accompany the song. Since Sophocles was born in 497/6 B.C., the date of this occasion will be ca. 442/1 B.C., about the time when the evidence of Eusebius' *Chronicle* attests Herodotus' presence in Athens. This is also the time in which Sophocles wrote his *Antigone*. It has long been seen that the passage in that play in which Antigone explains her preference for her brother by arguing that, once one's parents are dead, he alone is irreplaceable, whereas a husband or child is not (904–24), depends on Herodotus' story about the wife of Intaphernes (3. 119. 3–6), who, when given the choice by Darius to have one member of her family exempted from execution, opted for her brother: "O King, I could get another husband, God willing, and other children, if I were to lose these; but since my father and mother are no longer living, there is no way in which I could get another brother." The parallels between Antigone's arguments and those of the wife of Intaphernes are so close that they have been taken to corroborate the personal contact between tragedian and historian which is suggested by the fragmentary epigram.<sup>8</sup> A close relationship between tragedian and historian is further suggested by two other Sophoclean passages. Clytaemnestra's ominous dream in the *Electra* (417–27), in which Agamemnon's ancient scepter sprouted into a tree which overshadowed the whole of Mycene, presages the return of Orestes in a way similar to that in which the dream Herodotus (1. 108. 1–2) attributes to the Median king Astyages forewarns of the birth of Cyrus. Here a vine covering the whole of Asia sprang forth from the genitals of his daughter Mandane. Again, Oedipus' comparison of his sons to Egyptian males in the *Oedipus at Colonus* (337–41), who sit at home weaving while their wives go out to provide the necessities of life may well be indebted to Herodotus' account (2. 35. 2–4) of Egyptian men weaving at home, while their women buy and sell in the market-place. True, both these plays were probably written some time after<sup>9</sup> Herodotus' death

<sup>8</sup> Jacoby (above, note 1) 232–37.

<sup>9</sup> C. W. Fornara, "Evidence for the Date of Herodotus' Publication," *JHS* 91 (1971) 25–34, argued for as late a date as 414 B.C.; this view was attacked by J. Cobet, "Wann wurde



(performed ca. 420 and 401 B.C., respectively); but it is worth remembering that tales from Persia and Egypt were part of Herodotus' lectures in Athens. These two incidents may well have become engraved in Sophocles' mind at the time of Herodotus' visit to be recalled in these later plays. Moreover, on a superficial level, a similarity between the two authors can be seen in the importance of dreams, oracles, prophecies, and warnings that influence the lives of legendary heroes in Sophocles and those of historical figures of an ascertainable past in Herodotus; it is further manifested in the prominence given by both authors to concepts such as *hybris* (offensive pride), *tisis* (vengeance), *dikē* (justice), *phthonos* (jealousy, envy), and *atē* (moral indifference leading to ruin) as motivations for human conduct.<sup>10</sup>

To go beyond these similarities to assert that Herodotus' view of the historical process owes something to Sophocles is a plausible conjecture incapable of proof. But it is a point worth pursuing, for, it seems to me, both authors share a perception of human life that is not shared by any other two authors in the whole of Greek literature. To demonstrate this similarity in detail would take me beyond the scope of my present task. But I must indicate a little more clearly what I have in mind.

The tragic aspect of Herodotus' work has been described so beautifully by David Asheri in his recent edition of the first book of Herodotus<sup>11</sup> that his observations are worth quoting. Asheri remarks how the mechanism of historical development operates in Herodotus, as it does in tragedy, through an unconscious cooperation of gods and men. "In Herodotus," he writes, "history repeats itself in this sense: Behind the multifariousness and variability of particular events, which never repeat themselves, there exist archetypal models which remain and recur and which can be detected by way of analogy: 'I know,' says Artabanus to Xerxes (7. 18. 2-3), 'how bad it is to desire many things; for I remember how Cyrus fared in his expedition against the Massagetae, I also remember Cambyses' expedition against the Ethiopians, and I participated in Darius' campaign against the Scythians. Knowing all that, I have reached the conclusion that you, Xerxes, can be the happiest man in the eyes of all humanity, if you do not move <against the Greeks>.' Artabanus, that is, Herodotus, shows that behind specific Persian expeditions—different in detail, conducted by different kings against different peoples—there looms a recurrent 'model' of expansionism failed. If a particular event catches our interest as a curiosity, it gains historical significance as a symptomatic and paradigmatic phenomenon. That does not mean that Herodotus falsifies particulars so as to adapt them to the model;

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Herodots Darstellung der Perserkriege publiziert?" *Hermes* 105 (1977) 2-27. Fornara responded with more convincing arguments in "Herodotus' Knowledge of the Archidamian War," *Hermes* 109 (1981) 149-56.

<sup>10</sup> Schmid-Stählin I.2 (1933) 569-72.

<sup>11</sup> D. Asheri (ed. and comm.), *Erodoto. Le storie* I (Milan 1988) xliiv-xlv.

but a paradigmatic history necessarily implies a selection of human actions. In this respect, Herodotus is more of a philosopher than a historian, if philosophy, in the Ionian sense of the word, is primarily the search for being in becoming. Moreover, he is more of a poet than a historian, even though he wrote prose, because he is interested more in what might happen than in what really happened, less in 'what Alcibiades did and suffered' than in the paradigm."

I believe that it is possible to go beyond this to point out that Herodotus shares this paradigm more closely with Sophocles than either with Aeschylus or Euripides. Chronological considerations apart, which make such an influence unlikely, Euripides' tragic vision tends to consist in frail, vulnerable humans buffeted about by hostile powers in a world not of their own making. There is little of that in Herodotus. Nor does Herodotus share with Aeschylus the view of a moral universe in which superhuman forces control a human destiny which leaves to human agents little more than a choice that makes them links in a chain of events already predetermined in the mysterious ways of heredity. Just as Sophoclean drama is shaped by great individuals—an Oedipus, an Ajax, an Antigone—who, in acting reasonably according to their lights, fall victim to forces over which they have no control, so Herodotus sees the mainspring of historical developments in individuals placed in situations in which their decisions lead not only them but also the people whose destiny is tied up with theirs to an end which they did not foresee.

Sophoclean characters find themselves in conditions in which, however reasonably they act, their actions will inevitably have consequences which recoil against them and against those close to them in kinship, friendship, or citizenship: Oedipus, in performing his royal duty in trying to rid Thebes of a plague, discovers the identity which fate had hidden from him and falls, a blind exile, from his high station; Creon, in trying to restore balance to a state wrecked by fraternal war, stumbles against the religious obligations incumbent upon members of the family; Deianeira, in attempting to regain the love of her husband, destroys him. However good their intentions, however logical their aims, Sophoclean characters discover the limits of their humanity as set by inscrutable and inexorable forces. An Oedipus or a Creon may be warned of what is to come by a Teiresias, but no warning can avert what is in store for them.

A remarkably similar view of the human condition is taken by Herodotus both in working out the theme of his work as a whole and in innumerable details in his narrative which serve as building blocks for his structure.<sup>12</sup> History is enacted by persons whom character, family, and social and political mores and traditions have placed into situations with which they cope as reasonably as they can according to their lights, but

<sup>12</sup> J. Cobet, *Herodots Exkurse und die Frage der Einheit seines Werkes*, *Historia Einzelschriften* 17 (Wiesbaden 1971).

cannot control the outcome of their actions. A decision once made is subject to the inexorable laws of an external necessity, a force which, though divine, can be communicated to men by gods, especially by Apollo and his oracle, but is apparently not determined by them. In Herodotus, the fate of a great individual is usually identical with the fate of his people; his doom is their doom. This is the thread that holds together the large issue central to the work, the wars between Greeks and barbarians from the first major encroachment of non-Greeks upon Greek territories to the re-establishment of a natural boundary—the Hellespont—between them.

Beginning and end of his narrative are tied together by a statement of the external features of his paradigm: The theme that states which were formerly great have become small and those now great were small in the past is placed near the opening of Book 1 (5. 4) and echoed toward the end in Book 9 (27. 4). As in Sophoclean tragedy, history is enacted by great individuals: Rejecting mythical accounts, he starts out by naming Croesus as "the individual whom I know to have been the first to perpetrate acts of injustice against the Greeks" (1. 5. 3–6. 1), and the fate of Croesus is the fate of Lydia, just as the fate of Media and subsequent rise of Persia is the fate of Cyrus, and just as the fate of Persia becomes identical with the fate of Xerxes. Although a tragic setting is not sustained with equal intensity throughout the work, it is hinted at in the discovery on the part of all the major figures involved in the conflict between east and west that certain limits are set to human existence and that good fortune is never constant. Croesus, though warned by Solon that wealth and power do not constitute happiness, learns his lesson the hard way when he attacks Persia; Cyrus is taught by his attack on the Massagetae that he was misguided in "his belief in his more-than-human birth and good fortune in war" (1. 204. 2), despite Croesus' attempt to make his captor profit from his experience; Cambyses' mad lust for expansion is checked by the Ethiopians, Darius' by the Scythians, and Xerxes' by the Greeks.

The inevitability of the pattern inherent in the paradigm is driven home by innumerable vignettes whose structures exhibit a distinctly Sophoclean irony. There is, in the first place, the story of Candaules, whose excessive infatuation with his wife boded a bad end (1. 8. 2: *χρῆν γὰρ Κανδαύλῃ γενέσθαι κακῶς*), which came to pass through the duress his actions eventually imposed on Gyges; we find it in the story of Arion and the dolphin, which shows that those who believe that they can enrich themselves with impunity through murder on the high sea cannot get away with their crime; we find it in the story of Polycrates who, though willingly accepting the advice to give up his most treasured possession, retrieved it in spite of himself and met a horrible end. And we find it in a most striking way when a dream makes Xerxes realize that he cannot back out of his decision to march against Greece, however much he desires to do so. In the detailed narration of events as well as on the larger canvas of his history, Herodotus shows human agents placed in situations in which they are

constrained to act in ways which are bound to lead to failure, because they do not recognize until it is too late the limits which their humanity has set for them.

The similarities between the tragic view Herodotus takes of historical events in their large movement as well as in subsidiary details and Sophocles' treatment of the human condition is so striking that we are entitled to wonder whether they resulted from discussions between these two men. We have no way of telling either whether Herodotus had developed it sufficiently by the time he arrived in Athens in the 440s to transmit it to Sophocles or whether his friendship with Sophocles made him see the information he had gathered on his travels in a new way, which became the organizing principle of the work as a whole when, a decade or so later, he prepared the work as a whole for publication in Thurii. If we could be certain that the subject of his lectures in Athens was nothing but his travels, we could feel more confident than we can feel on the basis of the meager evidence we have that Sophocles' tragic vision had a greater impact on him than his stories had on Sophocles. In any event, it is unlikely that two such similar conceptions of human life should have developed in complete isolation one from the other. A further argument which would favour Sophocles' influence on Herodotus is that he was working in a tradition of tragedy which had been well established in Athens at least since the days of Aeschylus. We know of no similar tradition to which Herodotus could have been exposed before his arrival in Athens. That he did leave a mark on Athens is amply attested by Aristophanes' *Acharnians*.<sup>13</sup>

The tragic view does not divide men into saints and sinners, but presents them objectively as frail creatures placed into situations in which their decision will subject them to transcendent laws that will reveal the limits of their humanity and lead to failure or even ruin. For Herodotus, cities, states, and peoples operate under the same kind of constraint, and this, as we have seen, is one of the reasons why his admiration for Athens or for Sparta cannot be unconditional. He tells us at the opening and toward the end of his work that he will deal with cities both great and small, since "cities which were formerly great have for the most part become small, and those which were great in my own time were formerly small," and this leads him to the knowledge that "human happiness never remains constant" (1. 5. 4). It is inconceivable that a man holding these views was unaware of or indifferent to the events going on in his own contemporary world, dominated as it was by the imperial policy of a city which the sequel of the Persian Wars had catapulted from comparative insignificance at the time she first enters Herodotus' narrative to a greatness that set her on a collision course with Sparta.<sup>14</sup> Whether Herodotus approved or disapproved of

<sup>13</sup> Cf. *Ar. Ach.* 523–29 and *Hdt.* 1. 1–4. Further parallels are cited by Jacoby (above, note 1) 232.

<sup>14</sup> *Fomara* (above, note 1) 59–91.



Athens' imperial policy we do not know. But he is likely to have recognized it as an inevitable consequence of the role Athens had played in the Persian Wars, and his knowledge of human affairs made him foresee the conflagration to which it was leading.

Herodotus' migration from Athens to Thurii, where he seems to have spent the rest of his life, used to be seen as prompted by his support of Periclean policy. More recently it has been suggested that he was motivated by disenchantment with Pericles for hiding imperial designs under the pretext of the panhellenic policy advocated in the guise of the Congress Decree, and that he sought fulfillment of his panhellenic ideal in the new colony.<sup>15</sup> However, it is more likely that he left Athens and did not return to his native Halicarnassus because he knew that both places would be embroiled in the conflict that was sure to come. Thurii was far removed from the scene where the action would take place and it would give him the intellectual and social ambience in which he could live out his days as a keen observer of human life.

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<sup>15</sup> Strasburger (above, note 1) 23-25.

## The Closure of Herodotus' *Histories*

JOHN HERINGTON

### 1. Introduction

The question whether the *Histories*, as we have it, ends at the point where Herodotus intended it to end has been debated for more than a century, and even now there seems to be no firm consensus as to the answer. Although over the past few decades the majority of students seem to have inclined to the affirmative for various reasons, a respected authority on Herodotus could still conclude, in 1985, that "there is in fact no proper ending to the work, and though I have accepted the capture of Sestos as a logically reasonable endpoint, other material could well have followed and some kind of 'epic' conclusion might well have been expected."<sup>1</sup> The present article reconsiders the question in the hope that, at least, a greater measure of certainty is attainable than that.

On one factor in the problem only there seems to be general agreement, and this may be discussed fairly briefly: *As a historical narrative of the wars between the Greeks and Persians, the Histories is clearly unfinished.* Many scholars, especially in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, observed (perfectly correctly) that as a matter of history those wars did not end with the capture of Sestos; and from this they concluded that Herodotus did not live, or perhaps did not care, to complete his project.<sup>2</sup> The conclusion seemed to be reinforced by the observation of Lipsius that the last sentence in Herodotus' actual narrative of the war (9. 121), "and during this year

<sup>1</sup> K. H. Waters, *Herodotus the Historian* (Norman 1985) 114. The continuing uncertainty on the subject may be illustrated by two quite recent opinions. David Asheri in his general introduction to *Erodoto: le Storie I* (Milan 1988) xx-xxi, holds that at 9. 122, Herodotus' work "termina o, meglio, si interrompe. Manca almeno un epilogo"; John Gould, *Herodotus* (New York 1989) 18, remarks that Herodotus' "choice of an ending has surprised and disconcerted some modern readers, and the assumption that he meant to continue has provided a convenient explanation. But the sense of incongruity is more likely due to our lack of sensitivity to Herodotus' own criteria for determining the proper shape of a narrative."

<sup>2</sup> The most influential proponent of this view was no doubt Felix Jacoby, in his justly famed article "Herodotus" (*RE Suppl.*2, Stuttgart 1913), esp. cols. 372-79; the same passage contains a survey of the earlier literature on the question.

nothing happened any more beyond these things,"<sup>3</sup> belongs to a group of *transition-formulae* that occur fairly frequently within the *Histories*; could there be clearer proof that Herodotus had somehow been prevented from completing his intended narrative? Only in 1924 was confidence in this conclusion weakened by the observation of H. Fränkel<sup>4</sup> that this ending of the *Histories* conformed to the widespread archaic literary practice (exemplified above all in the Homeric and Hesiodic epics) of leaving the narrative open-ended, for a continuator to pick up on at some future time. In that case the last words in 9. 121 are no proof that the work is unfinished; rather they may be a deliberate invitation to someone else (a someone who in the event turned out to be Thucydides) to carry on the story from that point. But Fränkel's observation of course leaves untouched the simple fact that, for whatever reason, Herodotus' work does not complete the narrative of the Persian wars.

On the other hand, during the past five or six decades a number of observations have accumulated to suggest that the ending of the *Histories* presents a paradox: *While the book is open-ended as a strictly historical narrative, as a work of archaic art it is perfectly and unambiguously closed.* Sections 2 and 3 of this article will review the final chapters of the *Histories* (9. 108–22) in the light of those observations,<sup>5</sup> adding one or two more that seem to tend toward the same conclusion. In brief, we shall find that these chapters are carefully—some might even be tempted to say, artificially—designed to recall the entire course and tendency of Herodotus' great story, with special emphasis on its opening movements, and on the beginning of its climax, Xerxes' expedition of 480/79. The method used is, in a word, repetition: repetition of themes, situations, characters and even turns of phrase, in such a way that the hearer is reminded, by parallel or contrast, of those significant moments earlier in the work. What rhetorical term we apply to this method, once identified, is perhaps in the last resort a matter of indifference. For convenience, and for want of a more precise word, it will hereafter be referred to as *ring-composition*. Not all will agree with this extended definition of that term,<sup>6</sup> but no more applicable one seems to exist, and a certain degree of justification for it may be found in earlier usage.

<sup>3</sup> J. H. Lipsius, "Der Schluss des Herodoteischen Werkes," *Leipziger Studien zur classischen Philologie* 20 (1902) 195–202.

<sup>4</sup> Hermann Fränkel, "Eine Stileigenheit der frühgriechischen Literatur," first published in 1924, reprinted in his *Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens*, ed. 2 (Munich 1960) 40–96; the remark referred to is found on p. 85.

<sup>5</sup> The individual contributions of the various scholars concerned will be acknowledged, so far as is practicable, as the discussion reaches the relevant passages in Herodotus. Here, however, a special acknowledgement is due to the concise but richly suggestive discussions of the closure of the *Histories* by Henry R. Immerwahr, *Form and Thought in Herodotus* (Cleveland 1966) 8–9, 43 and 144–47.

<sup>6</sup> Immerwahr (previous note) 54, n. 3, would confine the term primarily to *verbal* repetitions, and would distinguish it sharply from "circular" or (after John L. Myres, *Herodotus, the Father of History* [Oxford 1953]) "pedimental" composition. But there is

W. A. van Otterlo thus defines ring-composition: "The theme set up at the beginning of a given section is followed by a longer or shorter discussion relating to it; and is then repeated at the end, in such a way that the entire section is framed by statements of like content and more or less similar wording. Thus it is closed off as a unified structure, clearly marked off from the context."<sup>7</sup> Van Otterlo, though not the first scholar to observe the phenomenon,<sup>8</sup> was the first to treat it in depth and also, it seems, to bring the term "ring-composition" into general currency. But his studies, so far as they related to Herodotus, were concerned with ring-composition as a device for defining units within the work, from the paragraph, through the longer digressions, to the *logoi*. He does not seem to have entertained the possibility that it might be employed to define the beginning and end of a poem or narrative—to mark off the entire work, as it were, from its context in *life*. That possibility was, indeed, acknowledged by Beck in her careful dissertation on ring-composition in Herodotus, but in one passage only;<sup>9</sup> for the topic (unfortunately for the rest of us) did not fall within the intended scope of her book.

Finally, in section 4, it will very briefly be suggested that the closure of the *Histories* is by no means unique in Greek literature. Other archaic large-scale compositions, notably the *Iliad*, seem to present a similar paradox: an open-ended narrative, an unmistakable artistic closure by means of ring-composition in the wider sense here adopted.

## 2. The Closure of the *Histories* as a Whole

Most readers approaching the *Histories* for the first time must experience a growing bewilderment once they have passed from its magnificent opening sentence into the surreal world of the Mythological Proem. They may momentarily recover their faith in the enterprise as they contemplate the vast historical perspectives opened up in 1. 5. 3–7. 4; but the part-bawdy, part-tragic tale of Gyges and Kandaules immediately follows that solemn

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some precedent, as will shortly be seen, for the use of "ring-composition" to denote thematic as well as verbal repetition; and neither "circular" nor "pedimental," at least as Immerwahr uses these terms, seems to apply quite so aptly to the phenomena discussed in this article.

<sup>7</sup> W. A. van Otterlo, "Untersuchungen über Begriff, Anwendung und Entstehung der griechischen Ringkomposition," *Mededelingen der Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen*, Afd. Letterkunde, N. R. 7 no. 3 (1944) 131–76; the passage here quoted occurs on pp. 131–32.

<sup>8</sup> See his article (previous note) 131–32 for earlier writers on the subject; they include H. Fränkel (above, note 4), and Max Pohlenz, in his *Herodot: der erste Geschichtsschreiber des Abendlandes* (Leipzig 1937).

<sup>9</sup> Ingrid Beck, *Die Ringkomposition bei Herodot und ihre Bedeutung für die Beweistechnik* (Hildesheim 1971) 84, where she speaks of "die grossen gedanklichen Ringkompositionen, die das übergreifende Einheit des Werks umspannen," and adduces, after Lesky, the episode of the Wisdom of Cyrus (9. 122).



moment. And so their perplexity continues, perhaps even as far as the opening of the Persian *logos* in 1. 95.

Similar surprises, and similar modulations in tone and theme, await those readers who persevere to the end of Herodotus' narrative. Those chapters (9. 108–22) that succeed the account of the Mykale battle and its aftermath contain three striking, and at first sight rather bizarre, episodes that have this in common: Each recalls a crucial passage, and with it a crucial theme, from the three major opening movements of the *Histories*. These episodes are the sexual infatuation of Xerxes, the crucifixion of Artayktes, and the advice of Cyrus the Great to the Persians.

The Xerxes episode (9. 108–13) is clearly designed as a pendant to, and a reminder of, the episode that opens the Lydian *logos*: Gyges and Kandaules (1. 8–13). The correspondences in location, characterization and, not least, phraseology seem unmistakable. Herodotus takes care to point out that Xerxes' infatuation began at Sardis, that is at the scene of the Gyges–Kandaules episode and indeed of most of the Lydian *logos*; this initial focus on Sardis is all the more striking since the major developments in the story actually occur after the court has moved on to Sousa (9. 108, end).<sup>10</sup> Both episodes concern the immoderate sexual conduct of an Eastern monarch and its fearsome consequences; and both are narrated with a certain ironic humor. Finally, as if Herodotus wished to make the parallelism clear beyond any doubt, they have in common a number of verbal similarities, for instance:

(1) The opening of each episode: 1. 8. 1 οὗτος δὴ ὦν ὁ Κανδαύλης ἡράσθη τῆς ἐωυτοῦ γυναικός: compare 9. 108. 1 τότε δὴ ἐν τῇσι Σάρδισι ἐὼν ἦρα τῆς Μασίστεω γυναικός.

(2) 1. 8. 2 χρῆν γὰρ Κανδαύλῃ γενέσθαι κακῶς: compare 9. 109. 2, of Artaynte, τῇ δέ, κακῶς γὰρ ἔδεε πανοικίῃ γενέσθαι κ. τ. λ.

(3) 1. 8. 3, Gyges to Kandaules, δέσποτα, τίνα λέγεις λόγον οὐκ ὑγιέα, κελεύων με δέσποιναν τὴν ἐμὴν θεήσασθαι γυμνήν;: compare 9. 111. 3, Masistes to Xerxes, ὦ δέσποτα, τίνα μοι λόγον λέγεις ἄχρηστον, κελεύων με γυναῖκα . . . μετέντα θυγατέρα τὴν σὴν γῆμαι;

(4) 1. 10. 2, of the injured wife of Kandaules, μαθοῦσα δὲ τὸ ποιηθὲν ἐκ τοῦ ἀνδρός, κ. τ. λ.: compare 9. 110. 1, of the angry wife of Xerxes, μαθοῦσα δὲ τὸ ποιούμενον, κ. τ. λ.

(5) 1. 11. 3 ὁ δὲ Γύγης τέως μὲν ἀπεθώμαζε τὰ λεγόμενα κ. τ. λ.: compare 9. 111. 3 ὁ δὲ Μασίστης ἀποθωμάσας τὰ λεγόμενα κ. τ. λ.

<sup>10</sup> It has actually been questioned whether Xerxes was in Sardis at the time of the battle of Mykale, and not rather in upper Asia, coping with the Babylonian revolt; see R. W. Macan, *Herodotus: the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Books* (London 1908), note on 9. 108. Professional ancient historians will be better able than the present writer to judge this matter; if Macan is by any chance right, the implications for Herodotus' methods are both interesting and disturbing.

(these happen to be the only two instances in Herodotus of the collocation ἀποθωμάζειν τὰ λεγόμενα).<sup>11</sup>

The second episode that concerns us, the crucifixion of Artayktes (9. 116–20), carries us back to the Mythological Prologue of 1. 1. 1–5. 2, and specifically to Herodotus' account of the Trojan War and of the eternal division between Europe and Asia.<sup>12</sup> When the Athenians arrive before Sestos, one of the Persians occupying the city is Artayktes, a man notorious for his wickedness. Herodotus describes at some length how he had seized, despoiled and defiled the shrine of the hero Protesilaos at nearby Elaious, and the deception by which he had earlier persuaded Xerxes into granting him possession of that shrine. "Sire," he had said (9. 116. 3), "at that place is the house of a Greek who made an armed expedition (*strateusamenos*) against your country and was slain, thus receiving his just deserts. Grant me this man's house, that every man may learn not to make an armed expedition against your country." Artayktes well knew that with these words he would obtain his request from the unsuspecting Xerxes; for he had chosen them (says Herodotus) in the knowledge that "the Persians hold all of Asia to be the property of themselves and of their reigning king." In the sequel, the Athenians occupy Sestos and capture the fleeing Artayktes. While one of his guards is cooking some dried fish, a prodigy occurs: The fish begin to wriggle about as if not dried, but newly caught. Artayktes interprets this as a token of Protesilaos' divinely granted power, even in death, to punish the wrongdoer, and offers to make lavish reparations to the hero and to the Athenians. The Athenian general Xanthippos, however, will have none of it. The Athenians take Artayktes "to the headland to which Xerxes had joined the bridge by which he crossed, or, some say, to the hill above the city of Madytos" (9. 120. 4), and there nail him to a plank and stone his son before his eyes. They then sail for home (9. 121), carrying their plunder with them, most notably the cables of Xerxes' bridge, which they have found stored up in Sestos, and which they will dedicate in the sanctuaries of the gods. The episode—and Herodotus' entire narrative—ends with the famous sentence quoted earlier: "And during this year nothing happened any more beyond these things."

This episode at Sestos effectively closes both a greater and a lesser circle. The lesser, which embraces the story of Xerxes' expedition into Europe in Books 7–9, will be discussed shortly; for the present we shall concentrate on the greater, which spans the entire *Histories*. The anecdote of

<sup>11</sup> E. Wolff, "Das Weib des Masistes," *Hermes* 92 (1964) 51–58 (reprinted in W. Marg, *Herodot*, ed. 2 [Darmstadt 1965] 668–78), has provided a comprehensive study of the resemblances between the two episodes in situation, content, tone and wording. On p. 56 he enumerates a number of verbal correspondences, including the second example in the above list.

<sup>12</sup> This has been observed by more students of Herodotus than can be conveniently enumerated; examples are Pohlenz (above, note 8) 163–64, and Immerwahr (above, note 5) 146.

Artayktes and Protesilaos recalls, verbally as well as thematically, the passage in 1. 4. 1–5. 1 in which Herodotus speaks of the Trojan War and of its consequences for the future relations between Europe and Asia—consequences with which, in some sense, the world still has to live. By undertaking that war, say the Persians, the Greeks put themselves mightily in the wrong, “for they began making an armed expedition (*strateuesthai*) against Asia before they, the Persians, did so against Europe . . . From this point on, they say, they have ever thought the Greek nation to be their foe. For the Persians claim Asia and the non-Greek nations that reside within it for their own, while they consider Europe and the Greek nation to be things apart. That is how the Persians say it happened; they find that the beginning (*archē*) of their enmity against the Greeks came about through the taking of Troy.”

The Artayktes episode not merely recalls this entire passage, and the momentous issues that it evokes; it also brings us back to the very first hostile act of the Trojan War, when a Greek warrior first set foot on Asian earth. Herodotus had no need to remind his contemporaries who Protesilaos was, and not all modern commentators have thought fit to supply Herodotus’ omission. This hero, of course, was known to the Greek artists of the fifth century, as he had been known to Homer, for one circumstance above all: he was the earliest casualty in the Trojan War, having been slain by a Dardanian “as he jumped from his ship, by far the first of the Achaeans” (*Iliad* 2. 702).<sup>13</sup>

The Xerxes episode and the crucifixion of Artayktes recall respectively the Lydian *logos* and the Mythological Prologue, both of which, though their thematic importance is incalculable, are still only distantly connected with the overriding theme of the *Histories*: the rise and disgrace of the Persian power. The last of our three episodes, the Wisdom of Cyrus (9. 122), brings us back to the opening of that great story.<sup>14</sup> At 1. 95. 1, having formally taken leave of his Lydian *logos*, Herodotus announces: “And from here our *logos* goes on to enquire who this Cyrus was who destroyed the realm of Croesus, and in what way the Persians gained the hegemony (*hēgēsanto*) of Asia”—a promise which he methodically fulfills in the remaining chapters of what we now know as Book One. 9. 122 in fact recalls what manner of man Cyrus was—the wise leader, the founder and upholder of Persian freedom—and reveals him at the height of his success,

<sup>13</sup> Most of the commentaries on Herodotus since that of Heinrich Stein (first ed., Berlin 1856) have of course duly quoted the *Iliad* passage in their notes on 9. 116. But the implications, in the Herodotean context, of the fact that Protesilaos was *the first Greek to attack Trojan soil* are not always explored in the secondary literature as they seem to deserve. Pohlenz, for example, does not consider them at all, Immerwahr only briefly (p. 146).

<sup>14</sup> For this view compare Myres (above, note 6) 299; Immerwahr (above, note 5) 146; and N. Ayo, “Prolog and Epilog. Mythological History in Herodotus,” *Ramus* 13 (1984) 39–42.

when he has become the ruler of Asia. The anecdote is hooked on to the Artayktes episode in a characteristically Herodotean way. It was an ancestor of this very Artayktes (says Herodotus), one Artembares, who was struck by a brilliant idea, which the Persians communicated to Cyrus in these words: "Since Zeus grants hegemony (*hegemoniān*) to the Persians and, among individuals, to you, Cyrus, after your conquest of Astyages [cf. 1. 127–30]—come, seeing that we possess a land that is little, and rugged at that, let us leave it and obtain another that is better . . . For just when, we ask you, will there be a finer opportunity than at a time when we rule many men and all of Asia?"

The prime function of 9. 122 thus seems to be to echo the opening of the Persian *logos*, and to recall the splendor of the Persian empire in its early years. At the same time, however, it recapitulates two major themes that pervade the *Histories* from beginning to end. To continue with Herodotus' account: When Cyrus had listened to Artembares' scheme, he firmly rejected it. If the Persians really must migrate, he said, they had better make up their minds to become the ruled instead of the rulers, for soft lands were apt to give birth to soft men. On this the Persians acknowledged the wisdom of Cyrus and retired from his presence. "They chose to rule while occupying a barren land rather than, while sowing the plain, to be others' slaves." That sentence, the last in the *Histories*, is here translated as literally as possible (even at the cost of a certain inelegance in the English style), in order to bring out the studied chiasmus, *rule, barren land: plain, slaves*, and as a reminder that Herodotus' final word is *doubleuein* "to be slaves." In that way, with quite extraordinary emphasis, the close of the Cyrus episode recalls the antithesis between freedom and slavery that is a leitmotiv of the entire *Histories*.<sup>15</sup> Simultaneously it re-states the association of freedom and valor with hard living in a rugged landscape, a theme that is found early in the *Histories* (see Sandanis' advice to Croesus in 1. 71), but reaches its fullest significance in the course of Xerxes' expedition; above all in Demaratos' remarks to the King on the poverty and *arete* of Greece (7. 121).<sup>16</sup>

At this point we may pause briefly to consider the combined effect of the three episodes in 9. 108–22 that we have been discussing. Even from what has been said so far, it may appear that they constitute a kind of triple ring-composition, recalling as they do three momentous passages from the outset of the entire *Histories*. By archaic compositional conventions, Herodotus could hardly have sent a clearer signal that the work had now

<sup>15</sup> The theme enters with the Lydian *logos*: Before the rule of Croesus all the Greeks were free (1. 6. 3), but Croesus enslaved them (1. 27. 4). Probably the most emphatic presentation of the antithesis occurs precisely in the opening chapter of the Persian *logos* (1. 95. 2): The Medes, "having gone into battle for *freedom* against the Assyrians, acted like brave men and, repelling *slavery*, became *free*."

<sup>16</sup> Compare Macan (above, note 10), note on 9. 122; Pohlenz (above, note 8) 163–64; Gould (above, note 1) 59–60.



reached its designed end. And one further point is worth stressing in this context: *Of the three elements in that ring-compositional closure, two are overtly and inseparably linked to the capture of Sestos.* Artayktes' crime, and his execution, took place in the neighborhood of Sestos, and it is Artayktes' forefather Artembares who provides the transition to the final ring-compositional element, the Wisdom of Cyrus. In other words, the artistic closure of the *Histories*, and the choice of stopping-point for the historical narrative of the Graeco-Persian wars, are mutually dependent. It seems scarcely possible, in the light of that, to argue that Herodotus intended to pursue the narrative to the capture of Byzantium,<sup>17</sup> or the foundation of the naval league,<sup>18</sup> or even far beyond, but for some reason broke off at the capture of Sestos. If he did so intend, why is the historical event at Sestos so crucial to the literary closural technique that he has adopted?

### 3. The Closure of *Histories* 7-9

Many scholars have noticed how certain elements in the closing chapters of the *Histories* recall the opening of the story of Xerxes' expedition, as it is told in Books 7-9. The Artayktes episode offers the clearest instances; by several overt allusions this is linked to the passage in 7. 33-34 which occurs at the point in the narrative where Xerxes has reached Sardis with his land force, and is preparing to march to Abydos. Meanwhile, Herodotus says, his emissaries "were working to bridge the Hellespont from Asia into Europe. Now in the Hellespontine Chersonese between Sestos and Madytos, there is a rugged promontory that juts into the sea opposite Abydos. It was here that, not long after this, when Xanthippos son of Ariphron was general of the Athenians, they captured a Persian, Artayktes, governor of Sestos, and nailed him alive to a plank; this man used to bring women to Protesilaos' shrine at Elaious, and there perform wicked actions. Now it was to this promontory that those whose charge it was built the bridge, starting from Abydos." It will be noted how this preliminary information about Artayktes is neatly dovetailed (of course by ring-composition, the framing element being the promontory opposite Abydos) into the account of the building of the bridge. In 9. 116-20 that information is repeated, with considerable expansions (the relevant passages have already been quoted in Section 2). Thus the story of Artayktes closes, as it opened, at or near the point where the fateful bridge touched European soil.<sup>19</sup> The cycle of Xerxes' expedition, like the greater cycle of the ancient

<sup>17</sup> So, tentatively, Pohlenz (above, note 8) 176.

<sup>18</sup> So, "fast zweifellos," Jacoby (above, note 2) col. 376 (after Wilamowitz and others, there cited).

<sup>19</sup> This point has most recently been made by Gould (above, note 1) 58-59. On p. 59 he adds the interesting suggestion that Artayktes' execution at the point where Xerxes' bridge touched Europe may echo a theme announced in the Gyges-Kandaules episode (1. 11. 5),

enmity between Asia and Europe originating in the Trojan War, is closed by this execution. And it is surely no accident that the very last incident in Herodotus' historical narrative, immediately following that execution, is the removal of the bridge-cables to Greece.<sup>20</sup>

Likewise, but less overtly, the Xerxes episode of 9. 108–13 seems also to recapitulate the story of the expedition of 480/79. That story opened with Xerxes at the height of his power and splendor: His speech in the Persian council (7. 8), the march of his army out of Sardis (7. 40–41), and his crossing of the Hellespontine bridge (7. 54–56) are among the most spectacular visions of royal pomp in all Herodotus. But having vanished from the stage after his retreat from Salamis, Xerxes is suddenly propelled back into the spotlight in 9. 108–13 in the role of a shabby, stupid and cruel sexual intriguer. The contrast between the Xerxes revealed at the beginning of the expedition and the Xerxes revealed at its end may well remind us of the contrast between the opening chorus of Aeschylus' *Persians* (65–92), where the magnificent and all-powerful king drives his chariot irresistibly toward Greece, and the epilogue (908–1077), where that same king appears before our eyes defeated and in rags. In both the tragedy and the history the entire story of personal and national humiliation is thus summed up and concluded.

It is possible also to discern an echo of the opening of Xerxes' expedition in the episode of the Wisdom of Cyrus. Lesky has seen a direct link between 7. 8 α 1 (Xerxes' speech proposing the expedition) and 9. 122. 2, noting that in both passages the word *hēgemoniē* (which Lesky takes to be a "Stichwort") occurs fairly prominently.<sup>21</sup>

At this point we may conclude our survey of the ring-compositional elements in the closing chapters of the *Histories*. In sum, it seems fairly clear that this elaborate system of echoes and repetitions must be designed to close simultaneously the greater story contained in the *Histories* as a whole, and the lesser, but culminating, narrative of Books 7–9. Even if there existed no parallel for such a closure of an entire large-scale composition, this conclusion would seem likely in itself, and it might seem to gain further support from the practice, widespread throughout archaic literature, of closing off units (sometimes very extensive ones) *within* a work by means

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where the Queen tells Gyges: "Your attack [on Kandaules] shall be from the same place from which he showed me naked."

<sup>20</sup> Compare, among others, Myres (above, note 6) 299; Immerwahr (above, note 5) 43 and 146.

<sup>21</sup> Albin Lesky, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*, ed. 3 (Bern and Munich 1971) 348; ed. 2 (Bern 1963) 296; for an elaboration of his view, cf. Beck (above, note 9) 84. The present writer, for his part, hesitates to lay too much stress on the suggestion. The two Herodotean passages concerned do not seem to be very closely related; and the instances of *ἡγεῖσθαι*, *ἡγεμονίη* in Herodotus with reference to the rule of Persia are by no means confined to those passages (see J. Enoch Powell, *A Lexicon to Herodotus* [Cambridge 1938] s. vv.).

of ring-composition. But there do in fact exist archaic parallels to the ending of the *Histories*; they will be sketched in the following section.

#### 4. The Closure of the *Iliad*

τῇ δὲ δυωδεκάτῃ πολεμίζομεν, εἴ περ ἀνάγκη: *Iliad* 24. 667 (Priam's last words to Achilles).

καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἔτος τοῦτο οὐδὲν ἔτι πλέον τούτων ἐγένετο: *Histories* 9. 121 (the final words in the narrative of the Persian Wars).

As Fränkel observed, the narratives both of the *Iliad* and of the *Histories* are open-ended in the sense that a continuator might (and in fact did) pick up the stories of the Trojan and the Persian wars respectively where each had left off. The above quotations, in which the incompleteness of the accounts of the respective wars is not merely acknowledged but almost (one might say) advertised, should be enough to illustrate the point. As Fränkel also indicated, this feature is actually shared by most of the other archaic hexameter poems of which we have any knowledge.<sup>22</sup>

Yet the surprising, and perhaps too little noticed, fact is that some of these archaic poems are also closed, artistically, by some form of ring-composition. The *Theogony* and the *Odyssey*, at least in the states in which we have them (and in which Herodotus probably had them also), are closed after a fashion by verbal repetitions of thematically loaded lines: *Theogony* 1022 Μοῦσαι Ὀλυμπιάδες, κοῦραι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο (= 966, 52, 25); *Odyssey* 24. 548 Μέντορι εἰδομένη ἡμὲν δέμας ἥδ' αὐδὴν (= 24. 503, 22. 206, 2. 401).<sup>23</sup> But neither of these ring-compositional closures can compare with that of the *Iliad* either in scale or in sophistication. In his edition of *Iliad* 24, C. W. MacLeod has put together the evidence that supports this statement, with admirable care and insight.<sup>24</sup> Since his book is readily accessible, it seems unnecessary to repeat all his discussion in detail, but here—with a couple of additions and a minor correction—are his chief results. Book 24 recalls the opening of the *Iliad* (Book 1 and the first incident of Book 2), and the Embassy of Book 9, both in situations and in phraseology. The main resemblances between it and the opening of the *Iliad* are as follows.

<sup>22</sup> For Fränkel's observation compare above, note 4; compare also B. A. van Groningen, *La Composition littéraire archaïque grecque: Procédés et Réalisations* (Amsterdam 1958) 70–72.

<sup>23</sup> It will be noted that the ring-compositional closure of the *Odyssey*, in particular, resembles those of the *Histories* and of the *Iliad* in that it recalls both the opening movement of the narrative and a supreme crisis in it. *Od.* 24. 503 and 548 (themselves constituting a ring-compositional frame for Athena's final epiphany) recall the goddess's guiding role in the Telemachy and in the Slaying of the Suitors.

<sup>24</sup> C. W. Macleod, *Homer, Iliad XXIV* (Cambridge 1982), Introduction, esp. 32–35. An earlier discussion of the question, not (as it happens) referred to in MacLeod, seems to deserve mention: C. H. Whitman, *Homer and the Homeric Tradition* (repr. New York 1965), esp. 259–60.

The episode of the old man who enters the Greek camp to supplicate Agamemnon for the ransom of his daughter, and is rudely refused, is balanced and contrasted with the episode of Priam's supplication to Achilles for the ransom of his son's body, and Achilles' acceptance of his prayer. The divine colloquies at the end of Book 1 and the beginning of Book 24, and especially the roles of Thetis and Hera in them, are similarly balanced and contrasted; as are (as has long been noticed) the time-lapses of nine and eleven days that occur in each book.<sup>25</sup> And as Agamemnon is lured to destruction by a deceitful dream from Zeus at the beginning of Book 2, so Priam is sent safely on his way by a true messenger from Zeus in 24. Furthermore, the parallelisms in situation between Books 1 and 24 are emphasized by the repetitions of certain lines and phrases that occur only in those two books: for example ἦμος δ' ἡριγένεια φάνη ῥοδοδάκτυλος ἠώς (1. 477 = 24. 788); and ὥς ἔφατ', ἔδεισεν δ' ὁ γέρων καὶ ἐπείθετο μύθῳ (1. 33 = 24. 571).<sup>26</sup>

The parallels between *Iliad* 24 and 9, as described by MacLeod, are less striking, but still substantial. In both books Achilles is surprised in his lodging by a night visitor or visitors, begging him to relent from his anger; and he entertains them with a meal. Near the end of each episode Achilles offers a bed to an old man or old men (Phoenix; Priam and Idaios). And in each Achilles, at our final glimpse of him, is peacefully asleep with his concubine (9. 663–65 and 24. 675–76; the first lines of each passage are identical); in 24, as MacLeod observes, "the concubine is Briseis, whose loss caused all the trouble."

By those means the last book of the *Iliad* lays to rest the poem's great theme of Achilles' wrath and, simultaneously, calls to mind its first beginning and a crucial moment in its progress. The end is bonded into the beginning, the circle is complete. In the *Histories* too, and through similar repetitions of situation and of phrase, the closing chapters contrive at once both to finish the tale and to recall its beginning and a major episode. In each case it is difficult to escape the inference that the ending we have is the ending designed. One may here add that the "some kind of 'epic' conclusion" to the *Histories* that was desiderated by Waters<sup>27</sup> seems, in fact, to be literally there in place—even if it is not the precise kind of conclusion that any reader later than the late fifth century might reasonably have expected, whether to an epic or to any other narrative.

<sup>25</sup> MacLeod (above, note 24), 32.

<sup>26</sup> MacLeod (above, note 24) gives five other pairs of responding passages from 1 and 24. In each of these examples, as in the second of those just quoted, the wording in the context of 24 pointedly emphasizes the parallels and contrasts between Priam's supplication of Achilles and Chryses' supplication of Agamemnon. As has been seen in Section 2 of this article, Herodotus' Xerxes episode (9. 108–13) similarly reinforces the situational parallel with the Gyges–Kandaules episode by means of verbal echoes.

<sup>27</sup> Above, note 1.



Finally, we may add two further apparent points of resemblance between the two great works. Neither of them properly falls even within the extended definition of ring-composition that has been adopted in the present article, but they are perhaps striking enough to be worth consideration in this context. Near or at the ends of both the *Iliad* and the *Histories* some major characters from the defeated side are brought back for a last-moment appearance, as if, once more, to remind us in person of the course and the issues of the entire work. We have already seen how Xerxes, the moving spirit of 7–9, and Cyrus, the hero of the Persian *logos*, are thus recalled to the stage in Herodotus. Similarly the last episode of the *Iliad*, the mourning and funeral for Hector, lines up not merely Priam but also Andromache, Hecuba and Helen, to make, as it were, their final bows, and at the same time vividly to recall some of the most moving scenes in the epic, from Book 3 to Book 22.

The inclusion of Helen as the last of the three women-mourners serves not only to recall the course of the epic but also to recall one of the antecedents to the narrative contained in it; this is the woman whose folly sparked the entire war. And here we come to a second possible point of resemblance to the Herodotean closure. Helen's reappearance is not, in fact, the only passage in 24 that carries us back to the remote beginnings of the Trojan saga. There are two others, both alluding to events not mentioned elsewhere in the *Iliad*: lines 28–30, on the Judgment of Paris, and lines 62–63, on the feast at the wedding of Peleus and Thetis—that fatal union of mortal and immortal from which Achilles sprang. Would it be too fanciful to compare these evocations to Herodotus' evocation, in the Artayktes episode, of the first combat in the Trojan War, the war which to the Persian sages was the ultimate cause of the events described in the body of the *Histories*? If that comparison is allowed, then in both the Homeric and the Herodotean finales we may discern a bold extension of the ring-compositional technique that has been discussed in this article: a closure emphasized not just by a return to the opening of the narrative, but by a return to the *archē* of the entire chain of events that led up to that narrative.

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## Iphigeneia Changes Her Mind

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Already in antiquity readers of Euripides' *IA* found Iphigeneia's change of mind problematic.<sup>1</sup> Notoriously, Aristotle (*Poet.* 1454a26–33) cited Euripides' heroine as the example of a tragic character who displays the defect of inconsistency. And since that time readers have debated Aristotle's judgment, some agreeing with the philosopher that Iphigeneia is indeed inconsistently portrayed,<sup>2</sup> others seeking to show in various ways that Iphigeneia's change of mind is properly motivated in dramatic terms. Gudrun Mellert-Hoffmann, for example, in a detailed study tried to show that the Panhellenic ideal that is voiced by Agamemnon and echoed by his daughter is not a pretense, as Funke had argued, but a motif that runs through the play and provides the genuine motivation for Iphigeneia's decision.<sup>3</sup> According to Bernard Knox, the audience is well prepared for Iphigeneia's change of mind, inasmuch as "it comes as the climax of a series of swift and sudden changes of decision which is unparalleled in ancient drama."<sup>4</sup> Wesley Smith, on the other hand, considers that Iphigeneia's decision is motivated by the fact that she has fallen in love with Achilles.<sup>5</sup> Erotic motivation of a different sort is perceived by the psychoanalyst André Green, who speaks of "the female masochistic movement of turning aggressive and erotic drives back upon the subject," and of "the desire for the father's penis" as being

<sup>1</sup> I should like to record here my gratitude to John C. Gibert and Walter Stockert, both of whom read an earlier version of this paper and supplied valuable criticisms and suggestions. In addition, Dr. Gibert kindly provided me with a copy of his splendid dissertation, *Change of Mind in Greek Tragedy* (Harvard 1991) and Dr. Stockert with portions of his forthcoming commentary on *IA*.

<sup>2</sup> See in particular H. Funke, "Aristoteles zu Euripides' Iphigeneia in Aulis," *Hermes* 92 (1964) 284–99.

<sup>3</sup> *Untersuchungen zur "Iphigenie in Aulis" des Euripides* (Heidelberg 1969) 9–90.

<sup>4</sup> "Second Thoughts in Greek Tragedy," *GRBS* 7 (1966) 229 (= *Word and Action: Essays on the Ancient Theater* [Baltimore 1979] 243–44). See also J. Griffin, "Characterization in Euripides: *Hippolytus* and *Iphigeneia in Aulis*," in C. Pelling (ed.), *Characterization and Individuality in Greek Literature* (Oxford 1990) 128–49, esp. 148.

<sup>5</sup> "Iphigenia in Love," in *Arktouros: Hellenic Studies Presented to B. M. W. Knox* (Berlin 1979) 173–80; cf. also V. Castellani, "Warlords and Women in Euripides' *Iphigenia at Aulis*," in *Drama, Sex and Politics, Themes in Drama 7* (Cambridge 1985) 1–10. Erotic motivation had already been stressed by W. E. J. Kuiper, "Aristoteles en Euripides' Aulische Iphigenia," *Hermeneus* 3 (1931) 3–6.

"realized through a renunciation demanded by the ego-ideal."<sup>6</sup> More recently, and more sensibly, Helene Foley has seen in the outcome of the play a resolution in ritual terms, namely in terms of the convergence of the themes of marriage and sacrifice.<sup>7</sup>

While I have profited greatly from these and a number of other suggestive studies,<sup>8</sup> I should like to concentrate here on an aspect of Iphigeneia's decision that has until now received insufficient attention. The novelty of this last play of Euripides consists not only in the *frequency* with which characters change their mind,<sup>9</sup> but also in the nature of the mechanism that brings the change about. For unlike Aeschylus' Agamemnon, for example, who is persuaded to trample precious fabric, and unlike Euripides' own Creon, who is persuaded to allow Medea to remain in Corinth for one more day, no one persuades Iphigeneia to become a sacrificial victim. (On the contrary, Iphigeneia and her mother are advised by Achilles to employ persuasion against Agamemnon, who remains adamant in his conviction that his daughter must be sacrificed.) Rather, Iphigeneia's change of mind, the suddenness of which is underlined by the *antilabe*,<sup>10</sup> occurs just as Achilles and Clytaemestra are discussing their plans to resist the forcible sacrifice of Iphigeneia. Let us, then, once again examine this problematic scene, this time concentrating on the *kind* of motivation that Euripides represents as causing Iphigeneia's change of mind.

In the previous scene, first Clytaemestra (1146–1208) and then Iphigeneia (1211–52) had pleaded with Agamemnon to spare his daughter's life. The concluding lines (1250–52) of Iphigeneia's speech leave no doubt in Agamemnon's—or the audience's—mind about the young girl's attitude at this point in the action:

τὸ φῶς τὸδ' ἀνθρώποισιν ἥδιστον βλέπειν,  
τὰ νέρθε δ' οὐδέν· μαίνεται δ' ὃς εὔχεται  
θανεῖν. κακῶς ζῆν κρεῖσσον ἢ καλῶς θανεῖν.

<sup>6</sup> *The Tragic Effect: The Oedipus Complex in Tragedy* (Engl. tr., Cambridge 1979) 179.

<sup>7</sup> *Ritual Irony: Poetry and Sacrifice in Euripides* (Ithaca 1985) 65–105; cf. A. Borghini, "Consacrazione alla morte e ritualità matrimoniale," *SCO* 36 (1986) 113–16.

<sup>8</sup> In particular, B. Snell, "Euripides' aulische Iphigenie," in *Aischylos und das Handeln im Drama*, Philol. Suppl. 20.1 (Berlin 1928) 148–60; H. Siegel, "Self-Delusion and the Volte-Face of Iphigenia in Euripides' 'Iphigenia at Aulis,'" *Hermes* 108 (1980) 300–21.

<sup>9</sup> See the important article by Knox (above, note 4) 213–32 (= 231–49).

<sup>10</sup> It is rare in tragedy for a speech of more than twelve lines to begin in mid-line, the only instances being *Hipp.* 1325, *Suppl.* 513, *Phoen.* 985, *IA* 414, 1368 and *Soph. Phil.* 54. This instance is unique in being the only such speech in tetrameters and the only one in which the speaker interrupts two other characters engaged in *antilabe*. This phenomenon is inadequately treated in W. Köhler, *Die Versbrechung bei den griechischen Tragikern* (Darmstadt 1913).

She wishes to stay alive at any cost. But Agamemnon remains unmoved.<sup>11</sup> Saying that he is powerless to resist the compulsion of Calchas and the entire Greek army (1255–75) Agamemnon leaves the stage, not to return. Iphigeneia sings an emotional lyric monody (1283–1335) in which she laments that she has been abandoned by her father<sup>12</sup> and wishes that the Judgment of Paris had never taken place. She recognizes that all hope is lost now that her father refuses to help, and she sees that her death is inevitable (1281–82, 1308–09, 1317). But there is nothing in the text of her monody to suggest that her attitude toward life and toward the sacrifice has changed. It is an “unholy” sacrifice sought by an “unholy” father (1318). By the end of her song Iphigeneia is an object of pity to both the chorus (1336–37) and the audience.

At this point the meter changes to trochaic tetrameters as Iphigeneia sees Achilles and his attendants rushing onto the scene. Out of shame and a sense of modesty Iphigeneia wishes to retire within. We are reminded of Achilles’ own uneasiness, in an earlier scene, at conversing with Clytaemestra (compare αἰδῶς 821 and αἰδῶ 1342, αἰσχρόν 830 and αἰσχύνομαι 1341). But Clytaemestra urges her daughter to remain (μίμν’ 1344, τί . . . φεύγεις; 1341), as she had earlier urged Achilles (compare μέινον· τί φεύγεις; 831). The purpose of these echoes is to enhance the point, made in the following lines, that Achilles and Iphigeneia are now in similar positions. For, as Achilles tells Clytaemestra, the entire Greek army is now demanding that he too be killed. But there is one crucial difference between the situation of Achilles and that of Iphigeneia. For, whereas the latter’s death is not contingent upon anything she has done or will do, the former is being pursued with murderous intent by the Greek army because of an action he has freely chosen to take. This is emphasized for the benefit of the audience in the conversation (1354–65) between Achilles and Clytaemestra. He is in trouble now because he spoke up against the proposed sacrifice of Iphigeneia, and he will continue to oppose the sacrifice even if it means a single-handed fight against the rest of the army. It is clear that he can avoid certain death at the hands of his fellow-soldiers simply by acceding to their demand that Iphigeneia be sacrificed. But Achilles would not be Achilles if he agreed to change his mind for no reason other than for the purpose of saving his life. Now, it is true that some readers of this play have found Achilles to be a distasteful *miles gloriosus*,<sup>13</sup> but they are unable to sub-

<sup>11</sup> There is, of course, great and deliberate irony involved in the fact that Agamemnon, whose irresoluteness has been emphasized throughout the play, steadfastly refuses to change his mind in the face of the entreaties of Clytaemestra and Iphigeneia.

<sup>12</sup> 1314 προδοῦς; cf. 1278 παραδοῦς (spoken by Clytaemestra). For Iphigeneia’s monody, see T. C. W. Stinton, *Euripides and the Judgement of Paris*, Soc. for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies, Suppl. Paper 11 (London 1965) 29–34.

<sup>13</sup> Pyrgopolynices is explicitly compared to Achilles (Plaut. *Mil.* 61, 1054) and, within the context of that comparison, *Mil.* 58 (*amant ted omnes mulieres*; cf. 1040) perhaps recalls *IA* 959–60, but this has no implications for the character of Achilles either



stantiate their views without introducing subjective arguments that have no basis in the text. Philip Vellacott, for instance, who calls the Achilles of this play "uncouth, tasteless, rude, and above all totally self-centered," is convinced that Achilles has no intention of fulfilling his promise to protect Iphigeneia.<sup>14</sup> But we cannot speak of the unexpressed intentions of literary characters without incurring the risk of perpetrating the "documentary fallacy."<sup>15</sup> When Achilles says that he is prepared to risk his life to protect Iphigeneia, we are, I think, obliged to believe him.<sup>16</sup> Nor are we justified in condemning Achilles' action as "ludicrous," as George E. Dimock, Jr. does,<sup>17</sup> on the grounds that he cannot possibly succeed in saving Iphigeneia's life. Inasmuch as the other characters in the play take Achilles seriously, we are, I think, obliged to take him seriously as well.

In particular, Clytaemestra, in the scene under discussion, takes Achilles seriously enough to praise his action (1359) and to ask his advice (1366). It is, indeed, at this point that Iphigeneia interrupts the conversation between her mother and Achilles with the speech in which she announces her change of mind. It is a stunning *coup de théâtre*. The girl who had earlier asserted her resolve to live at any cost now (1375) consents to die. The audience waits with bated breath to hear Iphigeneia's reasons for her change of mind. But what the audience hears, and what has frustrated critics from the time of Aristotle, is a speech that contains a series of points, virtually all of which could equally well have been made by Iphigeneia fifty lines earlier. She says, in England's translation, "It is hard to bear up against impossible odds" (1370); but that was just as true before she changed her mind as after. She claims (1378-84) that all of Greece depends upon her for success in its mission to punish Troy and to free itself from the threat of abuse at the hands of the barbarians; but, when these same sentiments were earlier expressed by her father (1271-75), she condemned him for his betrayal of her and for his impious behavior (1312-18). She observes (1395-97) that it is the will of Artemis that she be sacrificed, and that it is impossible for her, a mortal, to oppose the will of the goddess; but the relentlessness of the divine machinery seems to be acknowledged already in her monody, in which she refers to the sacrifice as "unholy." Finally, she concludes her speech (1400-01) by insisting that it is contrary to reason that the Greeks should be enslaved by barbarians, when the Greeks are by nature free and the barbarians by nature slaves. This is, of course, merely a

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in Euripides or in Homer. In any case, the Euripidean Achilles at *IA* 959-60 says essentially what his Homeric counterpart had said at *Il.* 9. 395-97.

<sup>14</sup> *Ironical Drama: A Study of Euripides' Method and Meaning* (Cambridge 1975) 43-45.

<sup>15</sup> See A. J. A. Waldock, *Sophocles the Dramatist* (Cambridge 1951) 11-24.

<sup>16</sup> Again (see above, note 13), the model is the Homeric Achilles who, in the first book of the *Iliad*, is prepared to risk his life to protect the seer Calchas; compare *IA* 1361 ἐμοῦ γε ζῶντος with *Il.* 1. 88 ἐμεῦ ζῶντος.

<sup>17</sup> In his and W. S. Merwin's translation of the play (New York 1978) 15-16.

more pointed version of what Agamemnon had said in the conclusion (1273–75) to his own speech.

But there is one element in Iphigeneia's speech that is new, and we will not be surprised if it turns out to be the most valuable clue to the understanding of Iphigeneia's motivation. She says (1385–91) that she and her mother ought not to seek to save her life when there are thousands of young men who are willing to die for Greece and whose death will be in vain unless she, too, is willing to die. This is not the same point that her father had made, when he emphasized the helplessness of one person standing in opposition to the wishes of all Greece (1259–72). Rather, Iphigeneia implies, it would be unreasonably selfish, under the circumstances, for one person to consider his own life of more value than the lives of all the rest.<sup>18</sup> Where has this element come from? The following lines make it clear. Iphigeneia points to Achilles and continues, saying that this man should not have to fight against all the Greeks and die for her sake. We cannot help but be reminded that the only thing that has happened on stage that can have caused Iphigeneia to change her mind is the dialogue between Achilles and Clytaemestra, in which Achilles offered to fight the entire Greek army in order to protect Iphigeneia. In other words, what has happened is that one character on stage is represented as having an emotional reaction to an action on stage involving another character. Iphigeneia, witnessing the willingness of Achilles (who is in a situation similar to her own) to die for her sake, is emotionally transformed.

Before we examine the implications of this emotional transformation, let us briefly consider a question that has divided scholars in recent years, namely the question of how the audience is expected to react to Iphigeneia's decision. There are those who are convinced that Euripides has portrayed Iphigeneia's willingness to be sacrificed in an "ironic" light and that the audience is expected to view Iphigeneia as a pathetic creature who is deluded by the deplorable mass-hysteria that is afflicting the army in general.<sup>19</sup> It is difficult to argue against the view that Euripides' "meaning" is the opposite of what is in the text. Perhaps the best argument is merely to restate what is in the text. Immediately after her speech Iphigeneia is praised in extravagant terms by the chorus, who elsewhere have the task of pointing out to the audience the delusions of the characters on stage,<sup>20</sup> and by Achilles, whose name is synonymous in Greek tragedy with nobility.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Similar sentiments are expressed in the fragments of Euripides' *Erechtheus*. With *IA* 1386 compare *NFE* 50. 38 Austin; with *IA* 1390 compare *NFE* 50. 34–35.

<sup>19</sup> See Vellacott (above, note 14) 174–77, 203–04, Dimock (above, note 17) 11–12, 16 and especially Siegel (above, note 8).

<sup>20</sup> *Med.* 811 ff., *Hipp.* 891 f.; *Aesch. Sept.* 677 ff., 686 ff., *Ag.* 1407 ff., 1426 ff.

<sup>21</sup> Even E. M. Blaiklock (*The Male Characters of Euripides* [Wellington 1952] 117–18) recognizes that Euripides would have had absolutely no precedent for depicting Achilles as the "spoilt and braggart boy" that Blaiklock sees in this play. There is greater support in the text for C. E. Hajistephanou's view (*The Use of ΦΥΣΙΣ and its Cognates in Greek*

The chorus (1403–04) speak of Iphigeneia's nobility of character, contrasting it with the "sickness" of the fate imposed on her by the goddess. Achilles also praises her nobility (γενναία γὰρ εἶ 1412), and indicates that he considers her worthy to be his wife. The only irony that we are justified in seeing here proceeds from the fact that the Homeric Achilles had said (*Il.* 9. 388) that he would under no circumstances marry a daughter of Agamemnon. But the irony consists in Euripides' portrayal of a couple whose character ideally suits them to one another,<sup>22</sup> but whose very character makes it impossible for them to be united: Iphigeneia's nobility constrains her to give up her life before she can be married, just as Achilles' nobility provokes his quarrel in the *Iliad* with Iphigeneia's father. Achilles continues to sing the praises of Iphigeneia's character, referring again to her nobility in 1422–23 (γενναία γὰρ / φρονεῖς) and, most notably, reacting to Iphigeneia's repeated assertion that he must not die for her sake by saying ὦ λῆμ' ἄριστον (1421). Now, the significance of this expression is that it is a quotation from Euripides' earlier Iphigeneia-play. At *IT* 609 Iphigeneia had reacted to the Greek stranger's willingness to die in his friend's stead by exclaiming, ὦ λῆμ' ἄριστον, after which she had gone on to praise the nobility of the young man (who would later turn out to be her brother Orestes). If, then, Euripides is indulging in "irony" in *IA*, that is to say, if he is presenting Achilles' praise of Iphigeneia as something that is to be held up to ridicule, then he is also indulging in self-parody, for which no possible explanation can be imagined.

It will be seen, then, that my view of Iphigeneia's decision is that it is something that Euripides intends his audience genuinely to admire. And, I think, this view finds support in Euripides' portrayal of self-sacrifice, a subject that has recently been admirably treated by E. A. M. E. O'Connor-Visser.<sup>23</sup> The reader is referred to O'Connor-Visser's account for details of

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*Tragedy* [Nicosia 1975] 99–102) that the presentation of Achilles' character has much in common with that of Theonoe's in *Helen*. We should keep in mind that Euripides' model for the Achilles of *IA* was the Achilles of Aeschylus' *Myrmidons*, whose nobility cannot be doubted (B. Snell, *Scenes from Greek Drama* [Berkeley and Los Angeles 1964] 1–22). Specifically, Euripides derived from Aeschylus the motif of stoning (compare *IA* 1350 with Aesch. fr. 132c. 1–2 Radt), as was first noticed by E. Loewy, *Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles* 2 (1934) 973 n. 2. Note also that the Aeschylean Achilles, like the Homeric, does not hesitate to praise his own character (fr. 132c. 13–14 Radt), so that we cannot read lines like *IA* 926–27 as evidence of the Euripidean Achilles' baseness.

<sup>22</sup> Note 930 ἐλευθέραν φύσιν (of Ach.) and 994 ὄμ' . . . ἐλεύθερον (of Iph.); 1063 Θεσσαλία μέγα φῶς (of Ach.) and 1502 Ἑλλάδι με φάος (of Iph.).

<sup>23</sup> *Aspects of Human Sacrifice in the Tragedies of Euripides* (Amsterdam 1987). Cf. also J. Schmitt, *Freiwilliger Opfertod bei Euripides*, *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten* 17.2 (Giessen 1921), J. Wilkins, "The State and the Individual: Euripides' Plays of Voluntary Self-Sacrifice," in A. Powell (ed.), *Euripides, Women, and Sexuality* (London 1990) 177–94.



the numerous similarities between the treatment of Iphigeneia here and the treatment of Macaria in *Heraclidae*, of Polyxena in *Hecuba*, of Menoeceus in *Phoenissae* and of Praxithea's daughter in *Erechtheus*. These similarities require us to assume, in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, that the dramatic function of the sacrifice is the same in all these tragedies, which span a period of approximately a quarter of a century. In the *Hecuba*, for instance, the virtue of Polyxena and the purity of her act present a stark contrast to the sordid circumstances that surround her.<sup>24</sup> Likewise, in *Phoenissae*, Menoeceus is the embodiment of the courage and selflessness that are conspicuously lacking in Eteocles and Creon.<sup>25</sup> Just so, the nobility and resoluteness of Iphigeneia are presented in a way that allows for the strongest possible contrast with the characters of Agamemnon and Menelaus. The effect on the audience of these various sacrificial victims is a combination of admiration for their nobility and pity at their plight.<sup>26</sup>

This view of Iphigeneia's willingness to be sacrificed is, I think, supported by what we have noticed above concerning the dramatic circumstances of her change of mind. But, at the same time, what we see in *IA* represents an interesting and important innovation. We may speculate that this innovation arose from Euripides' long experience of composing tragedies that included the theme of human sacrifice and from his continuing concern with what we might be inclined to call the "theory of drama." Throughout his career, Euripides produced dramas that were designed to create striking intellectual and emotional effects in their audience. Among those effects, provoked particularly but not exclusively by those plays that contained scenes of human sacrifice, is the transformation of the audience by the arousal of feelings of pity and admiration. Euripides was undoubtedly as fully aware as Aristotle that pity is one of the prime emotions which tragedy aims to arouse, and that pity can best be aroused by admirable characters, that is, by characters who are morally upright and who are, at the same time, enough like us that we are able to relate to them.<sup>27</sup> We might almost say that this scene in *IA* represents a working-out in dramatic terms of problems regarding the relationship between drama and its audience that had preoccupied Euripides for decades and were to concern Aristotle as well in the following century. Iphigeneia's response is dictated by two circumstances: the pity that is aroused in her by witnessing Achilles' situation and the fact that she is herself in a similar situation. As far as the first of these circumstances is

<sup>24</sup> O'Connor-Visser (previous note) 67. Cf. D. J. Conacher, *Euripidean Drama* (Toronto 1967) 165.

<sup>25</sup> O'Connor-Visser (above, note 23) 183, C. Mueller-Goldingen, *Untersuchungen zu den Phönissen des Euripides*, Palingenesia 22 (Stuttgart 1985) 161.

<sup>26</sup> P. Decharme, *Euripides and the Spirit of his Dramas* (Engl. tr., New York 1906) 203–11, O'Connor-Visser (above, note 23) 43.

<sup>27</sup> I have formulated these last remarks in such a way as to show that, while Decharme (previous note) 204 is correct to say that Aristotle in the *Poetics* does not mention it, admiration for the tragic character is implicit in Aristotle's discussion.



concerned, it is perhaps true that we might not use the English word "pity" to describe Iphigeneia's feelings toward Achilles at this point, but Euripides' contemporaries would surely have used the Greek word ἔλεος—the word used in Aristotle's famous definition of tragedy (*Poet.* 1449b27)—in this case. Indeed, Iphigeneia's situation seems almost designed to illustrate Aristotle's definition of that term: ἔστω δὴ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῳ κακῷ . . . τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν, ὃ καὶ αὐτὸς προσδοκῆσειεν ἂν παθεῖν (*Rhet.* 1385b13–15, with the following discussion). As far as the second of these circumstances is concerned, we have seen above that Euripides emphasizes the similarities between the situations of Iphigeneia and Achilles. But not only are their situations similar; Euripides has given these two characters other similarities as well. Both are young, both are of noble birth and upright character; indeed, as is emphasized throughout the play, they would be ideally suited as partners in marriage. The reason Euripides has depicted Iphigeneia and Achilles in such similar terms is surely to make the strength of this feeling of pity as intelligible as possible. For, as Aristotle was to recognize, closeness in age, character and station encourages the feeling of pity.<sup>28</sup> And, just as the tragic poet must be careful to delineate his characters in such a way that he best arouses feelings of pity in his audience, so Euripides has here matched his characters in such a way that he most convincingly arouses in one feelings of pity for the other.

What Euripides has done here, in projecting onto Iphigeneia the emotional response that is proper to the audience, is novel, but not entirely unprecedented. In fact, there is an anticipation of this device earlier in this play. In the first episode there is a remarkable scene between Agamemnon and Menelaus that has certain affinities with the scene we have been considering. Circumstances appear to have made it inevitable that Iphigeneia is to be sacrificed, and Agamemnon laments the situation in terms similar to those used later by Iphigeneia herself in her monody.<sup>29</sup> Surprisingly, the effect that this speech has on Menelaus is to cause him to change his mind. Menelaus had previously reproached Agamemnon for his weakness of character but now, seeing his brother's tears (477–78) and witnessing his distress first-hand (489–90), he pities (ὥκτιρα 478, ἔλεος 491) both him and Iphigeneia. The reaction of the chorus to Menelaus' change of mind is the same as that to Iphigeneia's: They praise his nobility of character (γενναῖ' ἔλεξας 504) just as they praise hers (τὸ μὲν σόν, ὦ νεᾶνι, γενναίως ἔχει 1403). We may see Menelaus' change of mind as, in a sense, prepara-

<sup>28</sup> *Rhet.* 1386a24–25 τοὺς ὁμοίους ἐλεοῦσι κατὰ ἡλικίας, κατὰ ἡθῆ, κατὰ ἔξεις, κατὰ ἀξιώματα, κατὰ γένη.

<sup>29</sup> Both Agamemnon (467–68) and Iphigeneia (1284 ff.) blame Helen and Paris for causing their woes. Agamemnon (463) envisions Iphigeneia calling him her murderer, and she later does just that (1318). At the conclusion of Agamemnon's speech the two-line comment of the chorus (469–70) begins καὶ γὰρ κατ'ὥκτιρ'; after Iphigeneia's monody the chorus' two-line comment (1336–37) begins ἐγὼ μὲν οἰκτίρω σε.

tion for that of Iphigeneia.<sup>30</sup> But hers is more to be admired than his for two reasons. In the first place, while Menelaus' pity is aroused primarily by his brother's tears and laments, Iphigeneia's is aroused more by what Aristotle might call "the structure of the situation itself."<sup>31</sup> In the second place, the feelings that Menelaus has for Agamemnon and Iphigeneia are readily understood as arising from the fact that they are close relatives,<sup>32</sup> whereas she had never so much as met Achilles before this scene began.

There is, as far as I am aware, only one other scene in surviving Greek tragedy that is comparable to what we find in *IA*.<sup>33</sup> It is in *Prometheus Bound*, a play written by a dramatist no less concerned than Euripides about the workings of pity as it affects both characters and audience.<sup>34</sup> As we noted just above, the play begins with a scene in which Hephaestus expresses his feelings of pity for his kinsman Prometheus. And, as the play continues, first the chorus, then Ocean and Io come on stage and repeat the sentiments that Hephaestus had expressed and the audience shares. But the most striking expression of sympathy for the Titan comes at the very end of the play. For the daughters of Ocean not only express their pity verbally; they act on their feelings. And that act takes the form of a remarkable change of mind. In the final trimeters of the play, before the meter changes to anapaests, the chorus, appropriately to their watery nature, urge Prometheus to yield and to put aside his stubbornness (1036–39). But, in the course of the brief anapaestic scene that closes the play, the chorus so far change their mind that they willingly suffer along with Prometheus, although they were given every opportunity to depart unharmed. The author has even gone out of his way to underline the chorus' decision by placing their defiant speech (1063–70) at the very center of a strictly symmetrical construction: Their speech is preceded and followed by speeches of equal length by Hermes, whose speeches are themselves framed by speeches of Prometheus that come within one metron of being equal to one another in length. The chorus' change of mind has taken place within the space of

<sup>30</sup> Gibert (above, note 1) 278–80 is particularly good on this.

<sup>31</sup> *Poet.* 1453b2–3 ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τῶν πραγμάτων, ὅπερ ἐστὶ πρότερον καὶ ποιητοῦ ἀμείνονος.

<sup>32</sup> At 491–92 Menelaus says that pity (ἔλεος) came over him συγγένειαν ἐννοουμένῳ. This is reminiscent of *PV* 39, where Hephaestus, in response to Kratos' inquiry into his reasons for pitying Prometheus, says τὸ συγγενές τοι δεινόν.

<sup>33</sup> John Gibert reminds me of the scene in *Soph. Ant.* (526 ff.) in which Ismene tries to share in Antigone's responsibility for the burial of Polyneices, after having earlier advised her sister against such action, and in his dissertation (above, note 1) 83 he well compares that scene with the scene in *IA* in which Menelaus changes his mind. But, from the perspective here adopted, Ismene's decision is not strictly comparable, as she has been off stage since the end of the prologue, and it appears that her change of mind took place while she was off stage, and did not result from witnessing and reacting to events on stage.

<sup>34</sup> Among the "Eigenwörter" found in this play but not in the genuine plays of Aeschylus are ἐλαινός, συγκάμνω, συναλγέω and συνασχαλάω; cf. W. Burkert, *Zum altgriechischen Mitleidsbegriff* (diss. Erlangen 1955) 59–60.

twenty-two lines, and all that has happened on stage that can have caused the change are the two brief speeches, the defiant speech of Prometheus and the threatening speech of Hermes. The change is sudden and surprising, but it has been prepared—whether successfully or not is a matter for individual judgment—by the constant emphasis throughout the play on pity and sympathy. The author seems to expect his audience to accept the chorus' change of mind on the basis of his own confidence that he has successfully aroused in the audience the same sort of feelings that apparently lie behind the chorus' action.

Whether Euripides was influenced in this particular by the author of *Prometheus Bound* is difficult to say. If we had available to us all the evidence of fifth-century tragedy we would be in a better position to judge. In any event, there is one way in which Euripides has gone beyond his predecessor: In the earlier play it is the chorus who change their mind as a result of an emotional reaction to what has occurred on stage; in Euripides it is an individual character. It had long been customary for the chorus to react to and comment on what was taking place on stage, the chorus serving in a sort of mediatory capacity between the characters on stage and the audience.<sup>35</sup> In a perhaps more interesting way (because the psychology of the character is of more interest than that of the chorus), Euripides has chosen to present Iphigeneia as reacting to Achilles' noble display of selflessness in the same way that the chorus of *Prometheus Bound* react to Prometheus' admirable fortitude. And, as with so many of Euripides' innovations, we find this device becoming a standard element in the subsequent development of Western drama.

I conclude by mentioning briefly just two later occurrences of this device in the work of two very different dramatists. The first is to be found in Pierre Corneille's *Polyeucte* (1643), which dramatizes the conversion and martyrdom of St. Polyeuctes during the persecutions of the Emperor Decius. Polyeucte had been a worshipper of pagan gods, but has now converted and, with the excessive zeal of the new convert, openly smashes pagan idols and disrupts pagan worship. He is arrested by his father-in-law Félix, the governor of Armenia. Félix and his daughter Pauline entreat Polyeucte to renounce his evil Christian ways in an effort to forestall his arrest and execution. But Polyeucte merely enrages Félix with his stubborn adherence to the strange cult and with his repeated insistence that Félix and Pauline themselves convert, and ultimately Félix himself orders his son-in-law's execution. At the end of the play, Pauline appears before Félix and declares that she too is now a Christian. Her eyes have been opened while witnessing the martyrdom of her husband, by whose blood she is baptized.<sup>36</sup> Now, the

<sup>35</sup> W. B. Stanford, *Greek Tragedy and the Emotions* (London 1983) 46–47.

<sup>36</sup> Pauline actually states (1725–28) that Félix can see the blood with which she has been spattered, but the conventions of the Parisian stage in the 17th century would surely

conversion of Pauline, which takes place off stage, is not entirely unexpected, and is explicable in terms of her frequently-expressed devotion and obedience to her husband Polyeucte. What interests us here is the reaction of Félix. Before our very eyes, and within a very short space of time, he is transformed on stage from persecutor to believer. Witnessing his daughter's willingness to share the fate of Polyeucte has converted him from one who inflicts punishment on Christians to one who would gladly suffer martyrdom himself. This conversion of Félix was not in Corneille's source (Surius' *Vitae Sanctorum*), so there was no requirement that he include it. Further, as a strict adherent to the principles of Aristotle, who had condemned Iphigeneia's change of mind, Corneille was aware that he was risking censure with this bit of dramaturgy. But he felt that he was nevertheless dramatically justified. Apart from his appeal, in the "Examen" prefixed to the published text of the play, to the "miraculous" character of conversion, he has effectively prepared his audience for this development. In the first place, Corneille stresses Félix's nobility and, especially, his feeling of pity for Polyeucte.<sup>37</sup> In the second place, in a cunningly devised scene (Act 5, scene 2) reminiscent of the confrontations between Pentheus and Dionysus in *Bacchae*, Félix actually pretends that he wishes Polyeucte to initiate him into the secrets of Christianity.<sup>38</sup> Finally, emphasis has been placed throughout the play on the ways in which one person's behavior can serve as an example for others. For instance,<sup>39</sup> Polyeucte declares (672) that the example of his own death will do more to strengthen the Christians than his continuing to live. Félix also shows himself to be a believer in the value of example: He resolves to force Polyeucte to witness the martyrdom of his friend Néarque, on the grounds that example has greater effect than threats (885). Félix is right, but he does not recognize that the effect of Néarque's martyrdom will be to strengthen the faith of Polyeucte, rather than to change his mind. Félix's own mind will finally change only when he has witnessed the effect that the example of Polyeucte has had on his own daughter.

From the time of Louis XIV we move to that of Ludwig II of Bavaria. Our second instance of this device comes from the nineteenth century's greatest interpreter of Greek drama, Richard Wagner.<sup>40</sup> In the second act of

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not have tolerated this touch of realism. Rather, the audience must be expected to imagine the blood, as Euripides' audience was expected to imagine the "palace miracle" in *Bacchae*.

<sup>37</sup> See 804, 870, 1010. For pity as a theme in this play, see 85, 573, 577, 1443.

<sup>38</sup> Although, unlike Pentheus, Félix does this in hopes of buying time for Polyeucte, rather than in hopes of obtaining further evidence of his crime.

<sup>39</sup> See also 684, 707-08, 1378.

<sup>40</sup> For Wagner's relationship with Greek drama, see W. Schadewaldt, *Hellas und Hesperien*<sup>2</sup> II (Zurich 1970) 341-405; H. Lloyd-Jones, *Blood for the Ghosts* (London 1982) 126-42; M. Ewans, *Wagner and Aeschylus* (Cambridge 1982); N. O'Sullivan, "Aristophanes and Wagner," *Antike und Abendland* 36 (1990) 67-81.



*Die Walküre*, Brünnhilde appears before Siegmund. Wotan has decided that Siegmund must be killed by Hunding, and Brünnhilde, who earlier in the act had identified herself with Wotan's will, has come to lead Siegmund away to Walhall. Siegmund's death is inevitable for, as Brünnhilde explains to him, "wer mich erschaut, der scheidet vom Lebenslicht." In response to his inquiries she tells him that he will be reunited in Walhall with his father Wälse and that there await him in this hero's paradise *Wunschmädchen* to minister to his needs. So far, Siegmund finds nothing to object to, but he has one further question of the Valkyrie, namely whether he can bring along Sieglinde, his sister and bride, who is at the moment asleep with her head in his lap. Brünnhilde replies that he will not see Sieglinde once he arrives in Walhall. Siegmund refuses to go on this condition, and he threatens to kill himself and his bride, choosing to be united in death with Sieglinde in preference to the everlasting bliss ("ewige Wonne") promised by Brünnhilde. At this point, as Wagner's stage-directions<sup>41</sup> tell us, Brünnhilde is transformed by an overwhelming sense of sympathy ("im heftigsten Sturme des Mitgefühls"). Because she has witnessed Siegmund's undying devotion to his mortal bride (which devotion echoes the affection that Wotan has taught the maiden Brünnhilde herself to feel toward Siegmund), and because she has seen the extent of this hero's bravery in the face of death, she changes her mind. No longer is she determined to carry off to Walhall Siegmund's lifeless body after his inevitable defeat; instead, she has resolved to alter fate itself ("Beschlossen ist's: Das Schlachtlos wend ich.") and to grant victory to Siegmund. Brünnhilde's change of mind is remarkably similar to Iphigeneia's: In both instances young maidens (who have been betrayed by their fathers) are confronted by heroes whose situations arouse feelings of pity and admiration which, enhanced by erotic undertones, inspire the one maiden to change from bitter laments to glorious acceptance and the other to change from dutiful compliance to heroic defiance. There is, however, one striking dramaturgic difference between the two scenes. For, while Iphigeneia's change of mind has taken audiences by surprise, Brünnhilde's has been so skillfully prepared that it seems natural, even inevitable. Indeed, this scene in *Die Walküre* is in effect a dramatization of the division within the will of Wotan, whose passionate desire for Siegmund's survival was earlier in the act thwarted by the indignant protests of Fricka. We need not see this as an indication of Wagner's superiority to Euripides as a dramatist. Rather, it serves to underline the novelty in the use of this device by the earlier dramatist, who (like the author of *Prometheus Bound*) had not yet made it the established and familiar element of dramatic technique that it was to become in subsequent centuries.

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<sup>41</sup> And his music: The score here indicates changes of tempo, dynamics and key.

## Fathers, Sons and Forgiveness

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Theseus in Eur. *Hipp.* 1257–60 says that when he heard how the curse he pronounced on his son had been fulfilled he rejoiced at the news through hatred (μίσει) of Hippolytus; but out of respect for the filial relationship which is of concern to the gods he is “neither gladdened<sup>1</sup> nor grieved” by what has happened. When Artemis has disclosed the truth of the matter, he abases himself in utter remorse (1325 ὀλοΐμην). Artemis heaps excoriating reproaches on his intemperate failure to test the truth of Phaedra’s false accusation, but grants him forgiveness for that (1326 ἔτ’ ἐστὶ καὶ σοι τῶνδε συγγνώμης τυχεῖν) because the whole train of disaster was the work of Aphrodite in her pursuit of her vendetta against Hippolytus. Consoling Hippolytus, Artemis tells him (1435) “I advise you not to hate your father (πατέρα μὴ στυγεῖν).” Theseus has destroyed him ἄκων, i.e. under a misapprehension which acted as a constraint; it is only to be expected that mortals will go wrong when they are caught up in a train of god-given events; and it was Hippolytus’s μοῖρα to die as he is now dying. Artemis has no intention of forgiving Aphrodite (a goddess, after all, could not claim to have acted in ignorance of the facts), and she proclaims (1420–22) that she will kill “whatever mortal is dearest to Aphrodite”; the innocence of that next victim does not worry her, any more than Phaedra’s innocence worried Aphrodite.

According to the story told in Xen. *Cyr.* 3. 1. 38–40, the king of Armenia, father of Tigranes, executed a man who in his view was corrupting (διαφθείρειν) his son. Tigranes had greatly admired this man as καλὸς καὶ γαθός, and tells Cyrus, “When he was going to his execution, he said to me, ‘Do not be angry with your father (μὴ τι σὺ . . . χαλεπανθῆς τῷ πατρί) simply because he has condemned me to death. He does this not from ill-will (κακόνοια) but from ignorance (ἄγνοια), and all the wrong that people do from ignorance I regard as action under constraint

<sup>1</sup> By οὐθ’ ἥδομαι κτλ., coming so soon after ἥσθην, he must mean that conventional αἰδώς is strong enough to pull him away from ἡδονή, in the direction of λύπη, to a half-way point, but not beyond that. ἥσθην normally describes the speaker’s reaction at the time of utterance (e.g. Ar. *Nu.* 174, 1240), but νῦν δ’ requires the audience to re-interpret it as a true past tense.

(ἀκούσια).” Cyrus is impressed by so noble a sentiment. The king excuses himself by admitting that he resented (φθονεῖν) his son’s mentor, believing that the man was usurping the respect (θαυμάζειν) which a son owes to his father. Cyrus concedes that the king’s fault was only human (ἀνθρώπινά μοι δοκεῖς ἀμαρτάνειν), and, turning to Tigranes, he commands him, “Forgive your father (συγγιγνώσκει τῷ πατρί).”

Consideration of the similarities and differences between these two passages affords a good basis for comparison of Greek and modern attitudes to forgiveness.

The most obvious difference between the passages is one of vocabulary. If learners of Greek who have approached the subject through Classical literature are asked, “What is the Greek for ‘forgive’?” they are likely to say, “συγγιγνώσκω.” A student of the New Testament could hardly fail to say, “ἀφίημι,” having in mind such famous texts as Lk 23. 34, “Father, forgive them . . .” (ἄφες αὐτοῖς κτλ.). Ἀφιέναι is, of course, attested in that sense from the fifth century onwards (e.g. Ar. Nu. 1425 f.), and is used in Attic law of a victim who, before dying, absolves his killer (Dem. 37. 59). The converse is not true, for συγγιγνώσκειν and συγγνώμη are not at all favoured in Christian Greek. Unlike “forgive” and its equivalents in modern European languages, συγγιγνώσκειν declares itself by its composition a verb of cognition. That much is clear from its usage by Herodotus and Thucydides in other senses, “concur” in general (i.e. “share someone else’s opinion”) and “admit” in particular (i.e. “share with one’s accuser the same assessment of one’s own action”). The *locus classicus* is Thuc. 2. 60. 4, “You blame me, who advised you to fight, and yourselves, οἱ ξυνέγνωτε.” The sense “forgive” arises from a recognition that people very commonly regard their own actions as justified or at least, even if they feel some shame and regret, as not deserving punishment. Σύγγνωθί μοι is an appeal for empathy, “Share my view of the matter.” That is not something which Christians oppressed by a sense of their own unworthiness would demand of God, but there is no theological reason why it should not be demanded of the Olympian gods. Justin *Dial.* 9. 1 συγγνώμη σοι . . . καὶ ἀφεθείη σοι combines a personal statement with a prayer; but the Lord’s Prayer (Mt 6. 12 ἄφες . . . ὥς καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀφήκαμεν) and Mt 18. 21 ἀμαρτήσῃ εἰς ἐμέ . . . καὶ ἀφήσω αὐτῷ show that humans too can ἀφιέναι offences against themselves. The connotations of a word do not necessarily persist through its compounds, and it would be perilous to found an argument on an insistence that they do, but in the case of συγγιγνώσκειν the other compounds of γινώσκειν and the first hundred words beginning with συν- picked at random from the lexicon favour the argument from etymology.

The striking fact about συγγιγνώσκειν and συγγνώμη is that the former is not attested before Simonides (*PMG* 542. 27 (Danae apologises to Zeus for venturing to voice the hope that her fortunes will change), and the latter not until Herodotus. Until Simonides, Greek of the archaic period

seems to have lacked a simple equivalent of our "forgive." The Attic law on manslaughter uses αἰδεῖσθαι (noun αἷδεσις, Dem. 21. 43, Arist. *Ath.* 57. 3) of the permission given by the victim's family to the guilty man to return to Attica, and this is understandably translated "pardon," a term which has a legal colouring and is somewhat closer to "concede" or "waive" than to "forgive."<sup>2</sup> Pardon in accordance with legal requirements or social convention and pressure can still leave a powerful residue of ill-will. The Attic αἰδεῖσθαι seems to be a special application of the general sense of the word, behaviour towards another person as if that other person had precedence over oneself.

To infer from these lexical considerations that no one ever forgave anybody in the Greek world until the late archaic period would be no more intelligent than inferring, from the fact that English and German distinguish between conscience and consciousness, whereas French and Italian do not,<sup>3</sup> that the phenomenon of conscience is confined to certain parts of Europe. The alternative inference, that early Greek poets chose (or happened) never to portray anyone demanding or receiving forgiveness, is demolished by observation: Achilles forgives Agamemnon in *Iliad* 19. Or is that the imposition of modern categories on an alien text? The question must be asked, but it need not be intimidating. To answer it, let us extricate ourselves for a while from the history of words and get into the history of experiences, which show much less diachronic change. We have all had the experience of forgiving and being forgiven. What is going on in us when we forgive, and what do we think is going on in other people when they forgive us?

If you have harmed me, and later I have the capacity and the opportunity to harm you but do not do so, then *prima facie* I have forgiven you. The qualification "*prima facie*" is necessary, because there are many practical reasons for abstaining from revenge on a given occasion, however implacable my desire for it may be. Perhaps I see and relish the prospect of an even better opportunity in the future; or, more often, abstention is a means to some other end, e.g. maintaining good relations with a friend of yours. The words "I forgive you" can be invested with an appearance of the performative character of "I promise," but the performance is not irrevocable; as the words constitute a statement about my feelings, to which you do not have direct access, the statement may be false and shown to be false by later events. It is true only if I no longer *wish* to harm you, no

<sup>2</sup> Cf. C. E. von Erffa, ΑΙΔΩΣ (= *Philologus* Suppl. 30. 2 [1937]) 105 f.; D. M. MacDowell, *Athenian Homicide Law in the Age of the Orators* (Manchester 1963) 125 f.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. E. V. Kohák in the preface to his translation (Evanston 1974) of Paul Ricoeur, *Le volontaire et l'involontaire*, xxxvi: "I have . . . rendered *la conscience* 'consciousness' even in expressions where 'awareness' would have been usual, reserving the term 'conscience' for the few passages where this specific meaning is indicated by the context." When lecturing in Italy on Greek moral values I had to discuss at some length with Italian friends the circumlocutions needed to resolve the ambiguities of *coscienza*.



matter how tempting and frequent the opportunities to do so. Then we can speak of "true" or "genuine" forgiveness.

Remission of anger, of hatred, of the desire to hurt, call it what we will, is the point at issue in the attempts of Agamemnon's envoys to move Achilles in *Iliad* 9: 157 μεταλλάξαντι χόλοιο, 255 f. μεγαλήτορα θυμόν / ἴσχειν ἐν στήθεσσι· φιλοφροσύνη γὰρ ἀμείνων, 496 f. δάμασον θυμόν μέγαν, οὐδέ τι σε χρὴ / νηλεὲς ἦτορ ἔχειν, 675 χόλος δ' ἔτ' ἔχει μεγαλήτορα θυμόν, 678 οὐκ ἐθέλει σβέσσαι χόλον. When events have brought about Achilles' reconciliation with Agamemnon, he uses similar terminology: 19. 67 f. ἐγὼ παύω χόλον, οὐδέ τι με χρὴ / ἀσκελέως αἰεὶ μενεαινέμεν. Not surprisingly, in classical prose also forgiveness is regularly contrasted with anger: Lys. 29. 5 (ὀργίζεσθαι), Pl. *Euthd.* 306c (χαλεπαίνειν), *Mnx.* 244b (ἀγανακτεῖν), *Phdr.* 257a (ὀργή), 269b (χαλεπαίνειν), *Rep.* 366c (ὀργίζεσθαι). E. *Hipp.* 1435 πατέρα μὴ στυγεῖν and Xen. *Cyr.* 3. 1. 38 μή τι . . . χαλεπανθῆς τῷ πατρί, compared above, come in this category.

Orestes, in his plea for help to Menelaus (E. *Or.* 642–79), "forgives" him for his part in the sacrifice of Iphigenia; I'm not asking you, he says, to kill Hermione in compensation; δεῖ γὰρ σ' ἐμοῦ πράσσοντος ὡς πράσσω τὰ νῦν / πλέον φέρεσθαι, καμὲ συγγνώμην ἔχειν (660 f.). The words are harsh and wry. Orestes does not mean that he shares the γνώμη which Menelaus had about the sacrifice at Aulis, nor are we to imagine that he no longer resents it, only that it is pointless for the weak to hope for revenge on the strong. The strangeness of the "reason" for his "forgiveness," the bitterness with which the words are charged, prompt us to ask what reasons the Greeks usually offer for forgiveness.

Most of the time, though not quite all the time, they are the same as we give nowadays.<sup>4</sup> Ignorance and error; duress; poverty, alcohol, lust, provocation; weaknesses believed to be characteristic of the old, or the young, or the female; inherited temperament; loyalty to relations and friends; the mortal propensity to err. I may forgive you out of pity, if great misfortune befalls you before I have any opportunity for revenge; or you may buy my forgiveness by payment of compensation. It is easy to be cynical about compensation, but cynicism is misplaced. Your payment to me is your loss, and in so far as loss is a form of suffering, I have my revenge, my desire to harm you is satisfied, and I have no more desire to harm you. At the same time, generosity in giving is very commonly a manifestation of affection and equally commonly a cause of affection, so the payment restores us to friendship.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> For detailed examples see my *Greek Popular Morality* (Oxford 1974) 133–60.

<sup>5</sup> In 1988 a well-known singer received £1.25 million from a newspaper in an out-of-court settlement of a libel action he had brought against it. He then said, "I don't bear *The Sun* any malice," and a spokesman for the paper said, "We are delighted that *The Sun* and Elton have become friends again."

There are however some differences between ancient and modern grounds for forgiveness. I cannot expect nowadays to be forgiven on the grounds that my wrongdoing was fated, a plea with which Gorgias plays (B 11. 6) in his defence of Helen; but it was never an entirely safe plea, for "My action was fated" invites the retort (as Clytaemnestra discovers in *A. Cho.* 910 f.), "So is my revenge." Nor can I plead that God compelled me to do wrong, though I might (especially if I were an evangelist caught in an embarrassing situation) say that I was tempted by the Devil, and I might even get some credit for being considered by the Devil a worthwhile target. A Greek might say that a god distorted his mind, destroying his better judgment (cf. Agamemnon in *Il.* 19. 86–94), but whether that is accepted as a reason for forgiveness depends on whether his adversary has independent grounds for forgiving.<sup>6</sup> If he has none, he may suggest that the god's object was actually to put the victim in a situation from which punishment would inevitably follow, and that it is imprudent to thwart a god's purpose (cf. *And.* 1. 113, *Lys.* 6. 22). Theseus was forgiven by Artemis not because Aphrodite intervened directly in his mind (as she had done in Phaedra's), but because she created a situation in which he did wrong ἀνθρωπίνως. Diminished responsibility on grounds of mental illness, an important issue in modern thinking about crime and punishment, was not recognised in Greek penal codes, partly because the illness could be regarded as evidence of divine disfavour, and partly because Greek society generally treated risk to the community as deserving precedence over unfairness to an individual.

The variation "revenge . . . punishment . . ." in the previous paragraph is not unconscious, and it remains firmly within the field of τιμωρία, τιμωρεῖσθαι. There are occasions on which wrongdoing by an animal, slave, child, employee or subordinate incurs infliction of suffering without incurring at the same time the anger, hatred or even ill-will of the owner or superior who inflicts it; the suffering is treated as an ingredient of training and education and as a regrettable necessity for the deterrence of others.<sup>7</sup> The Greeks denoted that by κολάζειν, κόλασις, and *Arist. Rhet.* 1269b12–14 defines κόλασις as inflicted τοῦ πάσχοντος ἔνεκα, τιμωρία as τοῦ ποιοῦντος ἔνεκα. Clement of Alexandria adopts the Aristotelian distinction in *Paed.* 1. 8 (p. 131. 8) and in asserting (*Str.* 7. 16 [p. 72. 20]) that God κολάζει but does not τιμωρεῖσθαι (a proposition not easily defended in an eschatological context). Yet he slips into looser usage in *Str.* 7. 12 (p. 74. 6) when he refers to the τιμωρία of malefactors, and 7. 10 (p. 41. 18) κολάσεως καὶ τιμωρίας ἀπάσης, ἃς ἐκ τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων εἰς παιδείαν ὑπομένομεν σωτήριον. Plato's Protagoras (*Prt.* 324a–c) appears at first sight to be drawing a clear distinction between μετὰ λόγου

<sup>6</sup> See further my *Greek and the Greeks* (Oxford 1987) 88, 138 f.

<sup>7</sup> The legendary flogging pedagogues who said "This hurts me more than it hurts you" are regarded with contempt because what they said was sometimes false; that does not preclude the possibility that it was sometimes true.

κολάζειν, infliction of suffering for the purpose of making the sufferer behave better in future, and ὥσπερ θηρίον ἀλογίστως τιμωρεῖσθαι, infliction τούτου ἔνεκα, ὅτι ἡδίκησεν. We might think that he is distinguishing between two genera of action by the criterion of intention.<sup>8</sup> He continues, however: "This opinion is held by all those who τιμωροῦνται, whether in a private or a public capacity. All people τιμωροῦνται καὶ κολάζονται<sup>9</sup> those whom they think guilty of wrongdoing, and your fellow-citizens, the Athenians, do it as much as anyone." The first part of this statement, "This opinion . . . capacity" is untrue, as we know from our own experience, but the statement as a whole shows that Protagoras's distinction is between two species of the genus τιμωρία, one μετὰ λόγου and the other ἀλόγιστος. Even that distinction does not count for much in the courts; the speaker of Lys. 6, who demands the death penalty for Andocides, urges the jury in 13 and 42–44 to κολάζειν wrongdoers, and in 15, 18, 53 to τιμωρεῖσθαι them. Modern usage, except on the plane of theory, is hardly more inclined to distinguish,<sup>10</sup> and the reason for that is simple enough: From the receiving end, the distinction is not apparent. If I am sentenced to ten years in jail, how can it matter to me whether it is called "correction" or "revenge"? I may be told that I am "paying my debt to society," but a more concise term is avoided. The reason for its avoidance leads us directly to what is by far the most important difference between Greek and modern attitudes to forgiveness, the powerful role played in our moral thinking by the uncompromising command of Christ to forgive (Mt 18. 22) and his prohibition of retaliation (Mt 5. 38–47). Acknowledgement of religious duty causes Christian societies, whatever suffering they inflict on wrongdoers, to deny that it is revenge. Realisation that no society will last very long if it continues to forgive wrongdoing enables it to believe that κόλασις and ἄφεσις can somehow exist κατὰ ταῦτὸν καὶ πρὸς ταῦτὸν ἅμα. In individual cases, religious duty coupled with an un-hellenic belief in a great moral gulf between God and humanity can induce someone whose daughter has been killed by gunmen to say, "I forgive them, because I know that I too have need of forgiveness."

Greek gods do not command us to forgive on an extravagant scale, if at all. They themselves are not conspicuously forgiving, and we have some allusions to particular cases in which the criteria they apply to forgiveness are at best human, and at worst<sup>11</sup> heroic. The most straightforward case is

<sup>8</sup> For a logical analysis of Protagoras's argument see C. C. W. Taylor's translation and commentary (Oxford 1976) 90–96.

<sup>9</sup> The switch from the active voice (b2, b7) to the middle is unexpected; it is caused, I think, by the introduction of the public domain (δημοσίᾳ) into the context, for the state κολάζει but ὁ γραφόμενος κολάζεται.

<sup>10</sup> I have heard a vengeful husband say, "I want her to suffer. I want to *punish* her."

<sup>11</sup> Cf. B. M. W. Knox, *The Heroic Temper* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1964) 19–25 on the uncompromising disposition of the Sophoclean hero.

that of Pheretima, queen of Cyrene, who impaled round the walls of Barce those of its citizens whom she held most responsible for her son's murder, and for good measure cut off their wives' breasts and nailed the breasts too to the walls. Some time later she died of a horrible illness, so demonstrating, says Herodotus (4. 205) ὥς ἄρα ἀνθρώποισι αἱ λίην τιμωρίαι πρὸς θεῶν ἐπίφθονοι γίνονται. If she had been more discriminating in her vengeance, seasoning it with clemency (as Xenophon's Cyrus would have done) and abstaining from barbarous torture and offensive display, the gods would not have been moved to hostility. They reacted as humans do, and had the power to give expression to their reaction.

The second case, that of Herakles' murder of Iphitus, is more subtle. According to the speech of Lichas in Soph. *Tr.* 248–90, Iphitus's father Eurytus had grossly insulted Herakles; on a later occasion, therefore, Herakles distracted the attention of Iphitus when they were on top of a high tower, and pushed him over the edge. For this Zeus sentenced Herakles to a year's servitude under Omphale; "If," says Lichas (278–80) "he had requited Iphitus *openly*, Zeus would have forgiven him (Ζεὺς τᾶν συνέγνω) his just victory (ξὺν δίκῃ χειρουμένῳ), for the gods too have no love of hybris." To a modern scholar, killing a young man because one has been treated hybristically by his father seems the act of a maniac; but there are cultures and sub-cultures today (e.g. in Lebanon, to say nothing of points much further west) in which it would be *de rigueur*, a salutary thought when we are tempted to contrast "ancient" and "modern" without qualification. Herakles is one of those tragic characters who do nothing by halves, and the gods of tragedy, while sharing human distaste for treacherous killing, are prepared to tolerate face-to-face revenge on a monstrous scale.

Yet Herakles would not have fared well before an Athenian jury.<sup>12</sup> There is abundant evidence that in the fourth century magnanimity, forgiveness, "niceness," very commonly designated ἐπιείκεια, were admired and respected, and they were a product of civilised society to which religious doctrine does not appear to have made any significant contribution. Arist. *EN* 1143a19–24 associates συγγνωμονικός and ἐπιεικής very closely. The Athenian speaker in Pl. *Lg.* 757e is notably uncomfortable about the necessary conflict between τὸ ἐπιεικὲς καὶ σύγγνωμον and strict justice, and Arist. *EN* 1137a31–38a3 wrestles with their interrelation, coming to the agreeable conclusion that ἐπιείκεια is δικαιοσύνη τις. I have explored ἐπιείκεια elsewhere,<sup>13</sup> and draw attention now to two words, etymologically related to each other, one common and one rare, which are sometimes used with connotations of magnanimity: The common word is γενναῖος, the rarer word γεννάδας, which is confined to Aristophanes,

<sup>12</sup> Nor would Antigone, confronted by a prosecutor like Lycurgus.

<sup>13</sup> *Greek Popular Morality* 61–63, 191.



two passages of Plato and one of Aristotle.<sup>14</sup> Given their derivation from γέννα, they might have been used to imply pride, haughtiness and arrogance, but that is just what they do not imply, and this fact tells us much about Athenian attitudes to forgiveness.

The long-dead general Myronides is admiringly called γεννάδας in *Ar. Ec.* 304, but we do not know for what virtues, other than swift and resolute military action, he was remembered in tradition; in *Ach.* 1230 the victorious Dikaiopolis is hailed as ὁ γεννάδα; and one of the slaves in *Eq.* 240 f. prevents the Sausage-seller from running away in panic by saying ὁ γεννάδα / ἀλλαντοπῶλα, μὴ προδῶς τὰ πράγματα. Nothing so far to associate the word with magnanimity, but *Frogs* enlarges the field. In 179, when Xanthias has offered to carry all the luggage if no one else can be found to do so, Dionysus compliments him by saying χρηστός<sup>15</sup> εἰ καὶ γεννάδας, and Xanthias earns the same compliment from the Janitor (640 "You really are γεννάδας ἀνὴρ!") when he displays a willingness to submit to pain in the interests of fair play. 738–42, the opening of the conversation between Xanthias and the slave of Pluto, throws fresh light on the connotations of the word. "Your master," says the slave admiringly, "is γεννάδας ἀνὴρ!" "Of course he is," says Xanthias, "he doesn't know how to do anything but drink and screw." Pluto's slave persists: "Fancy his not beating you up when it was proved that you'd been claiming to be the master, when you were a slave!" The slave calls Dionysus γεννάδας because he forgave Xanthias; Xanthias agrees, because, in his view, Dionysus's horizon is confined to drink and women, so naturally he's easy-going. The connotation "easy-going" and therefore "magnanimous" suits *Pl. Phdr.* 243c, where γεννάδας is coupled with πρῶτος (which in turn is coupled with εὐκολος in *Hp. Mi.* 364d), and *Arist. EN* 1100b32, on the man who endures great misfortunes εὐκόλως, not through insensitivity but because he is γεννάδας καὶ μεγαλόψυχος. The last occurrence of γεννάδας in *Frogs* is at 997, where the chorus appeals to Aeschylus to keep his temper in arguing against Euripides: ἀλλ' ὅπως ὁ γεννάδα / μὴ πρὸς ὀργὴν ἀντιλέξεις. Just as ὁ γεννάδα addressed to the fleeing Sausage-seller was not an expression of a judgment on his character but an attempt to give him a certain character by addressing him as if he already possessed it—cf. "O most merciful king!" and the like, addressed to a

<sup>14</sup> For the history of γεννάδας and its hypothetical prehistory see G. Björck, *Das Alpha Impurum und die tragische Kunstsprache* (Uppsala 1950) 51–54. LSJ boldly labels it "Doric," but it is not yet attested in any non-Attic text.

<sup>15</sup> Χρηστός is often translated (even by people who should know better) "useful," for which the Greek is χρήσιμος; χρηστός is in fact the most general Attic word for "good," and the translation "useful" is appropriate only in such phrases as χρηστὰ διδάσκειν, χρηστὰ παραινεῖν, because a useful lesson or useful advice is the same as a good lesson or good advice. The translation of χρηστός as "noble" is also inappropriate except when a writer loyal to the upper class treats that class as if it had a monopoly of goodness. On the wide scope of χρηστός see my *The Greeks and their Legacy* (Oxford 1988) 10 f.

tyrant—so the chorus in *Frogs* hopes to induce in Aeschylus the behaviour of a γεννάδας ἀνὴρ. That fits the only instance of ὦ γεννάδα in Plato, *Chrm.* 155d. Socrates is telling Critias of his encounter with the young and dazzlingly beautiful Charmides: “And then, ὦ γεννάδα, I saw inside his himation, and I was all afire, head over heels . . .” This is just the sort of context in which speakers elsewhere in Plato ask for forgiveness, e.g. *Euthd.* 286e “My question may be rather a bore, ἀλλὰ συγγίγνωσκε”; cf. *Smp.* 218b “That’s why I’ll tell you the whole story; you’ll forgive what I did then and what I’m saying now.” Socrates is afraid that his candid confession of erotic sensibility will embarrass Critias, and may bore him.

Γενναῖος too, a term of positive evaluation which requires a very wide range of translations to cover all the contexts in which we find it, may have the connotation “easy-going,” “magnanimous,” “laid-back,” as it does in Pl. *Rep.* 558c, a passage of caustic irony about the “marvellously agreeable” way in which a democratic state is run. Socrates refers to its συγγνώμη καὶ οὐδ’ ὅπωςτιοῦν σμικρολογία (“total dismissal of mere details”) and its readiness to take on trust anyone in politics who asserts his goodwill to the city. Glaucon, going along with the irony, agrees: πάννυ γ’, ἔφη, γενναῖα.

This completes a full circle and brings us back to Hippolytus. Artemis’s recommendation that he should not “hate his father” is hardly needed, because Hippolytus has already made his freedom from hatred sufficiently clear in addressing Theseus as δυστάλας . . . τῆσδε συμφορᾶς<sup>16</sup> (1407) and in saying that he mourns for his father more than for himself (1409). After Artemis’s exhortation, he takes the first step towards formal forgiveness, λύω δὲ νεῖκος πατρί (1442), but in adding that he does this at Artemis’s behest he still leaves unresolved the issue which, it seems, most troubles Theseus at this moment. Attic law (Dem. 37. 59) provided that if the victim of homicide forgave (ἀφιέναι) the killer, there was no pollution, no angry ghost to appease, and therefore no punishment. Hippolytus makes the formal declaration which gives effect to this provision, σε τοῦδ’ ἐλευθερῶ φόνου (1449). Theseus is incredulous (1450 τί φῆς; ἀφίης αἵματός μ’ ἐλεύθερον;), and Hippolytus puts his declaration beyond question by calling on Artemis to witness it (1451). Then Theseus exclaims (1452) ὡς γενναῖος ἐκφαίνει πατρί.

Artemis is very far from issuing a divine injunction equivalent to “Bless them that curse you”; she is sorting out a situation in a heroic family in a way which will not conflict significantly with the existing corpus of Attic myth about Theseus. For the purpose, she treats Theseus’s fatal cursing of Hippolytus as if it were φόνος ἀκούσιος (which it is not, 887–90). Tigranes’ tutor chooses to treat the king’s sentence too as if it were

<sup>16</sup> A defendant (or his sympathisers) may refer to a misdeed of his own as a συμφορά. If a prosecutor called it that, he would be as good as conceding the case; cf. D. M. MacDowell’s edition of Andocides, *On the Mysteries* (Oxford 1962) 126.

ἀκούσιος (which, again, it is not). Hippolytus and the tutor—and by implication Tigranes himself, whom we have previously heard pleading for his father's life and moving Cyrus to forgiveness of rebellion (*Cyr.* 3. 1. 7–37)—earn praise by forgiving a murderous (and unforgiving) injustice.

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## The *Koina* of Epirus and Macedonia

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It is a particular pleasure to pay tribute to the outstanding scholarship and warm friendship of Fritz Solmsen, whom I first knew at Cambridge in the 1930s. Then he was my host at the Institute for Research in the Humanities at Madison, Wisconsin, in 1975–76 and in 1977, and he and Lieselotte were most welcoming to my wife and me. Our friendship was renewed most happily in Chapel Hill in 1986, when I was working at the National Center for the Humanities. On many occasions, and especially at Madison, where I took some seminars on Herodotus for him, we discussed many problems of Macedonian history and he approached them all with his fresh and penetrating mind and a wonderful grasp of the Greek language. The subject which I have chosen is such as we discussed then.

The term τὸ κοινόν was much in use in what we now call Northern Greece in the fourth century B.C. In the treaty of c. 393 between "Amyntas, son of Errhidaeus" and "Chalcideis" there were arrangements for the export of such timber products "as τὸ κοινόν does not need," and for financial conditions affecting τὸ κοινόν, i.e. the "Chalcideis" (Tod, *GHI* 111. 11–12). The term τὸ κοινόν was certainly the official designation in use, because the inscribed stone was found at Olynthus and gave the Chalcidian version of the treaty. The literal meaning of τὸ κοινόν is not "the state" or "the league" as in LSJ<sup>9</sup> s.v. κοινός, but "the community" or "the commonality." If we keep to the literal meaning, there is no difference in essence between the following examples of its use over a wide span, geographically and chronologically: τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἰώνων (Hdt. 5. 109. 3), Σπαρτιητέων τὸ κοινόν (Hdt. 1. 67. 5), Αἰτωλῶν τὸ κοινόν (Tod, *GHI* 137. 9 and 17), Μολοσσῶν τὸ κοινόν (*SGDI* 1334), τὸ κοινὸν Μακεδόνων (*IG* XI. 4. 1102), κοινὸν τῶν Παιόνων (*SIG* 394) and κοινὸν τῶν Βυλλιόνων (*PAE* [1965] 59). In each case it was "the community."

The literal meaning was prominent in such expressions as ἡ κοινὴ εἰρήνη "the communal peace" (Tod, *GHI* 145. 6 and 11 τὴν νῦν γεγεννημένην ἡμῖν εἰρήνην; cf. 177. 21), ἡ κοινὴ συμμαχία, "the communal coalition" (Plb. 4. 9. 2, being the so-called Symmarchy, organised by Antigonus Doson). When the Apeirotai banished the



Molossian king Aeacides in 317, they passed a communal decision, κοινὸν δόγμα τῶν Ἑπειρωτῶν (Diod. 19. 36. 4).

The members which made up τὸ κοινόν were not political units, such as city-states, tribes or leagues, but people. Thus in the so-called Corinthian League of 337 those sharing in "the common peace" were named in the inscription, the certain surviving names being Thessalians, Thasians, Ambraciotes, Phocians, Locrians, Malians, Dolopes, Perhaebians and Cephallenians (Tod, *GHI* 177). We may make the comment that some were organised in tribes, others in city-states and others in federal systems; but those distinctions are not to be deduced from "the common peace." And vice versa it is a mistake to infer from τὸ κοινόν or ἡ κοινὴ συμμαχία that its members were organised only in one political form.<sup>1</sup> There is no doubt that any group of individuals could employ the expression. Thus the Spartiatai, who were the elite citizens of the Lacedaemonian state, were described by Herodotus as Σπαρτιητέων τὸ κοινόν (1. 67. 5). There was no implication that the Spartiatai were a federated body or a city-state. They were a "community" of armed warriors, led by two kings elected from one family.

The area in which this type of community survived and flourished until the Roman conquest was most markedly Epirus, and the reason for that survival was the fact that the transhumant form of pastoralism continued from early times into the Hellenistic period.<sup>2</sup> The evidence is provided by a large number of inscriptions which reveal an extraordinary number of ethnic terms and many decisions taken by ethnic κοινά. The basic unit was a small community such as the Aterargoi, τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀτεράργων, which passed its own resolutions (*Ep. Chron.* 1935. 261; *Epirus* 536). When such a community was threatened, it tended to associate itself with other such communities. Together they formed a cluster with a new

The following abbreviations are used in this article:

<i>CAH</i>	<i>The Cambridge Ancient History</i> , 2nd ed.
<i>Epirus</i>	N. G. L. Hammond, <i>Epirus</i> (Oxford 1967)
Errington	R. M. Errington, <i>Geschichte Makedoniens</i> (Munich 1986)
<i>HMac</i> I	N. G. L. Hammond, <i>A History of Macedonia</i> I (Oxford 1972)
<i>HMac</i> II	N. G. L. Hammond and G. T. Griffith, <i>A History of Macedonia</i> II (Oxford 1979)
<i>HMac</i> III	N. G. L. Hammond and F. W. Walbank, <i>A History of Macedonia</i> III (Oxford 1988)
<i>Mac State</i>	N. G. L. Hammond, <i>The Macedonian State</i> (Oxford 1989)
Walbank	F. W. Walbank, <i>A Historical Commentary on Polybius</i> I–III (Oxford 1957–79)

<sup>1</sup> This was implied, when the Symmachy was defined as "a League of Confederacies" (Walbank I 256) or "a League of Leagues" (*CAH* VII. 1. 468). The strongest member at the start—Macedonia—was not a confederacy nor a league, and later members did not have to become leagues. To say that "Macedones" (Pib. 4. 9. 4) were "perhaps only nominal members" is to go beyond the Greek words, probability and actuality.

<sup>2</sup> See *Epirus* 256 f. and 267 and *Mac State* 387, citing the results of a survey in North Pindus led by A. K. Vavritsas.

corporate name, e.g. Omphales. In course of time the clusters coalesced to form a larger association, again with a corporate name, e.g. Molossoi. The three stages led to an accumulation of ethnic terms: Thus we find Μολοσσοὶ Ὀμφάλες Χιμῳάριοι (*SGDI* 1347 of c. 330–310; *Epirus* 566) and Μολοσσὸς Ὀνόπερνος Καρτατός (*SGDI* 1346). To take another example, the Prasaebi, themselves a member of the larger association “The Chaones,” consisted of at least five subsidiary tribes, since the officials and members of their community had as ethnics Aixonios, Tharios, Kotulaios, O . . . atas and Prochtheios. Another cluster in the same region, the Pergamii, had as officials of their community men with the ethnics Acralestos and Charadros.

Of the larger associations in Epirus the Chaones and the Molossoi were known to Hecataeus in the sixth century (*FGrH* 1 F 103 and 108), and to them Thucydides adds Atintanes, Orestai, Parauaiοι and Thesprotoi in the operations of 429 (2. 80. 5). The Dassaretii developed from being a constituent tribe of the Chaones in the sixth century as the Dexaroi (*FGrH* 1 F 103) into being an independent association. There were other associations to the southeast, such as the Agraiοι (Thuc. 3. 106. 2). All these associations were liable to have a fluctuating membership; for the basic units—the small tribes—had freedom of choice and exercised it. Thus, according to Strabo 323–24, whose information was derived from Hecataeus, the Chaones were the strongest association in Epirus, probably in the period before the mid-sixth century. They were then overhauled by the Molossians, who had pride of place until c. 480. During their period of ascendancy the strongest centre of economic power was in the area north of Lake Ochrid (see *CAH* III. 3 [1982] 271). There were strong links at that time between Trebenishte, where the royal cemetery of the rulers north of Lake Ochrid was situated, and the oracular shrine of Dodona;<sup>3</sup> and Strabo attributed the Molossians’ rise to power to the fact that Dodona was “beside them” (cf. *FGrH* 1 F 108).

In this period the tribes of Upper Macedonia were members of the Molossian association, and they were called, e.g. Orestai Molossoi (*FGrH* 1 F 107 Ὀρέσται· Μολοσσικὸν ἔθνος). However, in the 480s most of them were brought into the sphere of the Macedonian king by Xerxes, when he was preparing his invasion of Greece,<sup>4</sup> and most of them from then onwards were “Macedones,” e.g. Λυγκηστῶν Μακεδόνων in Thuc. 4. 83. 1; cf. 2. 99. 2 τῶν γὰρ Μακεδόνων καὶ Λυγκησταὶ καὶ Ἑλιμιῶται. The Orestai may have been an exception, because they operated together with a western tribe, the Parauaei, in 429 (Thuc. 2. 80. 6). In the fourth century the Molossian association increased in power; for, as we see from inscriptions, its membership grew from ten to fifteen tribal groups, which included the Orestae (*SEG* XXIII 471. 13) and some that were previously members of the Thesprotoi (*Epirus* 527 and 530 f.).

<sup>3</sup> *Epirus* 437 f.

<sup>4</sup> Just. 7. 4. 1, as explained in *HMac* II 63 f.

Since the publication in 1956 of two inscriptions from Dodona it has been demonstrated beyond cavil that the tribes of the Molossian group were Greek-speaking in the latter part of the fifth century; for the names and the patronymics of men mentioned in the decisions of 370–68 B.C. were all Greek, and the language and the institutions of the inscription were entirely Greek. That is merely a *terminus ante quem* they spoke Greek. Moreover, the dialect of questions asked evidently by local persons at Dodona was West Greek, and not the Doric dialect of the Corinthian colonies which traded with the Molossian group. The conclusion is certain that these tribes were Greek-speaking from the beginning at least of the Iron Age. It follows that the tribes of Upper Macedonia were also speakers of Greek; for non-Greek-speakers would not have been admitted to a Greek association.<sup>5</sup> That they spoke the West Greek dialect is clear from an inscription in Seleucid Syria, in which there were magistrates with a West Greek termination *πελιγᾶνες*, and from the mention of *ἄδειγᾶνες* in Plb. 5. 54. 10.<sup>6</sup> The northern limit of the Greek-speaking tribes is supplied to us by Strabo 326; for they extended up to the southernmost Illyrian tribes, these being Bylliones, Taulantii, Parthini, Brygi and Enchelii (the last being around the northern part of Lake Ochrid),<sup>7</sup> and these Greek-speaking tribes (he has just mentioned the lands of the Pelagones, Lyncestae, Orestae and Elimeotae) were said “by some to have the same hair-style, dialect, cloak and suchlike things as far as Corcyra” (327).

The conditions of ancient transhumant pastoralism were unchanged until very recent times, when flocks of sheep were transported by car and winter pastures were turned into agricultural land. We can therefore gain some relevant information from the pastoral groups of the Sarakatsani and the Vlachs. The viable size of a group, known as a *parea* or *stani*, was between 200 and 500 persons, varying with the extent and quality of pastures. During the turbulence of the Turkish Empire some groups, which had been entirely nomadic, combined to form clusters and built villages in high Pindus at Vovoussa (four groups) and Avdhella (five groups), for instance. In each group the adult armed men met together to make some decisions for the group and to elect a leader of the group with wide powers (a *tselingas* or *tshelniku*). This leader usually held office for life, and his family being held in honour often provided his successor. The larger association, e.g. the armed men of Vovoussa, elected a leader from one of its

<sup>5</sup> The inscriptions, from Dodona, were published by D. Evangelides in *AE* (1956) 1 ff.; for comments see *Epirus* 524 ff. Inscriptions show that the names and the language of Upper Macedonia was Greek; see *HMac* I 90 and F. Papazoglou in *Chiron* 18 (1988) 250 f.

<sup>6</sup> For *peliganes* see *Syria* 23 (1942–43) 21 f. Walbank I 583 proposed to emend “*adeiganes*” to “*peliganes*” but not on any grounds of palaeography.

<sup>7</sup> This is disputed by Albanian scholars, e.g. in *Iliria* (1982) 2. 84 f. and (1984) 2. 79 f., and by P. Cabanes in *Iliria* (1986) 1. 83. See my arguments in *JRS* 79 (1989) 19 f.

constituent groups.<sup>8</sup> We see a similar system in the larger associations which Thucydides described briefly: The leader was normally a king, and where he was lacking, e.g. for the Chaones, the leaders were two men of "the ruling family" (Thuc. 2. 80. 5 ἐκ τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους). The smaller, constituent groups are revealed in inscriptions as having each its own assembly and officials in the fourth and following centuries. For instance, there was mention c. 340 of a formal decision: ἔδοξε τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῶν ... (SGDI 1335) and the officials included προστάται, of which Thucydides recorded an earlier instance (2. 80. 5 ἐπετησίῳ προστατείᾳ, among the Chaones). The community passed resolutions about its internal affairs and regulated relations with other communities.<sup>9</sup> The fact that they were all ultimately subsumed into τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀπειρωτῶν did not apparently diminish the vitality of their own institutions.

It is important to note that the expression τὸ κοινόν means a community of its own members and takes its corporate name for those members only. Thus κοινὸν τῶν Βυλλιόνων was the community of Bylliones. I stress this point, because some scholars have recently imported the concept of a federal system and have argued that the Greek words meant a "League" of which the Bylliones were a leading member and other groups such as the Amantes or Atintanes were members.<sup>10</sup> That, however, was not the sense of the word in the northwestern area; for the *koinon* of Apeirotai, Molossoi, Thesproti, Aetoloi, Pergamioi, etc. in every case was the body of its internal members and not the basis of a wider confederation. Thus κοινὸν τῶν Βυλλιόνων was the community of the Bylliones, a group of Hellenised Illyrians who were bilingual (Strabo 326).

We have seen that the large tribal associations of what was called Upper Macedonia spoke the same dialect and had the same system of organisation as those of Epirus. The evidence for the small tribes is less rich than that for the small tribes of Epirus, probably because wood rather than stone was used for recording decisions in classical and early Hellenistic times. Even so, the evidence of Greek inscriptions of the early Roman Empire is valid for earlier times, because the Macedonians were an unusually conservative people. Inscriptions have recorded decisions by "Orestai" (IG XI. 4. 1118, third century B.C.), by τὸ κοινὸν Ὀρεστῶν (*Ziva Antika* 9 [1959] 163 f., first century A.D.) and by Ἐλημιωτῶν τὸ κοινόν (*Ancient Macedonia* II 130, second century A.D.). Within the association of the Pelagones it appears from inscriptions of the second century A.D. that a cluster of groups were called ἡ τῶν Ἀργεσταιῶν πόλις (*Spomenik* 71 [1931] no. 88) and that one of the units in the cluster was Νεαπολεϊτῶν τὸ κοινόν (*ibid.*, no. 63). Another association, that of the Derriopes, was called δῆμος

<sup>8</sup> For a fuller description see my book, *Migrations and Invasions in Greece and Adjacent Areas* (Park Ridge, NJ 1976) 37–51.

<sup>9</sup> Examples are given in *Epirus* 525–40.

<sup>10</sup> See note 7 above, and add F. Papazoglou in *Historia* 35 (1986) 444.



Δερριόπων in an inscribed poem of the first century A.D. (*Chiron* 18 [1988] 237), and πόλις with πολιτάρχαι (L. A. Heuzey and L. Daumet, *Mission archéologique de Macédoine* [Paris 1876] 315). One of its constituent parts was Στυβερραίων ἡ πόλις (ibid., no. 501), cited as ἡ πόλις (*Chiron*, loc. cit.), another was Δοστωνέων τὸ κοινόν (*Spomenik*, loc. cit., no. 437), and a third part was the "Geneatai" (in Latin in *BCH* 47 [1923] no. 277).<sup>11</sup> In the land of the Lyncestae we hear only of "the villages of Arrhabaeus" in Thucydides' narrative (4. 124. 4 τὰς τοῦ Ἀρραβαίου κώμας); these may have corresponded with the small *koina* farther north.<sup>12</sup> In Orestis two parts of the association are known. An inscription of the second century A.D. from Sisanion mentions a πόλις (the name not surviving) and gives a list of ephebes.<sup>13</sup> An inscription of the same period recorded the decisions of a community called the Battynaioi, referred to as ἡ πολιτεία, with regard to grazing rights and the cutting of stakes (*JHS* 33 [1913] 337 f.); they were evidently a pastoral community.<sup>14</sup> In Elimeotis a decision was recorded κ]ατὰ τὸ δό[ξαν τῇ β]ουλῇ καὶ [τῷ δ]ήμῳ (*AE* [1936] *Chron.* 10); it is evident that the Maleiatae (*vel sim.*) were a small tribal group within the association known as the Elimeotai.

Before we leave Epirus and Upper Macedonia we must consider the form of leadership in these tribal systems. Where ownership of flocks, pasture and timber was communal, it was essential that the leader, namely the elected *tselingas* or *tshelniku*, should have very strong powers of directing the movement and the activity of the "company," and of negotiating on its behalf with other groups and with settled communities. When groups joined together and formed a cluster, one of the group-leaders was elected leader of the cluster, exercised similar powers, and was often succeeded by a member of his family. The common name for such a leader was *basileus*, similar to *phylobasileus* in early Attica. In our area most of the large associations were ruled by men from "native" royal families (Strabo 326 ὑπὸ ἰθαγενῶν ἥρχοντο). But there were notable exceptions. The Molossoi chose Neoptolemus, son of Achilles, and his descendants as their kings; the Chaones stated that their kings were descended from Helenus of Troy; and the Lyncestae elected in the mid-fifth century a descendant of the Bacchiadae of Corinth as their king (Strabo 326). When a "native" was

<sup>11</sup> A stranger at Styberra had the ethnic Δοληνεστής (*Chiron* 18 [1988] 249); he came probably from this region.

<sup>12</sup> For other *komai*, see *HMac* I 89 f.

<sup>13</sup> See *HMac* I 114. Mr. N. D. Ziakas informed me by letter that the stone is still where Leake saw it.

<sup>14</sup> The meaning of political terms in Upper Macedonia may have differed from the meaning in southern Greece. In the inscription from Sisanion the term ἡ πολιτεία seems to mean the citizen body, which met in an ἐκκλησία, according to the inscription of the Battynaioi. In Epirus ἡ πόλις τῶν Χαόνων meant not a city-state but simply "the state" (*PAE* [1952] 298; *Epirus* 593); and in Illyris Sesarethos figured as a *polis* of the Taulantii, again a state rather than a city-state (Hecataeus, *FGrH* I F 103).

elected and the succession was in his family, the tribal group from which he had come was called the royal tribe; and if a newcomer was appointed, he was given the tribal affiliation of the royal tribe.

Because tribal affiliations were important, relationships were expressed in the genealogy of eponyms. Thus the sons of Neoptolemus and Andromache were "Molossos and Pielos and Pergamos, the youngest," and it was from Pielos that the kings of the Molossoi took their origin (Paus. 1. 11. 1-2). Since Pielos was the eponymous ancestor of the Peiales, it is evident that they were the royal tribe within the Molossian association both before and after the election of Neoptolemus. On the other hand, Pergamos was the eponymous ancestor of the Pergamii, a constituent tribe of the Chaones, and it seems that they were the royal tribe in that association; for the tradition was that after the death of Neoptolemus Andromache consorted with Helenus. Associations which had "native" kings were the Parauaioi, the Orestai, the Tymphaioi, the Elimeotai and the Pelagones (Thuc. 2. 80. 6, 2. 99. 2; *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 89; Tzetz. ad Lycophr. 802 for Polyperchon). Great honours were paid to the kings, as we have seen recently in the remarkably fine tombs of the Elimeote kings in the fifth century at Aiiane.

Although the kings had extensive powers, they were constitutionally elected and had to deal with some form of Assembly, as we see from the exchange of oaths between the Molossian king and his Molossians at Passaron (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 5. 2) and from the expulsion of Aeacides by the κοινὸν δόγμα of the Epeirotai (Diod. 19. 36. 4). In the reign of Alexander I, c. 340, there is mention of an Assembly's decision—of the Molossoi or of a constituent tribe—which was recorded at Dodona: ἔδοξε τῷ ἐκκλησίῳ τῶν . . . (*SGDI* 1335; *Epirus* 535). The monarchies of the tribal groups of Upper Macedonia were terminated by Philip II, but the administrative systems continued. Thus honours were paid to "King X, son of King X" by "Orestae" in the third century (*IG* XI. 4. 1118), and during the armistice in 197 the Orestae absconded to join Rome (Plb. 18. 47. 6). Troops were recruited territorially from the cantons of Upper Macedonia, and each canton continued to have its own citizenship, which was controlled by an internal administrative body.<sup>15</sup> Evidence of the meetings and decisions of such bodies survives from the period of the early Roman Empire.

We turn finally to the Macedones. They enter history in the fragment of a poem of Hesiod: "Magnes and Macedon . . . lived round Pieria and Olympus" (fr. 7 M-W). To Hesiod the Magnetes and the Macedones were Greek-speaking, since they were first cousins of Hellen's sons in his genealogy. In 1979 I marshalled the evidence and said the evidence was

<sup>15</sup> For the territorial regiments of infantry, see *Mac State* 163. The citizenship, e.g. of Alexander Lyncestes, has often been misunderstood as indicating that he was a prince of the Lyncestid royal house (e.g. Errington 60, "Abkömmling des lynkestischen Königshauses"). It simply meant that a man was a resident and a citizen of a canton, e.g. Lynceus. See *Mac State* 140 n. 8. See Arr. *An.* 6. 28. 4 and *Ind.* 18. 4-6.

conclusive that Hesiod was correct, and that the Macedones spoke, like the Magnetes, a local form of the Aeolic dialect of Greek. Since then M. Andronikos has unearthed a large number of names of leading Macedonians at Vergina, which lead independently to the certain conclusion that the Macedones of the early fourth century were Greek-speaking.<sup>16</sup> Their dialect differed from that of the tribes of Upper Macedonia; for instance, their magistrates were *πελιγόνες*, whereas those of Upper Macedonia were *πελιγῶνες*. Their dialect remained isolated over some centuries, because the summer pastures of "Pieria and Olympus" were adjacent to the winter pastures of the Pierian coast, whereas shepherds elsewhere had to move their flocks over great distances between the pastures of high Pindus and the lowlands of Epirus and Thessaly.

That the Macedones were an association of pastoral tribes is to be inferred not only from their habitat but also from all their early traditions. As such they had a royal tribe, which was recorded in genealogical form: Macedon had a son Argeas, whose descendants were the "Argeadae" (Steph. Byz. s.v. "Argeou"), and these "Argeadae Macedones," it was said, had come originally from Argos in Orestis (App. Syr. 63 "Ἀργὸς τὸ ἐν Ὀρεστείᾳ, ὅθεν οἱ Ἀργεάδαι Μακεδόνες"). It was this tribe which led the way in the conquest of the area round the river Axios (Strabo 7, fr. 11 and fr. 20), and it was to this tribe that "the Argead kings," whether "native" or adopted, belonged (Paus. 7. 8. 9 and App. Mac. fr. 2). It was incumbent on the Macedonian kings to carry out the traditional sacrifices of this tribe, the "Argeadika" (Ath. 14, 659f), and when a new king was chosen, "let the Macedones with the king celebrate the customary rites for the Argeadae" (PVindob. 31954).<sup>17</sup> Early in the seventh century the Macedones chose a newcomer as king, Perdiccas, a member of the Temenidae, descended from Heracles and rulers of Argos in the Peloponnese; and it was from Perdiccas' line that all kings were chosen down to Alexander IV.<sup>18</sup>

Perdiccas inherited the strong powers of the pastoral leader. He directed the founding of Aegeae at Vergina and the settling of pastoral groups in the Emathian plain, each as a *πόλις*, retaining its own institutions and citizenship. In other conquered areas, such as Eordaea, the pastoral system continued, and the Eordaiοι were a typical association of pastoral tribes with their own administration and citizenship. The Macedones, like the

<sup>16</sup> HMac II 39–54; M. Andronikos, *Vergina: The Royal Tombs* (Athens 1984) 84, who shows the evidence to be "unambivalent." To suppose that the Greek language was adopted from contact with Corinthian colonies, e.g. in the fifth century, by peoples as far inland as Pelagonia is absurd. Errington (13) accepted that the Macedones were Greek-speaking but hesitated about their "nationality" ("die Frage des wirklichen Volkstums . . . kann . . . nicht ausreichend beantwortet werden"). It is difficult to see what criterion other than language distinguished Illyrians and Thracians from the Macedones in the fifth century.

<sup>17</sup> See further in *Mac State* 16 f.

<sup>18</sup> Some still follow Abel's view of 1847 that this dynasty of kings did not come from Argos in the Peloponnese; see *Mac State* 19.

Molossoi, took an oath of loyalty to a new king,<sup>19</sup> and they served as the king's forces (Diod. 18. 16. 1 αἱ βασιλικαὶ δυνάμεις). We are afforded two insights into their status. Thucydides distinguished the Macedones proper, the conquering people, as οἱ Μακεδόνες οὗτοι (2. 99. 6), from the tribes of Upper Macedonia, which were semi-dependent and in a different sense "Macedones" (2. 99. 2).<sup>20</sup> Anaximenes, who was dealing only with the Macedones proper, stated that Alexander (in my opinion Alexander II, c. 369) widened the Royal Companionship, so that it included both the Companion Cavalrymen and the bulk of the infantrymen as Foot-Companions.<sup>21</sup> These men evidently had a higher status than the remainder of the armed forces, which had included, for instance, Greeks resident in the kingdom (Thuc. 4. 124. 1).

That the "Macedones" met often in "Assembly" was noted at the start of Philip's command, and at the time of Alexander's succession (Diod. 16. 3. 1 τοὺς Μακεδόνας ἐν συνεχέσιν ἐκκλησίαις; cf. 16. 4. 3 and 17. 2. 2); and the term for "Assembly" (ἐκκλησία) has political overtones, which are not to be ignored. The number of Macedones was greatly enlarged when Philip incorporated in his kingdom the cantons of Upper Macedonia and brought the elite troops of those cantons into his King's Forces. It was from these Forces that Alexander intended to send 10,000 men home in 324. They were correctly described as "the citizens" (Diod. 17. 109. 1 τῶν πολιτῶν), and it was before they returned home that Antipater found himself short of "citizen soldiers" (Diod. 18. 12. 2 ἐσπάνιζε γὰρ ἡ Μακεδονία στρατιωτῶν πολιτικῶν).

The king continued to deal with the use of conquered land and the distribution of the citizen families of Macedones. Alexander III in 335/4 "gave to Macedones Kalindoia" and other lands, hitherto cultivated by the Bottiaioi, so that the Assembly of Macedones could create a city of "Macedones." Philip V moved "citizen men with their wives and children" from cities of Lower Macedonia to settle on sites in inland Emathia (Plb. 23. 10. 4).<sup>22</sup> For their part the "Macedones" tried and decided all allegations of treason. The king and the Macedones were the two parts of the state. As such they both figured on the dedication for victory at Sellasia in 222: βασιλεὺς Ἀντίγονος βασιλέως Δημητρίου καὶ Μακεδόνες. As a

<sup>19</sup> See *Mac State* 65–67. G. T. Griffith wrote in *HMac* II 386 f. that an oath to a new king "seems established," but he did not develop a case.

<sup>20</sup> The other peoples in this chapter (Pieres, Bottiaei, Eordoi, Almopes, Grestones and Bisaltai) were not then, and never became, "Macedones," although they were subject to the rule of the Macedonian king within Macedonia under Philip II and his successors.

<sup>21</sup> *FGrH* 72 F 4, cited in *HMac* II 706 by G. T. Griffith, who held that the Alexander of the fragment was Alexander the Great. See *Mac State* 98 for my reasons.

<sup>22</sup> The evidence that "Macedones" were an elite group within the Macedonian kingdom is irrefutable. See most recently the inscription from the site of Kalindoia in which the land of the Greek-speaking Bottiaioi in inland Chalcidice was transferred by Alexander in 335/4 to "Macedones." See *CQ* 38 (1988) 386 and M. B. Hatzopoulos, "Bulletin épigraphique," *REG* 101 (1988) 444 ff.



“community” the “Macedones” honoured their king, Philip V, in a dedication at Delos (*IG* XI. 4. 1102):

τὸ κοινὸν Μ[ακε]δόν[ων]  
βασιλέα Φί[λιππον βασιλέως]  
Δημητρίου ἀ[ρετῆς ἔνεκα]  
καὶ εὐνοία[ς Ἀπόλλωνι]

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## The Eminence of Social Justice in Plato

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In this paper I wish to chip away at one of the major received opinions in Platonic scholarship.<sup>1</sup> The orthodoxy which I wish to challenge is that in the *Republic* Plato takes individual or personal justice—the diverse but integrated workings of the parts of the soul—as primary justice or justice pure and simple and takes social justice—an individual's fulfilling his distinctive function in the social division of labor—as a secondary and derivative notion. I shall argue to the contrary that social justice rather than individual justice turns out to be the architectonic principle of the two kinds of justice. A great deal turns on this issue.

For if I am right then Plato is not foreshadowing Aristotle and the whole tradition of agent-oriented ethical theorists, who claim that good actions are to be understood as those which would be performed by the good person—whose goodness must be capable of being defined independently of the acts which he performs. For Plato, the parts-of-the-soul doctrine and in particular justice viewed as psychic harmony is supposed, on this reading, to provide the requisite independent means of assessing the goodness of an agent and so derivatively of his acts.

The view that Plato is such an agent-oriented theorist was first clearly articulated in the closing speculative paragraph of David Sachs' well-known article, "A Fallacy in Plato's *Republic*":

I believe it likely that Plato held that there are allowable exceptions to every moral rule, or virtually every moral rule, of conduct . . . [For Plato,] rules of conduct do not constitute anything essential to morality or justice. This, I believe, was one of the principal motives for his characterization of justice, a characterization not in terms of conduct and relations of persons, but in terms of the relation of parts of the soul.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The paper was read at the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division meetings March 1985 in San Francisco. It is a companion piece to "A Platonic Happiness," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 4 (1987) 131–45.

<sup>2</sup> D. Sachs, "A Fallacy in Plato's *Republic*," in G. Vlastos (ed.), *Plato I* (Garden City, NJ 1971) 50–51. That a philosopher recognizes exceptions to important moral rules, of course, need not propel him into acceptance of an agent-centered theory. All the

This view has been advanced more recently in the writings of Julia Annas.<sup>3</sup> I shall argue to the contrary that Plato advances an act-oriented ethical theory, in which the goodness of an action is determined independently of the motives, intentions, or even virtues of its agent. I shall advance this view in two ways. First, I will show that Plato's analogy between the parts of the city and the parts of the soul leads to irresolvable paradox if individual justice is taken as primary justice, paradox that can be handsomely resolved if social justice is taken as paramount. Second, I argue that the alleged proof text of the orthodox—*Republic* 4, 443c–44a—does not require the interpretation it has traditionally been assigned.

\* \* \*

The orthodox view that the just society consists of individuals all with similarly diversified and integrated souls places Plato in serious difficulty. For Plato has a problem if he *both* wishes to claim that everyone in the Platonically just state has some one social function which is accounted for by the type of soul which the individual has *and also* wishes to claim that everyone in the Platonically just state is just in such a way that all three parts of the soul of each individual are diversified and integrated in the same way from individual to individual. If Plato is claiming that the state is just and integrated and that the individual is just and integrated in both cases as being a harmony of diverse parts, he backs himself into the paradox that the state will be just only if the individuals are not (for social distinctness demands distinctiveness of psychic kinds) and all the citizens will be just only when the state is not (for if every soul has the same kind of parts in the same relations, so as to be balanced, there will be in the state no division of labor based on diverse soul-types).<sup>4</sup>

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philosopher need do is to recognize some *hierarchy* of rules and principles. The structure of principles would then explain when one rule overrides or trumps another, thus incorporating exceptions to lower-ranking rules into a system of morality. The central books of the *Republic* and the discussion of the Form of the good clearly show that Plato thought ethical principles form a hierarchy. Further, he clearly thought he could incorporate into a system of justice the exceptions which Sachs has centrally in mind (justified lying, and the failure to return "owed" goods). For Plato devotes large stretches of argument to the issue of when and to whom one may or should lie and to the issues of proper private ownership and distributive justice.

<sup>3</sup> J. Annas, "Plato and Common Morality," *CQ* 28 (1978) 437–51 and *An Introduction to Plato's Republic* (Oxford 1981) 157–69.

<sup>4</sup> When Plato speaks of psychic "harmony" (e.g., 443d5) he does not mean harmony in the sense of a musical *chord* or arrangement of chords, rather he is referring to the *tuning* of an instrument (see Plato's extended discussion of psychic harmony at *Phaedo* 92a–95a). Harmonies in the former sense may, of course, be very various, but in the latter sense there can be but one harmony between instruments of the same type that are to play together.

Through most of the *Republic* Plato studiously avoids confronting this paradox, which results from viewing the good individual and the good state as strictly parallel in structure.<sup>5</sup> Even through most of Books 8 and 9, Plato formally maintains the soul/state parallelism with the structures of unjust individuals paralleling exactly the structures of unjust states. Finally, and significantly, right at the end of Book 9, Plato gives us the equipment we need to resolve the paradox.

I suggest that Plato's way out of the paradox is to hold that social justice is the architectonic ordering principle of individual justice, that an individual's psychic parts are distinct yet balanced only as the result of his holding his position in the Platonically just, functionally diversified state. The individual's internal balancing is a balancing that occurs as the result of external forces provided from the Platonically diversified state; indeed, social functions viewed as external forces are constitutive of the integration and harmony of the state. The relation of individual balance and state diversification is to be understood, I suggest, along the lines of the following medical analogy.

Imagine an individual who is diseased, say, by leukemia or some other similar form of cancer, in such a way that one part of the body is manifesting an unlimited propensity to proliferate at the expense of other essential body parts and that this is occurring because some other part of the body, say the body's natural immune system, is underdeveloped and so is not keeping in check the propensity of the disease-causing part to proliferate, with the result that the totality of bodily functions is thrown wildly out of kilter. Now, the bodily parts can be brought back into balance by external forces, say, through injections of compensatory bodies, irradiation, or drugs, all of which enhance or supplement the body's weak immune system and so make the immune system effective in ways it could not be on its own (for Plato's analogous views on bodily cures, see *Timaeus* 89a-d). Thus the body could be said to come to be in balance again, but *only* as the result of external forces which are able to come into play just exactly because the external world is not homogeneous, but rather is functionally differentiated, having ready repositories of medicine and medical knowledge.

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The paradox, then, cannot be resolved by claiming that Plato is thinking of individuals differing as chords differ. In any case, given the components of the Platonic soul, especially the appetites and ambition with their propensities to excess, there can be only one right combination of them. Other combinations are not chords but discords: the various unjust souls of Books 8-9 (e.g., 554d9).

<sup>5</sup> Bernard Williams has shown that to maintain strict soul/state parallelism Plato must go to the extreme of performing a number of intellectual sleights of hand, "The Analogy of City and Soul in Plato's *Republic*," in E. N. Lee, et al. (edd.), *Exegesis and Argument*, *Phronesis* Suppl. 1 (Assen 1973) 196-206.



The parts of the soul and their relation to the external world are, I suggest, very much like this for Plato. The lowest part of the soul is an unlimited appetite with a propensity to take over and completely disrupt the functions of the other parts of the soul (for the appetites as boundless and insatiable, see 442a, 555b, 562b, 586b, 590b, 604d; and as always tending to disruption, see 577c–e, 579c–e, cf. *Philebus* 63d–e). The intelligence which keeps these passions and appetites in check and so in balance is not equally or sufficiently the possession of every man. Therefore, if every man were to use only his own resources in balancing his soul, the Platonic state would be impossible; rather we would have the chaotic flux of the democratic state, in which the very possibility of diversified yet integrated functions is destroyed (562b–64c; n.b. the disease metaphors in 563e, 564b–c). Plato gives us the remedy for this situation as the final substantive point which is made in the main sequence of Books (2–9). Plato claims that in the Platonically just state the majority of citizens will be enslaved to the wisdom of the philosopher (590c), and continues:

It is best that an individual should have divine intelligence within himself, but if he has not, then it must be *imposed from outside*, so that as far as possible we should be all *alike* and friendly, since governed by the same principle. (590d3–6)

When finally here Plato briefly sketches what “rubbing together” individual and social justice would look like—the project entertained at 434e–35a—we find that the integration of the diversified parts of the individual soul is dependent upon and results from the individual’s position in the *state’s* division of labor. That all individuals are “alike,” are equally, individually just and balanced, is the result of the relations of the individual to other parts of the state, rather than the result of the workings of the individual’s parts *in themselves*. Thus Plato resolves the paradox of the strict parallelism of individual and state by claiming that the balance within the individual is the relational result of external forces which are made possible by individuals having different types of souls which in and of themselves have psychic functions which are *not* in balance. The derivative, relational balance of the individual occurs as the result of balanced diversity in the state. The balanced diversity of the state is the result of the imbalance of psychic functions in individuals. This imbalance of the individual holds even for the philosopher, who *qua* philosopher no longer exercises as he did in youth (537b, 539d) and so has an attendant atrophying of the middle part of the soul (410b, e) requiring balancing in the state by others (519c–20c). In this way it finally turns out that social justice is the architectonic principle for individual justice. Parts of an individual’s soul fulfill their functions in major part because the functions are enhanced by external forces provided from the functionally diverse state.

Usually, however, just the opposite is claimed. The critical tradition holds that primary justice for Plato is an attribute of the relations of the

parts of the soul and that social justice is somehow derivative upon this personal justice. This position is generally thought to be unequivocally stated near the close of Book 4, in a highly compressed and turbid passage, 443c–44a. I will suggest that this passage makes no such claim and is committed to no more than the soul/state parallelism so far discussed. The purpose of the passage, I claim, is simply to establish the surprising result that there *is* a sense of justice that can be applied to an individual in isolation. It is not the purpose of the passage, along the way, to deny that social justice, the fulfilling of social functions, also really is justice.<sup>6</sup>

When in the passage 443c–44a Plato denies that justice lies in a man's external affairs or in concerns extrinsic to his proper self (τὴν ἔξω πρᾶξιν τῶν αὐτοῦ 443c10), he does not mean, I suggest, for social functions to fall under the description "extrinsic concerns." Plato has just claimed that all along he has been maintaining that fulfilling social functions is a principle and mold of justice (ἀρχὴν τε καὶ τύπον) and now he reaffirms that this is in fact true (443c1, 9). Rather, the extrinsic concerns which are denied the status of proper loci of justice are things like the acquisition of wealth, the care of the body, politics, and contract making. These are immediately catalogued (443e3–4). The denial that these are an independent source of moral and social concern is important. For it was these things which formed the proper concerns of justice for all of Socrates' interlocutors. The whole passage harks back to the long discussion earlier in Book 4 on the status of wealth, contracts, and law at 422a–27a, where it was also denied that these concerns constitute proper arenas of justice.

The two passages vary as follows. The later (443) claims that the proper disposition (ἔξις 443e6) of the parts of the soul is a chief and necessary *means* by which we achieve what is appropriate in regard to our extrinsic concerns. For the proper relations of soul parts, especially the repression of the insatiable appetites, keep one from naturally running off to excess in *whatever* course of action one takes with regard to money, the body, and day-to-day relations with others. Thus, this passage bears the burden of establishing that the Platonically just man will also be just as that notion is commonly understood. Thus the passage continues the point of 442e–43a: The man who has his aggressive appetites under control will not rape, steal, or cheat. But the mere correct balance of soul parts does not establish—how could it?—the determinately correct course of action with regard to sexual relations, wealth, and contracts. Knowing the (often open-ended) extremes of which we are capable, and towards which our appetites propel us, does not tell us how we ought determinately to act in regard to acquisitions, contracts, and other day-to-day affairs.

<sup>6</sup> The phrase ὡς ἀληθῶς (443d1), which posits a personal dimension of justice, should be seen as balancing, not superseding, the phrase τὸ ἀληθές (443c9), which re-affirms proper social functioning as justice.

For Plato—and this is the point of the earlier passage (422–27)—our social functions establish what our *ends* are to be regarding money making, care of the body, and dealings with others, and determine what positive form these activities are to take. In Book 5 this establishment of *ends* by reference to social functions is extended even to cover familial and sexual relations. Considerations of wealth, politics, civil law, and contracts all are derivative from and take their proper form from the way in which they can best serve in establishing Platonic social justice—each person's fulfilling his proper task. How much money we have, with whom we have dealings, and the like are all governed and molded by our social tasks; our social tasks are not governed and molded by them. This is the reason Plato wishes to deny that justice is primarily concerned with affairs extrinsic to one's proper self.

Now, for an individual to fulfill his social function and to order correctly his derivative civil affairs, his soul cannot be in a chaotic state. Further, if he is to be able to carry out his function, he must be the subject of certain basic forms of consideration from others, or at least non-interference in his affairs on the part of others. An individual cannot carry out his social function in a social climate where rape, murder, cheating, and theft are rife in the land. Therefore, if an individual is to possess a social function, it is necessary not only that his own soul possess individual justice but that the souls of others also possess individual justice. The parts of everyone's soul must be distinct and must not meddle with each other and so manifest individual justice, if social justice is to be possible throughout the state.

The purpose of our passage (443) then is to complete the discussion started earlier in Book 4 of the way in which the common arenas of justice are subordinately incorporated into the Platonic state. The purpose of the passage is not to dislodge social justice as a principle of justice but to establish individual justice as one.

This purpose is sufficient to explain the rhetorical exuberance of the passage. No reader uninitiated in Platonic ethics would suppose that it makes sense to say that an individual in isolation could be just. It would seem that unlike, say, bravery and prudence, which may be either social or purely personal in their locus and effect, justice is a virtue which must be social in its arena. It deals essentially with our relations with others. Indeed it is typically taken to be synonymous with social virtue. So Plato's claim that there *is* a sense in which it is appropriate to say that an individual even by himself is just is quite revolutionary when set against the background of common opinion. But it is revolutionary (or at least revisionary) even set against the language of justice which Plato himself has been developing heretofore in the *Republic*.

Even as late as 443b2 the phrase "the things proper to oneself" (τὰ αὐτοῦ) was being used, as it had been since Book 2 (370a ff.), as a stand-in or paraphrasis for "function." The phrase describes, quite generally,

something that a discrete, unified entity performs. Indeed, the possession and performance of what is peculiar and proper to oneself (ἡ τοῦ οἰκείου τε καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕξις τε καὶ πρᾶξις) was given as the *definition* of social justice at 433e12–34a1. But suddenly at the end of Book 4, this well-established vocabulary of “things appropriate and peculiar to oneself” is used without prior warning to define not the operations of a unified self, but (rather surprisingly) the *parts* of the self (τὰ οἰκεῖα 443d3, certainly; τῶν αὐτοῦ c10 and ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ d1, probably).<sup>7</sup> It is therefore not surprising that Plato draws attention to this shift in usage and claims that the new use of the vocabulary is legitimate in the new context. He does this by saying that the parts of the soul “really” and “truly” (τῷ ὄντι 443d3, ὡς ἀληθῶς d1) are things proper and distinctive to an individual. But this is not to say that all other dimensions of justice are sham, derivative, or in some other sense less than real.<sup>8</sup> To say that one type of thing is truly F is not to deny that other types of things are also truly F. Further, it is perfectly natural in ordinary discourse to use “truly” and “really” to describe unexpected discoveries or surprising turns of events. It is in this sense that Plato’s use of the terms in this passage is even to be expected, since he describes the unanticipated discovery that there really is a sense in which an individual thought of in isolation can be just and wishes to signal the surprising malleability of the language of justice. But we must not mistake the justified rhetorical exuberance of the passage for more than what it is. Plato is not throwing out or even demoting his social conception of justice. *Republic* 443 is not, then, the star passage for those who wish to claim that for Plato justice per se is individual justice. But the orthodox have nowhere else to turn in the *Republic* to establish their position. I suggest that they should begin to doubt it.

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<sup>7</sup> I think it possible that these phrases at 443c10, d1 are vague in scope and are not simply extensionally equivalent to the later expression τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένη, 443d3.

<sup>8</sup> When at 443c4 Plato calls social justice an “image,” he is not thereby giving it a status inferior to that of individual justice or claiming that individual justice is the original of which social justice is an image—something he might easily have said if he were so inclined. Rather Plato is contrasting social justice with a third sort of justice which is in both the just man and the just state (444a4–5). The claim that the definition of social justice is an image is simply part of the general acknowledgment throughout Books 2–4, 8–9 that the definitions of the virtues (and indeed all of these Books’ substantive moral claims) are tentative hypotheses, which in the terminology of the central Books are dream-images of eternal certainties (533b–c). Even the doctrine of the tripartite soul is viewed as tentative (435c–d). And at 506d the *individual* virtues (504a) are said to have been discussed as the Idea of good will be, that is, through images and likenesses. For both social and individual justice as tentatively understood when compared to some third more fundamental form of justice (probably the Idea of justice is intended), see 543d–44a.





## Combing and Curling: *Orator Summus Plato*<sup>1</sup>

HELEN F. NORTH

The title of this talk may recall the subjects taught in the school attended by the Mock Turtle in *Alice in Wonderland*: reeling and writhing and fainting in coils, but actually the first part (combing and curling) comes from quite a well-known passage in the treatise by the Greek critic, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Composition*, and the second from Cicero, in *De Oratore*.

Dionysius was one of that influential group of Greek men of letters—teachers of rhetoric, literary critics—who settled in Rome in the age of Augustus and provided guidance in the advanced study of Greek literature for rich and cultivated Romans, often men with political ambitions. Most of them regarded Demosthenes as the supreme master of oratorical style: They found in him the ultimate exemplar of what they called *deinotēs* (awe-inspiring intensity)—ever the most admired trait in oratory of the grand style. But they discussed and analyzed in minute detail passages from many other authors as well, and one of them was Plato. In Chapter 25 of the treatise *On Composition* Dionysius comments on the tremendous care that Plato devoted to securing the most effective arrangement of words. Even at the age of 80 he was still “combing and curling his dialogues and braiding them in every way” (τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ διαλόγους κτενίζων καὶ βοστρυχίζων καὶ πάντα τρόπον ἀναπλέκων).

There follows the famous story about the notebook found among Plato's effects when he died: It contained many different arrangements of the first sentence of the *Republic*. It is not certain whether it was only the first eight words (κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος) that Plato kept combing and curling, or the whole sentence (up to νῦν πρῶτον ἄγοντες). Quintilian, who also knows the story, seems to imply that it was only the first four words (κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ, 8. 6. 64), which would be even more remarkable. Both ancient and modern critics have been fascinated by what Dionysius rightly calls Plato's *philoponia* (love of labor) in reworking this passage. Demetrius, perhaps a

<sup>1</sup> Apart from supplying references, I have made only minimal changes in this lecture, which I had the honor of delivering on March 22, 1989 at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, as part of a memorial to Friedrich Solmsen, revered teacher and friend for more than forty years.

contemporary of Dionysius, in his treatise *On Style* (c. 21) analyzes the entire sentence (as far as ἄγοντες) and comments on the studied ease and relaxation of the period that he finds there, while J. D. Denniston, in *Greek Prose Style*, provides an enlightening discussion of the first eight words, suggesting some of the reasons for their extraordinary felicity. ("The effect may seem due to accident"—he says—"but such accidents do not befall inferior writers.")<sup>2</sup>

I chose the quotation from Dionysius to emphasize an aspect of Plato's achievement that exerted tremendous influence in antiquity, yet has received comparatively little notice in our own time, compared, that is, with the amount of attention devoted by modern scholarship to his dialectic, his theory of Forms, his concept of love, of the ideal state, of education, and so on. I mean his rhetoric. The scrupulous, unremitting attention to word-placement, which caught the attention of Dionysius, is but one result of Plato's upbringing in the Athenian world of the last quarter of the fifth century, dominated intellectually by the Sophists and incurably infected by sophistic rhetoric. The ancient critics recognized Plato as a product of this revolutionary movement, and this is why Cicero says in *De Oratore* that, in spite of making fun of the orators, Plato seemed himself to be the *orator summus*, the consummate orator (1. 47): *in oratoribus irridendis ipse esse orator summus videbatur*.

To be sure, one phase of Plato's relation to rhetoric has always received more than adequate attention (as it does in the passage from Cicero just quoted): his hostility, most systematically and fully expressed in the *Gorgias* and the *Phaedrus*, but prominent in many other dialogues as well, from the *Apology* with its ostentatious rejection of the sophistic kind of *deinotēs*, through the *Menexenus*, that devastating parody of the standard funeral oration, and the *Symposium*, with its merciless imitation of Agathon's Gorgianic style, to the *Theaetetus*, which contains a vivid contrast between the forensic advocate and the philosopher, highly derogatory, of course, to the advocate.

The reasons for Plato's opposition to sophistic rhetoric are too well known and often rehearsed to warrant extensive analysis here.<sup>3</sup> Let me just recall that it was not only the perverse influence wielded by rhetoric on both politics and the ethics of the individual that aroused Plato's hostility. Even more basic was the fact that sophistic rhetoric took the side of appearance in the conflict between appearance and reality that lay behind much of the Socratic-Platonic philosophy. Rhetoric, as it was developed in the late fifth century and practiced in the early fourth, was concerned, not with knowledge, but with the appearance of knowledge. It did not care for truth,

<sup>2</sup> *Greek Prose Style* (Oxford 1952) 41.

<sup>3</sup> This subject is discussed at greater length in North, "Swimming Upside Down in the Wrong Direction: Plato's Criticism of Sophistic Rhetoric on Technical and Stylistic Grounds," *Traditio* 32 (1976) 11-29. I quote from pp. 11-12 in slightly altered form.

only for what was probable or persuasive. To seem, rather than to be, was its goal. This indifference to truth for its own sake led sophistic rhetoric to a position of neutrality about moral values. It sought to please and gratify its audience, with a view to winning victories and scoring points, not to arrive at an understanding of the Good, certainly not to leave its hearers better than it found them. Success and power constituted the goal of sophistic rhetoric; these were, after all, the reasons why students flocked to the Sophists in the first place. As a consequence of these two characteristics—being indifferent to truth and aiming at gratification—yet a third grievous flaw emerged: Rhetoric used modes of persuasion repugnant to the philosopher, appealing to the emotions rather than to the intellect. Hence Plato was bound to oppose it on the same grounds as imitative poetry in the *Republic*: It encouraged the domination of the lower faculties of the soul over the higher. Such poetry is in fact a form of rhetoric addressed to a mob, Plato tells us in the *Republic* (604e5). Hence both poetry and rhetoric invite the same condemnation, and for the same reasons.

The arguments against sophistic rhetoric are set forth at greatest length in the *Gorgias*, and it is fascinating to see how long they survived, supplying the ammunition used by philosophers in the intermittent warfare against rhetoric that broke out with new vehemence when the Romans appeared on the horizon—those rich and powerful barbarians, eager to be hellenized in certain limited ways, and willing to pay for the process. The rhetoricians of course devised counter-arguments, which were in their turn canonized. We may estimate the seriousness with which Plato's polemic continued to be taken nearly five centuries after the *Gorgias* by the zeal with which Aelius Aristides, a representative of the Second Sophistic, responded to the Platonic attack in two long treatises written close to the middle of the second century of our era. One treatise was a defence of rhetoric itself, the other a defence of the four statesmen whom Plato had denounced in the *Gorgias* for leaving Athens worse than they had found her. Yet at the conclusion of the first treatise, Aristides admits that Plato is the father and teacher of orators,<sup>4</sup> and it is the positive aspect of Plato's love-hate relation to rhetoric that I wish to pursue, not the negative.

The mention of Gorgias, the greatest of the sophistic rhetoricians of the first generation, reminds me that by a curious coincidence Plato was born (according to the best tradition) in the very year in which Gorgias paid his first, famous visit to Athens, 428/7 B.C. If the two events did indeed coincide, it follows that the most vigorous and effective enemy of sophistic rhetoric embarked on what was to be a long lifetime (Plato lived to be 80) just as the greatest champion of that rhetoric, already half-way through an even longer life (108 years), appeared on the scene of some of his most glittering triumphs.

<sup>4</sup> Aristides 2. 465 Behr. For the dates of the two *Defences* consult C. A. Behr, *P. Aelius Aristides. The Complete Works I* (Leiden 1986) 449, 460.



The impact of Gorgias, Protagoras, and the rest of that first group of Sophists on Athenian intellectual, political, and cultural life in the next two decades is fully documented in the literature of the period. It would have been quite impossible for Plato to escape exposure to the technical devices introduced or popularized by the Sophists (any more than their moral and political views), and his *Dialogues* are full of evidence that he did not, in fact, escape. We know very little about Plato's education. Neither the *Dialogues* nor the *Epistles* contain direct references to his schooling. The names of his music teacher, his wrestling teacher, and the man who taught him grammar survive in various anecdotes,<sup>5</sup> but there is never a word about any training in rhetoric. We know, of course, Plato's social position in Athens, and we can guess what opportunities he would have had. His father, who traced his descent from the mythical kings of Athens, died when Plato was a child, and his mother (a descendant of Solon) married as her second husband a man who was a close friend and supporter of Pericles. (He was, in fact, the father of Demos, said to be the *erōmenos* of Callicles in the *Gorgias*.) A boy of Plato's connections would have heard and seen, at close range, whatever went on in Athenian political life in the turbulent years that followed the Sicilian disaster of 415: the fall of the democracy, the rise and fall of the Four Hundred and then the Thirty Tyrants, the trial of Antiphon, the overthrow of Theramenes, the return and second departure of Alcibiades. During these formative years Plato obviously absorbed the rhetorical techniques that were being adapted, not only to the needs of the lawcourts and the public assemblies, but also to those of the tragic and comic theatre. His friendship with Socrates would have given his life a specific orientation; it would not have wiped out what he had observed all about him during the years when he was growing up. So it is only to be expected that the *Dialogues* are richly, endlessly rhetorical, owing so much of their form to the strategies perfected by the Sophists that it may even be said that without rhetoric there would have been no *Dialogues* as we know them, no Plato, in fact—certainly no Platonic Socrates.

Let us consider a few of the ways in which Plato is revealed as the heir of sophistic rhetoric. First and most obvious is his extensive use of formal orations in the *Dialogues*. Plato is in fact a logographer (a writer of speeches for others to deliver) of the first rank. For variety, range, mastery of all the available means of persuasion (in Aristotelian terms *ēthos*, *pathos*, *logos*) he has no equal. It is, from one point of view, a pity that he was deflected from his early ambition to be a statesman, because an orator greater than Pericles may have been lost when Plato turned away from active politics and took shelter under that famous wall (*Rep.* 6, 496).

What is probably the single, best-known dialogue of Plato is not a dialogue at all, but a pseudo-forensic oration, the *Apology of Socrates*.

<sup>5</sup> See Alice Swift Riginos, *Platonica: The Anecdotes Concerning the Life and Writings of Plato* (Leiden 1976) 39–51.

Realizing as we must that there is no compelling proof that Socrates made any speech whatsoever at his trial, and that if he made a speech there is no reason to believe it was anything like this, we should recognize the strong pressures that led Plato to choose precisely this form for his vindication, not so much of Socrates, as of the philosophic life. The tension between the familiar form of the courtroom oration, well known to us from the Attic orators, and the substance that Plato embodies in this form is so dynamic as to make the *Apology* the most successful, as it is the most thorough, of all his adaptations of rhetorical forms. But other dialogues are almost as profoundly indebted. The *Menexenus* and the *Symposium*, in their very different ways, both depend on Plato's sovereign mastery of the form and the topics of, respectively, the funeral oration and the encomium, just as the *Phaedrus* is what it is because Plato can manipulate the paradoxical encomium with the most dazzling virtuosity.

Some readers, I suspect, fail to notice how skillfully Plato exploits the possibilities of formal oratory within a dialogue. No one, to be sure, is likely to miss the way he focuses attention on the series of speeches in the *Symposium*, adapts each speech to the speaker, organizes the whole set in irreversible order, and relates them to the dominant image of the ladder, culminating apparently in the speech of Diotima, but actually in that of Alcibiades. Yet in the *Gorgias*, for example, Plato leads so unobtrusively into the great speech of Callicles in praise of the life of ruthless ambition that few, I imagine, think of it in terms of oratory. (Certainly few modern commentators do justice to its rhetorical skill.)<sup>6</sup> But from the very start Plato gives us clues to what he is doing, as Callicles begins with an accusation typical of rejoinders in the Assembly, a charge that his opponent is babbling like a demagogue. The eloquence of his argument for the rule of the strong is due in large measure to his employment of time-honored rhetorical devices: quotations and interpretations of poetry, rhetorical questions, and a great variety of figures, including parallel structure, climax, and polysyndeton. The sentence about the revolt of the man who is by nature strong (484a) is especially instructive in its deployment of such devices, and it was this passage, E. R. Dodds suggests,<sup>7</sup> that inspired Nietzsche.

An instance of even more unobtrusive borrowing from the techniques of the courtroom occurs at the outset of *Republic* 5, where Plato introduces Socrates' discussion of the community of wives with what amounts to the standard topics of the proem, split between Glaucon and Socrates in such a way that the resemblance to oratory is disguised, yet the devices for arousing interest, disclaiming expert knowledge, and winning favor are all effectively manipulated (449d-51c). The adaptation of oratorical conventions to the dialogue-form was one of Plato's most brilliant discoveries, especially

<sup>6</sup> But E. R. Dodds, *Plato. Gorgias* (Oxford 1959) 267, comments on the "superb rhetorical vigour" of 483c7-84c3.

<sup>7</sup> Dodds (previous note) 389

evident in the *Gorgias*, *Republic*, *Symposium*, and *Phaedrus*. Whenever realistic dialogue is abandoned, rhetorical elements make an entirely different contribution, as can be seen in the last of Plato's works.

The *Laws* resorts unashamed to the manner of a treatise, and at moments of heightened intensity needs a change of pace, which is regularly secured through the introduction of oratory or oratorical devices. But even here the use of oratory has a function much more organic than mere stylistic variation. The Address to the Settlers in the new city to be founded on Crete (715e–18c) is a case in point. It constitutes a model of the persuasive proem that the Athenian Stranger (who replaces Socrates in this final dialogue) recommends for all the important laws of the new *politeia*. The ideal situation (he says) would be one in which the citizens would be extremely easy to persuade in the direction of virtue (718c), and the proem to any legal code should help make them more docile and well-disposed (723a, cf. 718d). These, of course, are the traditional functions of the proem according to standard rhetorical doctrine.<sup>8</sup> The Stranger gives examples of legislation that merely states the law and specifies the penalty, and the same legislation when equipped with a persuasive proem, and then goes on to formulate a long and elaborate proem to the entire legal code, while admitting that everything that has been said up to this point (Books 1, 2, and 3) has in fact been a kind of gigantic proem. The Address to the Settlers itself is essentially a homily, dealing with the most lofty subjects (the nature of God, the relation of man to God, the political consequences of piety and impiety), and it accurately forecasts the religious context of the ideal state.

But beyond the obvious use of formal oratory of various types, Plato's dialogues abound in rhetorical techniques that enrich and give form to the expression of his thought. Consider his mastery of *ēthos*, *pathos*, and *logos*, the three Aristotelian modes of persuasion that I have already mentioned. *Logos* (argumentation) we may take for granted in the development of the dialogue form, but the other two are deployed in ways that now seem obvious only because we are so familiar with what Plato achieves by their use. *Ethos* (characterization) and *pathos* (emotional appeal) are ideally combined in the persona of Socrates, nowhere more effectively than in the *Apology*, where in a heightened manner they perform the functions that *ēthos* and *pathos* normally do in any courtroom speech for the defence. But these essentially rhetorical methods of gaining assent continue to appear in non-oratorical contexts. The very existence of the Socrates who has dominated the history of ethics testifies to the rhetorical genius of Plato, for the *ēthos* established in the *Apology*, the *Crito*, and the *Phaedo* is responsible for the *pathos* that so moves us in these works and directs our response to the drama of Socrates' death.

<sup>8</sup> Consult H. Caplan on the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 1. 4. 6 for the history of this doctrine both before and after Aristotle. See also Quintilian 4. 1. 5.



Neither *ēthos* nor *pathos* was invented by the rhetoricians, to be sure, but it was they who systematized what had long been practiced in poetry and was now being refined and defined for the benefit of the orators. We know that Thrasymachus, the rhetor who speaks so forcefully in Book 1 of the *Republic*, worked out ways of appealing to the emotions, especially pity,<sup>9</sup> and while we cannot so easily identify the one who took the first steps in establishing the doctrine of *ēthos*, we need not doubt that the subject was discussed among professionals. Aristotle tells us as much in the *Rhetoric*, when he responds both to those who denied that *ēthos* was of any importance to the orator, and to those who thought it was indeed important but could best be secured by means outside the speech itself (1. 2. 4–7, 1356a1–27). Aristotle's own requirement (that *ēthos* develop within the oration) would have been more than adequately satisfied by the procedure used in the *Apology*. There Plato's achievement is particularly worth studying because of the ambiguity of his task, an ambiguity derived from his twofold audience, the members of the jury supposedly being addressed by Socrates and the readers of the *Apology* from that day to this. Because of the historical fact that Socrates was condemned to death, Plato was obliged to design a speech that would make this outcome comprehensible. Hence the apparent arrogance evinced by Socrates at certain points in his defence, an attitude that would inevitably have antagonized a jury (as it does many undergraduates to this day). Because Plato was using the trial to demonstrate the supreme value of the philosophical life, the speech had to reveal a character that would win the admiration of thoughtful readers. It is the readers who really matter, and the *ēthos* of the Platonic Socrates demonstrated in this speech is designed for its effect on them.<sup>10</sup>

Another obvious debt is related to oratorical structure. The sophistic rhetors usually organized their teaching around the concept of the "parts of the oration," and while this approach ultimately proved less satisfactory than the Peripatetic focus on the functions of the orator (known in Latin as the *officia oratoris*)—invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery—it did provide the novice speaker with specific, detailed guidance in shaping his proem and his epilogue and all that stretched between. Plato was thoroughly familiar with the stereotypes, and he uses them with consummate skill, as when at the beginning of the *Apology* he simultaneously derides and exploits the cliché about being inexperienced in speaking, most overworked of all the topics of the proem. Adapting this cliché, he makes Socrates protest his inexperience in the courtroom and at

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Plato, *Phaedrus* 267c–d.

<sup>10</sup> For a comparison to the challenge faced by Euripides, when he wrote Hippolytus' speech in his own defence before Theseus, see North, "Socrates Deinos Legein," in *Language and the Tragic Hero: Essays on Greek Tragedy in Honor of Gordon M. Kirkwood*, ed. P. Pucci (Atlanta 1988) 121–30. The portrayal of Socrates as the philosophic hero is analyzed by E. Wolff, *Platons Apologie* (Berlin 1929). See also R. L. Fowler, "The Rhetoric of Desperation," *HSCP* 91 (1987) 5–38.



the same time redefine the supreme oratorical quality of *deinotēs* as "to speak the truth" (17a). The reader follows the paradoxical development of this definition throughout the speech and ultimately realizes that under the guise of the well-worn assertion of *apeiria* (inexperience) Plato has served notice that his Socrates both rejects the values common to the Athenians and gives a new meaning to their accepted vocabulary.

Still another example of Plato's exploitation of familiar sophistic techniques appears in the speech assigned to Agathon in the *Symposium*, where the Gorgianic style of the speaker is parodied and the topic of the cardinal virtues as the basis of encomium is treated in a perverse and sophistic manner.<sup>11</sup> In both ways—by the parody of sophistic style and by the exposure of sophistic thinking—he reveals Agathon's eulogy of Eros to be seriously flawed.

Most of what I have said so far applies to the dialogues in which long, connected speeches play a prominent part. But Plato's debt to rhetoric is equally pervasive, if less immediately obvious, in the non-oratorical dialogues. It would probably go too far to claim that Plato owes to rhetoric the very texture of his style, for Plato's style draws upon many sources—Ionian philosophy and poetry to name two that stand out—yet much of what makes his dialogues memorable, much of what enables his thought to find persuasive expression, springs from the devices, the figures, the elements of style worked out by sophistic rhetoricians. The figures that we associate with Gorgias (antithesis, isocolon, parison, homoeoteleuton) were not, of course, invented by him; every one of them can be identified in pre-Gorgianic prose, and before that in poetry. But Gorgias refined and systematized the figures and inspired his students, such as Polus and Antisthenes, to write treatises "On Style," which carried into the second generation of sophistic rhetoricians the interest in elegance of diction and figurative language that constitutes an enduring legacy of rhetoric to the development of Greek prose.

Plato by no means confines himself to the Gorgianic figures, although it is amusing to see how frequently he is reproached by ancient critics for excessive Gorgianisms. His ability to mould a style capable of conveying a vast range of ideas (a style that with equal effectiveness encompasses all the gradations from the plain to the grand—and there are many more than three gradations) and his ability to fit the style both to the speaker in a given dialogue and to the subject under discussion, these twin abilities derive from his mastery of a multitude of rhetorical devices (figures of thought and figures of diction), his penetration into the mysteries of *ēthos* and *pathos*, and ultimately his sure grasp of the principle of the *prepon* (what is appropriate). This basic *virtus dicendi* enabled him to organize and adorn in the most effective way what his powers of *inventio* had produced.

<sup>11</sup> For a more detailed analysis of Agathon's speech as a parody of Gorgias, see North (above, note 3) 19–20.

One way to test this statement is to read the *Phaedrus*, both for its doctrine and for the way that doctrine is expressed. What I have in mind, very briefly, is (1) the emphasis on the *prepon* and its synonyms in Socrates' criticism of Lysias' speech as lacking in *anankē logographikē* (264b), a term immediately explicated as the organization of a discourse like a living thing, whose middle and extremities are suited to one another (*πρέποντα ἀλλήλοις*), (2) his praise of his own two speeches as demonstrating the principle of definition, which leads to clarity and self-consistency (*τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ὁμολογούμενον* 265d), (3) his comparison of a genuine art of rhetoric to the genuine art of tragedy, which consists of the appropriate integration (*πρέπουσαν σύστασιν*) of dramatic speeches so that they are in harmony (*συνισταμένην*) with one another and with the whole (268d), (4) his insistence that one who practices the truly rhetorical and persuasive art must adapt speeches to souls out of a knowledge of which arguments will be persuasive to which souls (271b), (5) his comprehensive recapitulation in which he requires a recognition of the *kairos*, the appropriate moment for speech or silence, for one kind of speech or another, and finally (6) his consideration of *euprepeia* and *aprepeia* in writing, as well as in speaking (274b). These passages demonstrate Plato's exquisite sensitivity to the *prepon* as a fundamental principle of discourse. The doctrine is present throughout the *Phaedrus*, not merely as a theory emphasized in the rhetorical section, but as the underlying justification for the variety of styles employed in the earlier, dramatic and mythological parts.

If I may turn from style to a particular topic closely identified with rhetoric in its political context—one that justifies the Sophists' concern for the techniques of deliberative, as well as forensic and epideictic oratory—let me mention the orator-statesman, normally called a *rhētor* in Athenian usage,<sup>12</sup> but for Plato more often a *politikos*. Plato's attitude toward this figure, while consistently hostile, shows variations related to the dominant interest of specific dialogues.

As is well known, the *Apology* reflects the conviction that the philosopher, not the orator-statesman, is the true benefactor of the *polis*. According to Socrates, no just man can survive if he enters politics; he who fights for the right must do so in private, not in public (31c). Socrates himself, the self-proclaimed gadfly of Athens, has been prevented from taking part in public life by his *daimonion*, the mysterious sign, internal yet somehow divine, that warns him against certain actions, and he has therefore accepted the paradoxical position of being at once *apragmōn*, one who minds his own business, a non-meddler, and *polypragmōn*, one who meddles in other people's business, performing the greatest service to the state, but always as a private citizen (31d–32a).<sup>13</sup> Socrates' method of

<sup>12</sup> See M. H. Hansen, "The Athenian 'Politicians' 403–322 B.C.," *GRBS* 24 (1983) 33–55 for the customary terminology, and *The Athenian Assembly* (Oxford 1987) 49–69.

<sup>13</sup> On this paradox see L. B. Carter, *The Quiet Athenian* (Oxford 1986) 183–86.

dialectical refutation, the *elenchus* (not the statesman's oratorical *deinotēs*) is what truly advances the welfare of the citizens. |

The same attitude is developed at much greater length in the *Gorgias*, but it can also be detected in certain shorter dialogues, which are not primarily interested in the position of the orator-statesman, but comment tangentially on this topic. In the *Euthydemus*, for example, we find Socrates debating with two teachers of eristic, and in the course of the conversation sharply distinguishing the object of politics from the object of philosophy (306a–b). He also briefly considers whether to subsume the art of speech-making under the art of politics (290b–91d), and observes that neither of these arts can make us happy. The *Meno* criticizes four celebrated Athenian statesmen for failing to teach their sons the excellence that they themselves possessed (93c–94b). In the *Gorgias* this charge is extended to include the failure to instruct all the citizens. When Callicles praises the great statesmen of the past for having employed a noble kind of rhetoric, Socrates retorts that they failed in the primary task of the noble rhetor, to instil virtue. Not only their own sons, as in the *Meno*, but all the citizens have thus been neglected, because they have been flattered by the orators instead of being corrected and told the truth. And now Socrates, who earlier in the *Gorgias* had reaffirmed the distinction between what the *politikoi* do and what he does, saying explicitly, "I am not one of the *politikoi*" (473e), startles us by saying, "I think that I am one of the few persons in Athens (not to say the only one) who attempt the art of politics, and alone of men living today, I attend to political affairs" (521d). Socrates is able to make this statement because he now admits the theoretical possibility of a noble art of rhetoric, in contrast to the debased kind used by the Athenian rhetors, and the *politikos* who will use the noble rhetoric can be identified with the philosopher, who aims to make the citizens as good as possible, saying what is best, whether pleasant or the reverse (502e, 503a).

How such a noble rhetoric would actually operate the *Gorgias* does not reveal, nor does the *Republic* take us much farther, since although the philosopher and the ruler are now identified, the resulting paragon is not called a *politikos*, much less a *rhētor*, and under the conditions postulated for the ideal state the philosopher-king has little need of oratory to convince the citizens that they should adopt any given legislative proposal. The *Republic* shows no interest in legislation or constitutional procedures. The philosopher-kings are accepted by those they rule because of their expert knowledge, attained through the long process of education that culminates in dialectic and knowledge of the Forms. By a combination of *peithō* (persuasion) and *anankē* (compulsion) they harmonize the citizens and contrive to make each one do his own work for the good of the whole (519b–20a), but we learn very little about the actual means of persuasion (or of *anankē*, for that matter).

An entirely different situation obtains in Plato's final work, the *Laws*, which not only accepts the need for legislation to achieve the best *politeia*

compatible with human weakness, but devotes serious attention to persuasion as an instrument of the ruler. Two earlier dialogues, the *Phaedrus* and the *Politikos*, help us to understand Plato's attitude in this final treatment of the role of rhetoric in the state. The *Phaedrus* develops the hint of the *Gorgias* about a philosophical art of rhetoric, illustrating it by the accomplishment of Pericles under the guidance of Anaxagoras (269e), and extends the scope of this rhetoric to include private and written *logoi*, as well as spoken oratory, specifically mentioning written laws (278c).

The *Politikos* revives the suggestion made in the *Euthydemus* about a political art that would know how to make use of the results of other arts, such as speech-making and generalship. Now the statesman whose nature and functions are discussed in the *Politikos* will make use of expert advice in fields that he himself need not master. A kind of rhetoric called by the novel term *rhētoresia*—perhaps invented by Plato to avoid the invidious implications of *rhētorikē*—shares in the ruler's art (304a). The task of the statesman is to decide whether persuasion or compulsion or neither is to be employed. The task of *rhētoresia*, once that decision has been made, is to render persuasive what is just. It will persuade the general mass of the population by telling them stories (*mythologia*), rather than by imparting instruction (*didachē*, 304d). Before we conclude that *mythologia* necessarily conveys a contemptuous connotation, we should ponder Plato's own uses of myth and the relation of myth to *didachē* (or apodeictic) in such dialogues as the *Symposium*, *Phaedrus*, or *Timaeus*. /

The *Laws* permits us to see *rhētoresia* functioning in the service of the state. The official responsible for exercising persuasion is now called a *nomothetēs* (legislator), never a *rhētor*, and there are remarkably few references to any related word, even *rhētorikos*, in the *Laws*, but a great many to *peithō* and *peithein*, which are regularly coupled with words that mean to teach—*didaskēin*, *paideuein*, and the like. The uses of persuasion in the *Laws* are so many and varied as to defy enumeration in a brief survey,<sup>14</sup> but they clearly demonstrate Plato's strong, continuing interest in the relation of rhetoric to statesmanship and his originality in adapting various rhetorical techniques to the needs of the Cretan city. I have mentioned the use of persuasive proems to the laws. A law not so equipped is referred to as a *nomos akratos* (unmixed law), which constitutes a tyrannical imposition, relying only on coercion (723a). Another rhetorical technique employs praise and blame, the matter of traditional epideictic, as a mode of education, used in connection with games and festivals and governed by strict rules determining not only who is worthy to receive praise, but who is eligible to bestow it. What Plato calls *παρρησία ἐν Μούσαις* (freedom of speech amid the Muses) turns out to be important for the Cretan city (829c).

<sup>14</sup> Consult G. Morrow, *Plato's Cretan City* (Princeton 1960) 552–60, and "Plato's Concept of Persuasion," *Philosophical Review* 62 (1953) 234–50.



One measure of the difference between the *Republic* and the *Laws* may be seen in the different ways the two states come into being. In the *Republic* philosophers become kings, and the philosophers are such by virtue of their mastery of dialectic. In the *Laws* the ideal city could come into existence under two conditions: first, if there should be a young tyrant possessed of certain qualifications (youth, self-control, a good memory, courage, a noble nature, and—best of all—good luck), and secondly, if this young ruler should find a great lawgiver to give him advice (709e–10b). The qualifications of the lawgiver in turn are summed up by comparison to a mythical exemplar—Nestor, the honey-tongued orator of the *Iliad*, who excelled all other men in the power of speech and in *sōphrosynē* (711e). The element of *aretē* retains the same importance it has always had in Plato's political thought, but dialectical ability has now made room for rhetoric. /

It is time to turn to the other, perhaps less familiar, half of our subject: Plato's influence on rhetoric, not his debt, but his legacy. Once again, I shall omit the negative side, the way in which Plato's anti-rhetorical arguments continued to be used, adapted, and elaborated by the Hellenistic philosophical schools, by the enemies of rhetoric in Rome, and by opponents in even later times, who repeated Plato's charges that rhetoric was morally and artistically indefensible and that it harmed both the state and the rhetorician himself.<sup>15</sup> Let me instead mention some of the positive effects that Plato had on rhetoric and oratory, prose-writing in general, and literary criticism in particular.

It is, I think, widely accepted that the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle develops certain notions sketched in the *Phaedrus*, the dialogue in which Plato at last lays the foundation for a rhetoric acceptable according to his standards, as sophistic rhetoric had not been. Friedrich Solmsen many years ago set forth the main lines of this argument, especially with respect to the systematic treatment of emotional appeals. I can do no better than to quote from his influential article in *Classical Philology* in 1938 ("Aristotle and Cicero on the Orator's Playing upon the Feelings"), where an Appendix on the *Phaedrus* and the *Rhetoric* sums up the evidence for Aristotle's indebtedness to Plato:

In both works rhetoric is based on dialectic, σαφήνεια is regarded as the most essential requirement of the diction, and a demand for the intrinsic unity of the λόγος is put forward and illustrated by a comparison with the organic unity of an animal's body. Add to this the description in both of rhetoric as dialectical demonstration plus ψυχαγωγία, the polemical attitude in both works toward the vulgar rhetoricians with their systems of τὰ μόρια τοῦ λόγου, and the fact

<sup>15</sup> The continued use of the second of these arguments is discussed by North, "*Inutilis sibi, perniciosus patriae*," *ICS* 6 (1981) 242–71.

that tradition . . . has it that Aristotle's rhetorical μέθοδος originated in the Academy. (pp. 229–30)

The persistence of Plato's influence may be seen in other ways as well. One that had far-reaching importance was the hierarchy of values that he established, by which the ἀγαθὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, the "goods of the soul," took priority, followed by those of the body and then by the external advantages (wealth, friends). This doctrine, already prominent in the *Apology* (36b–c), where it justifies Socrates' claim that he is the only true statesman, exercised its most far-reaching influence on ethical and political philosophy, but it had an impact on rhetoric also, because it helped to establish the topic of *aretē* as the essential subject for epideictic oratory, the oratory of praise and blame. Nothing was more characteristic of the Platonic–Aristotelian (as distinguished from the sophistic–Isocratean) strain in ancient epideictic than the insistence that praise is due only to *aretē*, not to the other so-called goods that people sought or boasted.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, in the very definition of virtue and its various categories, Plato exercised a unique influence. It had always been customary to organize eulogy around a set of values approved by the community being addressed (as in the Athenian *epitaphios logos*), but the group of virtues available for such exploitation was shifting and amorphous, both in number and in content, until Plato in Book 4 of the *Republic* established a canon of four excellences (wisdom, justice, courage, and moderation) as necessary for the perfection of the soul and the state. From then on, but especially after they had been adopted by the Stoics as the core of their ethical system, these four virtues were canonized and—to speak only of their role in rhetoric—they formed the basis for the regular school instruction in the oratory of praise and blame. The Roman rhetorical handbooks and the treatises on epideictic by Menander Rhetor and others make the dominance of the Platonic ethical system unmistakable.<sup>17</sup> It came to dominate judicial and deliberative oratory as well as epideictic, and quickly spread to historiography, since the schools of rhetoric provided the only training in the writing of artistic prose available to aspiring historians.

Literary criticism, from Aristotle and Theophrastus onward, owed to Plato certain doctrines so well known as Platonic in origin that it will suffice merely to name them, especially since some have been alluded to in my quotation from Professor Solmsen. In Peripatetic theory, among the virtues of style (*saphēneia*, clarity, *Hellenismos*, correctness, *paraskeuē*, elaboration, and the *prepon*, appropriateness), the first and last, clarity and

<sup>16</sup> See V. Buchheit, *Untersuchungen zur Theorie des Genos Epideiktikon von Gorgias bis Aristoteles* (Munich 1960) 84–116.

<sup>17</sup> See H. Caplan on the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 3. 2. 3 and 3. 6. 11 for the cardinal virtues in deliberative and epideictic oratory. Consult also D. A. Russell and N. G. Wilson, *Menander Rhetor* (Oxford 1981) 263.

appropriateness, are strongly emphasized by Plato.<sup>18</sup> The comparison of a speech or a poem to a living thing, with a demand for organic unity, derives from the *Phaedrus* (264c). The conception of the poet as irrational, while neither original nor exclusive with Plato, found in his *Ion* and *Phaedrus* the treatment that posterity was destined to remember. Moreover, in the *Phaedrus* Plato carried the notion into new territory when he demonstrated the need both for divine madness and for strict control, derived from the knowledge of dialectic and psychology. Ultimately the *theia mania*, divine madness, of the poet in the *Phaedrus* was transmuted into the theory of *sōphrōn mania* (sane madness), controlled inspiration, which was made to account for such extravagantly admired oratorical qualities as the *deinotēs* of Demosthenes. It contributed also to the concept of *to hypsos*, the sublime, in "Longinus."<sup>19</sup>

Related to the influence of Plato's theoretical advice about the choice and arrangement of words and the structure of a speech, and deserving of close attention (because at certain times it seems to have been much more widely studied than his theoretical principles) is the emergence of Plato himself as a model of style. This is the final topic that I should like to address.

We may begin by returning to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the Greek historian and rhetorician working in Rome in the time of Augustus, whom I quoted at the outset. In his essay on Demosthenes, part of a series on the Attic orators, he tells us that certain persons (τινες)—probably philosophers, although he does not say so—consider Plato to be *daimoniōtatos*, a supreme genius, accepted as the definitive model (*horos kai kanōn*) for both the plain and the forceful styles (23). Such persons even say that if Zeus spoke Greek, he would sound like Plato. Dionysius maintains that he himself admires Plato's *deinotēs* in the *Dialogues*, especially those in which he preserves the Socratic character (rather surprisingly, he cites the *Philebus*), but he is highly critical of him when he abandons the style proper to the dialogue-form. Most especially he dislikes it when Plato introduces praise and blame into political discussions and tries to convert them into speeches for the prosecution or the defence. When he does so, he becomes different from himself and disgraces the philosophical profession.

This is a revealing comment; it shows Dionysius the rhetor on the defensive. The prominence of speeches in some of the *Dialogues* is precisely what attracted to their study young men interested in becoming orators, especially orator-statesmen in the Ciceronian tradition. Dionysius, who is above all determined to maintain the supremacy of Demosthenes as the model of models, mounts a clever attack on Plato the would-be rhetor.

<sup>18</sup> Clarity, *Phaedrus* 265d; appropriateness, 268d, 274b, and see above, pp. 208–09.

<sup>19</sup> For the steps by which *sōphrōn mania* became equivalent to *theia mania* (with a striking reversal of the implications of *sōphrōn* in the *Phaedrus*), see North, "The Concept of Sophrosyne in Greek Literary Criticism," *CP* 43 (1948) 1–17, esp. 14–16 on Ps.-Lucian and Ps.-Longinus.

First he ridicules him by applying to him the lines addressed by Zeus to Aphrodite in the *Iliad* (5. 428–29), when she flees to him for comfort, after being wounded by Diomedes:

Not to you, my child, are given the works of war,  
But do you busy yourself with the lovely tasks of marriage.

The analogy tends to remove Plato from serious consideration as a model for the professional speaker. His style is identified with what is soft, charming, incapable of real polemic. Dionysius then proceeds to compare the *Menexenus* with Demosthenes' *On the Crown* (all the while insisting that it is a fair comparison because this is the most effective—*kratistos*—of Plato's *politikoi logoi*). To compress a very long discussion of Plato's faults, let me just say that Dionysius tears to pieces passage after passage of the *Menexenus*, finding in them unnecessary repetition, defective rhythms, excessive ornamentation, youthful indulgence in Gorgianic theatrical tricks, clumsiness, incoherence, even meanness (*tapeinotēs*) and general bad taste—*akairia*, a word that turns up more than once in rhetorical criticism of Plato's rhetoric (24–29).

Dionysius concludes with still another derogatory comparison, this time saying that Plato's style is like a flowery spot affording a traveller a pleasant resting place, while the style of Demosthenes is like a fertile field providing an abundance of the necessities of life, as well as the luxuries that make for pleasure (32). He repeats his charge that Plato's oratory aims only at formal beauty, while that of Demosthenes is useful and practical. (One of the clichés of Greek and Roman criticism is to compare Plato's style to weapons used on parade, Demosthenes' to weapons of war, Plato's to a body accustomed to a life of ease in the shade, Demosthenes' to a body hardened by exercise in the sunlight.)<sup>20</sup>

Yet when he is not attempting to exalt the virtues of Demosthenes, Dionysius is capable of more objective criticism, and he tells us, in the treatise *On Composition*, that Plato excelled in the arrangement of words (though not always in their choice), that he, with Herodotus and Demosthenes, merited praise for variation (*metabolē* 19), and that, like Homer and Sophocles, he used the best kind of *synthesis*, the well-blended (*eukratos*), which constitutes a mean between the austere and the flowery (24), high praise from a Peripatetic critic. Dionysius is not talking about the middle style, in the normal sense of the term as used in Greco-Roman criticism, but rather the middle type of composition or word-placement, yet in fact Plato is almost invariably cited (along with Isocrates) as a model of the middle style, a category that he regularly exemplified in Byzantine criticism.

Especially penetrating are some of the observations of "Longinus," an enthusiastic admirer of Plato. He too compares him with Demosthenes,

<sup>20</sup> See F. Walsdorff, *Die antiken Urteile über Platons Stil* (Bonn 1927) for a variety of critical clichés.



especially in their use of amplification (*auxēsis*), and he likens Plato to a kind of sea (*pelagos*), flooding a vast expanse, steady in his majestic and stately dignity (12). The key words are *onkos* (weightiness) and *megalo-prepēs semnotēs* (great-souled dignity). Plato achieves grandeur (*megethos*) in spite of the fact that he flows along with a noiseless current (a phrase borrowed from the *Theaetetus* 144b). "Longinus" uses Plato as the supreme exemplar of how sublimity may be attained through imitation (*mimēsis*). What Plato imitated was Homer. "Plato irrigated his style with 10,000 rivulets from the great Homeric spring," says "Longinus," and concludes with the memorable statement that Plato contended with Homer for the first prize (13. 4).<sup>21</sup>

Imitation was of course the basis of the educational system in Greece and Rome, a circumstance that lent enormous influence to Plato as stylist. However sharply any rival or critic disagreed with the substance of Plato's philosophy, the fact remained that he wrote like an angel (or like Zeus in the ancient commonplace). The desire to understand how he did it and to imitate his virtuosity has obsessed critics, rhetoricians, and even some philosophers from antiquity to modern times. Among the rhetorically oriented critics the most influential in late antiquity was certainly Hermogenes of Tarsus, a contemporary of Marcus Aurelius, whose treatise *Peri Ideōn* (*On Ideas or Forms of Style*)<sup>22</sup> left its impress on Byzantine literature and criticism, as well as on writing of the imperial age in Greece. Brought to the West by George of Trebizond in 1426 and translated into Latin by 1538, it exercised a pervasive influence on Latin and vernacular literature of the Renaissance.<sup>23</sup> The very title of this treatise betrays its Platonic inspiration. As George Kustas has said, "... in Hermogenes we are witnessing the decisive step in the process of the Platonization of rhetoric."<sup>24</sup> We might also say that in Hermogenes we witness the culmination of the process of "rhetoricizing" Plato, a process that had long since proclaimed itself in such remarks as that of Dionysius of Halicarnassus about the expectation that Plato should serve as a *kanōn orthoepeias*, a standard of correct diction (*Dem.* 26). By the imperial age the philosopher had become a model of style, and although readers who cared only for style, with no regard for content, must have been in the minority, as De Lacy observes,<sup>25</sup> one or two such readers are on record, including the

<sup>21</sup> Consult D. A. Russell, *"Longinus" On the Sublime* (Oxford 1964) esp. xxxix-xl and 109-17.

<sup>22</sup> Translated by C. W. Wooten as *Hermogenes. On Types of Style* (Chapel Hill 1987).

<sup>23</sup> For its influence in the West, consult A. Patterson, *Hermogenes and the Renaissance: Seven Ideas of Style* (Princeton 1970).

<sup>24</sup> *Studies in Byzantine Rhetoric* (Thessaloniki 1973) 163.

<sup>25</sup> P. De Lacy, "Plato and the Intellectual Life of the Second Century A.D." in *Approaches to the Second Sophistic*, ed. G. W. Bowersock (University Park, PA 1974) 7-8.

student of Taurus mentioned by Aulus Gellius, and Fronto, the teacher of Marcus Aurelius.<sup>26</sup>

The judgments pronounced by Hermogenes were to be decisive in defining Plato's stylistic impact in late antiquity and Byzantium. His *Peri Ideōn* identifies seven Forms of style (each of them with several subdivisions) and describes each Form according to eight categories (such as diction, figures, composition, rhythm). Several of the Forms are illustrated by references to Plato. Beauty (*kallos*), Grandeur (*megethos*), Solemnity (*semnotēs*)—a subdivision of *megethos*, Sweetness (*glykytēs*) and Modesty (*epieikeia*)—two subdivisions of Character (*ēthos*)—are regarded as eminently Platonic, and Hermogenes advises his readers to study specific passages in the dialogues in order to recognize and imitate these qualities.<sup>27</sup>

Most revealing among Hermogenes' comments on Plato's style is his repeated assertion that Plato is the supreme model of what he calls panegyric, a term that is now equivalent to the epideictic genre, but has a greatly expanded meaning. Panegyric includes historiography and most other forms of prose-writing (what Plato prophetically called *logographia* in the *Phaedrus*), and even, at one point, includes poetry as well.<sup>28</sup> Hermogenes maintains that Plato's is the most beautiful panegyric style in prose. In fact, he is to panegyric what Demosthenes is to deliberative and judicial oratory, and what Homer is to poetry.<sup>29</sup>

Menander Rhetor also, in the late third century, author (or supposed author) of influential treatises on epideictic, makes it clear that Plato dominates the genre.<sup>30</sup> This dominance continued into Byzantine times, when the schools were heavily influenced by Neoplatonic commentaries on Hermogenes and other rhetorical writers, as well as on Plato's *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus* themselves, and rhetoric was used, not for its original purposes, but to prepare for the study of philosophy.<sup>31</sup> A remarkable development was the equation of the three types of oratory with the three Platonic faculties of the soul. As reported by the *Prolegomenon* of Marcellinus (late fourth or early fifth century), the highest faculty (the rational) is associated with panegyric.<sup>32</sup> What had been regarded in earlier times as the more important types, the judicial and the deliberative, were linked with the inferior faculties, the spirited and the appetitive. Hence the kind of rhetoric in which Plato was thought to excel corresponded to what, in his organization of the tripartite soul, was undeniably the highest faculty.

<sup>26</sup> Both cited by De Lacy (previous note) 6, 8.

<sup>27</sup> *Peri Ideōn*, ed. Rabe, 297, 246, 247, 386, 387, 243, 244, 337, 348.

<sup>28</sup> Consult Wooten (above, note 22) 138–39.

<sup>29</sup> Rabe (above, note 27) 386–90.

<sup>30</sup> See Russell and Wilson (above, note 17) xxxviii and Index under "Plato."

<sup>31</sup> See G. A. Kennedy, "Late Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 13 (1980) 181–82.

<sup>32</sup> Rabe, *Prolegomenon Sylloge*, 286; consult Kennedy (previous note) 188.

Another source of Hermogenes' influence on later attitudes toward Plato's style lay in the unprecedented flexibility of his critical method. By considering the possible combinations and permutations of the seven Forms and their thirteen sub-Forms, Hermogenes far outstripped such predecessors as Demetrius and Dionysius in the subtlety with which he could analyze and describe the characteristics of any particular author. Thus, as Kustas observes,<sup>33</sup> he came to have a special appeal for Christian thinkers, conscious of the uniqueness of the individual soul. Moreover, some of the Forms that Hermogenes identified were themselves particularly attractive to Christianity. Simplicity (*apheleia*) and Dignity (*semnotēs*) were both considered characteristic of Christian literature. In Hermogenes' system these two Forms were opposed, yet they were both exemplified by Plato, who thus became of interest, not only for what he said, but for how he said it. Furthermore, the quality of grandeur (*megethos*), which ancient critics found in Plato (and of which *semnotēs* is a subdivision for Hermogenes) was thought to include an element that the Neoplatonist Proclus terms the enigmatic and identifies as one source of Plato's vigor (*pathos*). Since for Byzantine criticism obscurity (*asapheia*) is sometimes a virtue of style (when clarity would reveal to the uninitiated what they should not be told), the Platonic example could profitably be studied in this connection too, as the relation of the enigmatic to the obscure was analyzed.<sup>34</sup>

Among other associations between the style of Plato and the special concerns of Byzantine literary culture traced by Kustas, particular importance attaches to the increasing use of moral terminology derived from Plato to describe stylistic distinctions, and the consequent tendency to identify aesthetic with moral standards. The extension of the concepts of propriety (the *prepon*) and appropriateness (*kairos*) in Byzantine literary theory, as a means of giving suitable expression to the divine or cosmic order, and the relation of this development to Plato's *Timaeus* deserve notice.<sup>35</sup>

Long before the Byzantine era, to be sure, the *Timaeus* had been prominent in stylistic criticism, as well as in the study of Plato's thought. "Longinus" cites the famous description of the human body in *Timaeus* 65c-85e as a series of metaphors making for sublimity (while noting also that it is because of such passages that Plato is criticized for his Bacchic frenzy, 32. 7). If we look ahead many years to the renaissance of Byzantine literature in the eleventh century, we learn that Michael Psellus set for himself twin goals: to improve his stylistic eloquence through rhetoric and to purify his spirit through philosophy. "Philosophy without rhetoric has no charm (*charis*), and rhetoric without philosophy has no content (*schēma*)."<sup>36</sup> The model for what he hopes to achieve is the *Timaeus*. In

<sup>33</sup> *Studies* (above, note 24) 17.

<sup>34</sup> Consult Kustas (above, note 24) 12, 39-40.

<sup>35</sup> Kustas (above, note 24) 41-42.

<sup>36</sup> *Chronographia* 6. 107.

this determination to reconcile rhetoric with philosophy and this choice of a model Psellus may serve as our final example of the persistent, benign influence of Plato, *orator summus*.

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## Plants as Aristotelian Substances

ROSAMOND KENT SPRAGUE

*Farewell, beloved Fritz!*

When Aristotle lists the things that exist by nature, as he does, for instance, in the first line of *Physics* 2. 1, he mentions "the animals and their parts . . . and the plants and the simple bodies (earth, fire, air, water)"<sup>1</sup> 192b9–10 (and cf. *Metaph.* 7. 2, 1028b9–13). Things like these, he says in *Metaphysics* 7. 7, "are substances if anything is" (1032a20). Since, then, plants are full-fledged natural substances for Aristotle, it should be of interest to give them some special attention. After all, as he reminds us in the *de Partibus*, "respecting perishable plants and animals we have abundant information, living as we do in their midst, and ample data may be collected concerning their various kinds, if only we are willing to take sufficient pains" (1. 5, 644b26–31).

In this paper I first collect some information about Aristotelian plants, then try out the thesis that in some respects his plants are superior to his animals, and, finally, discuss some of the philosophical implications of an interesting distinction made by Aristotle between two grades of nutrition, a topic having special relevance to plant function.

## I

As things that come to be and pass away, plants will naturally be subject to Aristotle's general principles for perishable things, as, for example, the principle of substratum. "For," he says, "we find in every case something that underlies from which proceeds that which comes to be; for instance, animals and plants from seed" (*Ph.* 1. 7, 190b3–4). The direction of coming to be is of course towards form, and, in the normal Aristotelian way, runs true to type: Not only does man beget man, but plant begets plant (cf. *EE* 2. 6, 1222b18–19 and *PA* 2. 1, 646a34).

To this point nothing has been said about plants which does not apply equally to animals, but if we consider the location of natural substances in

<sup>1</sup> Translations of Aristotelian passages are from the Revised Oxford Translation, ed. J. Barnes (Princeton 1984) unless otherwise noted.

the cosmos, a difference at once appears. In the *Generation of Animals* Aristotle attempts a systematic correlation of living things with the elements in which they spend their time and flourish: "Plants belong to the earth, aquatic creatures to the water, and land-animals to the air . . ." (3. 11, 761b13-14, Peck). This correlation is certainly not an unqualified success: It immediately occurs to one to ask, what about birds? Do they not also belong to the air? And, as Aristotle is himself aware, the scheme is not complete without the identification of a group of living creatures whose natural element is fire. "This fourth tribe," he concludes, "must be looked for on the moon" (761b22). (The possibility that anyone would actually *do* this no doubt seemed to him remote.) Aristotle does not make much use of this projected scheme, but that plants have a special relationship to earth is a point of which he remains convinced.

This special relationship of plants to earth calls for some additional comment. Plants not only, as is obvious, have earth as their natural habitat, but earth is the principal element of which they are themselves composed (*Juv.* 19 [13], 477a28). That such should be the case is not surprising, since earth is an important part of the diet of plants. "It might be thought," Aristotle says, "that [plants] are fed by one substance only, viz. by Water," but in fact they "are fed by more than one, for Earth has been mixed with the water" (*GC* 2. 8, 335a12-14).

The close relationship between plants and earth accounts for another characteristic of plants, their disinclination to move. Unlike animals, who must go about to acquire their food, plants are fed *in situ*. Having no need, then, to seek food elsewhere, they remain in one place. As a result they are able to dispense with a whole complex of functions needed by animals: Plants do not need sensation or imagination in order to apprehend the location of food, nor appetite to encourage them to pursue it, nor locomotion to accomplish this pursuit.

This simplicity of plant functions (these are, of course, restricted to nutrition, growth, and reproduction) is, furthermore, reflected in their structure. As Aristotle puts it concisely in the *de Partibus*:

Plants . . . inasmuch as they are without locomotion, present no great variety in their heterogeneous parts. For, where the functions are but few, few also are the organs required to effect them. (2. 10, 656a1-4)

In other words, it is because plants have nowhere to go that they have no feet. Not only do they have no feet, but, in spite of the fact that they take in food, they have no stomachs. "The earth and its heat serv[es] them in the place of a stomach," Aristotle tells us in the *de Partibus* (2. 3, 650a23). The function of the stomach is the concoction of food into nutriment; the food of plants, however, is "already treated and prepared" (650a21, Peck). Animals here are at a definite disadvantage. Being creatures of locomotion, they not only have to search for food, but need also to carry supplies. They have, Aristotle says, "as it were an earth inside them" (650a25, Peck), and it

is from this ambulatory dining-room, the stomach, that they draw their concocted food.

The fact that plants are so wedded to their native habitat has its effect not only upon their diet and upon their structure, but also upon their position. By this I mean not simply their position in the scale of nature, which is firmly inferior to that of animals, but their position with respect to function. "All living beings have a superior and an inferior part," Aristotle observes in the *de Incessu* (4, 705a30), and he emphasizes the point that this arrangement is to be found just as much in plants as in animals. The superior part, however, is so designated with respect to its function as a recipient of food, and since plants, as we have seen, obtain their nourishment from the earth, they are, strictly speaking, *upside down*, their roots being their mouths. As Aristotle remarks epigrammatically in the *de Anima*, "up and down are not for all things what they are for the whole world" (2. 4, 416a4). Empedocles, then, was wrong in attempting to explain "the downward rooting [of plants] by the natural tendency of earth to travel downwards, and the upward branching by the similar natural tendency of fire to travel upwards" (416a1-2). Not only does Empedocles display a fine disregard for function, but he also consigns the growing plant to a dreadful fate: As earth and fire rush in opposite directions, the unfortunate plant will be torn in two. Aristotelian plants, however, being unified by soul, are in no such peril.

A final point concerning plants and earth has to do with epistemology. Plants, in Aristotle's view, have no sensation, and the reason is that "they consist of earth" (*de An.* 3. 13, 435b1). Their bodies are uncompounded (Aristotle does not, apparently, think of water as a significant part of plants in spite of its role in their nutrition), and thus they cannot have even the most basic sense, the sense of touch (*de An.* 3. 12, 434b28). Sensation requires the possession of a mean of contrary qualities, and the ability to receive the forms of sensible objects without their matter (*de An.* 2. 12, 424a32-b3). Plants, however, are affected by form and matter together. Their manner of apprehending objects is, in fact, to eat them, as is evident from the beginning of 2. 4. Perhaps this simply shows their low earthy natures and their preoccupation with food.

What I have said about plants so far has, I hope, indicated that they are subject to Aristotle's general philosophical principles, and that what he tells us about them, although sometimes rather quaintly expressed, is not at all unexpected. As we proceed, it will continue to be evident that plants have a well-defined and also quite an important place in Aristotle's scheme.

In emphasizing, in the first part of this paper, the relation between plants and earth, I have, one might say, emphasized the lower side of vegetable nature. It may even be said of plants, and is said by Aristotle in the *History of Animals* (8. 1, 588b9), that the whole genus, if compared with that of animals, is "devoid of life." But then, "as compared with other corporeal entities," plants are "endowed with life" (588b10-11). In fact,



"there is observed in plants a continuous scale of ascent towards the animal." And, if we turn to final causes, more can be said than this: We shall find that plants as well as animals are interested in eternity.

This mood of aspiration on the part of plants is most neatly expressed in *de Anima* 2. 4, when Aristotle writes (in a mood reminiscent of Plato's *Symposium* 207d):

... for any living thing that has reached its normal development ... the most natural act is the production of another like itself, an animal producing an animal, a plant a plant, in order that, as far as its nature allows, it may partake in the eternal and divine. (415a27-29, and cf. *GA* 2. 1, 731b32-36)

The nature of such partaking is, as Aristotle indicates, not completely successful: the individual plant or animal must perish, leaving the attainment of eternity to the species. As he says, again in the *de Anima*, the living thing "remains not indeed as the self-same individual, but continues its existence in something like itself—not numerically but specifically one" (2. 4, 415b6-8). The final cause, then, of plants is reproduction, and the other plant functions, those of nutrition and growth, subserve this end. To speak more generally, plants, like other Aristotelian entities, are controlled by teleology. As Aristotle himself expresses it in the *Physics*, "in plants too we find that for the sake of which, though the degree of organization is less [than it is in animals]" (2. 8, 199b10-11), and, in the *de Anima*, he points out that "the parts of plants in spite of their extreme simplicity are organs" (2. 1, 412b29).

Clearly, in spite of their resemblance to animals in the matter of teleology, plants retain their inferior position in the scale of nature. They are less highly organized and, as a result, have fewer functions. I now proceed, however, to mention a few respects in which it might be argued (and argued on purely Aristotelian grounds) that plants are superior to animals.

## II

For one thing, the functions of plants, that is, those of nutrition, growth, and reproduction, are the absolute minimum conditions for admission to the scale of nature. Life can exist without the animal and rational functions; it cannot exist without the plant functions. Aristotle even goes so far as to write, in the *Generation of Animals*, that "the business of most animals is, you may say, nothing else than to produce young, as the business of a plant is to produce seeds and fruit" (1. 4, 717a22-23), implying that even in things higher than plants, the plant functions remain dominant. Of plants themselves he writes that "to the essence of plants belongs no other function or business than the production of seed" (1. 23, 731a25-26).

Then again, it is quite noticeably the case that plants are longer-lived than animals; the date-palm is a good example (*Long.* 4, 466a9, and cf. 6, 467a6–b3). Although, like animals, plants will die if deprived of nourishment, yet they “continually renew themselves and hence last for a long time” (6, 467a12). Animals are not only less efficient in this respect, but also, because of their inveterate habit of running about, they are far more prone to suffer accident and come to an early grave.

Further, there is at least one instance in which plants may be said to *benefit* from an experience which for animals constitutes a serious and usually mortal injury. I refer here to division, an event which Aristotle mentions quite often, usually in relation to insects<sup>2</sup>: A divided insect will live for a short time, but lacks the organs necessary for continued self-maintenance. But with plants, Aristotle says, there is a difference: “The portions of the divided insect live only for a limited time, whereas the portions of the plant actually attain the perfect form of the whole, so that from one single plant you may obtain two or more” (*PA* 4. 6, 682b32–34). In other words, division (through the taking of slips or separation of bulbs), far from being an injury to a plant, is a means by which it attains its reproductive purpose.

One final way in which, it might be argued, plants have the advantage over animals, is in the matter of sex differentiation. It has been mentioned that plants share with animals the final cause of reproduction, and also that nutrition, which is a function of animals as well as of plants, subserves reproduction. Animals, unlike plants, do not have the good fortune to be rooted in their source of nourishment, but must move about to seek it. Such being the case, Nature has provided them with the needful organs, that is, mouths, stomachs, and feet, in varying forms. Food, however, is not the only thing sought by animals: Each, or at any rate each male animal, is seeking its reproductive partner. Thus in animals male and female are distinct and separate. In plants, however, Aristotle writes, “male and female are not found” (*GA* 1.1, 715b19, Peck); in them “these powers are mingled, female not being separated from male” (1. 23, 731a1–3). What is more, the copulation of animals is really an attempt to achieve the plant condition:

For when there is need for them to generate the sexes are no longer separated any more than in plants, their nature desiring that they shall become one; and this is plain to view when they copulate and are united [that one animal is made out of both]. (1. 23, 731a11–14)

It could be argued, further, that sexual contact on the part of animals is not only an attempt at physical integration, of a type already existing in plants, but also an attempt at metaphysical integration, and that this too already exists in plants. The point will be made clear if we remember that

<sup>2</sup> I have discussed some of these points at greater length in a paper entitled “Aristotle and Divided Insects,” *Methexis* 2 (1989) 29–40.

for Aristotle the male parent is the vehicle of form, and that the female provides the matter. The sexual union of male and female may be regarded, then, as an effort to achieve the union of form and matter. This union takes place most obviously in the new substance, which will utilize the parental contributions as the basis for its own matter and form. But it takes place, in a different way, in sexual contact, where the parents as it were imitate the new substance by coming as close to each other as is physically possible. In animals, of course, this parental union is extremely transitory, but in plants it is permanent. Thus plants, I should say, attain better than animals to the status of natural substances.

Aristotle comes close to saying this himself when he writes, in the *Generation of Animals*, that "animals seem to be almost like divided plants, as though one should separate and divide them, when they bear seed, into the male and female existing in them" (1. 23, 731a21-23). He implies, that is, that plants are the norm and animals the aberration. In the beginning of Book 2, however, he makes a spirited defence of the separation of the sexes in animals, arguing that because form is more divine than matter—I suspect he really means that men are more divine than women, who are, after all, "deformed males" (2. 3, 737a27)—it is *better* that the sexes should be separate. But he was also the philosopher who maintained in the *de Anima* that questions about the unity of matter and that of which it is the matter were beside the point: "It is as though we were to ask whether the wax and its shape are one" (2. 1, 412b8). Plants, I should say, represent this fundamental type of unity far better than animals. In the case of animals, in fact, Nature, by separating male from female for what appears to be the sole purpose of bringing them back together, comes perilously close to doing things in vain.

Now I am conscious of being in a sense perverse in attempting to argue for the thesis that in some respects plants are superior to animals for Aristotle. After all, reproduction is not the only road to divinity; there is the way of contemplation, and contemplation, in anything other than the Unmoved Mover, is normally performed by animals—rational animals, it is true, but still animals. Plants, although they may be thinking deep vegetable thoughts, are hardly, I should guess, devoting themselves to philosophical tasks such as distinguishing between Socrates and Socrates seated. Then too it might be said that whereas there is a certain efficiency in being rooted to the spot if the spot is one's source of nourishment, there is also a certain divinity in motion, in that in moving one comes closer to the condition of the heavenly bodies. That locomotion is primary and therefore superior to the other types of motion such as growth (the kind peculiar to plants) is clear from *Physics* 8. 7, where Aristotle writes:

Now all things that go through the process of becoming acquire locomotion last. It is this that accounts for the fact that some living things, e.g. plants and many kinds of animals, owing to the lack of the

requisite organ, are entirely without motion, whereas others acquire it in the course of their being perfected. (261a14–18)

And we know, of course, that “what is posterior in the order of becoming is prior in the order of being” (261a12). Perhaps it would be somewhat unkind, in the circumstances, to point out to Aristotle that the most divine entity in his philosophy, the Unmoved Mover, is rather plant-like in not moving at all.

### III

The topic with which I wish to conclude has a particular relation to the doctrine of the categories, and possibly—although this is a good deal more speculative—to the doctrine of *hexis*. It concerns a distinction made by Aristotle between two types or grades of nutrition, a distinction which is therefore of special relevance to the vegetable soul.

It will be convenient to begin by reminding ourselves that the basic functions of the vegetable soul are nutrition and growth. (The third plant function, reproduction, is dependent on the other two.) Now nutrition, Aristotle tells us, “though the same as growth, is yet different from it in its being” (*GC* 1. 5, 322a25). What is the meaning of this somewhat cryptic remark?

The easiest way of answering this question is to consider the particular phenomena that Aristotle is intending to describe. In the life of any creature possessing soul, the following stages are discernible: 1) coming-into-being from appropriate seeds or parents; 2) growth to a certain limited size (a size controlled by *logos*); 3) a stage concurrent with but also succeeding growth that may be called preservation or maintenance; 4) reproduction (not essential to life but a natural expectation of any mature living thing); 5) decay, a stage in which maintenance weakens; 6) death, or passing-out-of-being.

Aristotle’s distinction between two grades of nutrition relates to the second and third of these stages, that is, to the stage of growth and to the stage of maintenance. He delineates this difference as follows:

In every instance, of course, there is nourishment of two grades present: 1) “nutritive,” that is to say, which provides both the whole and the parts with being; 2) “growth-promoting,” that is to say, which causes increase of bulk. (*GA* 2. 6, 744b33–37, Peck)

It is to clarify and emphasize this distinction that Aristotle employs the doctrine of the categories. Growth is motion occurring in the category of quantity; nutrition, however, is motion occurring in the category of *substance*. The point is particularly well stated in *de Anima* 2. 4:

Food has a power which is other than the power to increase the bulk of what is fed by it; so far forth as what has soul in it is a quantum, food



may increase its quantity, but it is only so far as what has soul in it is a "this-somewhat" or substance that food acts *as* food; in that case it maintains the being of what is fed, and that continues to be what it is so long as the process of nutrition continues. (416b11-14)

Reproduction does of course also involve motion in the category of substance, since, in reproduction, a new substance comes into being. But, as Aristotle is precise in pointing out, nutrition concerns a substance which is already in being: "Nothing generates itself, but only maintains itself" (416b16).

I did, however, mention (and this is the most speculative part of the paper) that there might be some connection between Aristotle's distinction between two grades of nutrition, quantitative and substantive, and his doctrine of disposition or *hexis*. As a preliminary we need to bear in mind that, roughly speaking, *hexis* corresponds to first actuality. That is, if we think in terms of a progression from potentiality to actuality, there is a stage at which certain functions may be possessed or *had* without necessarily being exercised. The subsequent exercise or use of these functions may be called (although Aristotle inconsiderately failed to coin the expression) "second actuality." This type of terminology enables Aristotle to give accurate ontological descriptions of, say, the powers of sensation with which we are born (we already *have* them ready for exercise and are not born with a mere potentiality of acquiring them: *de An.* 2. 5, 417b17-19 and *EN* 2. 1, 1103a26-32) or of a sleeping animal (which may be regarded as possessing life without utilizing life: *de An.* 2. 1, 412a25-26).

The point which suggested to me the parallel with nutrition was the fact that Aristotle, in contrasting the transition from initial potentiality to first actuality or *hexis* with the transition from *hexis* to second actuality or use, speaks of the first transition in terms of the extinction of contraries, and the second in terms of maintenance or preservation. So at *de Anima* 2. 5 he writes:

Also the expression "to be acted on" [as for instance by food] has more than one meaning; it may mean either the extinction of one of two contraries by the other, or the maintenance of what is potential by the agency of what is actual and already like what is acted upon, as actual to potential. (417b2-5)

The two types of nutrition fit neatly into this pattern: Growth involves the extinction of smallness and immaturity by maturity and size; after a certain point, however, maturity and the appropriate size are possessed and growth ceases. The work of nutrition is then devoted to maintenance, and, as an extension of maintenance, to reproduction. If the parallel was in fact in Aristotle's mind, it could then be said that one of his most important philosophical distinctions was intimately associated with his reflections on nutrition and the vegetable soul.

A connection between philosophical reflection and the phenomena of nutrition and growth can be seen as far back as Anaxagoras, who had asked the question, "How can hair come from what is not hair and flesh from what is not flesh?" (fr. 10). Such questions were no doubt the sort of thing that caused Socrates to say, at *Phaedo* 96c, that his study of the natural philosophers had caused him to unlearn what he had previously thought he knew "about the cause of growth in human beings." And it was Aristotle's detailed consideration of such problems in a more generalized form in the first book of *On Generation and Corruption* that occasioned the remark with which I began this section, that "nutrition, though the same as growth, is yet different from it in its being" (322a25).

### Conclusion

In giving some attention to Aristotelian plants, I have merely scratched the surface of an intrinsically interesting topic. There is the ecological observation in the *Politics* (1. 8, 1256b15–19) that as animals are for the sake of man, so plants are for the sake of animals. The special connection of plants with eating and growth leads to consideration of such topics as mixture and the void. Oysters are a kind of water-plant and could do with inspection. There are intriguing details such as that "it is among plants that tastes occur in richest variety" (*Sens.* 4, 441b7), and that, although plants derive from the air assistance in the preservation of their natural heat (*Juv.* 6, 470a21–22), yet they do not breathe (*de An.* 1. 5, 410b31). Nor indeed do they sleep, as Aristotle explains in detail in the *de Somno*, as at 1, 454b26–31 and 454a12–17. It is sufficient here, however, to point out that plants, being genuine Aristotelian substances, cannot be discussed apart from such normal Aristotelian concepts as potentiality and actuality, form and matter, and final cause.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Portions of this paper were presented in lecture form at the Georgia State University, the South Carolina Society for Philosophy, and the Open University (London).



## The Plan and Intention of Aristotle's Ethical and Political Writings\*

PAUL A. VANDER WAERDT

My objective here is to reconstruct the plan of Aristotle's exposition of political science (*politikē*) in his *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*, and to show that this plan reveals certain fundamental but unnoticed features of his philosophical intention. First I demonstrate, on the basis of numerous programmatic but unfulfilled forward references in the extant *Politics*, that Aristotle planned to complete this work in certain promised "discourses on the regimes" (*Pol.* 1260b8–20) by reconsidering his accounts of moral virtue, education and household management from the perspective of the different forms of regime and the divergent ends each promotes. Secondly, I explore the philosophical intention of this plan of *politikē*, arguing that Aristotle's enquiry remains fundamentally incomplete without this reconsideration. His aim of providing the statesman with the knowledge of "legislative science" necessary to apply the teaching on the human good presented in the ethical writings, I suggest, requires this promised account of the way in which the moral virtues vary according to the ends promoted by the different forms of regime. Our enquiry will help to clarify the philosophical significance of Aristotle's conception of "ethics," as tradition has come to know it, as political science.<sup>1</sup>

\*This paper has a long history: I first conceived many of the views here presented when I studied Aristotle's political thought with David O'Connor in 1984, and I remain indebted to him for much valuable discussion over the years. This paper was first presented at Duke University in December 1988, as part of a lecture series on Aristotle, and a subsequent version was read to the seminar in Traditional and Modern Philosophy at The University of Sydney in September 1990. I am grateful to these audiences, as well as to Michael Frede, Phillip Mitsis and A. E. Raubitschek, for helpful suggestions. Particular thanks are due to my late colleague in Chapel Hill, Friedrich Solmsen, who helped to shape my thinking on this subject through much stimulating discussion. It is an honor to dedicate the final result to his memory.

<sup>1</sup>In recent years three valuable studies on this subject have appeared: E. Trépanier, "La politique comme philosophie morale chez Aristote," *Dialogue* 2 (1963) 251–79; S. Cashdollar, "Aristotle's Politics of Morals," *JHP* 11 (1973) 146–60; R. Bodéüs, *Le philosophe et la cité: Recherches sur les rapports entre morale et politique dans la pensée d'Aristote* (Paris 1982); see also P. A. Vander Waerdt, "The Political Intention of Aristotle's Moral Philosophy," *Ancient Philosophy* 5 (1985) 77–89.



Study of this problem has been plagued by confusion since antiquity. Traditional assumptions notwithstanding, abundant evidence demonstrates that Aristotle's ethical writings do not constitute an "autonomous moral science,"<sup>2</sup> but rather form part of his comprehensive political science.<sup>3</sup> Despite the unfortunate title of one recent article, Aristotle *never* "calls ethics ethics."<sup>4</sup> He never employs the terms "ethics" (\**ēthikē*) or "ethical science" (\**ēthikē epistēmē*).<sup>5</sup> Whenever he refers to the subject-matter of his ethical writings, he always designates it as *politikē*. Thus in the *Rhetoric*, when discussing "the investigation concerned with matters of character, which it is just to call political" (1356a26–27; cf. 1359b9–11), he outlines the whole complex of topics treated in the ethical writings under this heading.<sup>6</sup> Numerous passages of the *EN*, moreover, clearly identify his

<sup>2</sup> This is the view of R. A. Gauthier and J. Jolif, *L'Éthique à Nicomaque* (Louvain 1959) II.1 1–2, 10–12; see *contra* Cashdollar (previous note) 157–58 and Bodéüs (previous note) 81, who rightly insist that one cannot infer an "autonomous moral science" from Aristotle's use of the term *ēthikoi logoi* (see below, note 13). This confusion may be traced back to the early Peripatos. The author of the *MM*, an early Peripatetic of Theophrastus' generation who frequently defends the framework of Aristotelian doctrine the philosophical motivation of which no longer is understood (cf. W. Jaeger, "Über Ursprung und Kreislauf des philosophischen Lebensideals," *SBBerlin* [1928] 402–12; P. A. Vander Waerdt, "The Peripatetic Interpretation of Plato's Tripartite Psychology," *GRBS* 26 [1985] 283–302), undertakes to speak "concerning ethics" (ὅτι ἐπὶ ἠθικῶν [1181a25–81b1]), but insists repeatedly that his enquiry is part of *politikē* (cf. 1182b1–6, 27–32; 1183a3–5, 21–24, 33–35; 1197b28–29), evidently to save Aristotle's official designation of his enquiry. Aristotle's presentation of *politikē* in separate treatises seems to have led even early Peripatetics to isolate his enquiry into character from *politike* as a whole.

<sup>3</sup> Cashdollar (above, note 1) 148–49 argues that Aristotle "never speaks of a subdivision or branch of politics which treats moral matters apart from matters of state," but his division of the science of the human good into *politikē*, *oikonomikē* and *phronēsis* (*EE* 1218b12–16) suggests that Aristotle considered enquiry into the individual, household and city each to be subdivisions of *politike* as a whole, a view confirmed by his plan of exposition (cf. Vander Waerdt [above, note 1] 82–84). In the further discussion here promised (1218b15–16), he distinguishes between *phronēsis* as (a) concerned with the individual; (b) concerned with the household; (c) the architectonic part concerned with legislation, *phronēsis nomothetikē*; and (d) the "political" part, subdivided into deliberative and judicial components (1141b23–42a11). Thus one subdivision of *politikē* is concerned with "moral matters."

<sup>4</sup> C. Chamberlain, "Why Aristotle Called Ethics Ethics," *Hermes* 112 (1984) 176–83, who argues that Aristotle invented *ta ēthika* to designate "the new field of ethics" (he follows Gauthier and Jolif uncritically).

<sup>5</sup> As J. Burnet pointed out long ago, *The Ethics of Aristotle* (London 1900) 25–27. The curious scholarly fashion of rejecting Aristotle's stated position is well exemplified by M. Riedel's claim that Aristotle's designation of his enquiry as *politikē* "indicates conceptual confusion" ("Concerning Several *Aporiai* in Aristotle's Practical Philosophy," *Ancient Philosophy* 1 [1981] 156–57 with 159 n. 28; similarly, e.g., H. H. Joachim, *Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics* [Oxford 1951] 16).

<sup>6</sup> In treating the subjects of deliberative, forensic and epideictic oratory (1358b4–59a5), Aristotle resumes all the basic topics treated in the ethical and political writings, explicitly stating that these topics properly belong to *politikē* rather than rhetoric; cf.

subject-matter as *politikē*, as do parallels in the *EE*.<sup>7</sup> Such evidence shows plainly that this subject-matter belongs to political science, not to an independent science of ethics. More importantly, as I shall argue, Aristotle's doctrine in the *EN* can only be properly understood in light of the political framework in which it was conceived and presented.

If we are to understand Aristotle's intention in offering a teaching on *politikē*, we must first clarify the place of the ethical writings within its plan. Failure to reconstruct this plan precisely, I suggest, has obscured the interpretation of Aristotle's moral philosophy in fundamental ways.

## I

Let us begin, for purposes of orientation, by surveying Aristotle's programmatic statements concerning his plan and intention in the *EN*. We will then consider the genuine difficulties which have hindered understanding of this plan in the past, and outline our proposed solution.

In the opening pages of the *EN*, Aristotle designates the subject-matter of his inquiry as *politikē*, the architectonic science of the human good (1094a26–b15), specifies the proper audience of *politikē* (1095a2–13), and discusses its methodology (1095a30–b13). The aim of *politikē* is to educate citizens in accordance with the human good, a final end which is chosen for its own sake (1094a18–22), as Aristotle explains (1094a28–b11):

*Politikē* determines which of the sciences are to exist in the cities, which sciences each [of the citizens] is to learn, and to what extent. And we see that even the most honored of the capacities are subordinate to it—military strategy, household management and rhetoric, for example. Since *politikē* uses the rest of the sciences and since, furthermore, it legislates what [the citizens] are to do and what they are not to do, its end would seem to encompass the ends of the other sciences and capacities, so that the end of *politikē* would be the human good. For even if this is the same for the individual and for the city, the good of the city would appear to be the greater and more perfect thing to attain and preserve, for the attainment of the good by one man

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below, note 19, and *Poetics* 1450b4–12 with G. Else, *Aristotle's Poetics* (Cambridge, MA 1957) 265–70.

<sup>7</sup> Aristotle's audience in the *EE* consists of statesmen (1216b35–39), and he attempts (at 1216b26–17a18) to identify the mode of enquiry necessary to achieve the conjunction between the individual's good and the good without qualification which it is the purpose of *politikē* to produce (cf. 1236b39–37a3, 1248b26–37; *Pol.* 1331b24–32b10). (For other hints that the *EE* is conceived as a political inquiry: 1216a10–37 with 1153b7–25, 1214a30–b5, 1215b1–5; 1216b18–25 with *EN* 1112b11–14; 1218a33–35; 1218b11–16 with 1141b21–42a11; 1234b22–23; and, in the common books, 1130b25–29 with 1276b16–77b32; 1137b17–24; 1152b1–5.) At 1216b37 I accept the emendation τῷ πολιτικῷ for the τῶν πολιτικῶν of the MSS (M. Woods in his edition of the *EE* [Oxford 1982] 201 ascribes this emendation to Ross/Walzer, but it may be found in H. Richards' *Aristotelica* [London 1915] 53).

alone is desirable, but it is even nobler and more divine for peoples and cities. Our inquiry, then, aims for these things, being a political one.

Thus *politikē* aims to direct the other practical sciences in achieving ends, both for individuals and cities, which properly conform to the human good. Its aim, in short, is not knowledge but action (1095a5–6).<sup>8</sup> And this is why Aristotle's audience consists of statesmen (actual or potential),<sup>9</sup> whose training in *politikē* is intended to enable them to produce citizens who are good, obedient to the laws and practitioners of noble deeds (cf. 1099b28–32, 1102a7–10, 1103b3–6, 1140b7–11, 1177b12–15).<sup>10</sup>

Accordingly, Aristotle aims throughout the *EN* to provide this audience with the knowledge of the human good necessary to legislate well. Thus, for example, he explains that inquiry into pleasure and pain is of particular importance for the political philosopher (cf. 1095a10–12, 1152a1–3), just as study of the voluntary and involuntary is useful for the lawgiver in allocating honors and punishments (1109b30–35; cf. 1180a5–14). Above all, when introducing his programmatic division of the soul in 1. 13, Aristotle explains that the true statesman must study the *human* soul in order to attain a knowledge of *eudaimonia* sufficient to legislate well (1102a7–25). His psychology in the *EN* accordingly is not intended, like that of the *De Anima*, to account for all the soul's functions, but only for those directly relevant to human conduct;<sup>11</sup> thus it is fundamentally

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *EN* 1099b28–32, 1102a7–12, 1103b3–6, 1140b7–11, 1177b12–15, 1179a35–b2; *EE* 1236b39–37a3. Of course Aristotle does introduce "theoretical philosophy" wherever appropriate (*EE* 1214a15)—an important example of which is his introduction of "disembodied *nous*" from the *De Anima* in *EN* 10 (see below, note 12). But his use of it is subservient to his practical intention: While theoretical knowledge is an end in itself, it may be useful "accidentally" (1216b3–17a18), and the statesman must acquire such knowledge to attain the ends of *politikē* (1216b35–39, 1236b39–37a3; cf. 1215b2–4, 1216a25–26).

<sup>9</sup> For the evidence, see Bodéüs (above, note 1) 123–25. Since legislative science is useful (and necessary in inferior regimes) for individuals who seek to turn others toward virtue, Aristotle's enquiry benefits not just statesmen. Still, Aristotle can achieve his *practical* aim only by educating political men, who alone are able to bring about the conjunction between the citizens' good and the good without qualification which *politikē* aims to produce.

<sup>10</sup> Aristotle holds that the city exists by nature to foster *eudaimonia* among its citizens (cf. 1252b29–30, 1278b21–24, 1281a1–4, 1325a5–10, 1328a35–41), a purpose of course realized only in the case of the best regime, whose educational program accords with the human good (cf. *EE* 1236b38–37a3, 1248b26–37; *Pol.* 1293b1–7, 1328b34–29a2, 1331b24–32a38); see C. Lord, *Education and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle* (Ithaca 1982); P. A. Vander Waerdt, "Kingship and Philosophy in Aristotle's Best Regime," *Phronesis* 30 (1985) 249–73.

<sup>11</sup> This contrast between Aristotle's moral and theoretical psychology emerges clearly from his criticism of the familiar divisions of moral psychology at *De Anima* 432a24–b7; see P. A. Vander Waerdt, "Aristotle's Criticism of Soul-Division," *AJP* 108 (1987) 627–43.

informed by the political intention animating his enquiry as a whole.<sup>12</sup> Finally, as Aristotle explains in detail in *EN* 10. 9, his teaching on *politikē* remains incomplete without an account of legislation and the forms of regime.

Let us turn, then, to restore Aristotle's moral philosophy to this political framework. We must first clarify three genuine difficulties which have impeded this task in the past: (i) the relation of the two ethical writings to the *Politics*; (ii) the latter's plan of argument; and (iii) Aristotle's intention in dividing his account of *politikē* into separate treatises.

(i) Although the *EE* is not, like the *EN*, elaborately linked to a political work, all citations of the *ēthikoi logoi* in the extant *Politics* refer to the *EE* or to the common books (*EN* 5–7 = *EE* 4–6), which—as is generally agreed—were originally written for the *EE*,<sup>13</sup> the earlier of the two treatises. Thus the composition of the extant *Politics* postdates the *EE* and antedates the *EN*.<sup>14</sup> Given this chronology, which has been strangely neglected, it is

<sup>12</sup> I have argued this thesis in detail in an essay on "The Statesman and the Soul," which I plan to publish in the near future.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. 1261a30, 1280a18, 1282b20, 1295a36, 1332a8, 1332a22 and *Met.* 981b25 with W. Jaeger, *Aristotle* (Oxford 1948) 283–85, F. Dirlmeier, *Eudemische Ethik* (Berlin 1962) 111–15 and A. Kenny, *The Aristotelian Ethics* (Oxford 1978) 5–8. Kenny argues in detail for the *Eudemian* origin of the common books, although much of his case is seriously flawed (cf. J. M. Cooper, *Nous* 15 [1981] 381–92). Cooper claims that Aristotle reworked the common books for inclusion in the *EN*, but his sole argument in support—that 1130b26–29 refers not to the *Politics* as generally thought but to 1180b23–81a31—is not cogent. Aristotle does not discuss the individual's education in 10. 9 (1180b7–8) insofar as he is *haplōs anēr agathos*, nor is the relation between the good man and good citizen—which, as the *gar* (1130b29) clearly shows, is part of the evidence for the promised discussion—even mentioned in 10. 9. Therefore 1130b26–29 must refer to the thematic discussion at *Pol.* 1276b16–77b32 (subsequently elaborated at 1278b1–5, 1283b40–84a3, 1288a38–b2, 1293b5–7, 1328b33–29a2, 1333a11–16), and Cooper's claim is left without support.

<sup>14</sup> The fact that the *Politics* cites the *EE* rather than the *EN* is strangely neglected by Kenny (above, note 13) 226–30 in his attempt to prove the priority of the *EN* to the *EE*, but it is incontrovertible proof of the relative chronology here advocated: If the *Politics* postdated the *EN*, after all, it would follow the plan of 1181b12–24, and it would not cite the *EE*. Kenny's claim that *EE* 1244b29–36 criticizes *EN* 1170a25–b9 fails: (a) There is no evidence that Aristotle is criticizing a written text: the phrase ἐν τῷ λόγῳ does not mean "in the book," but merely refers to the *aporia* raised at the beginning of 7. 12 (cf. 1244b31, which refers to the "argument" of b29–30; 1245a27 and 1245b12, where *logos* refers to the *aporia* raised at the beginning of 1244b2). (b) The *EN* does not advance the position criticized at *EE* 1244b29–36, since it never asserts that the happy man will have no friends, which the *logos* in question maintains. (c) Kenny's claim that τὸ γινώσκειν αὐτό (*EE* 1244b29) is a criticism of the *EN* for "the exaggerated value placed upon the abstract awareness of one's own or other's existence" misses Aristotle's point about the relation between friendship and self-sufficiency: God escapes the need for friendship by being his own object of cognition, whereas we, in order to know ourselves as good, require an object for the operation of our cognitive capacities, a need which our friend fulfills. Kenny's argument thus provides no evidence at all for the chronological relation between the two ethical writings.



no surprise that the *EN* and *Politics* do not provide a straightforward, comprehensive exposition of *politikē*.

(ii) There are in fact serious discrepancies between the political work outlined at *EN* 1181b12–24 and the extant *Politics*: Not only does the latter diverge in detail from the program outlined, but it fails to provide the account of the laws appropriate to each form of regime which Aristotle says is necessary to complete his enquiry. Hence the overall plan of *politikē* has remained quite obscure. Fortunately, however, the numerous unfulfilled forward references in the *Politics*, also strangely ignored, prove conclusively that Aristotle intended to complete his work with an extensive account (his “discourses on the regimes” [*Pol.* 1260b8–20]) of legislation and the forms of regime. These plans for the completion of the *Politics*, I shall argue, correspond exactly to the work outlined at *EN* 1181b12–24.

(iii) Finally, Aristotle’s division of his teaching on *politikē* into separate treatises has encouraged scholars to abstract the *EN* from its political context. For although the *EN* forms part of *politikē*, it nevertheless abstracts from the political considerations—such as the forms of regime, their laws and ways of life—which in practice always inform the individual’s moral education. And the *Politics*, in its extant incomplete form, contains no thematic account of how to relate the doctrine of the *EN* to the divergent ends promoted by the various regimes, or of the practical use the statesman is to make of this doctrine when legislating. Hence it has remained unclear precisely how the *EN* is incomplete without the *Politics*.

These difficulties concerning Aristotle’s intention can be resolved by reconstructing precisely his plan of *politikē*. In his “discourses on the regimes,” Aristotle intended to reconsider his accounts of moral virtue, education and *oikonomia* (already treated in *EN* and *Pol.* 1) from the perspective of the various forms of regime and their divergent ends. When Aristotle abstracts from the political conditions of moral education in the *EN*, he does so quite intentionally, because he plans to complete this account by reconsidering it from a political point of view in his “discourses on the regimes.” This is the intention that underlies the structure of Aristotle’s plan of *politikē*.

My argument is organized as follows. We first (Section II) discuss the unfulfilled forward references in the *Politics*, which demonstrate that Aristotle intended to complete it as promised at *EN* 1181b12–24. Next (Section III), we consider Aristotle’s promised “discourses on the regimes,” their place in the plan of *politikē*, and the philosophical motivation of this plan. In Section IV we examine how to reconcile the teaching on moral education in the *EN* with the doctrine that education must conform to the ends promoted by the regime in force, and how the statesman’s education in legislative science enables him to turn the citizens even of inferior regimes toward the good life properly understood. Finally, we conclude (Section V) by showing that the moral virtues vary according to the “character” and ends promoted by the different forms of regime.

## II

In the concluding chapter of the *EN* (10. 9), Aristotle turns to explain why an enquiry into legislation and the forms of regime is necessary to complete his account of *politikē*.<sup>15</sup> Discourses alone do not suffice to produce moral improvement, he says, because some human beings are not amenable to the persuasion of reason; hence the compulsion of law is necessary (1179b20–80b25). And since *politikē* has the practical purpose of improving moral conduct, the *EN* itself remains fundamentally incomplete without a teaching on law to effect this improvement. Aristotle's practical intention thus inevitably subsumes enquiry into human character into what he calls "legislative science" (*phronēsis nomothetikē*), which is the "architectonic" component in Aristotle's division of *politikē*.<sup>16</sup> Accordingly, legislative science takes on an extraordinary scope. First, legislative science regulates the education not merely of the young, but rather of *all* citizens throughout their lives (1180a1–4):

Doubtless it is not sufficient for men to receive the right nurture and discipline in youth, but they must practise what they have learned and reinforce their lessons by habit even when they have grown up. For this purpose we need laws to regulate the discipline of adults as well, and indeed the whole of life.

This continuing education in virtue for mature citizens accords well, of course, with the educational program of Aristotle's best regime in *Pol.* 7–8.<sup>17</sup> Second, *anyone* who wishes to improve the moral conduct of others must acquire legislative science; one who does so will become like Pericles, skilled in managing his own affairs as well as those of the household and city.<sup>18</sup> The scope of legislative science is due in part to the neglect with which cities (Sparta excepted) treat their citizens' moral education. In the absence of an adequate program of public education, Aristotle says, legislative science enables an individual to turn his children and friends to virtue (1180a24–34). As the architectonic component of *politikē*, it directs the moral education both of whole cities and of individual citizens in inferior

<sup>15</sup> See the analysis of Bodéüs (above, note 1) 95–132.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Bodéüs (above, note 1) 113–14. Since Aristotle holds that *politikē* and *phronēsis* are the same *hexis*, the architectonic component of *phronēsis* is identical with the architectonic component of *politikē*.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Lord (above, note 10) 34–35, 100–04, 177–79.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. 1142a7–10 (where I accept Richards' πολιτικῆς for the MSS' πολιτείας). Aristotle's conclusion here that one cannot attain *phronēsis* in one's own affairs without *oikonomia* and *politikē* proves that the individual, in order to manage his own affairs well, must acquire legislative science. Cf. 1180b23–26: "Presumably, then, one who wishes to make others (whether many or few) better through discipline must endeavour to acquire legislative science—if indeed we may become better through laws."

regimes who seek to educate their families and friends in accordance with the human good.

Before turning to outline the enquiry necessary to complete the statesman's education in legislative science, Aristotle considers competing claims to teach this science, which is, he says, a "part" of *politikē* (1180b30–31). In this case its practitioners, the statesmen, do not themselves teach it, apparently relying upon experience (*empeiria*) rather than thought (*dianoia*). And the sophists who claim to teach it fail, principally for two reasons: First, they fundamentally misconceive the proper relation between rhetoric and *politikē*, wrongly considering the latter identical with or even inferior to the former (1181a12–19);<sup>19</sup> and second, "they think that it is easy to legislate by collecting the best-reputed of the laws . . . as though the selection did not require understanding (*synesis*)."<sup>20</sup> For Aristotle, on the other hand, rhetoric is a subordinate component of *politikē* which the statesman employs to achieve the ends fixed upon by his legislative science.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Aristotle opposes the sophistic assimilation of *politikē* to rhetoric in order to restore *politikē* to its proper status as the architectonic science which governs all the other practical capacities. In fact, he apparently objects to the study of rhetoric in controversy with Isocrates over its proper relation to *politikē*, defending the study of "political rhetoric" on grounds similar to those advanced in the concluding section of *EN* 10. 9 (cf. Cic. *De Oratore* 3. 141; Philodemus, *Rhet.* 6 with H. M. Hubbell, "Isocrates and the Epicureans," *CP* 11 [1916] 405–18, "The *Rhetorica* of Philodemus," *Trans. Conn. Academy of Arts and Sciences* 23 [1920] 243–382; I. Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition* [Göteborg 1957] 299–311). For the precise sense in which he considers rhetoric subordinate to *politikē* see especially his discussion of deliberative oratory in *Rhetoric* 1. 4 (1359b2–16). In the earlier passage to which Aristotle here alludes, he says that, because rhetoric is a kind of offshoot of dialectic and *politike*, it "slips into the garb of *politikē*;" those sophists who claim to possess it do so partly through lack of education, partly through boastfulness, and partly through other all-too-human causes (1356a25–30). Their chief mistake is that they fail to recognize the difference between "common" topics, which furnish syllogisms and enthymemes for all sciences, whatever their difference in species, and "specific" topics, which are derived from propositions peculiar to each species or genus and which correspondingly furnish syllogisms and enthymemes applicable only to a particular science (1358a10–33; cf. 1356a30–33). The sophists' failure to understand this difference leads them to transgress the limits of rhetoric (1358a2–9) and to lose sight of the fact that only *politikē* can supply the "specific" topics necessary for deliberation about political matters. By clarifying the nature and limited scope of rhetoric Aristotle shows why it must be subordinate to *politikē*, the architectonic science which provides these "specific" topics.

<sup>20</sup> Aristotle holds that the sophists' assumption that it is easy to legislate by collecting the best-reputed of the laws merely reveals ignorance of the understanding (*synesis*) necessary to judge which laws are suitable in which circumstances (1181a15–b12). The sophists fail to recognize that the regime is the guiding source of law, and that different regimes and ways of life are appropriate to different peoples, depending upon their natural character—laws which are appropriate to one form of regime can endanger another's very preservation.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. C. Lord, "The Intention of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*," *Hermes* 109 (1981) 326–39; and, on Aristotle's critique of Hippodamus, L. Strauss, *The City and Man* (Chicago 1964) 17–25.

The fundamental deficiencies in the sophists' understanding of the proper task of legislation require Aristotle to consider how the study of regimes may advance the statesman's education. The concluding paragraph of the *EN* requires close attention as his most precise statement of his plan (1181b12–24):

Since our predecessors have left the question concerning legislation unexamined, perhaps it is best if we ourselves investigate it, and indeed the question concerning regimes generally, in order to complete the philosophy concerning human affairs. First, then, let us try to review any discussion of merit contributed by our predecessors on any particular part of the subject; then, on the basis of our collection of regimes, to investigate what kinds of institutions save and destroy cities in general, and each of the forms of regime in particular, and through what causes some are well governed and others the reverse. For after we have investigated these things perhaps we will understand better what is the best regime, and how each of the regimes is ordered and what laws and customs each uses. Let us then begin the discussion.

The discrepancies between this outline and the extant *Politics* frequently have led scholars to declare 1181b12–24 spurious.<sup>22</sup> The most serious of their objections is easily removed,<sup>23</sup> and their conclusion is quite

<sup>22</sup> For a review of the objections brought against this passage and an able defence of its authenticity, see Bodéüs (above, note 1) 147–52. C. Lord's attempt ("The Character and Composition of Aristotle's *Politics*," *Political Theory* 9 [1981] 472–74) to attribute this passage to Theophrastus as the outline of his *Politics* in six books (D.L. 5. 45) is not cogent.

<sup>23</sup> Aristotle's statement that legislation has been left uninvestigated by his predecessors (1181b12–15) has been widely misunderstood by commentators, who do not see how Aristotle could have written this in view of Plato's works (thus e.g. F. Susemihl and R. D. Hicks speak of their posited interpolator's "madness," *The Politics of Aristotle* [London 1894] 69). To explain this criticism one need only consider his statement that "The *Laws* is concerned for the most part with laws, and little is said about the regime" (1265a1–2). Aristotle holds that the regime is the *taxis* of offices which determines what is sovereign in the city and what is its end, the source of the laws laid down to promote the city's way of life (cf. L. Strauss, *Natural Right and History* [Chicago 1953] 135–38 and R. Bodéüs, "Les législations malheureuses: Remarques sur la constitutionnalité des lois d'après Aristote" [forthcoming]). Plato's *Laws*, however, is *not* an account of the regime in this technical sense (cf. G. R. Morrow, "Aristotle's Comments on Plato's *Laws*," in *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century*, ed. I. Düring and G. Owen [Göteborg 1960] 147–48). Moreover, since Aristotle correctly recognizes that the "second-best" regime of the *Laws* by virtue of its abandonment of radical communism is only a more practical version of the best regime of the *Republic*, as the Athenian Stranger himself suggests (cf. 1265a1–9 and 1265b31–66a6 with *Laws* 739a–e, 711a–12a, 875c–d), and therefore that it presupposes the same educational program and the rule of the same philosophy (cf. H. Cherniss, *Gnomon* 25 [1953] 377–79 and T. L. Pangle, *The Laws of Plato* [New York 1980] 376–77, 459–62, 504, 509–10), he can legitimately deny that Plato as well as his other predecessors (cf. 1288b39–89a10, 1316b25–27) had investigated legislation. Since the laws are laid down to suit the regime and not *vice versa*, an account of legislation presupposes enquiry into the forms of regime, and Plato had concerned himself only with the best regime and not with the "collections of regimes and laws" which would be useful to



unjustified. This passage, I shall argue, rather indicates Aristotle's plan for the revision and completion of the *Politics*.<sup>24</sup> Its numerous unfulfilled forward references show conclusively that Aristotle planned to revise it as promised at 1181b12–24. We may begin by considering how well the extant *Politics* conforms to this outline.

This passage does not clearly account for *Pol.* 1: While its argument originates in a refutation of Plato's identification of the forms of rule with one another (*Statesman* 258e–59c), and hence might be regarded together with Book 2 as the promised critique of Aristotle's predecessors (b15–17), an account of *oikonomia* does not obviously fall under the heading of *nomothesia*, the neglect of which by Aristotle's predecessors requires him to undertake the enquiry promised at 1181b12–24. Thus the work here outlined might well have begun with Book 2, if this is the critique of his predecessors that Aristotle has in mind here.<sup>25</sup> The following lines (b17–20) do not obviously account for Books 3 and 4; but in promising to explain, on the basis of his collection of regimes, what preserves and destroys them, Aristotle clearly refers to Books 5 and 6 (cf. 1289b23–26, 1301a19–25, 1316b31–36). He then mentions the best regime of Books 7–8 (b20–21), but the further investigation of how each regime is ordered and what laws and customs it uses (b22) does not occur in the extant *Politics*. This fact is of the greatest importance. The emphasis throughout *EN* 10. 9 on the study of legislation does not square well with our *Politics*, which investigates the regimes and does *not* provide the account of legislation which Aristotle says is necessary to complete his enquiry.<sup>26</sup>

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train the statesman in legislative science. Aristotle criticizes Plato because his exclusive interest in the best regime leads him to ignore the forms of regime with which the statesman ordinarily must concern himself, and therefore makes his work insufficient to serve as the basis for the education of Aristotle's statesman (set out in *Pol.* 4. 1).

<sup>24</sup> Bodéüs' most recent discussion of this passage, "La recherche politique d'après le programme de *L'Éthique à Nicomaque* d'Aristote," *LEC* 51 (1983) 23–33, offers several stimulating suggestions; but his central claim, that "le philosophe . . . pourrait avoir voulu seulement mettre son auditoire en mesure de voir et comprendre, sans envisager expliquer lui-même ce qui devait être vu et compris," is contradicted not only by the plain syntax of the passage (note the subjunctive verbs), but also by the numerous unfulfilled forward references in the *Politics*, collected herein, which prove that he planned to revise and complete it as outlined at 1181b12–24.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. 1260b20–24, where Aristotle undertakes a new beginning by considering his predecessors' views on the best regime. Whatever Aristotle's reasons for beginning the *Politics* with a critique of Plato on the forms of rule and *oikonomia*, the argument of Book 2 does not obviously depend upon Book 1, and so a revised version might have begun with Book 2. If Aristotle did plan to begin with a critique of his predecessors' views on the regime, he certainly would have focused upon the best regime, since his predecessors had left legislation uninvestigated by their exclusive focus on the best regime (cf. above, note 23).

<sup>26</sup> In fact the whole argument of the *Politics* from the end of Book 1 (1260b22–24) is devoted to the study of regimes, as may be seen by considering the programmatic remarks at the beginning of each of Books 2–8.

Fortunately, however, abundant evidence shows that Aristotle planned to provide this promised (1181b22) account in his "discourses on the regimes." There are several forward references, unfulfilled in our *Politics*, which demonstrate that this work was to include an account of legislation, considered in light of the various forms of regime which lay down the end to which the laws are directed—precisely what Aristotle's account of the lawgiver's education in *EN* 10. 9 would lead one to expect. Thus Aristotle dismisses at the first stage of his argument a discussion of whether it is expedient for a general to hold office for life on the ground that this is more the form of enquiry into laws than of that into the regime (1286a2–7). The implication is that at a later stage, when the enquiry into regimes is completed, Aristotle will take up that concerning the laws. This interpretation is confirmed by his programmatic remarks in 4. 1, where he says that the lawgiver, in order to aid existing regimes, must know not only the various forms of regime but also which laws are suited to which regime; the laws promote the regime's particular ends, and so the lawgiver must understand the forms of regime in order to legislate well (1289a5–25). Hence enquiry into regimes must precede that into legislation (1181b13–14). This evidence, together with *EN* 1181b22 and unfulfilled forward references in Books 4 (1300b5–9) and 6 (1316b40–17a1)—hence Books 4 and 6 cannot be taken as the promised investigation of legislation—show that Aristotle planned to follow his enquiry into the various regimes, which culminates in the account of the best regime in Books 7–8, with one into the laws appropriate to the others as well.<sup>27</sup>

To reconstruct more precisely how Aristotle planned to revise the *Politics*, let us consider the concluding paragraph of *Pol.* 1, which provides an invaluable guide to the plan of the work as a whole. Here Aristotle explains why his account of the forms of rule and of the virtue and education of members of the household in Book 1 is incomplete and why it must be reconsidered in his promised "discourses on the regimes" (1260b8–20):

<sup>27</sup> Note also Aristotle's unfulfilled promise at 1135a13–15 to consider the various forms of justice and injustice, which he may have planned to do in the "discourses on the regimes" in light of the various forms of regime (at 1130b26–29 there is an unambiguous forward reference to the *Politics* [cf. above, note 13]). Note also his account of the five subjects of deliberative oratory in *Rhet.* 1. 4, which he prefaces (1359b16–18) and concludes (1360a37) by saying that these subjects belong properly to *politikē* rather than rhetoric. The five subjects are ways and means, war and peace, the defence of the country, imports and exports, and legislation (cf. *Xen. Mem.* 3. 6)—the last being of particular importance, since the city's safety lies in its hands. Consequently, Aristotle says, the deliberative orator must know how many forms of regime there are, what is expedient for each, and how each is destroyed (1360a20–23). And, in order to legislate well, he needs to learn from other peoples "what forms of regime are suitable to what kinds of people" (1360a33), for which purpose he recommends travel books for instruction about the laws of other races. This summary of the subject-matter of *politikē* underlines the crucial role of legislation in Aristotle's thought, and confirms our contention that he planned to consider the laws and forms of regime appropriate to various peoples. See also *Rhet.* 1365b21–66a16.

Concerning the virtue belonging severally to the man, woman, children and father and their intercourse towards one another—what is the noble and the ignoble course of action, and how it is necessary to pursue the good and flee the evil—it is necessary to go through in the discourses on the regimes. For since every household is part of a city, and since the members are parts of the household, and one must see the virtue of the part with reference to the virtue of the whole, it is necessary for both children and women to be educated with a view to the regime, if it makes any difference for the goodness of the city whether the children and women are good. And it must make a difference: For the women comprise half of the free population, and from children come the partners in the regime.

Aristotle's promise here to reconsider *oikonomia* from the perspective of the various forms of regime corroborates his plan (1181b22–24) to complete his enquiry by considering how each of the regimes is ordered and what laws and customs each employs. Moreover, this passage also clarifies the contents of the "discourses on the regimes," whose purpose was to discuss the legislation and educational programs appropriate to each of the forms of regime. The many unfulfilled forward references in the *Politics*, to which we now turn, show that this account also was to contain a reconsideration of the contents of Book 1 generally, including natural slavery and acquisition.

(i) In discussing the natural character of the slaves of his best regime, Aristotle states that if possible they should not be of the same stock, and not thymoeidetic (1330a25–33; cf. 1264a34–36; [Ps.-Ar.] *Oec.* 1344b12–14), so that they will be useful for work and unlikely to engage in sedition; or, in the second instance, they should be barbarian subjects who are not thymoeidetic (cf. 1285a19–22).<sup>28</sup> He then concludes, "how slaves should be employed, and why it is advantageous to set freedom (*eleutheria*) before them as a reward, we shall explain later" (1330a31–33; cf. [Ps.-Ar.] *Oec.* 1344a23–b22; Xen. *Oec.* 5. 16; Cic. *De Off.* 1. 41). Aristotle probably considered it necessary to reconsider slave-management because he thought that each regime will use slaves differently in accordance with the different ends each promotes (cf. 1322b30–a5).

(ii) The territory of his best regime, Aristotle says (1326b30–39), should be of such a size as to enable the inhabitants to live liberally (*eleutheriōs*) and moderately; but he promises to reconsider this definition more precisely later, when speaking generally about acquisition and the proper use and ownership of wealth. Since Aristotle already has discussed acquisition as a part of *oikonomia* in 1. 8–11, he apparently plans to reconsider it in light of the various forms of regime, because the role of acquisition in a regime varies according to its end (cf. 1280a22–81a8). This

<sup>28</sup> Note the reference to the ethnology of 7. 7 at 1285a19–22. Aristotle's insistence that the best regime's slaves not be of a thymoeidetic character is of considerable importance for the interpretation of his account of natural slavery in *Pol.* 1; see "The Statesman and the Soul" (above, note 12) Section IV.

promised account apparently was to form part of Aristotle's reconsideration of *oikonomia* in light of the various forms of regime.<sup>29</sup>

(iii) Aristotle also planned to discuss education in detail in the "discourses on the regimes"—not surprisingly, given its central role in his political thought. At the conclusion of *Pol.* 1, Aristotle defers discussion of the education of women and children on the grounds that they must be educated with reference to the particular regime in force, since different forms of regime promote different ends, which ends in turn determine its laws and educational program.<sup>30</sup> At 1337a14–18, Aristotle states that a city's educational program must correspond to its form of regime, for each regime has its own ethos, which safeguards its particular way of life. Thus Aristotle's account of the laws appropriate to the various forms of regime (1181b22–24) must include discussion of their corresponding educational programs.

Five passages show that he planned to do so. At 1335b2–5, Aristotle promises to discuss the bodily constitution in parents which is most beneficial to children in his discourse on the education of children (*peri paidonomias*), presumably referring to the account promised at 1260b8–20. At 1336b24–27, he promises to consider whether the young should be prevented from seeing iambic verses and comedy; and at 1338a32–36, he promises to consider whether there is one educational program or several in which boys (of the best regime) should be trained with a view to the noble rather than to the necessary. Apparently Aristotle planned to correlate various educational programs with different regimes. Finally, at 1339b10–11 Aristotle promises to consider a series of questions concerning whether music education is able to improve character, and at 1341b38–40 to discuss the meaning of *katharsis*.<sup>31</sup> The wide variety in subject no less than the specificity of these unfulfilled forward references point to an extensive account of the various programs of public education.

(iv) Aristotle's best regime offers its mature citizens a continuing education in virtue,<sup>32</sup> and his promise at 1330a3–5 to explain why common meals are beneficial suggests that he intended to consider the institutional arrangements best suited to educate mature citizens.

One or two of the foregoing examples might conceivably be taken to refer to discussions in other works. But taken cumulatively, they clearly confirm Aristotle's promises to consider how each of the regimes is ordered and what laws and customs each uses, and to complete the *Politics* in his "discourses on the regimes" by reconsidering his initial accounts of virtue and education in light of the various forms of regime. For our purpose it

<sup>29</sup> See further above, note 12.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. above, note 16 and below, notes 41–42.

<sup>31</sup> For recent accounts, see Lord (above, note 10) 105–50 and R. Janko, *Aristotle on Comedy* (London 1984) 136–51.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. above, note 17 and the corresponding text.



does not matter whether these "discourses" have been lost through a mechanical accident, or whether they were planned but never written,<sup>33</sup> for the extant *Politics* both in its doctrine and plan of argument unambiguously assumes it. Accordingly, let us consider the place of the "discourses on the regimes" in the plan and intention of *politikē*.

### III

The persistent scholarly failure to take seriously Aristotle's programmatic statements concerning the political intention of his enquiry into *politikē* is due in part simply to failure to reconstruct its plan precisely. Now that we have seen that Aristotle planned to complete the *Politics* with the account of legislation promised at the conclusion of the *EN*, we may turn to consider what philosophical considerations led Aristotle to present his teaching on *politikē* in separate treatises—in his apolitical *ēthikoi logoi*, on the one hand, and his account of the various forms of regime and their corresponding laws and educational programs, on the other. We shall focus on how the "discourses on the regimes" bring his enquiry to completion.<sup>34</sup>

The central difficulty which structures Aristotle's presentation of *politikē* is that of considering the individual's moral education in light of the wide variety of regimes in which such education takes place. Aristotle holds that any regime must provide its citizens with a universal, public education conforming to its particular ends and way of life to ensure its self-preservation; cities which fail to do so are thereby harmed.<sup>35</sup> The statesman's first task, accordingly, is to educate his citizens according to the ends promoted by the regime in force, whether it be democratic, aristocratic or some other, *not* to make them good human beings without regard to their regime's way of life (cf. 1276b30–33). Since only the best regime promotes ends which accord with the natural hierarchy of human goods, most human beings receive an education intended to make them good citizens of their particular regime, not good human beings without qualification. The doctrine that human beings are to be educated in accordance with the regime in force thus drives a wedge, except in the exceptional case of the best regime, between an education intended to

<sup>33</sup> Lord (above, note 22) 470–71 proposes the hypothesis of a mechanical accident to explain the compositional anomalies of the *Politics*, but this accident must have taken place very early in the transmission of the text, if at all, for the *Politics* alone among the major works is assigned the correct number of books in the pre-Andronic lists, and the contrast Cicero draws (*Fin.* 5. 11) between Aristotle and Theophrastus is explicable only if the *Politics* in his day did not include the "discourses on the regimes." Since the numerous compositional anomalies of the *Politics* cannot be fully resolved by any rearrangement of the text, I doubt that it ever was a finished work.

<sup>34</sup> Further arguments in support of the interpretation here advanced are presented in the essay mentioned above, note 12.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. 1282b10–11, 1289a1–25, 1308b20–24, 1310a12–36, 1337a11–32.

produce good citizens—good relative to their regime's end—and one intended to produce human beings who are also good without qualification.

Now *politikē* aims, of course, to effect a conjunction between the citizens' good and the good without qualification (cf. above, note 10). Aristotle's explanation of how the statesman may make men good human beings in inferior regimes is explored in Section IV. At present, we need to consider how this problem shapes Aristotle's plan of *politikē* as set out in Section II.

There are, of course, other plans of exposition that he might plausibly have adopted. Thus Aristotle could have treated the forms of regime and their corresponding educational programs *before* the moral education of individuals. Such is his order of exposition, after all, in the *Rhetoric*: When considering deliberative oratory he enumerates the five most important subjects for political deliberation (1. 4) before he takes up the individual's *eudaimonia* in 1. 5; and, again, in 1. 8–9 he considers the forms of regime before turning to virtue and vice. In both cases the dependence of virtue upon the forms of regime leads him to consider the political phenomena with which oratory is concerned before considering moral phenomena. Why then did Aristotle not adopt a similar plan in his exposition of *politikē*, which would enable him to treat moral education in light of the divergent ends promoted by the various regimes?

Aristotle adopts the plan he does adopt, I suggest, because of his normative intention: Just as the city exists by nature to foster not mere life but rather the good life, so Aristotle's enquiry into *politikē* is intended to enable human beings to lead the good life properly understood. Consequently, the statesman in legislating is guided by a double teleology whereby his minimal aim is to preserve his regime, but his higher aim is to turn it toward the good life, so far as circumstances permit (see below, pp. 249–50). He does not merely legislate in the interest of the regime in force, but rather fosters *eudaimonia* for his citizens as far as possible through political virtue.

Now a moment's reflection shows why this intention precludes the alternative plan of exposition just suggested. That plan would enable Aristotle to treat the individual's moral education in light of the different ends promoted by the various regimes. But, since his purpose is to provide the statesman with the knowledge necessary to turn any regime toward the good life, Aristotle could hardly have treated these regimes without first treating the best regime, dedicated to the promotion of human virtue and *eudaimonia* properly understood, from which all other regimes in some sense are deviations. Yet Aristotle's account of the best regime relies upon his account of the best way of life for the individual, as he makes plain at the beginning of *Pol.* 7 (cf. 1323a14–21, 1324a5–13).<sup>36</sup> Aristotle's normative intention thus requires him to adopt the plan he does adopt: first,

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Lord's commentary on 7. 1–3 (above, note 10) 180–89.

to inquire into the individual's virtue and *eudaimonia*, abstracting from all political considerations; then to consider the forms of regime, their laws and educational programs; and finally, in his "discourses on the regimes," to reconsider the individual's moral education in light of the divergent ends each form of regime promotes. In adopting this plan, Aristotle is able to tie his teaching on moral education to the diversity of regimes in which education takes place.

This plan obviously gives a crucial place to the "discourses on the regimes," which relate the individual's *eudaimonia* to the divergent ends promoted by the various regimes. In order to aid regimes of all kinds, "divergent" as well as "correct" ones, the statesman must know how to apply the doctrine of the ethical writings, always seeking to preserve the regime even as he turns it toward the good life. In relating moral education to the forms of regime, the "discourses" enable the statesman to apply his knowledge of the human good in all circumstances.

Moreover, Aristotle's plan of exposition entails that his teaching in the *EN* is fundamentally incomplete, in that it abstracts from the political circumstances which regulate the individual's moral education. Since all regimes but the best promote views of justice which are partial or even in conflict with the human good, and since education always takes place within a particular political context, the statesman requires a knowledge of "legislative science" to make this teaching effective in inferior regimes. This point deserves particular emphasis, because scholars of Aristotle's moral philosophy, nearly without exception, have ignored the political intention of his teaching.

To see how the doctrine of the *EN* and of *Pol.* 1 is incomplete, and how the "discourses on the regimes" complete it, let us consider the example of *oikonomia*. As we saw, the "discourses" were to reconsider the topics treated in *Pol.* 1: the virtue and education of subordinate members of the household, the forms of rule (1260b10–13), natural slavery (1330a25–33) and acquisition (1326b33–34). Each topic is incomplete without Aristotle's promised reconsideration. His initial account of these topics is incomplete because of the natural differences in the citizen bodies of the various regimes.<sup>37</sup> In the ethnology of *Pol.* 7. 7, where Aristotle considers the natural characters of the Europeans, Asians and Greeks, he explains that different peoples (including different Greek peoples) have different natural characters, which make them suited to different kinds of regimes; the diversity in regimes therefore corresponds to natural differences among human beings (1327b23–38):

The nations in cold places, and particularly those in Europe, are filled with spiritedness (*thymos*), but are relatively lacking in intelligence (*dianoia*) and art (*technē*); hence they remain freer, but lack political institutions and are unable to rule their neighbours. Those in Asia, on

<sup>37</sup> See Section V of the essay cited above, note 12.

the other hand, have souls endowed with intelligence and art, but lacking in *thymos*; hence they remain ruled and enslaved. But the race of Greeks shares in both qualities, just as it occupies the middle position in space. For it is endowed with both intelligence and *thymos*; hence it remains free, possesses the best political institutions, and is capable of ruling over all, if it should obtain a single regime (*politeia*). And the nations of the Greeks display the same differences in their relations with one another; for some have a nature that is one-sided, whereas others have a nature that is well-blended in relation to both of these capacities. It is clear, therefore, that those who are to be readily guided by the lawgiver toward virtue must be endowed with both intelligence and *thymos* in their nature.

Aristotle's purpose here is to define the natural qualities of the best regime's citizens, whose way of life is dedicated to the leisured cultivation of philosophy (cf. above, note 10). These qualities consist in a natural endowment of *thymos* and *dianoia*, which together make the citizens natural freemen capable of being educated in virtue (cf. 1332b8–10, 1334b7–8), and of maintaining their political freedom. Peoples which lack these natural qualities, Aristotle holds, cannot share in the best way of life.

These natural differences among peoples considerably complicate Aristotle's exposition of *politikē*. For it entails that the diversity among regimes has a natural rather than merely conventional basis. Since peoples differ in their natural characters, different forms of regime and educational programs are needed to promote the different ways of life of which each is capable. The various "correct" forms of regime thus correspond to natural differences among peoples, differences which the statesman must take into account when seeking to make the citizens' good identical with the good without qualification.

It is in consideration of the natural differences among various peoples, I submit, that Aristotle adopts the plan of *politikē* that we have reconstructed. In his initial accounts of the moral virtue and education of the individual and of members of the household, Aristotle plainly wishes to avoid the complexities that would arise from considering them in terms of the divergent ends promoted by various regimes. Accordingly, he abstracts from all relevant political considerations in the *EN* and *Pol.* 1. Similarly, as I have argued in detail elsewhere,<sup>38</sup> Aristotle bases the doctrine of *Pol.* 1 on the moral psychology of the ethical writings, abstracting from *thymos*, whose central role in his psychology does not emerge until *Pol.* 7. 7. Thus in his initial account of the *eidē archēs*, for example, he treats the natural relations of rule and subordination in the household on the assumption (later modified by the introduction of *thymos* in *Pol.* 7. 7) that the capacity for prudent deliberation alone constitutes the psychological basis of human freedom. He does so because he holds that not all peoples—or all Greek

<sup>38</sup> See Section IV of the essay cited above, note 12.



peoples—possess *thymos*, and that its conjunction with *dianoia* is even rarer. Yet, since the individual's moral education is dependent upon the ends promoted by his regime, Aristotle must reconsider his initial account in light of the natural characters and corresponding forms of regime appropriate to the various peoples. Aristotle planned to provide this reconsideration in his "discourses on the regimes," and the absence of this section from the extant *Politics* has greatly impeded our understanding of the plan and intention animating Aristotle's presentation of *politikē*. Still, our reconstruction of the contents and philosophical motivation of the "discourses" has enabled us to see that the *EN* must be understood in light of the political framework in which it was conceived and presented.

## IV

Now that we have reconstructed the plan of Aristotle's exposition of *politikē*, we need to clarify how the statesman uses the teaching of the ethical writings when legislating in particular regimes. In other words, how is that teaching related to the requirement that a regime educate its citizens in accordance with the ends it promotes? As Aristotle explains in *Pol.* 7. 1–3, the statesman's view of the best way of life for his city depends upon his view of the best way of life for the individual.<sup>39</sup> But his first task, as Aristotle also emphasizes, is to legislate in accordance with the ends promoted by the regime in force.<sup>40</sup> Hence Aristotle considers how to preserve not only the "correct" forms of regime, but even tyranny, the worst of the deviant forms. Since the ends promoted by the forms of regime (apart from the best regime) often are incompatible not only with one another but even with the human good,<sup>41</sup> a fundamental dilemma arises. While *politikē* aims to make the citizens' good identical with the human good, the statesman in an inferior regime, if he is to secure its preservation, may well have to legislate with a view to ends which are incompatible with the human good.

It is Aristotle's account of legislative science (*phronēsis nomothetikē*), I suggest, which resolves the dilemma. This science enables an individual, in the absence of an adequate program of public education, to turn his children and friends toward virtue (1180a29–34). Since only Sparta among actual regimes possesses such an educational program, legislative science enables individual citizens as well as the statesman to educate others in accordance with the human good even in inferior regimes which promote

<sup>39</sup> Cf. above, note 36 and Vander Waerdt (above, note 1) 84–85.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. the passages cited above, note 35.

<sup>41</sup> Although Aristotle designates regimes which aim at the common advantage as "correct," and regimes which aim at the ruler's advantage "deviant" (1279a17–21), even correct regimes diverge from the best way of life because the ends they promote are partial and do not accord with the natural hierarchy of human goods (see below, Section V).

ends incompatible with the human good.<sup>42</sup> In legislating he is guided by a double teleology whereby his first task is to secure his regime's preservation,<sup>43</sup> but his higher task is always to turn it toward the good life and to foster genuine *eudaimonia* as far as possible through political virtue.

This double teleology well accords with the role Aristotle assigns to political life in realizing man's natural capacities. As a "political animal" man requires a certain kind of political community in order to survive and live well, and the city comes into being for the sake of life, but it exists for the sake of the good life.<sup>44</sup> The statesman's purpose, accordingly, is to investigate how cities, families and human beings may share in the good life and *eudaimonia*.<sup>45</sup> To secure this end he must ensure the city's preservation, and so may be said to be concerned in the first instance with "mere life" as opposed to the good life. But his higher purpose is always to improve his citizens' way of life in accordance with the normative intention of *politikē*.

The most striking example of this double teleology at work is Aristotle's discussion in 5. 9 of the two ways of preserving tyranny: First, the tyrant may seek to humble his subjects, keeping them in mutual distrust and incapable of action—thus preserving his power but in no way falling short of wickedness (1313a24–14a29); or he may attempt to make his rule kingly, governing in his citizens' interest and protecting only his power—thus his rule will become more honorable and longer lived, and his character will become nobly disposed toward virtue or at least only half-base (1314a30–15b10). This second course of action shows how the tyrant's rule may be turned toward virtue even as it is preserved. This example also illustrates how legislative science can aid in effecting the moral improvement of inferior regimes within the constraints imposed by its ends.

In seeking to reform an existing regime or to found a new one, then, the statesman aims to turn it toward the good life, so much as circumstances permit. To discharge this task, as Aristotle explains in 4. 1, he needs to understand each of the forms of regime, their corresponding laws and

<sup>42</sup> Bodéüs (above, note 1) 113 n. 26 goes seriously astray in his contention that "il s'agit, en l'occurrence, de remédier aux carences du législateur et non d'édicter des règles de conduite prétendument meilleures que les normes implicitement recommandées par la législation," an assumption which vitiates his conclusion (221–25). This interpretation of the intention of legislative science is unsupported by any text and is refuted by the evidence adduced below which proves that the statesman's task is not merely to legislate in the interest of the regime in force, but to foster *eudaimonia* among his citizens.

<sup>43</sup> On Aristotle's preference for reforming a deviant regime rather than replacing it through revolution, see R. Bodéüs, "La durée des régimes politiques comme condition de la morale selon Aristote," *Justifications de l'éthique*, XIXe Congrès de l'Association des Sociétés de Philosophie de Langue Française (Louvain 1983) 103–08.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. 1252b29–30 with 1278b19–30, 1280a31–34, 1280b39–81a4, 1283a14–22; *EN* 1160a11–30.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. 1325a7–10 with 1333a33–39; *EN* 1099b29–30, 1103b2–6, 1113b21–26, 1129b14–30a13.

educational programs, and what tends to preserve and destroy them. In order to realize his normative intention, in other words, he requires a wide body of empirical knowledge, partly provided in Books 4–6 and partly promised for the “discourses on regimes,” to guide him in legislating for the various regimes. The task of *politikē*, Aristotle holds, is four-fold (1288b21–35):

It is clear that, with respect to the regime, it belongs to the same science to investigate (i) what the best regime is, and what quality it should have to be what one would particularly pray for, with external things providing no impediment; and (ii) which regime is fitting for which [peoples]. For perhaps it is impossible for many to obtain the best, so that the good lawgiver and the true statesman ought not to overlook the one that is superior simply and the one that is best under the circumstances. Moreover, thirdly, [it belongs to the same science to investigate] (iii) the regime based upon a presupposition: for any given regime ought to be investigated [to determine how] it could arise in the beginning and in what way, once it has come into existence, it could be preserved for the longest time (I mean the case where it happens that some city neither conducts politics in the manner of the best regime—and lacks even the necessary equipment for it—nor in the manner of the regime possible for it under the circumstances, but some inferior one); and, besides all these things, (iv) the regime that is especially fitting for all cities ought to be recognized . . .

Aristotle's program of *politikē* is intended to avoid his predecessors' errors of failing to investigate the best possible regime and the one more attainable for all, or of praising some existing one, such as the Spartan (cf. 1260b27–36). In contrast, Aristotle holds that the statesman should be able to aid existing regimes by reforming them in accordance with an arrangement that arises directly out of those that exist (1289a1–5; cf. above, note 43). His knowledge of legislative science enables him to educate his citizens in accordance with the human good even in regimes which promote ends conflicting with that good.

## V

Our purpose has been to reconstruct the political framework of Aristotle's moral philosophy. In dividing his account of *politikē* into separate works, he does not seek to establish “ethics” as an autonomous science, but to account for the variety of regimes in which moral education takes place. In his “discourses on the regimes,” as we have seen, Aristotle planned to explain the relation between these two works by reconsidering the topics treated in the *EN* and *Pol.* 1 in light of the divergent ends and ways of life promoted by the various forms of regime. Let us now turn to consider the implications of this plan for interpretation of one aspect of Aristotle's ethical writings, his account of moral virtue.

It is not controversial that an individual's views about the human good are decisively informed by the laws, customs and educational programs of his regime. What is most striking about Aristotle's position, however, and what has gone entirely unnoticed in the scholarship, is that justice and the moral virtues vary according to the end promoted by the regime in force. Since the "discourses on the regimes" are not extant, we lack the comprehensive account of the relation between the virtues and the forms of regime that Aristotle planned to provide here. But when discussing deliberative oratory in *Rhetoric* 1. 8 he writes as follows (1365b21–66a16):

The greatest and most authoritative of all the means of persuasion and of noble counsel is to know all the regimes and to distinguish the customs, manners and advantage of each. For all men are persuaded by what is advantageous, and that which preserves the regime is advantageous. Moreover, the declaration of authority is authoritative, for there are as many [forms of] authority as there are [forms of] regime. And there are four [forms of] regime—democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy and monarchy—so that the deciding authority is always a part or the whole of one of these . . .

One should not neglect the end of each regime, for men make choices with reference to the end. Now the end of democracy is liberty, of oligarchy wealth, of aristocracy things relating to education and the laws, [ . . . ] and of tyranny self-preservation. It is clear, then, that one must distinguish the customs, manners and advantage relating to the end of each, since men choose with reference to this. But since proofs are established not only by demonstrative but also by ethical argument (for we trust one who appears to be of a certain sort—good or well-intentioned or both), we would need to be acquainted with the characters of each of the regimes, for with reference to each the character most likely to persuade is that characteristic of it. These characters will be grasped by the same means, for characters are manifest in accordance with intentional choice, and intentional choice has reference to the end.

Aristotle does not discuss the "character" of each of the forms of regime in the extant *Politics*, but it is clear that this character decisively informs a regime's way of life. At the outset of his account of the best regime's educational program, Aristotle says "it is necessary to educate with a view to each [form of] regime; for the special character of each regime both customarily preserves the regime and establishes it in the beginning, for example the democratic character democracy and the oligarchic character oligarchy; and the best character is always the cause of a better regime" (1337a14–18; cf. 1310a12–18). Aristotle ranks regimes according to their character because this character reflects the partial or incomplete way in which the various regimes promote the best way of life as elaborated in *Pol.* 7–8. Similarly, his account of justice and the other virtues depends on the divergent ends promoted by the various regimes. In *Pol.* 5. 9 he says that a ruler ought to possess virtue and justice: "in each regime the kind that is



relative to the regime; for if justice is not the same in all regimes, there must also necessarily be differences in [the virtue of] justice" (1309a36–39). Thus not only the good citizen's justice but his other moral virtues as well vary according to the end promoted by his regime (cf. 1276b30–33, 1284a1–3). In the extant *Politics* Aristotle does not spell out how the moral virtues are adjusted to the ends of the various regimes.<sup>46</sup> He does state, however, that "[the virtue of] justice is a virtue characteristic of associations, and that all the other virtues necessarily follow upon it" (1283a38–40). The other virtues evidently follow upon justice because justice is perfect virtue not simply but toward others and so in a sense is not a part of virtue but the whole of virtue (cf. 1129b11–30a10).<sup>47</sup> Hence the moral virtues depend upon a regime's ends just as justice as a whole does. In short, the good citizen's virtue varies according to his regime's end.

Aristotle provides some indication of how the moral virtues depend upon the forms of regime in his account of the partial claims to justice advanced by the democrats and oligarchs. Both parties agree that justice consists in a certain kind of equality, but the democrats suppose that those who are equal in one respect, freedom, are equal simply, whereas the oligarchs suppose that those who are unequal in another respect, wealth, are unequal simply (cf. 1280a7–25, 1282b16–83a22, 1301a25–b4). Both parties, Aristotle argues in *Pol.* 3. 9, overlook the decisive consideration: the end for which the city is constituted. If the city were constituted for the sake of possessions, the oligarchs' argument would be strong; but since it is rather constituted for a complete and self-sufficient life, for the sake not merely of living together but of noble actions, the decisive consideration is virtue. Both democratic justice and oligarchic justice only partially reflect justice properly understood. And since the other moral virtues follow upon inclusive or universal justice, democratic and oligarchic regimes presumably educate their citizens according to an understanding of the human good as partial as their principles of justice. A regime's character comes to light in the laws it enacts to promote its ends, and this character is better the more closely its ends, whether democratic, oligarchic or some other, correspond to the human good (cf. 1310a12–18, 1337a14–18).

The fact that justice and the moral virtues vary according to a regime's ends sharply underscores the importance of the political framework of Aristotle's moral philosophy. In practice, the moral virtues always come to light in a particular regime, whose perspective is partial to the extent that its ends diverge from those of the best regime. The account of the moral virtues presented in the ethical writings, accordingly, is incomplete inasmuch as it abstracts from the political circumstances which in practice always govern the individual's moral education—the "character," laws and

<sup>46</sup> As W. L. Newman recognizes in his commentary (Oxford 1902) IV 403.

<sup>47</sup> On this subject see D. O'Connor, "The Aetiology of Justice," to appear in a volume of essays on the *Politics* edited by C. Lord.

educational programs of the various forms of regime. In fact, it is only in the exceptional case of the best regime, which educates its citizens in accordance with the natural hierarchy of human goods,<sup>48</sup> that the moral virtues appear just as they are presented in the ethical writings. In all inferior regimes, they emerge in the partial perspective of ends which diverge from the best way of life. But since all regimes educate their citizens in accordance with the ends they promote, one who wishes to employ legislative science to turn others towards virtue must understand these inferior regimes in order to apply his knowledge of the human good properly. It is only through the statesman's legislative science that the political face of virtue in inferior regimes may somehow come to resemble virtue properly understood. That is why, after all, the enquiry into *politikē* that Aristotle begins in the *EN* is incomplete without the extant *Politics* and the promised "discourses on the regimes."

Contrary to the near-universal assumption of modern scholarship, then, Aristotle's teaching in the ethical writings emerges in its proper light only within its political framework. The scholarly practice of reading the ethical writings in isolation from the *Politics* has no foundation whatsoever in Aristotle's thought. If we wish to understand his moral philosophy, we must restore it to the political context in which it was originally conceived and presented.

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<sup>48</sup> Or at least as far as is possible on the level of politics: see Vander Waerdt (above, note 1) 84–85.



## Aristotle's Elegiacs to Eudemus

(Fr. 673 Rose<sup>3</sup> = Olymp. in Pl. *Gorg.* Comm.  
p. 214. 25 ff. Westerink)

R. RENEHAN

ὅτι δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης σέβει αὐτὸν ὡς διδάσκαλον, δηλὸς ἐστὶ  
γράψας ὅλον λόγον ἐγκωμιαστικόν· ἐκτίθεται γὰρ τὸν βίον  
αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑπερεπαινεῖ· οὐ μόνον δὲ ἐγκώμιον ποιήσας αὐτοῦ  
ἐπαινεῖ αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις τοῖς πρὸς Εὐδήμον  
αὐτὸν ἐπαινῶν Πλάτωνα ἐγκωμιάζει γράφων οὕτως·

ἐλθὼν δ' ἐς κλεινὸν Κεκροπίης δάπεδον  
εὐσεβέως σεμνῆς Φιλίης ἰδρύσατο βωμὸν  
ἀνδρὸς ὃν οὐδ' αἰνεῖν τοῖσι κακοῖσι θέμις·  
ὃς μόνος ἢ πρῶτος θνητῶν κατέδειξεν ἐναργῶς  
οἰκεῖν τε βίῳ καὶ μεθόδοισι λόγων, 5  
ὡς ἀγαθός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων ἅμα γίνεται ἀνὴρ·  
οὐ νῦν δ' ἔστι λαβεῖν οὐδενὶ ταῦτά ποτε.

v. 2 ἰδρύσατο] ἰδρύσαο Bergk || v. 6 malim γίγνεται, ut persuasum  
habeo Aristotelem sic scripsisse || v. 7 verba saepe in dubium vocata,  
varie tentata; haec exempli causa adfero: οὐ νῦν] τῶν νῦν Bergk,  
οὐκοῦν Geffcken | οὐ νῦν δ' ἔστι] νῦν δ' οὐκ ἔστι Wil. | λαβεῖν  
οὐδενὶ] λαθεῖν οὐδένα Rose | ταῦτά ποτε] ταῦτ' ἄπορον Theiler

That these verses are genuine is not in doubt, their meaning is. Much of the difficulty is directly traceable to the two facts that (1) the poem itself is incomplete and (2) the time and circumstances of its composition are uncertain. It is essential to keep these unfortunate gaps in our knowledge ever present in attempting to interpret the verses; more than one scholar who has tried his hand at this has put forward unproven assertions as if they were undoubted matters of historical record.

The number of problems which these few verses raise is remarkable; for convenience I list the main difficulties: (1) Olympiodorus cites these verses from τὰ ἐλεγεία τὰ πρὸς Εὐδήμον. Which Eudemus is intended? (2) Who set up the altar mentioned in verse 2? (3) Is the ἀνὴρ of verse 3 Socrates or Plato? (4) Was the altar set up in honor of the goddess Friendship (Φιλία) or of the man mentioned in verse 3? If the latter, does



this imply deification? (5) Who are the *κακοί* mentioned in verse 3? (6) What is the meaning of verse 7? To these difficulties I would add a seventh, hitherto ignored: What is the meaning of the Greek in verse 3, *ὃν οὐδ' αἰνεῖν τοῖσι κακοῖσι θέμις*?

Of the numerous discussions of this poem the most important are those of Wilamowitz<sup>1</sup> and of Jaeger.<sup>2</sup> Konrad Gaiser's useful study, "Die Elegie des Aristoteles an Eudemos," in *Mus. Helv.* 23 (1966) 84-106, provides a very full bibliography; for further details the reader should consult this paper.

There are two presumptive candidates to be the Eudemos of Aristotle's poem, (1) Eudemos of Cyprus, a fellow Platonist of Aristotle's who died in battle at Syracuse, probably either in the year 354 or in 353,<sup>3</sup> and in memory of whom Aristotle composed his dialogue *Eudemos*, and (2) Eudemos of Rhodes, a well-known student of Aristotle's. Both men have found their supporters. For instance, Wilamowitz and Gaiser (for very different reasons) favor the Cyprian, Jaeger and Düring the Rhodian. At first sight Eudemos of Cyprus seems an attractive choice; what more natural than that Aristotle should address a poem on friendship to the friend whose death so moved him that he named a dialogue after him? "Sehr viel ansprechender [*sc.* than that the poem is addressed to Eudemos of Rhodes] ist dagegen, dass der Unbenannte, dem das Gedicht galt, der Kyprier Eudemos war, und dass das Gedicht durch die Freundschaft zu diesem dem Aristoteles entlockt ist, ganz wie der Dialog seines Namens," wrote Wilamowitz<sup>4</sup> who dated the poem to before the year 357. But there are difficulties: "The traditional text is *ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις τοῖς πρὸς Εὐδήμον*. That is to say, a *living* Eudemos

The following abbreviations are used in this article:

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|---------------------|---|
| Düring <sup>1</sup> | I. Düring, <i>Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition</i> (Göteborg 1957)   |
| Düring <sup>2</sup> | I. Düring, review of <i>Vita Aristotelis Marciana</i> , ed. O. Gigon, <i>Gnomon</i> 35 (1963) 342-46  |
| Düring <sup>3</sup> | I. Düring, <i>Aristoteles. Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens</i> (Heidelberg 1966)  |
| Gaiser              | K. Gaiser, "Die Elegie des Aristoteles an Eudemos," <i>Mus. Helv.</i> 23 (1966) 84-106  |
| Immisch             | O. Immisch, "Ein Gedicht des Aristoteles," <i>Philol.</i> 65 (1906) 1-23  |
| Jaeger <sup>1</sup> | W. Jaeger, <i>Aristotle. Fundamentals of the History of his Development</i> <sup>2</sup> . Translated with the Author's Corrections and Additions by Richard Robinson (Oxford 1948) |
| Jaeger <sup>2</sup> | W. Jaeger, "Aristotle's Verses in Praise of Plato," <i>CQ</i> 21 (1927) 13-17 = <i>Scripta Minora</i> I (Rome 1960) 339-45  |
| Wil. <sup>1</sup>   | U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, <i>Aristoteles und Athen</i> II (Berlin 1893)   |
| Wil. <sup>2</sup>   | U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, <i>Platon</i> I <sup>5</sup> (Berlin 1959)  |

<sup>1</sup> Wil.<sup>1</sup> 412-16.

<sup>2</sup> Jaeger<sup>1</sup> 106-10 and Jaeger<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> Gaiser 102 n. 62.

<sup>4</sup> Wil.<sup>1</sup> 413.

is addressed. This can be none other than Eudemus of Rhodes, the pupil of Aristotle. The poem, I take it, is composed after the death of Plato; and this Eudemus is appropriately addressed in a poem directed, after a recognized convention, to an ἐταῖρος for his enlightenment." So pronounced Jaeger,<sup>5</sup> and Greek usage favors his position. His point is that πρὸς Εὐδημον is normal Greek when someone is being directly addressed (and therefore alive); the Greek for "in honor of Eudemus" would be εἰς Εὐδημον and that is not what Olympiodorus wrote.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, κατέδειξεν . . . οἰκείῳ βίῳ (vv. 4–5) clearly suggests that the βίος in question is over (otherwise one might expect a present tense) and the emphatically contrasting οὐ νῦν in verse 7 leaves no doubt that such is the case. Furthermore, καταδείκνυμι was often applied, as Jaeger pointed out, "in a pregnant sense to religious revelation."<sup>7</sup> Such is surely its force here. Now it has not been observed that these verbs, when so used, almost invariably occur in the aorist, as here, and refer to a time now past. For examples see N. J. Richardson's note to the *Hom. Hymn to Demeter* 474–76 and my *Greek Lexicographical Notes*, vols. I and II s.v. καταδείκνυμι.<sup>8</sup> Plato, who is referred to here (as all now agree: see below), died some six or seven years after Eudemus the Cyprian, so that it follows that this latter individual cannot be directly addressed in this poem, which is what the πρὸς in the expression ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις τοῖς πρὸς Εὐδημον would unambiguously require. As noted above, the Greek for "in honor of Eudemus," not necessarily implying direct address, is εἰς Εὐδημον, and that is what we actually find in Plutarch, when he refers to the dialogue *Eudemus*, written after the death of Eudemus the Cyprian: . . . ὁ τε Κύπριος Εὐδημος, εἰς ὃν Ἀριστοτέλης ἀποθανόντα τὸν περὶ ψυχῆς διάλογον ἐποίησε (*Dion* 22. 5 = *Eudemus* fr. 1 Ross, who translates, "... Eudemus the Cyprian, to whom after his death Aristotle dedicated his dialogue *On Soul* ..."). Note that Plutarch makes no mention of the *Elegy to Eudemus* here. Has no one observed that this is a minor *argumentum e silentio* against the identification of the Cyprian Eudemus with the addressee of the poem? If Aristotle had composed the

<sup>5</sup> Jaeger<sup>2</sup> 14 = 340–41.

<sup>6</sup> I caution the inexperienced against assuming that such fine distinctions are artificial or imaginary; they are in fact very real. As good an illustration of this as any is the legal distinction seen in πρὸς c. acc. versus κατὰ c. gen. See Demosthenes' twenty-sixth oration, the title of which is Περὶ τῆς ἀτελείας πρὸς Λεπτίνην (*vel sim.*). One of the *argumenta* prefixed to this speech in the MSS begins 'Ο πρὸς Λεπτίνην λόγος ἐπιγραφὴν ἔχει τοιαύτην, ἐπειδὴ περ παρελθόντος τοῦ χρόνου ἐν ᾧ ὑπεύθυνος ἦν κρίσει καὶ τιμωρίᾳ γράφων τις νόμον, ἐφαίνετο Λεπτίνης ἀκίνδυνος· ὅθεν πρὸς αὐτόν, ἀλλ' οὐ κατ' αὐτοῦ ὁ λόγος. The distinction enunciated here is no grammarian's invention but a reflection of actual classical usage: Isaeus 11. 34 εἰ δὲ μήτε πρὸς ἐμὲ μήτε κατ' ἐμοῦ δίκην εἶναι φησι τῷ παιδί, τὸν κωλύοντα νόμον εἰπάτω κτλ. For the legalities at issue see W. Wyse's edition of Isaeus (Cambridge 1904) ad loc. (p. 701) and J. E. Sandys' edition of Demosthenes' *Leptines* (Cambridge 1890) xxii–xxiii.

<sup>7</sup> Jaeger<sup>2</sup> 16 = 343.

<sup>8</sup> See also Gaiser 96 n. 41.

poem for *this* Eudemus, it would have been entirely appropriate for Plutarch, who was a man of wide and varied learning, to have mentioned the fact in this context.

Wilamowitz recognized the difficulty presented by πρὸς but could not explain it.<sup>9</sup> Years later, he still adhered to his belief in the Cyprian, and still dated the poem after Eudemus' death despite the πρὸς: "... das Gedicht auf Eudemos von Kypros gemacht war, *natürlich als Totenklage*."<sup>10</sup> There is the additional difficulty that a *Totenklage* for Eudemus, presumably composed not long after his death in 354/53, would have been written while Plato was still alive, and that cannot be reconciled with the Greek of verses 4-7. Gaiser returns to the older view (considered, but not favored by Wilamowitz) that the poem was addressed to Eudemus the Cyprian *while he was still alive*, which would account for the πρὸς at least, but his new interpretation of the meaning of the poem seems completely untenable to me (see below). On the whole, despite the natural wish to associate the Eudemus of the poem with the Eudemus of Aristotle's dialogue on the soul, the position of Jaeger and some others is best supported by the evidence. Beyond the likelihood that Eudemus of Rhodes is intended by the words πρὸς Εὐδήμων we know nothing of the external occasion of the poem.

The related question of the identity of the person who dedicated the altar can be dealt with expeditiously. Wilamowitz seems to have always remained convinced that Eudemus of Cyprus was the dedicator. Jaeger described the dedicator of the altar as unknown to us. The Aristotelian *vitae* preserve a garbled account which makes Aristotle himself the dedicator.<sup>11</sup> In modern times Immisch and Düring have argued for this identification. This latter scholar is almost dogmatic: "Ist wirklich die Elegie so rätselhaft? Wem ist das Gedicht gewidmet, und wer ist Subjekt zu ἰδρύσατο? Ich kann nicht verstehen warum die Antworten, die auf der Hand liegen, nichts taugen: (1) Eudemos von Rhodos, sein treuer Schüler, (2) Aristoteles selbst, der nach langer Abwesenheit nach 'Kekropias heiligem Boden' zurückkehrte."<sup>12</sup> To this theory more than one scholar has objected that it is excluded by the verb in the third person. The objection is serious, but not decisive. So long as the poem remains fragmentary, and therefore the context unknown, it remains possible, despite the third-person verb, that the speaker is in fact Aristotle. It is even possible that the speaker of these words was not Aristotle himself; he could have put them in the mouth of another person referring not to himself, but to Aristotle. In sum, with our present knowledge we cannot answer the question; we just do not know. Here again Jaeger was correct.

<sup>9</sup> Wil.<sup>1</sup> 413: "Dann war es aber nicht an ihn gerichtet, da er in dritter Person erwähnt wird, und Olympiodor hätte εἰς Εὐδήμων sagen sollen. Wenn ich nun auch diese ... Auffassung vorsiehe, so muss ich doch gestehn, dass die Sache keineswegs sicher ist."

<sup>10</sup> Wil.<sup>2</sup> 561 n. 4 (emphasis mine).

<sup>11</sup> For details see Jaeger<sup>1</sup> 107 with n. 2 and Gaiser 97-100.

<sup>12</sup> Düring<sup>2</sup> 345; see also Düring<sup>1</sup> 317.

A far more interesting question is the identity of the ἀνὴρ of verse 3: Socrates or Plato? Bernays and Theodor Gomperz argued for the former. No one, I think, would agree with them nowadays, and it would be superfluous to refute anew in any detail. Suffice to point out that Olympiodorus' sole reason for adducing these verses was to provide evidence that Aristotle was not hostile to *Plato*. If the verses referred to Socrates they are pointless in this context, and surely it is most improbable that Olympiodorus, or rather his learned source, presumably still with access to the entire poem, was guilty of such a gross confusion.<sup>13</sup> There is no doubt that the reference is to Plato and the verses do reflect Aristotle's attitude towards Plato. They constitute a precious human document which strikingly illustrates Aristotle's veneration for Plato, as Jaeger has eloquently demonstrated. Scholars in antiquity at times assumed that Aristotle's disagreements with Plato meant that he must have been his enemy; we know better. Aristotle himself, practicing what he had learned from Plato, gave beautiful expression to his own attitude in the famous passage of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1096a11–16 ( . . . καίπερ προσάντους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γινομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἀνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἶδη κτλ.).

The poem also contains some slight doxographical clues, both about Socrates and about Plato, and these have perhaps not been adequately explored. There is a minor point of grammatical usage which is of interest because it proves that Aristotle regularly distinguished carefully between (1) the historical Socrates and (2) the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues. I refer to the so-called "Fitzgerald's Canon," according to which Aristotle wrote Σωκράτης (anarthrous) when he was referring to the Socrates of history and ὁ Σωκράτης when he meant the Platonic Socrates of the dialogues.<sup>14</sup> Now in verse 6 of our poem the revelation (κατέδειξεν) is announced: ὡς ἀγαθός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων ἅμα γίνεται ἀνὴρ. At first glance the thought looks "Socratic" and one understands why some scholars wished to assign it to Socrates. Others, correctly, objected both that Socrates taught nothing (he certainly never proclaimed a religious "revelation"!) and that this doctrine is that of the *Republic* and *Gorgias*.<sup>15</sup> As Jaeger observed, "it is improbable that the ethical rigorism of the *Gorgias* and the *Republic* is

<sup>13</sup> For further particulars see Jaeger<sup>1</sup> 106 n. 3. I add only that it is inconceivable that Aristotle could have written μόνος in v. 4—qualified by ἢ πρῶτος or not—of Socrates. Even a tentative exclusion of Plato's primary claim here on the part of Aristotle would be psychologically unconvincing. The enormous impact which contact with the living Socrates had on Plato was not, indeed could not be, experienced by Aristotle. Contrast his relatively subdued assessment of Socrates at *Met.* 1078b17–31.

<sup>14</sup> For Fitzgerald's Canon see W. D. Ross' edition of the *Metaphysics* (Oxford 1924), vol. I, xxxix–xli; the evidence for the validity of this "rule" (which is actually only a particular application of the normal use of the definite article) is quite convincing.

<sup>15</sup> For references see Gaiser 84 n. 2 (on p. 85). Scholars also rightly refer to the *Laws* 660e ( . . . ὡς ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ σώφρων ὢν καὶ δίκαιος εὐδαίμων ἐστὶ καὶ μακάριος) and 742e (σχεδὸν μὲν γὰρ εὐδαίμονας ἅμα καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι).



substantially Socratic."<sup>16</sup> In verse 4 Aristotle explicitly states *πρῶτος θνητῶν κατέδειξεν ἐναργῶς* and, as we have seen, all now agree that the reference is to Plato. From this we may legitimately draw the inference that Aristotle did not believe that Socrates had clearly demonstrated *both* by his life *and* by his philosophical teachings that "a man becomes both good and happy at the same time." Plato was the first to achieve that. Whether Aristotle felt that Socrates could not make such a claim because of his life's unhappy end<sup>17</sup> or because of his lack of positive teachings, or both, who can say? This conclusion is negative; it has a positive counterpart.

That Aristotle had great admiration for (much of) Plato's philosophizing—*μέθοδοι λόγων*—is hardly a new discovery. But this poem tells us explicitly that Aristotle believed Plato to be good (*ἀγαθός*) and happy (*εὐδαίμων*) and that he became so not only because of his philosophical dialectic, but also because of *his personal way of life* (*οἰκείῳ βίῳ*). This is a precious testimony, of a sort not found in his formal philosophical treatises, for Aristotle's own opinion of Plato the man, and it is deserving of comparison with Plato's judgment of Socrates in the *Seventh Letter*.<sup>18</sup> It merits greater attention than it seems to have received.

Next we consider briefly the meaning of vv. 2–3 (*εὐσεβέως . . . ἀνδρός*). Of these words Wilamowitz once wrote: "Und nun die Hauptfrage: *εὐσεβέως σεμνῆς φιλῆς ιδρύσατο βωμὸν ἀνδρὸς* (Πλάτωνος), was heisst das?"<sup>19</sup> His answer was that *βωμὸν ἀνδρὸς* go together and *φιλῆς* is a genitive of cause ("der Genitiv ist der des Grundes . . . zu dem die alten Grammatiker ein *λείπει ἢ ἔνεκα* zu bemerken pflegen"). That is, he took the Greek to mean, as he paraphrased it, *σεβόμενος τὴν σεμνὴν φιλίαν βωμὸν ιδρύσατο Πλάτωνος*. Wilamowitz then went on, in eloquent and stirring language, to argue that Aristotle here represents Plato as a god. Jaeger argued vigorously against this notion of an apotheosis of Plato, and printed *Φιλῆς* with a capital phi for clarity, correctly in my view. Wilamowitz's interpretation involves a curious and compound aberration both of style and sense. Verse two is an integral unit:

<sup>16</sup> Jaeger<sup>2</sup> 15 = 342.

<sup>17</sup> One tends to forget that the Greeks did not fully share our romantic view of Socrates' death. That it was a *noble* end they understood; that it was a *desirable* end would have struck them as paradoxical, not to say quixotic. Aristotle's own views on happiness are well known from his *Ethics*; he looked to the end in deciding whether a man was truly happy. At *EN* 1101a6–8 he states *ἄθλιος μὲν οὐδέποτε γένοιτ' ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων, οὐ μὴν μακάριός γε, ἂν Πριαμικαῖς τύχαις περιπέσῃ*. However he is not fully consistent in his views on what the prerequisites for happiness are (W. K. C. Guthrie, *History of Greek Philosophy* VI [Cambridge 1981] 342–43, has some good remarks on Aristotle's inconsistencies in this regard) and, in any event, it is not at all clear to what extent, or how rigorously, one should apply Aristotle's formal ethical teachings to the interpretation of this poem.

<sup>18</sup> 324 d–e: . . . φίλον ἄνδρα ἐμοὶ πρεσβύτερον Σωκράτη, ὃν ἐγὼ σχεδὸν οὐκ ἂν αἰσχυνοίμην εἰπὼν δικαιοτάτον εἶναι τῶν τότε.

<sup>19</sup> Wil.<sup>1</sup> 414.

εὐσεβέως σεμνῆς Φιλίης ἰδρύσατο βωμόν. What Greek who read thus far could have failed to join Φιλίης βωμόν together? If that question, so put, seem too facile to any, I shall be more specific. In a dedicatory epigram, real or literary, a certain neatness of diction is expected. For the name of the recipient of the altar to be postponed to the following verse when there is an abstract noun capable (1) of being personified as a deity and (2) of being governed by the word "altar" in that same verse is stylistically intolerable, and not to be explained away as due to Aristotle's lack of poetic ability when another explanation is ready to hand. Go now to the third verse. However one interpret ἀνδρός, it is undeniable that the following clause, ὃν οὐδ' αἰνεῖν τοῖσι κακοῖσι θέμις, must go closely with it. Take ἀνδρός as Wilamowitz does and the result is a dedicatory statement of the form "X set up an altar of the man whom it is right for the wicked not even to praise." In a dedication one wants a simple genitive of the name, not such a verse as ἀνδρός . . . θέμις. Compare Aelian, *Var. Hist.* 8. 19 = Anaxagoras A 24 D-K: ὅτι καὶ βωμὸς αὐτῷ ἴσταιται καὶ ἐπιγράφεται οἱ μὲν Νοῦ, οἱ δὲ Ἀληθείας.<sup>20</sup> Far smoother stylistically is Jaeger's interpretation: "He piously set up an altar of holy Friendship / For the man whom it is not lawful for bad men even to praise."

Not only the style, but also the sense of the verses is most peculiar, if Aristotle has intended to proclaim the apotheosis of Plato: He introduces him by the word ἀνδρός (v. 3), then seems to reinforce the point in verse 4 (θνητῶν), and, above all, in verse 6 incorporates ἀνὴρ in the philosophical truth exemplified by Plato in his own person. Wilamowitz himself seems later to have quietly dropped this interpretation: "Der Altar war von Eudemos der Freundschaft errichtet; mehr als dies ein Wort brauchte nicht auf ihm zu stehen. Gemeint war die Freundschaft Platons; das schliesst Aristoteles in einem zweiten Genetiv an . . ."<sup>21</sup>

Moreover, there is a passage in the *Magna Moralia* which, if it represents Aristotle's own position (as it probably does), raises the fundamental question whether friendship with a deified Plato would even be possible according to Aristotle: "First, then, we must determine what kind of friendship we are in search of. For there is, people think, a friendship towards god and towards things without life, but here they are wrong. For friendship, we maintain, exists only where there can be a return of affection, but friendship towards god does not admit of love being returned, nor at all of loving. For it would be strange if one were to say that he loved Zeus."<sup>22</sup> The fact remains, nor is it my intention to deny it, that Plato enjoys a very

<sup>20</sup> W. Haase *ap.* Gaiser 96 n. 39 adduced this passage.

<sup>21</sup> Wil.<sup>2</sup> 561 n. 4 (on p. 562).

<sup>22</sup> 1208b26-31 (tr. S. G. Stock). I do not wish to press this passage too much, not only because (1) it occurs in the *Magn. Mor.* and (2) because we cannot know whether Aristotle's formal doctrines are to be imposed upon this poem (cf. above, note 17), but also (3) because the *date of composition* of the poem is unknown, and Aristotle's beliefs could, and did, change.

special, indeed unique, position in these verses; we could describe him not unfairly as a θεῖος ἀνὴρ.

Next we must consider the meaning of verse 3, for it may be that no one has understood the Greek quite correctly. There seems no disagreement as to its rendering: "... for the man, whom it is permissible for the wicked not even to praise." What, precisely, is the reference? Wilamowitz: "... so war [Platon] ein Gott, und es war eine Blasphemie, wenn ein schlechter Mensch selbst lobend von ihm redete. Dies sagt Aristoteles von ihm aus: aber die notwendige Folge daraus, dass er ihn für einen Gott erklärt, will man nicht ertragen?"<sup>23</sup> Jaeger: "The name of 'friend' in Plato's sense could be claimed only by the good. If we remember that, we shall feel it no accident that Plato is characterized in this context as 'the man whom bad men have no right even to praise.' The words are no mere rhetorical hyperbole, they have reference to actualities. They are directed against a eulogy of Plato, which was of no account, against the sharp tongues of fellow-pupils who reproached Aristotle with unworthiness of Plato's friendship because he had criticized certain doctrines of the master."<sup>24</sup> And again: "... the 'bad men' whose praise Aristotle thinks damaging to the master are not just any *misera plebs*, but those mistaken admirers who thought it their duty to defend Plato against Aristotle's criticism of his doctrine."<sup>25</sup> Earlier Gomperz and Immisch had thought that the reference might be to such Cynic or Cyrenaic philosophers as Diogenes, Aristippus and Antisthenes. Gaiser proposes the tyrant Dionysius the Younger or Callippus, the Academic philosopher who killed Dion.<sup>26</sup> We may say at once that the notion that Aristotle would describe Academic philosophers as κακοί is incredible. That he would so describe any philosopher, qua philosopher, is most doubtful. Gaiser's suggestion in and of itself may seem a bit more plausible, for such a characterisation of either Dionysius or Dion would be founded on a moral, not a philosophical, judgment. The difficulty here is that we do not know that Aristotle would have so described them and, as Gaiser himself points out (103 n. 68), in *Rhet.* 1373a18–20 Aristotle treats Callippus without hostility, going so far as to say of Dion's murder, τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐγγὺς τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν φαίνεται! More importantly, Gaiser's identification is closely connected with his general interpretation of the poem, which assumes that both Eudemus the Cyprian and Plato were still alive at the time of composition and this, as we have seen, cannot be.

What all these proposals have in common is the assumption that *some* κακοί, whoever they may be, actually do praise Plato and that Aristotle is condemning them for so doing (οὐ θέμις).<sup>27</sup> These wicked men, we are to

<sup>23</sup> Wil.<sup>1</sup> 416.

<sup>24</sup> Jaeger<sup>2</sup> 15 = 341.

<sup>25</sup> Jaeger<sup>1</sup> 106–07.

<sup>26</sup> Gaiser 101.

<sup>27</sup> Bernays, who believed that the reference was to Socrates, took verse 3 to mean that wicked men could not praise him without thereby condemning themselves as

understand, have lauded Plato and thereby have been guilty of blasphemy. See especially Jaeger's explicit comments. On this interpretation, currently orthodox, we have the rather curious (though not impossible) situation that Aristotle is reproaching people for speaking well of Plato.

I call attention to several details. First, in this poem αἰνεῖν perhaps does not mean "praise" at all. The primary meaning of this non-Attic verb is not "praise," but "tell" or "speak of" (see LSJ s.v.), and the most natural, and expected, thought in such a context is, "in honor of a man whom it is right for the wicked not even to mention."<sup>28</sup> Compare Aesch. *Agam.* 97–98, ὁ τι καὶ δυνατὸν καὶ θέμις, αἶνει.<sup>29</sup> What is more, it is a curious fact that, if (it is a large "if") Aristotle is employing his formal philosophical vocabulary in this poem, it would, strictly speaking, be inappropriate for anyone to make Plato the object of αἰνεῖν in the sense of "praise" (i.e. = ἐπαινεῖν). For, while, pace Wilamowitz, Aristotle does not look upon Plato as a god in this poem, he clearly looks upon him as godlike, as θεῖος, and it is a tenet of Aristotle's that such people, like gods, are not the proper recipients of praise at all. They are above it.<sup>30</sup>

"Unglückselige," because they would thus be acknowledging the truth of the doctrine set forth in verse 6 that only the *good* man is simultaneously "glücklich"—and they themselves are not good (*Rh. Mus.* 33 [1878] 232–33). We need not linger over this curiosity, which seems to assume that the allegedly "wicked" men would have the same opinion of themselves as Aristotle had of them. Surely they would not.

<sup>28</sup> This and similar expressions are widespread; compare a tomb marker in Tama, Iowa, U.S.A.:

Assassinated  
July 19, 1913  
By a dirty coward  
Whose name is not worthy  
to be mentioned here.

(Quoted in *Sudden & Awful: American Epitaphs and the Finger of God*, by T. C. Mann and J. Greene [Brattleboro, VT 1968] 53.)

<sup>29</sup> αἶνει Wieseler: αἰνεῖν MV, a corruption which shows how naturally αἰνεῖν can follow θέμις (and here the verb cannot mean "praise"; note also that there is another variant, namely εἰπεῖν).

<sup>30</sup> In his formal philosophy Aristotle uses ἔπαινος and ἐπαινεῖν in a technical sense. *EN* 1101b10 ff.: ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας πότερα τῶν ἐπαινετῶν ἐστὶν ἢ μᾶλλον τῶν τιμῶν (i.e. does Happiness possess relative or absolute value?). The distinction between τὰ ἐπαινετά and τὰ τίμια is that the former is relative, not absolute; it is applied with reference to a discrete standard (δὲ ἀναφορᾶς). For this reason Aristotle regards praise of the gods as ridiculous (γελοῖος); he states explicitly τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἐστὶν ἔπαινος, ἀλλὰ μείζον τι καὶ βέλτιον . . . τοὺς τε γὰρ θεοὺς μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς θειοτάτους (1101b22–24). Compare further *MM* 1183b19–27; *EE* 1219b11–16. As M. Nussbaum succinctly observes at *MA* 700b34: "θειότερον καὶ τιμιώτερον. These words are linked elsewhere, and contrasted with ἐπαινετόν: the τίμιον and the divine are above praise; the object of praise is praised because it stands in a certain relation to something else." If, I say, Aristotle intended a strict distinction here, there can be no doubt that Plato is to be ranked among the objects of τιμή, not of ἔπαινος. If such be the case, the meaning of αἰνεῖν is settled.



Next, I list some expressions, the relevance of which will soon become apparent: (1) Lysias, fr. 53. 1 Thalheim = Athen. 12. 555 e-f οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τοιαῦτα περὶ θεοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνων, ἃ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις αἰσχρόν ἐστι καὶ λέγειν κτλ.; (2) Isocr. 4. 92 οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γε θέμις εἰπεῖν; (3) Dem. 18. 128 ποῦ . . . παιδείας σοι θέμις μνησθῆναι; (= οὐ θέμις σοι . . . ; compare the context); (4) Pl. *Tim.* 29a εἰ δὲ ὁ μὴδ' εἰπεῖν τινι θέμις κτλ.; (5) [Pl.] *Epin.* 986b . . . οἱ δὲ τοιοῦτοί τινες οἴους οὐδὲ θέμις εἰπεῖν ἡμῶν οὐδενί; (6) Plut. *Mor.* 1076b εἰ γοῦν, ὁ μὴδὲ θέμις ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν, κτλ. These passages show how common verbs of mentioning are with οὐ θέμις and comparable phrases. While this evidence does not prove that such is the meaning of αἰνεῖν here, it lends support to such an interpretation. Θέμις, as well as οὐ θέμις (*fas/nefas*) is common in such expressions, Pl. *Phdr.* 250b ἐτελοῦντο τῶν τελετῶν ἣν θέμις λέγειν μακαριωτάτην; *Soph.* 258b εἰ θέμις εἰπεῖν; *Symp.* 195a εἰ θέμις καὶ ἀνεμέσητον εἰπεῖν. Naturally, where the context calls for it, other infinitives also occur, e.g. Eur. *Hipp.* 1396 κατ' ὅσων δ' οὐ θέμις βαλεῖν δάκρυ; Pl. *Apol.* 30c-d οὐ γὰρ οἶομαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἀμείνονι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χείρονος βλάπτεσθαι; Theocr. 1. 15-16 οὐ θέμις ἄμμιν συρίσδεν; [Dem.] 25. 81 τούτων γ' οὐθ' ὅσιον οὔτε θέμις τῷ μιᾶρῷ τούτῳ μεταδοῦναι.<sup>31</sup> In any event, the basic interpretation of the poem is not dependent upon the specific meaning of αἰνεῖν here, since either "mention" or "praise" makes sense.

On the other hand, what is crucial for an understanding of our passage is the recognition that οὐ θέμις *with an infinitive of saying or mentioning (or praising) does not necessarily imply that anyone has actually mentioned the person or carried out the practice in question.* In this regard οὐ θέμις with *any* infinitive is at least neutral; the speaker who uses οὐ θέμις is expressing a moral judgment on an activity which may or may not have actually occurred. Very often the context shows that it did not and cannot. This is particularly clear at Pl. *Apol.* 20b, where Apollo, ὁ θεὸς ὁ ἐν Δελφοῖς, is the subject: τί οὖν ποτε λέγει [*sc.* ὁ θεός] φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ψεύδεται γε· οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ. Inspection of the contexts of the other examples of οὐ θέμις cited above will provide further confirmation of this.

In other words, contrary to the widespread assumptions of previous interpreters, in the clause ὃν οὐδ' αἰνεῖν τοῖσι κακοῖσι θέμις, the dative τοῖσι κακοῖσι need not, and, I would say, certainly does not contain an allusion to any definite individuals. The clause is generic and there is no reason to assume that Aristotle has any specific person(s) in mind. Gaiser observed, "Dass der aristotelische Vers zum Teil formelhaften Charakter hat, beweist der Anklang an einen Vers des Euripides (Hippolytos 81), wo es den

<sup>31</sup> For more examples of οὐ θέμις *c. inf.* and a discussion of the meaning of οὐ θέμις see A. W. Bulloch, *Callimachus. The Fifth Hymn* (Cambridge 1985) 185-86 (note to verse 78).

Schlechten verwehrt wird (τοῖς κακοῖσι δ' οὐ θέμις), die Blumen der Göttin zu pflücken."<sup>32</sup> This is a useful observation, even if Aristotle's words are hardly a "reminiscence" of the *Hippolytus* passage. What that passage rather suggests is that οὐ θέμις τοῖς κακοῖς *cum infinitivo* was a stock religious expression. In the nature of things we would expect it to be so, and Aristotle's verse further suggests this. One should notice immediately that in Euripides, as in Aristotle, the dative τοῖς κακοῖς is most naturally understood as generic. I call attention to another passage, "Hippocrates" *Lex* c. 5: τὰ δὲ ἱερὰ ἐόντα πρήγματα ἱεροῖσιν ἀνθρώποισι δείκνυται· βεβήλοισι δὲ οὐ θέμις, πρὶν ἢ τελεσθῶσιν ὀργίοισιν ἐπιστήμης. Note the striking parallelism with Aristotle here. There is the same transference of mystery terminology to intellectual revelation (δείκνυται/κατέδειξεν), and the same expression of religious prohibition (βεβήλοισι οὐ θέμις/τοῖσι κακοῖσι οὐ θέμις). Above all, observe that the dative βεβήλοισι is unquestionably generic; no specific individual is, or can be, intended. This argues strongly that the article in τοῖσι κακοῖσι is generic and that both expressions should be interpreted along similarly general lines.

Let us return to Euripides' *Hippolytus*, verses 78–81, to which reference has just been made above:

Αἰδῶς δὲ ποταμίοισι κηπεύει δρόσοις,  
 ὅσοις διδακτὸν μηδὲν ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει  
 τὸ σωφρονεῖν εἴληχεν εἰς τὰ πάντ' αἰεὶ,  
 τούτοις δρέπεσθαι, τοῖς κακοῖσι δ' οὐ θέμις.

Hippolytus is the speaker, and his gospel is, in its own way, as strange for the fifth century as Plato's was for the fourth. Who are the κακοί whom he has in mind? W. S. Barrett *ad loc.* observes the following: "Eur. is not concerned to pass allusive judgement on any particular beliefs of his own day: his theme is not contemporary but timeless, and his purpose is simply to delineate in its beauty and inadequacy alike the puritan austerity of which Hipp. is the type. . . . this picture . . . is no piece of contemporary polemic but a dramatist's characterization of a type . . ." (p. 173). This is, *mutatis mutandis*, as good an exegesis as any of Aristotle's ὃν οὐδ' αἰνεῖν τοῖσι κακοῖσι θέμις.

Now verse 7, οὐ νῦν δ' ἔστι λαβεῖν οὐδενὶ ταῦτά ποτε: What does this mean? Not a few, including Wilamowitz, pronounced it corrupt. None of the numerous conjectures proposed carries conviction; in such a situation it is always prudent to return to the *paradosis* and attempt to extract sense from it. The verse has been approached from several directions. Rose's conjecture, λαθεῖν οὐδένα for λαβεῖν οὐδενὶ (= "No one can now fail to notice this"), cannot be correct, because it goes too far. Aristotle would not say that Plato's holy revelation was now obvious to everyone; only certain philosophers could hope to grasp it. The same objection applies to

<sup>32</sup> Gaiser 101 (after H. Hommel: n. 60).

Theiler's ταῦτ' ἄπορον for ταῦτά ποτε. Gaiser, retaining the MS text, understands νῦν to mean "in this world," "in the here and now," in contrast to the incorporeal other world of the disembodied soul, so that for him the verse means: In this world of matter no one can grasp (λαβεῖν) the knowledge of ultimate reality; only in another existence can one truly acquire (λαβεῖν) the ideal knowledge of Platonic philosophy. He goes so far as to see an allusion to *anamnesis* in the poem. The meaning which he gives to νῦν here is, in this context and without further qualification, impossible, and his whole interpretation is, in my judgment, quite mistaken. To go no further, it was in the here and now that Plato showed clearly by his life (= ὁ νῦν βίος!) the truth expressed in the sixth verse. Jaeger also defended the paradox and explained οὐκ ἔστι λαβεῖν as a "standing expression in Aristotle's treatises for the unattainability of the ideal." (Against this interpretation of the Greek see Gaiser 91.) Jaeger renders the verse, "But now it is not possible for anyone ever to attain this." By "this" (ταῦτα) he understands what everyone else seems to, namely the philosophical "gospel" announced in the sixth verse. The objection to Jaeger's interpretation is the opposite of that to Rose's and Theiler's: It does not go far enough. By denying the possibility of anyone else's attaining this ideal,<sup>33</sup> Jaeger would have Aristotle deny the possibility of the philosophical life in a most un-Platonic, and un-Aristotelian, manner. Here it is relevant to recall the metaphor κατέδειξεν, which it was Jaeger's own merit to have elucidated. It is an image drawn from the sphere of religious revelation. It would be pointless, and no grounds for veneration, to have revealed the unattainable. Rather, literal sacred mysteries (τελευταί) are revealed *to the elect, to those capable of full initiation into them*. As applied to philosophers, the select few, the analogy here is obvious and perfect.

Let us try a different approach. That the verse, beginning with οὐ νῦν δ' and ending with ποτε, is inelegant seems clear. Aristotle was not a professional poet and some of his experiments with diction do not succeed. He has been harshly judged by distinguished critics: "... ein Dichter war Aristoteles nicht, das zeigen alle seine Verse;"<sup>34</sup> "... Aristotle, whose memory for poetry was as lamentable as his talent for composing it."<sup>35</sup> Others, including Guthrie<sup>36</sup> and Jaeger, have been kinder; in *GRBS* 23 (1982) 251-74 I have tried to show that Aristotle's Hermias poem was a technically sophisticated production. But rough edges there undoubtedly are. In verse 4 μόνος ἢ πρῶτος is prosaic; the collocation is partly borrowed from Aristotle's own technical rhetorical diction. See *Rhet.* 1368a10, 1375a2, 1385a21 (noted by Gaiser, after K. Thraede: 96 n. 42). In verse 7

<sup>33</sup> Jaeger<sup>2</sup> 17 = 344: "The doctrine is not the less true for the fact that only Plato himself was able wholly to realize it."

<sup>34</sup> Wil.<sup>2</sup> 561 n. 4 (on p. 562).

<sup>35</sup> M. L. West, *Hesiod. Theogony* (Oxford 1966) 68.

<sup>36</sup> W. K. C. Guthrie, *History of Greek Philosophy* VI (Cambridge 1981) 33 (on the Hermias poem).

οὐ νῦν . . . οὐδενὶ . . . ποτε should be taken closely together: "But not now is it ever possible for anyone . . ." <sup>37</sup> The general meaning would be more clearly represented by νῦν δ' οὐκέτι ἔστι κτλ. Aristotle seems to have attempted a stronger denial by using οὐποτε (i.e. "never again now") rather than οὐκέτι, and by placing οὐ at the beginning and ποτε at the end of the verse, somewhat infelicitously. Wilamowitz's νῦν δ' οὐκ ἔστι (*Hermes* 65 [1930] 246) seems to me a rewriting of Aristotle rather than a correction of the MSS.

If the reader is prepared to follow thus far, namely to accept (1) that the text is sound and (2) that Aristotle is stating, somewhat clumsily, that it is not now—and never will be—possible for any to attain this (λαβεῖν ταῦτα), to what, then, does ταῦτα refer? We have seen that scholars understand it of the content of the sixth verse and that the resultant sense is problematic. Greek often uses plural demonstratives where we expect a singular. May not ταῦτα refer rather to Plato's achievement as expressed in verses 4 and 5, namely μόνος ἢ πρῶτος θνητῶν κατέδειξεν ἐναργῶς κτλ.? Aristotle glorifies Plato as the πρῶτος εὐρετής of this philosophical truth, much as Lucretius has glorified Epicurus, especially in the proems to his third and fifth books. Plato it was who first revealed, by his life and teaching, this great mystery, that a man becomes good and happy simultaneously. To have revealed that—this is the distinction which no one else can ever attain, the prize which no one can now win (λαβεῖν can mean either or both). <sup>38</sup> The glory is all Plato's and his alone.

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<sup>37</sup> Compare Jaeger<sup>2</sup> 17 = 344: "νῦν and ποτέ do not exclude one another, as has been thought. νῦν includes all time since Plato; ποτέ stands for any moment of time within this period . . . Attempts to alter the words οὐ νῦν are due to a failure to see that the sharp opposition is needed to distinguish the present of the writer from the time when Plato still moved among men."

<sup>38</sup> Λαμβάνω in the sense of "winning" a prize is common; see LSJ s.v. ἄθλον I. It is curious, and perhaps no mere coincidence, that the phrases μόνος καὶ πρῶτος and πρῶτος καὶ μόνος are technical terms of the vocabulary of athletic competition. See M. N. Tod, "Greek Record-Keeping and Record-Breaking," *CQ* 43 (1949) 111: "But by far the commonest phrase is the combination μόνος καὶ πρῶτος or πρῶτος καὶ μόνος, used interchangeably . . ." For occurrences in non-athletic contexts, see e.g. Pl. *Menex.* 237e (μ. καὶ π.) and Polyb. 4. 20. 3 (π. καὶ μ.).





## Livius und Augustus

ERICH BURCK

Obwohl Friedrich Solmsen sich weder in seinen eigenen Studien mit dem Geschichtswerk des Livius beschäftigt noch eine Vorlesung oder ein Seminar darüber gehalten hat, griff er es doch mit lebhaftem Interesse auf, wenn ich ihm dies oder jenes von meiner Beschäftigung mit Livius berichtete. Daher sei es erlaubt, ihm in dieser Gedenkschrift einen Beitrag über Livius zu widmen.

### I

Das persönliche Verhältnis des Livius zu Augustus und seinem Prinzipat ist oft und unter sehr verschiedenen Aspekten erörtert worden, ohne daß man bisher zu einem Konsens gekommen wäre. Das liegt vor allem daran, daß die direkten Zeugnisse darüber sehr spärlich sind und daß die indirekten Schlüsse auf Textstellen beruhen, deren Aussage und persönlicher Bezug vieldeutig sind. Immerhin besteht darüber weithin Übereinstimmung, daß Livius wie seine Zeitgenossen Vergil und Horaz nach zwanzig Jahren Bürgerkrieg den durch Octavians Sieg bei Aktium heraufgeführten Frieden und die durch seine ersten Maßnahmen erreichte Stabilisierung der Lebensverhältnisse begrüßt hat. Das wird u.a. dadurch bewiesen, daß er die Schließung des Janus im Jahre 27 als ein Geschenk der Götter feiert<sup>1</sup> und daß er unbeschadet der vielen Kriegsberichte und des Stolzes auf die römischen Siege die Vormachtstellung Roms über die ganze Welt in der Eintracht des römischen Volkes und im Frieden gesichert sehen will. Wann und unter welchen Umständen eine erste Berührung zwischen beiden Männern erfolgt ist und wie sich ihr Verhältnis zueinander entwickelt hat, ist nur andeutungsweise zu ermitteln.

Drei Notizen erlauben vielleicht wenigstens einen Hinweis. Als Livius davon berichtet, daß er einen Irrtum über die Erringung der *spolia opima*

<sup>1</sup> *Bis deinde post Numae regnum (scil. Janus) clausus fuit, semel T. Manlio consule post Punicum primum perfectum bellum, iterum quod nostrae aetati dii dederunt, ut videremus, post bellum Actiacum ab imperatore Caesare Augusto pace terra marique parata* (1, 19, 3). Vgl. den dringenden Wunsch zur Erhaltung des Friedens am Ende des Alexander-Exkurses (9, 19, 17).

durch A. Cornelius Cossus berichtigen will—wir werden darauf gleich zurückkommen—, weist er auf eine Äußerung des Augustus hin, mit der dieser die bestehende Unklarheit mit Hinweis auf seine Autopsie der Weihinschrift geklärt habe: *hoc ego cum Augustum . . . se ipsum in thorace linteo scriptum legisse audissem* (4, 20, 7 ff.). Diese Formulierung zeigt, daß er nicht von Augustus selbst, sondern von dritter Seite den Ausspruch des Augustus gehört hat und daß offenbar damals noch keine Beziehung zwischen beiden bestand. Das liegt ja auch nahe, da nicht damit zu rechnen ist, daß der Paduaner Livius, selbst wenn er Buch 1 als Probe seines Schaffens in einem kleinen oder größeren Kreise vorgetragen haben sollte, in Rom die Aufmerksamkeit des Publikums und vor allem des Princeps vor der Publikation der ersten Pentade auf sich gelenkt haben dürfte. Da ich, was ich hier nicht begründen kann, mit zahlreichen Forschern damit rechne, daß Livius erst nach der Rückkehr Octavians nach Rom im Jahre 29 oder gar erst 27 mit der Arbeit an seinem Werk begonnen hat und daß die erste Pentade im Jahre 25 fertig vorlag, wird man die Bekanntschaft des Livius mit Augustus nach diesem Termin ansetzen.

Die viel zitierte Stelle des Tacitus, daß Augustus Livius einen Pompejaner genannt habe, daß dies aber ihrer Freundschaft keinen Eintrag getan hätte,<sup>2</sup> läßt sich vielleicht chronologisch andeutungsweise verwerten. Wir erfahren nämlich durch Sueton, daß der spätere Kaiser Claudius in seinen jungen Jahren auf Anraten des Livius angefangen habe, sich mit historischen Studien zu beschäftigen: *historiam in adolescentia hortante T. Livio . . . scribere aggressus est*.<sup>3</sup> Da Claudius im Jahre 10 v.Chr. geboren war, dürfte der Beginn dieser historischen Arbeiten in das erste Jahrzehnt n.Chr. zu datieren sein. Das ist etwa die Zeit, in der Livius das Leben und Schicksal des Pompeius in den Büchern 91–112 behandelte. Es ist gut denkbar, daß damals das Urteil des Augustus über Livius als Pompejaner gefallen wäre, sei es im persönlichen Gespräch des Princeps mit Livius über seine laufende Arbeit, sei es auf Grund einer Vorlesung des Livius aus seinem Werk oder auf Grund der Lektüre eines Werkteils durch Augustus. Sowohl die Notiz des Tacitus als auch die Nachricht Suetons sprechen für die Annahme, daß eine auf Vertrauen begründete und wohl auch schon länger währende Verbundenheit zwischen beiden Männern bestand.

Schließlich sei noch erwähnt, daß sich vor der Periocha des Buches 121 die Notiz findet: (*liber*) *qui editus post excessum Augusti dicitur*. Falls diese Bemerkung auf eine Anordnung des Livius zurückgeht, wird man nach dem Grund dieser Verfügung fragen. In Buch 120 hatte Livius über den Zusammenschluß von Antonius, Octavian und Lepidus zum sog. zweiten Triumvirat und die unmittelbar darauf folgenden Proskriptionen berichtet, denen nach Ausweis der Periocha zahlreiche römische Ritter und 130

<sup>2</sup> Titus Livius, *eloquentiae ac fidei praeclarus in primis, Cn. Pompeium tantis laudibus tulit, ut Pompeianum eum Augustus appellaret* (Tac. Ann. 4, 34, 3).

<sup>3</sup> Suet. Claud. 41, 1.

Senatoren zum Opfer fielen, unter ihnen auch Cicero. Die Zustimmung Octavians zur Ermordung Ciceros war wahrlich kein Ruhmesblatt für ihn. Voller Blut und Opfer waren auch die von Buch 121 an berichteten folgenden Jahre bis zum Perusinischen Krieg, an dessen Ende Octavian im Februar des Jahres 40 zwar gegenüber dem belagerten Antonius und seinen Soldaten Milde walten ließ, aber als Akt der Rache für den Tod Caesars 300 Senatoren und Ritter hinrichten ließ. Wir wissen nicht, wie Livius diese Octavian schwer belastenden Jahre dargestellt hat. Aber die Vermutung liegt nahe, daß er diese Bücher dem Augustus vorenthalten wollte: vielleicht weniger aus Furcht, das bestehende Vertrauensverhältnis zu stören oder sich gar den Zorn des Princeps und eine Strafe zuzuziehen als vielmehr aus Rücksichtnahme und Taktgefühl, Augustus zu einer Stellungnahme zu seiner Behandlung dieser Jahre zu nötigen. Auch hier kommt man über Vermutungen nicht hinaus. Als eine solche erweist sich auch die—sehr wahrscheinliche—Annahme, daß Livius und Augustus sich bei einer Vorlesung des Historikers zuerst begegnet sind, wie eine Bemerkung Suetons dies nahe legt: *recitantis et benigne et patienter audiit nec tantum carmina et historias, sed et orationes et dialogos*.<sup>4</sup>

Welchen Eindruck gewinnt man von den Erwähnungen des Augustus in den erhaltenen Büchern? An den beiden bereits erwähnten Stellen spricht Livius vom *imperator Caesar Augustus*<sup>5</sup> und bei den *spolia opima* des Cornelius Cossus von *Augustus Caesar, templorum omnium conditor aut restitutor*:<sup>6</sup> das erste gleichsam ein offiziöser Titel,<sup>7</sup> das zweite ein naheliegender Hinweis bei der Erwähnung des von Augustus wiederhergestellten Tempels des Jupiter Feretrius, in dem die *spolia opima* aufbewahrt waren, auf eine der ersten kultischen Regelungen des Augustus. Dieser Erwähnung der Äußerung des Augustus, daß er die Weihinschrift für Cossus im Tempel gesehen habe, fügt Livius die Worte hinzu: *prope sacrilegium ratus sum Cossus spoliis suorum Caesarem ipsius templi auctorem subtrahere testem*. In dieser Formulierung hat G. Stübler<sup>8</sup> einen Hinweis auf eine göttliche Erhöhung des Augustus gesehen und hat sich bemüht, in weiteren Textstellen eine solche Huldigung für Augustus zu finden. Dabei ist er so weit gegangen, daß er die These aufstellte, daß Livius Augustus als Gott und Gottes Sohn auf Erden—wie Romulus—gesehen wissen wollte.<sup>9</sup> Das ist völlig verfehlt. Das Wort *sacrilegium* hat sich offenbar eingestellt, da Augustus gleichsam aus dem Tempel heraus gesprochen hat und der *restitutor* dieses Tempels mit dem obligaten Hüter

<sup>4</sup> Suet. Aug. 89, 3.

<sup>5</sup> 1, 19, 3.

<sup>6</sup> 4, 20, 7.

<sup>7</sup> Das Schwergewicht liegt in diesem Satz auf dem Geschenk der Götter, nicht auf der Leistung des Augustus.

<sup>8</sup> G. Stübler, Die Religiosität des Livius, Tübinger Beitr. z. Altertumsw. 35, 1941.

<sup>9</sup> "Gott hat Augustus gesandt, der Welt die Segnungen des Friedens zu vermitteln . . . Augustus, Gott, Gottes Sohn ist gekommen, die Welt selig zu machen" (43).



des Heiligtums gleichgesetzt wird. J. Briscoe<sup>10</sup> und H. J. Mette<sup>11</sup> haben aus der Stelle—zu Unrecht, wie ich meine—eine gewisse Skepsis gegenüber der Allwissenheit des Augustus heraushören wollen. Das Richtige hat meiner Meinung nach P. G. Walsh gesagt, der die Worte als "respektvoll" und als Zustimmung zu den kultisch-religiösen Erneuerungen deutete.<sup>12</sup>

Eine dritte Erwähnung findet sich zum Jahre 206 bei der Vertreibung der Punier aus Spanien, als Livius darauf hinweist, daß erst in der Gegenwart (*nostra demum aetate*)<sup>13</sup> Spanien *ductu auspicioque Augusti Caesaris* endgültig bezwungen worden ist. Auch hier handelt es sich um eine sachliche Feststellung, die gewiß ehrenvoll ist, die Livius aber notiert, ohne sie zu einem Ruhmesblatt für Augustus zu machen. Die Gelegenheit dazu hätte hier—wie an manchen anderen Stellen der erhaltenen Bücher—nahe gelegen, zumal Augustus nach längerer Abwesenheit bei seiner Rückkehr nach Rom freudig begrüßt<sup>14</sup> und die Ankündigung der endgültigen Unterwerfung Spaniens sicher mit großer Genugtuung aufgenommen worden ist.

Schließlich haben einzelne Forscher wie L. Ross Taylor,<sup>15</sup> K. Scott<sup>16</sup> und Stübler gemeint, daß Livius mit dem relativ häufigen Auftreten des Wortes *augustus* das dem Octavian im Jahre 27 beigelegte Cognomen Augustus in der Öffentlichkeit habe beliebt machen wollen. Das ist schon deshalb abzulehnen, weil das Wort, wie H. Erckell<sup>17</sup> dargelegt hat, nur in der

<sup>10</sup> J. Briscoe, *The First decade*, in *Livy* ed. by T. A. Dorey (London-Toronto 1971) 1–11.

<sup>11</sup> H. J. Mette, *Livius und Augustus*, *Gymn.* 68, 1961, 269–85. Mette hat aus der Behandlung des Augustus durch Cassius Dio, der in den Büchern 45–51 nach dem Nachweis von Ed. Schwartz (R.-E. I 3, 1899) Livius als Hauptquelle benutzt hat, den Schluß gezogen, daß Livius gegenüber den Maßnahmen des Augustus kritisch war und blieb. Auch Walsh (vgl. Anm. 12) sieht ihn bis zuletzt als traditionellen Republikaner. R. Syme, *Roman Revolution* (Oxford 1939) 317; 468 spricht dagegen von einer bleibend freundlichen Annahme der neuen Ordnung wie durch Vergil und Horaz. Andere meinen, daß Livius nach der ersten willkommenen Annahme von Ruhe und Frieden die Hoffnung auf Wiederherstellung der alten Ordnung aufgegeben und sich resignierend den neuen politischen Realitäten angepaßt hätte: W. Liebeschütz, *JRS* 57, 1967, 45–55; E. Lefèvre, *Die unaugusteischen Züge der augusteischen Literatur*, *Saeculum Augustum* II (Darmstadt 1980) 173–96; Luce (vgl. Anm. 22) glaubt, sogar eine Mißbilligung der Pläne des Augustus durch Livius annehmen zu können.

<sup>12</sup> P. G. Walsh, *Livy* (Cambridge 1961) 15; R. von Haehling, *Zeitbezüge des T. Livius in der ersten Dekade seines Geschichtswerks: Nec vitia nostra nec remedia pati possumus*, *Historia*, Einz. Schr. 61 (Stuttgart 1989): "weit von einer panegyrischen Würdigung entfernt." (180).

<sup>13</sup> 28, 12, 12. Ob sich diese Wendung auf das Jahr 23 oder 19 bezieht, kann hier nicht erörtert werden und ist für unsere Fragestellung belanglos.

<sup>14</sup> Vgl. Hor., c. 3, 14.

<sup>15</sup> L. Ross Taylor, *Livy and the name Augustus*, *Class. Rev.* 32, 1918, 158 ff.

<sup>16</sup> K. Scott, *Identification of Augustus with Romulus*, *TAPhA* 56, 1925, 82 ff.

<sup>17</sup> H. Erckell, *Augustus, Felicitas, Fortuna*, Diss. Göteborg 1952. W. Liebeschütz, *The religious position of Livy's history*, *JRS* 57, 1967, 45–55, betont die kaum aufhebbare Schwierigkeit, von seinem Werk auf die religiöse Haltung des Livius Rückschlüsse zu ziehen. Walsh (vgl. Anm. 12) rückt ihn nahe an die stoischen Vorstellungen seiner Zeit, wie etwa im Sinne Ciceros, heran (*passim*), ohne dies jedoch gültig beweisen zu können.

Form *augustiora* im Gegensatz zu den *res humanae* auftritt und weil die religiöse Haltung des Livius in dem Geflecht von Schicksalsfügungen, göttlichen Wendungen und Zufällen kaum zu eruieren ist. Alles in allem wird man also festhalten dürfen, daß Livius bei der Erwähnung des Augustus an allen Stellen in Distanz zu ihm steht und sachlich-nüchtern von ihm spricht.

## II

Auf der anderen Seite liegt es offen zu Tage, daß Livius in der hohen Wertschätzung des frühen Römertums den Bemühungen des Augustus um eine innere Erneuerung Roms nach dem Bilde der Vorfahren nahe steht. Jedem Leser des Livius sind die zahlreichen Bemerkungen gegenwärtig, in denen er direkt oder indirekt auf den Vorbildcharakter einer Handlung oder Person aus der Frühzeit Roms verweist oder einzelne Verfallserscheinungen im Lebensstil der Gegenwart wie die Mißachtung religiöskultischer Gepflogenheiten und Tradition,<sup>18</sup> die luxuriöse Lebensführung,<sup>19</sup> den Hang zu Bürgerkriegen<sup>20</sup> in einen schroffen Gegensatz zu den Normen der *mores maiorum* setzt. Eine solche Verklärung der Vergangenheit, verbunden mit mehr oder minder heftiger Zeitkritik, war bei dem hohen Traditionsbewußtsein der Römer in der vorlivianischen Annalistik bereits angelegt, und manche der kritischen oder lobenden Äußerungen des Livius mag er seinen Quellen entnommen haben. Aber es dürfte kein Zweifel bestehen, daß eine solche Beurteilung der Geschichte durch die Zeitereignisse mit der Beendigung der Bürgerkriege und der Einkehr eines umfassenden Friedens eine erhebliche Verstärkung erfahren hat. R. Syme<sup>21</sup> und P. J. Luce,<sup>22</sup> die beide die erste Pentade bereits vor 27 abgeschlossen halten, vertreten die Ansicht, daß Augustus für seine Reformmaßnahmen Orientierungshilfen durch Livius erhalten habe und von ihm zu eigenen Entscheidungen und Maßnahmen angeregt worden sei. Walsh nimmt an, daß Livius vierzig Jahre in Frieden mit Augustus gelebt und "großen Einfluß" auf ihn gehabt habe.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>18</sup> *Sed nondum haec, quae nunc tenet saeculum, neglegentia deorum venerat* (3, 20, 5); *nunc nos tamquam iam nihil pace deorum opus sit, omnes caerimonias polluimus* (6, 41, 9); vgl. 4, 6, 11; 3, 57, 7; 8, 11, 1.

<sup>19</sup> *Adeo in quae laboramus sola crevimus, divitias luxuriamque* (7, 25, 9); vgl. 7, 2, 13; 3, 26, 7; 3, 57, 7.

<sup>20</sup> *Nondum erant (scil. cives) tam fortes ad sanguinem civilem nec praeter externa noverant bella* (7, 40, 2); von Haehling 51–52.

<sup>21</sup> R. Syme, *Livy and Augustus*, Harv. Stud. in Class. Philol. 64, 1959, 50; ders., *Roman Aristocracy* (Oxford 1986) 39; 445 erwähnt Livius als loyal historien, eloquent patriot.

<sup>22</sup> P. J. Luce, *The dating of Livy's first decade*, TAPhA 56, 1965, 240.

<sup>23</sup> Walsh (vgl. Anm. 12), *Livy* 18.

Solche Annahmen unterschätzen die Eigeninitiative des Augustus<sup>24</sup> und finden im Text des Livius keine Stützen. Es liegt vielmehr nahe, daß Livius bei seiner Arbeit an der ersten Pentade in den Jahren nach 29 (27) mit seiner hohen Bewertung des frühen Römertums die auf die Erneuerung der *mores maiorum* gerichteten Reformen des Augustus bejaht hat und sie vielleicht sogar habe unterstützen wollen. Dabei braucht man in dieser Zustimmung keineswegs, wie das gelegentlich geschehen ist, eine Huldigung an Augustus zu sehen. Diese Konfrontation der vorbildlichen Frühzeit und gewisser Dekadenzerscheinungen der Gegenwart bietet einen Einblick in die Diskussion, die in Rom in den Jahren nach Aktium und besonders nach der Rückkehr Octavians stattgefunden hat und der Frage galt, wie sich das neue Regiment entwickeln und welchen Kurs der Princeps einschlagen werde. Solche Erörterungen sind um so lebhafter zu denken, als wir wissen, daß bereits in den beiden vorangegangenen Generationen die Probleme einer Umgestaltung der römischen Führungsschicht und einer kritischen Überprüfung der traditionellen römischen Politik und Staatsführung aktuell waren. Ich erinnere, um nicht weiter zurückzugreifen, im theoretischen Bereich nur an Ciceros Schrift *De re publica* und in der praktischen Politik an die Regelung des Jahres 52, als Pompeius *consul sine collega* war. Sogar bis in die Dichtung hatten diese Probleme Eingang gefunden. So stellt Vergil im Prooemium des ersten Buchs der Georgika<sup>25</sup> die Frage, über welchen Bereich der Welt Octavian *quem mox quae sint habitura deorum concilia, incertum est* nach seinem Tode und seiner Aufnahme in den Kreis der Götter seine Herrschaft ausüben wolle. In seinen visionären Versen über die Veranstaltung künstlerischer Agone in Mantua gelobt er einen Tempel zu errichten, in dessen Mitte Octavian verehrt werden soll: *in medio mihi Caesar erit templumque tenebit*.<sup>26</sup> Er schließt die Georgika mit dem Hinweis auf Octavians Siege und Rechtsprechung im Osten und wählt dafür das aussagestarke Bild *Caesar dum magnus ad altum fulminat*.<sup>27</sup> Auch Horaz läßt uns die Unsicherheit erkennen, die über der Institutionalisierung des neuen Herrschaftssystems und der künftigen Stellung Octavians lag. In der wohl ins Jahr 29 zu datierenden Ode 1, 2, in der er die Frage stellt, welche Gottheit die Römer nach den Freveln der Bürgerkriege entsöhnen werde, nennt er nach Apoll, Venus und Mars an letzter Stelle Octavian, den Rächer Caesars, in dem er eine Epiphanie des

<sup>24</sup> Abwegig ist die These von H. Petersen, *Livy and Augustus*, TAPhA 92, 1961, 440–57, daß Livius mit der Zeichnung von machtlüsternden, vorrevolutionären oder tyrannischen Gestalten Augustus vor Mißbrauch seiner Macht habe warnen wollen.

<sup>25</sup> Georg. 1, 24–42.

<sup>26</sup> Georg. 3, 16.

<sup>27</sup> Georg. 4, 560 f.

Merkur preist.<sup>28</sup> Auch in einigen Oden der folgenden Jahre rückt er Augustus in die Nähe von Heroen oder Halbgöttern, wie Pollux, Romulus und die Dioskuren<sup>29</sup> oder sieht ihn gar als Stellvertreter Jupiters auf Erden.<sup>30</sup>

Es wäre fast unverständlich, wenn Livius an diesen tastenden Versuchen nicht teilgenommen und einen eigenen Weg zu einer Stellungnahme gefunden hätte. Liegt es schon nahe, daß ein Historiker bei seiner Behandlung vergangener Perioden und Persönlichkeiten—unbewußt oder bewußt—die eigenen Erfahrungen und Überlegungen in seine Darstellung einfließen läßt, um das vergangene Geschehen sich zu verdeutlichen und seine Ursachen und Wirkungen zu klären, so haben die annalistischen Vorgänger des Livius, insbesondere die Vertreter der sog. jüngeren Annalistik,<sup>31</sup> wie der Niederschlag ihrer Werke noch bei Livius zeigt, sich nicht gescheut, die Vergangenheit in erheblichem Ausmaß aus zeitgenössischem Geschehen und dem eigenen Erleben zu deuten. Dies ist teils aus ihrer politischen Überzeugung, teils aus darstellerischen Gründen zur Belebung der vergangenen Ereignisse geschehen. Natürlich lag die Versuchung nahe, Perioden der frühen Geschichte, für die wenig zuverlässiges Quellenmaterial vorlag, durch eigene Erfindungen von politischen oder militärischen Ereignissen "aufzufüllen" und anzureichern. So darf es uns nicht wundern, daß Livius dieses Material benutzt hat, um seine Stellungnahme zu den akuten Diskussionen über die Gestaltung der politischen Entscheidungen und der Neuordnung des gesamten Lebens nach dem Sieg von Aktium zum Ausdruck zu bringen.<sup>32</sup>

Als eine der gegenwärtigen Lage vergleichbare historische Periode bot sich eine der schärfsten Caesuren der römischen Geschichte an, in der die Römer eine existentielle Wende sahen: Rom nach der Zerstörung der Stadt durch die Gallier und die Phase des äußeren und inneren Wiederaufbaus durch Camillus. In der Darstellung seiner Person und Taten haben wir eine indirekte Stellungnahme des Livius zu der Neuordnung der Jahre 29–27 und zu Augustus und seinen politischen Zielen zu sehen. Zugleich bot die gewählte Epoche mit der großen Zahl der überlieferten Ereignisse die Möglichkeit einer spannenden Dynamik und starken Verlebendigung des Geschehens. Es spricht viel dafür, daß bereits die Vorlagen des Livius diese Epoche des Camillus einer Heraushebung für wert gehalten und sie ziemlich

<sup>28</sup> Hor. c. 1, 2, 41–44.

<sup>29</sup> Hor. c. 3, 3, 9 ff.

<sup>30</sup> Hor. c. 3, 5, 1 ff.

<sup>31</sup> Vgl. D. Timpe, Erwägungen zur jüngeren Annalistik, *AuA* 25, 1979, 97–119.

<sup>32</sup> Er selbst hat, soweit wir sehen, es unterlassen, solche stoffliche Erweiterungen vorzunehmen.



ausführlich aus dem Geist ihrer Person und ihrer Zeit behandelt hatten. Nun erhielt die gesamte Ereigniskette durch Livius eine neue Ausrichtung und Sinngebung.<sup>33</sup>

Den ersten Anknüpfungspunkt an die politisch-geistige Situation in Rom zwischen den Jahren 29 und 27<sup>33a</sup> liefert die Tatsache, daß Livius darauf Bezug nimmt, daß man damals nach einem Ehrentamen für den Sieger von Aktium und den neuen Herrscher suchte und daß dafür verschiedene Vorschläge (indirekt auch von Octavian selbst?) im Umlauf waren. Dazu gehörte auch der "Titel" (*alter*) *Romulus*, bis schließlich die Entscheidung für "*Augustus*" fiel. So ist es wohl kein Zufall, daß Livius Camillus bei seinem verschiedenen Auftreten mit wechselnden Beinamen charakterisiert und auszeichnet. Als Camillus nach seinen zwei Siegen über die Gallier als gefeierter Triumphator in Rom einzieht, läßt Livius ihn durch die Soldaten als *Romulus ac parens patriae conditorque alter urbis* (5, 49, 7)<sup>34</sup> gepriesen werden. Am Beginn des folgenden Jahres führt er ihn mit den Worten ein: *ceterum primo adminiculo* (scil. *urbs*) *erecta erat, eodem innixa, M. Furio principe*,<sup>35</sup> *stetit* (6, 1, 4) und fügt bei seinem Erfolg in der Schlacht gegen die Volsker die Wendung ein: *in ea parte, in qua caput rei Romanae Camillus erat* (6, 3, 1). In die Nähe der religiösen Sphäre rückt er ihn mit der fundamentalen Wende, die mit dem Sieg des Camillus über die Gallier für Rom eintrat, wenn er schreibt: *iam verterat fortuna, iam deorum opes humanaque consilia rem Romanam adiuvabant* und fortfährt: *eiusdem ductu auspicioque Camilli* (scil. *Galli*) *vincuntur*.<sup>36</sup> Über diese Annäherung an die *opes deorum*, mit deren Hilfe Camillus den Sieg erringt, ist Livius aber nicht hinausgegangen und hat es vermieden, die mit dem Wiederaufbau der Stadt Rom und seiner Tempel beschäftigten Römer erwägen zu lassen,

<sup>33</sup> Vgl. J. Bayet, *Tite-Live, Histoire Romaine* T. V, L.V (Paris 1954) 140–53; (wiederholt nachgedruckt); R. M. Ogilvie, *A commentary on Livy, Books I–V* (Oxford 1965) 741 ff.; E. Burck, *Wege zu Livius* (Darmstadt, 3. Auflage, 1987) 310–28; J. Hellegouarc'h, *Le Prinzipat de Camille*, REL 49, 1970.

<sup>33a</sup> Vor der Annahme gezielter, aber unausgesprochener Anspielungen auf bestimmte Persönlichkeiten oder Tatbestände der eigenen Zeit und vor der Annahme intendierter assoziativer Gedankenverbindungen beim Leser hat von Haehling wiederholt mit Recht gewarnt (23 f.; 53 ff.). Wenn sie sich aber—wie es im Folgenden der Fall ist—in größerer Zahl in einem zusammenhängenden Erzählungskomplex feststellen lassen und einen festen Sinnzusammenhang konstituieren, kann ihnen die Beweiskraft nicht abgesprochen werden. Auch von Haehling nimmt in mehreren Fällen solche intendierten Anspielungen an (203–15), von denen aber die vermuteten Hinweise auf die gegenseitigen Vorwürfe von Antonius und Oktavian über ihre "Trunksucht und Feigheit" (56; 185 f.) ausgesprochene Mißgriffe sind; dagegen ist dem Zeitbezug von 6, 6, 4–18 zuzustimmen (195, Anm. 16).

<sup>34</sup> Von Haehling 208 f. Man muß sich freilich hüten, diesen Lobpreis zu überschätzen, worauf auch Hellegouarc'h hinweist. Cicero gebraucht ähnliche Formulierungen, die wohl unter Gebildeten, namentlich in Reden, gängig waren, z.B. *Lentulus consul, parens, decus, salus nostrae vitae* (Cum pop. grat. egit 11); *video P. Lentulum, cuius ego patrem, deum ac parentem status, fortunae ac nominis mei* (Pro Sest. 144) u.a.m.

<sup>35</sup> Vgl. im Elogium *princeps pace belloque* (7, 1, 9).

<sup>36</sup> 5, 49, 5–6.

Camillus einen Kult und göttliche Ehren zu erweisen, wie es Vergil und Horaz als Möglichkeit erwogen hatten. Er begnügt sich mit dem Satz: *omnium primum, ut erat diligentissimus religionum cultor, quae ad deos immortales pertinebant, rettulit et senatus consultum facit, fana omnia . . . restituerentur*.<sup>37</sup> Dieser Satz stellt eine enge Assoziation zu den von Augustus getroffenen religiös-kultischen Maßnahmen dar, die er unmittelbar nach seiner Rückkehr in Gang gesetzt hat. Die Rückkehr des Camillus nach seinem Sieg über die Volsker und nach der Einnahme der von den Etruskern eroberten Stadt Sutrium formuliert Livius mit den Worten *in urbem triumphans rediit trium simul bellorum victor*.<sup>38</sup> Es kann kaum ein Zweifel bestehen, daß der Leser des Livius mit diesem monumentalen und einprägsamen Satz an die Rückkehr Octavians und an seinen dreifachen Triumph im Jahre 29 erinnert werden sollte. Dies wird noch dadurch unterstrichen, daß aus dem Erlös der durch den Verkauf der Gefangenen eingebrachten Summe zu Ehren des Camillus drei Schalen aus Gold mit seinem Namen gefertigt wurden, die in der Cella des kapitolinischen Jupitertempels aufgestellt wurden, so wie der im Jahre 27 vom Senat und Volk Augustus verliehene Ehrenschild mit den eingearbeiteten vier *virtutes* (*virtus, clementia, iustitia, pietas*)<sup>39</sup> in der *curia Julia* Aufstellung fand.

### III

Die Ereignisse des Jahres 386 bedürfen einer besonderen Prüfung. Damals war Camillus mit fünf Kollegen *tribunus militum consulari potestate*. Rom stand unter schwerem militärischem Druck, und Livius läßt den Senat den Göttern danken, daß Camillus in der Magistratur steht: *dictatorem quippe dicendum eum fuisse, si privatus esset*. Die Amtskollegen stimmen zu, daß Camillus diktatorische Befehlsgewalt erhält,<sup>40</sup> und bringen zum Ausdruck, daß sie bereit sind, sich ihm unterzuordnen: *nec quicquam de maiestate sua detractum credere, quod maiestati eius viri concessissent*.<sup>41</sup> Diese Formulierung läßt an die berühmte Aussage des Augustus im Monumentum Ancyranum denken, daß er an amtlichen Befugnissen nicht mehr als seine Amtskollegen besessen habe und *non potestate, sed auctoritate* das Regiment in der Hand gehabt habe.<sup>42</sup> Ob eine sinngleiche

<sup>37</sup> 5, 50, 1.

<sup>38</sup> 6, 4, 1.

<sup>39</sup> Mon. Anc. 34. Eine ähnliche Kumulation von *virtutes* bei Camillus: *Camillus consilio et virtute in Volscis bello, felicitate in Tusculana expeditione, utrobique singulari adversus collegam patientia et moderatione insignis* (6, 27, 1). Zur Ergänzung: *fides Romana, iustitia imperatoris in foro et curia celebratur* (6, 27, 11). In dieser Würdigung faßt Livius die vorbildlichen Eigenschaften und Leistungen des in seinen Augen idealen Staatsmanns zusammen.

<sup>40</sup> 6, 6, 6.

<sup>41</sup> 6, 6, 7.

<sup>42</sup> *Post id tempus auctoritate omnibus praestiti, potestate autem nihilo amplius habui quam ceteri, qui mihi quoque in magistratu collegae fuerunt* (Mon. Anc. 34).

Aussage als Willensäußerung des Augustus bereits am Anfang der zwanziger Jahre gefallen sein und in der Öffentlichkeit bekannt geworden sein könnte?<sup>43</sup> Livius läßt Camillus für den ihm erwiesenen Vertrauensbeweis danken, die Schwere der ihm übertragenen Verantwortung zum Ausdruck bringen und versichern, daß er alle Kräfte einsetzen werde, *ut tanto de se consensu civitatis opinionem, quae maxima sit, etiam constantem efficiat*.<sup>44</sup> Diese Erklärung erweckte beim Leser mit großer Wahrscheinlichkeit die Erinnerung an den Eid, mit dem Octavian im Jahre 31 vor dem Krieg mit Antonius ganz Italien und die Provinzen sich zur Treue verpflichtet hatte und der ihm den von ihm genützten *consensus universorum* eingebracht hatte, wie er es später im Monumentum Ancyranum bezeugt hat.<sup>45</sup> Livius läßt Camillus in der Verteilung der militärischen und politischen Aufgaben L. Valerius als *socius imperii consilii*que agieren und überträgt Ser. Cornelius die verantwortungsvolle Aufgabe als *praeses huius publici consilii, custos religionum, comitiorum, legum, rerum omnium urbanarum* zu fungieren<sup>46</sup>—wie es Octavian getan hatte, als er nach Aktium aufbrach und Maecenas die Obergewalt in Rom übertragen hatte.

Bei aller Anerkennung der auf gleiche Achtung und Aufgaben der Amtskollegen bedachten Regelungen des Camillus darf aber eine Einschränkung nicht überlesen werden, die Livius am Beginn seines Berichts macht. Die Amtskollegen betonen bei ihrer freiwilligen Unterordnung unter die Befehlsgewalt des Camillus, daß es sich hierbei um eine durch den drohenden Krieg herbeigeführte Sonderregelung handelt: *et collegae fateri regimen omnium rerum, ubi quid bellici terroris ingruat, in viro uno esse* (6, 6, 6). Dieser Sonderfall wird dadurch möglich und gerechtfertigt, daß zwei Voraussetzungen erfüllt sind: die Amtskollegen haben die Einsicht und den Willen, zur Behebung einer Notlage des Staates einem ihnen überlegenen Kollegen eine Sonderstellung einräumen und ihm außergewöhnliche Machtkompetenzen übertragen zu müssen, aber auf der anderen Seite darf der Herausgehobene von der ihm übertragenen Vollmacht nur so viel Gebrauch machen, wie es die Krisensituation und die Achtung

<sup>43</sup> Eine solche Assoziation wird dem Leser durch einen späteren Satz aus dem Camillusbericht nahegelegt. Als die Soldaten unerwarteter Weise vor einem Angriff zurückschrecken, läßt Livius im Rückblick auf die vorher geschilderte Kompetenzverteilung die provokative Frage an sie richten, ob sie ihn etwa nicht anerkennen wollten, da er seine Befehle nicht als Diktator, sondern als Militärtribun gebe und fügt hinzu: *neque ego maxima imperia in vos desidero et vos in me nihil praeter me ipsum intueri decet* (6, 7, 5).

<sup>44</sup> 6, 6, 9.

<sup>45</sup> *Juravit in mea verba tota Italia sponte sua et me bello, quo vici ad Actium, ducem depoposcit. Juraverunt in eadem verba provinciae Galliae, Hispaniae, Africa, Sicilia, Sardinia* (Mon. Anc. 25); vgl. D. Kienast, Augustus (Darmstadt 1982) 60; 67 ff.; dazu: *in consulatu sexto et septimo . . . per consensum universorum potitus rerum omnium rem publicam ex mea potestate in senatus populique Romani arbitrium transtuli* (Mon. Anc. 34).

<sup>46</sup> 6, 6, 12–14.

vor der Persönlichkeit der *socii imperii consilii* gebieten.<sup>47</sup> Camillus ist sich dieser Ausnahmesituation bewußt und übt *moderatio*.<sup>48</sup> Zugleich betont er die Notwendigkeit einer doppelten Führung, wenn er seine Antwort auf die Gewaltabtretung der anderen Militärtribunen mit dem Satz schließt: *circumsederi urbem Romanam ab invidia et odio finitimorum; itaque et ducibus pluribus et exercitibus administrandam rem publicam esse*.<sup>49</sup> Als die von Antium und den Volskern drohende Gefahr abgewendet ist, erteilt der Senat, nachdem er mit Camillus verhandelt hat (!) (*senatui cum Camillo agi placuit*),<sup>50</sup> den Auftrag, den Krieg gegen die Etrusker aufzunehmen. Trotz einer gewissen inneren Hemmung kommt Camillus dem Senatsauftrag nach: *quamquam expertum exercitum adsuetumque imperio, qui in Volscis erat, mallet, nihil recusavit. Valerium tantummodo imperii socium depoposcit*.<sup>51</sup> Wieder hört der Leser aus der Betonung des Gehorsams des Camillus gegenüber dem Senat und aus der erneuten Hervorhebung der Teilung des Kommandos, daß Livius mit seiner Darstellung der gesamten Maßnahmen sowohl des Camillus als auch der Amtskollegen einen starken Nachdruck darauf legt, daß trotz aller Bedrängnis Roms die Alleinherrschaft eines einzelnen Führers begrenzt wird. Dieser Tendenz gibt Livius starken Ausdruck, indem er die freudige Zuversicht der Senatoren hervorhebt, daß die von Camillus getroffenen Dispositionen die beste Regelung *et de bello et de pace universaque re publica* darstellen und daß der Staat keinen Diktator benötige: *si talis viros in magistratu habeat, tam concordibus iunctos animis parere atque imperare iuxta paratos laudemque conferentis potius in medium quam ex communi ad se trahentis*.<sup>52</sup> Dieser Satz faßt den Zustand der *concordia ordinum* zusammen, den Livius als eines der höchsten Ziele des römischen Gemeinwesens, vor allem in der ersten Dekade, aber auch in den folgenden Büchern in eindringlichen Szenen herausgearbeitet hat.<sup>53</sup> Man kann vermuten, daß dieses bereits von Cicero erstrebte politische Ideal

<sup>47</sup> R. von Haehling hat eine Vermutung von F. Hellmann, Livius Interpretationen (Berlin 1939) 54 f. aufgegriffen und hat wahrscheinlich machen können (191–217), daß Livius in der eingehenden Darstellung der Ereignisse des Jahres 446 (3, 66–70) einen Bezug auf die Situation in Rom im Jahre 28/27 hergestellt habe. Er sieht in dem Verhältnis der beiden Konsuln Titus Quinctius Capitolinus und Agrippa Furius, die bei ungleicher Gewaltverteilung, aber in persönlichem Konsens einen Feldzug durchführen und dank der Rücksichtnahme des ersten den Ruhm des Sieges teilen sowie in dem Namen des zweiten einen Hinweis auf das Verhältnis zwischen Augustus und M. Vipsanius Agrippa.

<sup>48</sup> Ein wie großes Gewicht Livius auf diese *moderatio* legt, lehrt die Tatsache, daß er sie in der kurzen Laudatio des Camillus am Ende des Amtsjahres 381 als letzte und wichtigste *virtus* aufführt (6, 27, 1).

<sup>49</sup> 6, 6, 11, Vgl. *In exercitu Romano cum duo consules essent potestate pari, quod saluberrimum in administratione magnarum rerum est* (3, 70, 1); von Haehling 197 f.

<sup>50</sup> 6, 9, 5.

<sup>51</sup> 6, 9, 6.

<sup>52</sup> 6, 6, 18; vgl. von Haehling 195, Anm. 16.

<sup>53</sup> Dies hier nachzuweisen würde vom Thema dieses Beitrags zu weit abführen.



sowohl einzelnen Politikern als auch Livius als erhofftes Leitbild für die nach der Rückkehr des Augustus im Jahre 29 einsetzende Neuorientierung des römischen Gemeinwesens vor Augen gestanden hat.<sup>53a</sup>

## IV

Wenn wir auf die von uns betrachteten Camillusberichte zurückblicken, können wir folgende Feststellungen treffen und festhalten: 1) Livius hat diesen Berichten schon durch ihre Platzierung an herausgehobenen Buchstellen<sup>54</sup> in seinem Werk eine besondere Bedeutung zugemessen. Der erste Teil bildet den Abschluß der ersten Pentade, der zweite Teil den Anfang der zweiten Pentade. 2) Beide Teile entsprechen einander im Umfang, sind als kontrastierende Gegenstücke gearbeitet und weisen die Merkmale höchster Livianischer Gestaltungskunst auf. Der Abschluß von Buch 5 entbehrt jeglichen Tatenberichts und wird durch eine der bedeutsamsten Reden des Livius gebildet; die Einleitung von Buch 6 ist im Gegensatz durch hohe Dynamik wichtiger Entscheidungen und Handlungen charakterisiert. Die Rede des Camillus ist wesentlich rückwärts gewandt und stellt eine Besinnung auf die religiös-kultischen Grundlagen und bewährten Traditionen der Stadt Rom dar mit dem Ziel ihrer Wiederaufnahme an dem von der Natur und den Göttern ausgezeichneten Platz.<sup>55</sup> Die Schilderung der ersten Jahre nach 390 ist auf die Zukunft gerichtet, zeigt den Eifer, mit dem der Wiederaufbau der Stadt betrieben wird,<sup>56</sup> und berichtet die neuen militärisch-politischen Regelungen und Erfolge.

3) In dem Aufbaubericht finden sich Formulierungen von Fakten und Reden, die beim Leser Assoziationen an die Neuordnung in Rom in den ersten Jahren nach dem Sieg von Aktium und an Entscheidungen und Handlungen des Augustus wecken sollen. Diese Hinweise auf Augustus sind im ganzen verhalten<sup>57</sup> und können nur in einigen Fällen, wie etwa in dem indirekten Hinweis auf den dreifachen Triumph des Camillus und die Weihung der goldenen Schalen als eine indirekte Huldigung an Augustus gesehen werden. Als abwegig wird man die Vermutung zurückweisen, daß

<sup>53a</sup> Es sei mit Nachdruck festgehalten, daß die Zeichnung dieses Leitbildes für das erste Dezennium des Prinzipats während der Arbeit des Livius an der ersten Dekade Gültigkeit beanspruchen darf, daß aber über die Einstellung des Livius in den folgenden Jahren nichts präjudiziert werden darf.

<sup>54</sup> Darüber besteht Konsens, daß Buchanfang und Buchende bei Livius in vielen Fällen eine besondere inhaltliche Heraushebung bedeuten.

<sup>55</sup> Eine Assoziation zu den merkwürdigen Überlegungen frühaugusteischer Zeit, die Hauptstadt nach Troja oder Alexandria zu verlegen, ist möglich (Suet., Jul. 79, 3; scharfe Ablehnung bei Hor. c. 3, 3, 57 ff.).

<sup>56</sup> *Et Roma cum frequentia crescere . . . intraque annum nova urbs stetit* (6, 4, 6). Über dem Eifer zum Wiederaufbau überhören die Plebejer die Versuche der Volkstribunen, sich für Ackergesetze einzusetzen (6, 5, 1–5).

<sup>57</sup> Dies gilt auch für den verdeckten Hinweis auf die vorbildliche Haltung des Augustus gegenüber Agrippa; s. Anm. 47.

Livius mit dem Camillusbericht auf einzelne Entscheidungen des Augustus habe Einfluß nehmen wollen oder daß dieser sich durch Livius in einzelnen Plänen und Handlungen habe beeinflussen lassen.<sup>57a</sup>

4) Von entscheidender Bedeutung ist die Tatsache, daß Livius die Übertragung der Herrschaftsgewalt auf *eine* Person nur in Sonderfällen, wie z.B. in schweren Kriegsnoten gerechtfertigt sieht, und daß die *concordia ordinum* ihm als höchstes Ziel für das Gemeinwesen vor Augen steht. Dabei soll dem Senat die letzte Entscheidung zufallen, nachdem er ein Einvernehmen mit dem im Konsens mit seinen Amtskollegen herausgehobenen Inhaber der höchsten Befehlsgewalt erzielt hat.

5) Wenn wir abschließend fragen, warum Livius die lockere Verschmelzung des Camillusberichts mit den Ereignissen der Jahre 31–27 in Rom vorgenommen hat und in welchem Sinne er diese Verquickung vom Leser aufgenommen wissen wollte, so bieten sich zwei Antworten an. Die eine ist in dem Wunsche zu sehen, die Ereignisse der Vergangenheit möglichst verständlich und aus dem eigenen Erleben heraus nacherlebbar zu machen. Dies war deswegen möglich, weil die miteinander in Beziehung gesetzten historischen Abschnitte in ihrer Grundsituation einander ähnelten. In beiden Fällen handelt es sich, wie bereits oben erwähnt, darum, daß nach einer die Existenz Roms bedrohenden Kriegslage, die durch die Kelten, bzw. durch Antonius und Kleopatra herbeigeführt worden war, eine grundlegende Wende für Rom erreicht und ein Neuanfang *consensu omnium* gesetzt worden ist. Die zweite Antwort ist darin zu sehen, daß die Ereignisse der jüngsten Gegenwart in wichtigen Entscheidungen festgehalten werden sollen. Beide Abschnitte bilden zusammen einen Modellfall, aus dem der Leser die Möglichkeiten und Wege erkennen kann und soll, eine existentielle Krise der Gemeinschaft zu bewältigen. Die Lösung nach 390 hat sich durch mehr als drei Jahrhunderte bewährt. Die Lösung von 29–27 soll sich in der Zukunft bewähren, wenn die Leser des Livius seinem in der Praefatio ausgesprochenen Rat folgen: *inde tibi tuaeque rei publicae quod imitere capias, inde foedum inceptu, foedum exitu, quod vites* (10).<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>57a</sup> Von Haehling 15.

<sup>58</sup> Mit Recht ist wiederholt, u.a. auch von Hellegouarc'h (vgl. Anm. 33), darauf hingewiesen worden, daß Livius die Gestalt und Handlungen des nach der Königsherrschaft strebenden M. Manlius Capitolinus, die er im Anschluß an die Camillus-Berichte—mit Anklängen an Catilina und Caesar—berichtet, als schwarzes Gegenbild zu Camillus entwickelt hat (6, 11, 3–25, 14): ein Volkshetzer und Revolutionär, der *sine moderatione* nach der Herrschaft strebt, ein falscher *parens plebis Romanae* (14, 5), ein falscher *vindex libertatis* (14, 10), ein falscher *servator patriae* (17, 4), vor dessen Verurteilung Livius feststellt: *illud notandum videtur, ut sciant homines, quae et quanta decora foeda cupiditas regni non ingrata solum, sed invisa etiam reddiderit* (20, 5): ein zweiter Modellfall für seine Leser, vgl. E. Burck, Das Bild der Revolution bei römischen Historikern, Gymn. 73, 1966, 86–109 (=Vom Menschenbild in der römischen Literatur [Heidelberg 1981] 118–43).



## Galen's Response to Skepticism

PHILLIP DE LACY

Galen's commitment to a science of medicine that could accurately diagnose diseases, identify symptoms and causes, and prescribe treatment brought him into conflict not only with physicians who questioned the need for such medical theory or the reasoning by which it was constructed, but also with the skeptics, whose arguments raised doubts about the possibility of gaining knowledge of the truth about any subject whatever and who held that it is possible to live with suspension of judgment.<sup>1</sup> Galen sometimes refuses to talk to the doubters; they are "boorish Pyrrhonists"<sup>2</sup> and contentious

The following abbreviations are used in references to Galen's writings:

CMG: *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum*.

K.: *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia*, ed. Karl Gottlob Kühn. 22 vols. (Leipzig 1821–33; repr. Hildesheim 1964–65).

MM: Galen, *Methodus Medendi*.

PHP: Galen, *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* (= CMG V 4.1.2).

SM: *Claudii Galeni Pergameni Scripta Minora*. 3 vols. (Leipzig 1884–93; repr. Amsterdam 1967).

Müller, *Beweis* (note 20) refers to I. Müller, *Über Galens Werk vom wissenschaftlichen Beweis*, Abh. Bayer. Akad. 1895, No. 2.

Other editions of Galen's writings are identified by the name of the editor. The following require an explanation, since they are in works not primarily on Galen:

*De opt. doct.* . . . Barigazzi (e.g. note 6) refers to A. Barigazzi, *Favorino di Arelate. Opere* (Florence 1966).

*Subf. emp.* . . . Deichgr. (e.g. note 2) and *De sectis* . . . Deichgr. (e.g. note 164) refer to K. Deichgräber, *Die griechische Empirikerschule* (Berlin 1930; repr. 1965).

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Cic. *Acad.* 2. 107, 108. Where possible pre-Galenic sources for skepticism are cited. When Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laertius are cited, it is with the caveat that their arguments may to some extent be post-Galenic. On possible echoes of Galen's language in Sextus see below, 302–03.

<sup>2</sup> Galen did not limit this abusive term to avowed Pyrrhonists. In *An in arteriis* 7 (4. 727. 9–12 K. = 172. 1–4 Furley–Wilkie), those who fled to the altar of boorish Pyrrhonism were Erasistrateans. In *De praecognitione* 5. 14–15 (CMG V 8.1, p. 98. 4–8), it was Alexander of Damascus who would not believe his eyes. In *De puls. diff.* 4. 2 (8. 710. 13–17, 711. 1–3 K.), they were skeptics and aporetics, who were not sure of their own feelings, and the physicians who were influenced by them. Similarly, in *Subf. emp.* 4 (49. 29–50. 1 Deichgr.), Galen calls the physician Cassius a Pyrrhonist. Galen expresses the relation of skeptic to empiricist in *Subf. emp.* 11 (82. 28–31 Deichgr.) with the words: *Qualis autem est secundum totam vitam sceticus, talis est circa medicativam empiricus.*



arguers.<sup>3</sup> Yet he does not ignore them. Indeed counter-arguments, he says, must be answered if one is not to be tossed about on waves of uncertainty.<sup>4</sup>

The first step in the defense of scientific method is to establish, in answer to the skeptics' doubts, that there are criteria of truth. Galen maintains that there are criteria in the specialized disciplines, and these specialized criteria could not exist if human beings had no natural criteria.<sup>5</sup> The person who devised the instruments of the arts such as the compass and the yardstick started from the natural criteria,<sup>6</sup> and it is by calling on the student's natural criteria that the teacher points out his errors and corrects them.<sup>7</sup> Not only are there natural criteria; they are common to all of us. For, Galen says, what is natural must be common to all and have a common nature.<sup>8</sup> A possible reason for stressing that all persons have these natural criteria may have been a desire to avoid the skeptics' argument that what is not common is not natural,<sup>9</sup> or the charge to which the Stoics were liable for their view that only the wise man has scientific knowledge. From that it would follow that the rest of us do not share the ability to separate true from false.<sup>10</sup> There are some, Galen says, who admit that the criterion requires no proof but who do not admit that it is natural or common to all.<sup>11</sup> He may have had the Stoics or Epicureans in mind.

In opposing the argument from the arts the skeptics say that appearances are sufficient criteria for choice and avoidance,<sup>12</sup> and the arts provide things useful for life through the observation of appearances.<sup>13</sup> The arts do not require a criterion that separates true from false.<sup>14</sup> Galen concedes that right opinion is as good as knowledge in practical matters, but it lacks stability and permanence.<sup>15</sup> It was the certainty that he found in

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *De peccat. dignot.* 3. 23–24 (CMG V 4.1.1, pp. 51. 22–52. 11) and *De ord. libr. suor.* 1 (19. 52 K. = SM 2. 82. 3–11).

<sup>4</sup> *Synops. libr. suor. de puls.* 1 (9. 432. 8–12 K.).

<sup>5</sup> *PHP* 9. 1. 10 (p. 542. 7–8). The same point was made by Lucullus, the spokesman for Antiochus, in *Cic. Acad.* 2. 22; cf. also 2. 146.

<sup>6</sup> *De opt. doct.* 4 (1. 48–49 K. = 184. 2–6 Barigazzi).

<sup>7</sup> *De opt. doct.* 2 (1. 44 K. = 180. 33–81. 11 Barigazzi).

<sup>8</sup> *PHP* 9. 1. 11 (p. 542. 8–11). On nature as common to all members of a class see below, 293.

<sup>9</sup> The skeptics used the proposition that what is not common is not natural in arguing that there is no common good; see Sextus, *PH* 3. 179 and *AM* 1. 147; Diog. Laer. 9. 101.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *Cic. Acad.* 2. 145; Sextus, *AM* 7. 152. Arcesilaus, according to Sextus (*AM* 7. 153), argued that on the Stoic view there can be no middle ground between the knowledge of the wise man and the opinions of the ordinary man. Galen recognizes, of course, that not all men are equally adept at using the natural criteria; cf. *Thrasymb.* 24 (5. 846–47 K. = SM 3. 62. 9–12).

<sup>11</sup> *PHP* 9. 7. 5 (p. 586. 23–27).

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Sextus, *AM* 7. 29–30.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Sextus, *AM* 5. 2; *Cic. Acad.* 2. 107.

<sup>14</sup> *Cic. Acad.* 2. 146.

<sup>15</sup> Gal. *De ord. libr. suor.* 2 (19. 54 K. = SM 2. 83. 17–23), with an apparent allusion to Plato, *Meno* 96d–98a.

mathematics that saved him from Pyrrhonic skepticism.<sup>16</sup> Mathematical reasoning was for him the model for philosophy and medicine.<sup>17</sup> The skeptics had of course questioned the fundamental concepts of mathematics. Carneades, Galen tells us, refused to believe that magnitudes equal to the same thing are equal to each other. He dismisses such an attack on the evident as a sophism.<sup>18</sup>

Having established the existence of natural criteria, Galen now identifies them. They are, according to *De plac. Hipp. et Plat.*, the eyes in their natural state seeing things that are visible, the ears in their natural state hearing things that are audible, the tongue tasting savors, the nostrils smelling odors, the skin touching things touchable, and the mind or intellect or whatever you want to call it, by which we distinguish what follows and what conflicts and the like.<sup>19</sup> Trusting in these natural criteria we accept as true what appears clearly to the senses or the mind.<sup>20</sup> They are the criteria that make possible the special criteria of the special disciplines.<sup>21</sup>

It is necessary, then, to distinguish between appearances that are clearly true and those that are not. Galen considered clear sensation and thought equivalent to the Stoic καταληπτική φαντασία,<sup>22</sup> and he therefore had to defend his view against the attacks of the skeptics on that Stoic view. It was first criticized by the Academic skeptics, and their criticism was broadened by the Pyrrhonist Aenesidemus to refute any attempt to move from the evident to the non-evident.<sup>23</sup> Aenesidemus' ten tropes give a list of

<sup>16</sup> *De libr. prop.* 11 (19. 40 K. = SM 2. 116. 20–23).

<sup>17</sup> See for examples *PHP* 8. 1. 25 (p. 486. 12, with the note on p. 684). Other examples, of which there are many, include *Subf. emp.* 12 (90. 2–4 Deichgr.) and *De peccat. dignot.* 3. 2–4 (CMG V 4.1.1, p. 46. 7–23). In *PHP* 8. 1. 20 (p. 484. 22–26), Galen asserts that those who have mastered Euclid's proof that the earth is the center of the universe accept it as confidently as they do that  $2 \times 2 = 4$ . In calling the elements of the art of medicine its theorems (θεωρήματα) Galen may have intended an allusion to the theorems of mathematics; see *De part. art. med.* 4, 5 (CMG Suppl. Or. II, pp. 122. 30–34, 124. 19–20) and the reference to θεωρήματα γραμμικά in *De usu part.* 10. 14 (3. 838 K. = 2. 110. 23–24 Helmreich).

<sup>18</sup> *De opt. doct.* 2 (1. 45 K. = 181. 14–82. 5 Barigazzi). Galen often refers to the arguments of the skeptics as sophisms; see below, 286.

<sup>19</sup> *PHP* 9. 1. 13 (p. 542. 13–20). In *MM* 1. 3 (10. 29. 3 K.) Galen identifies the criteria as πείρα and λόγος. Πείρα is the criterion of drugs in *De simpl. med.* 3. 6, 10 (11. 552. 13–15, 560. 18 K.).

<sup>20</sup> See for example *De opt. doct.* 4 (1. 49 K. = 184. 16–18 Barigazzi) and the discussion in Müller, *Beweis* 29–34. For examples of things clear to the mind see below, 305 and 306.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *PHP* 9. 1. 10, 23 (pp. 542. 7–8, 544. 17–21); *De opt. doct.* 4 (1. 48–50 K. = 184. 2–6, 18–19 Barigazzi).

<sup>22</sup> Cf. *PHP* 9. 7. 3 (p. 586. 18–21). In *De opt. doct.* 2 (1. 42 K. = 180. 5–8 Barigazzi) Galen equates the Stoic καταληπτός with βεβαίως γνωστός.

<sup>23</sup> For Aenesidemus see Photius, *Bibl.* 212 (3. 121 Henry). One of Aenesidemus' arguments was quoted by Sextus in *AM* 8. 234.

obstacles that confront anyone who wishes to determine which, if any, sense perceptions give accurate information about anything beyond themselves.<sup>24</sup>

In general terms Galen counters the arguments of the skeptics in three basic ways. (1) He appeals to the universal agreement of mankind. Everyone agrees that the judgment of true and false is to be referred to clear perception and thought.<sup>25</sup> Everyone except Academics and Pyrrhonists believes that what we see when awake is a source of firm knowledge, and what we see in dreams is false.<sup>26</sup> (2) He calls the skeptics' arguments sophistical. Those who would argue that it is unclear whether we are awake or asleep, or, if that is clear, whether what we see when awake is any more to be trusted than what we see when asleep, do not believe their own arguments. They are indulging in eristic.<sup>27</sup> (3) He charges the skeptics with upsetting human life. If what we see when awake, in good health, and sane is no more credible than what we see when asleep, sick, or mad,<sup>28</sup> the criteria of truth are thrown into disarray (συγκέχυνται).<sup>29</sup>

A fourth general charge, aimed at those who fall under the influence of the skeptics, is that they lack training in logic and scientific method. Some physicians, Galen says, doubt the evident because of sophisms that they are unable to solve.<sup>30</sup> And philosophers of all schools, including Academics and Skeptics, are blind to their own errors when they dare to make statements about things apart from proof and logical method.<sup>31</sup>

But in addition to his overall denunciation of skepticism Galen responds to specific difficulties raised by the skeptics. One such difficulty was that if some appearances are true and some are false, there must be a criterion by which we judge which appearances are true. But this criterion requires a

<sup>24</sup> The ten tropes are presented by Sextus in *PH* 1. 36–163 and more briefly by Diog. Laer. 9. 79–88. It is impossible to tell how far Sextus and Diogenes departed from Aenesidemus' text; but presumably they did not greatly alter the overall import of the tropes. Sextus may have added some of the medical examples that he gives. I follow Sextus' numbering of the tropes.

<sup>25</sup> See for example *PHP* 9. 7. 3 (p. 586. 19–20). Galen appeals also to common notions; see for example *De plenit.* 8 (7. 551. 9–10 K.).

<sup>26</sup> *De opt. doct.* 2 (1. 42 K. = 180. 8–14 Barigazzi). The argument from dreaming and being awake is in Aenesidemus' fourth trope: Sextus, *PH* 1. 104.

<sup>27</sup> *In Hipp. De vict. acut. comm.* 1. 16 (CMG V 9.1, p. 132. 10–15). See also below, note 47.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Aenesidemus' fourth trope: Sextus, *PH* 1. 100, 104.

<sup>29</sup> Gal. *De opt. doct.* 2 (1. 43 K. = 180. 19 Barigazzi). Cf. also *MM* 2. 7 (10. 155. 1–5 K.); *De caus. procatarc.* 92, 201 (CMG Suppl. II, pp. 22. 26–27, 54. 20–23); *De simp. med.* 1. 36, 37, 39 (11. 443. 4–12, 448. 13, 16–17, 455. 4 K.). In *De puls. dignosc.* 1. 2 (8. 786. 5 K.) Galen dismisses an ἀπορία of the empiricists as of no importance, as it cannot overturn the use of clear appearances. See below, 295. Sextus, *AM* 8. 157 denies that the skeptic causes life to be confused. In *De elem.* 1. 5 (1. 451 K. = 28. 18–20 Helmreich) Galen includes the monists among those who overturn life.

<sup>30</sup> *De caus. procatarc.* 115–25, 141 (CMG Suppl. II, pp. 28–30, 36. 3–5). See also below, note 68.

<sup>31</sup> *De peccat. dignot.* 5. 28–30 (CMG V 4.1.1, pp. 61. 11–62. 10).

demonstration, which in return requires a criterion, and so on.<sup>32</sup> Galen replies that it is madness, it is Pyrrhonic nonsense, to require a criterion prior to sense-perception or a logical demonstration of the truth of perceptibles. If that were so, one would need a proof that snow is white.<sup>33</sup> We don't need a criterion from outside for what we all have by nature.<sup>34</sup> Things clear to sense-perception and thought are the starting-point of all proof, and the person who doubts them has left himself nowhere to begin.<sup>35</sup> It was no doubt to avoid the regress of criteria for criteria that Galen says in *PHP* 9. 1. 12 (p. 542. 11–13) that he is reminding us of the natural criteria, not teaching or proving them.<sup>36</sup>

Of course Galen recognized that the same thing may appear different to different persons or to the same person at different times and under different circumstances.<sup>37</sup> He recognized also that things clear to thought may sometimes appear to be in conflict with things clear to sense. But the person trained in these matters will show that there is no real conflict.<sup>38</sup> One source of seeming conflict is rashness of assent. Some people are deceived when from rashness they assent to things not yet clear as though they were clear.<sup>39</sup> Seeing a person at a distance, they say confidently that it is Theon, but they are proved wrong when at close range it turns out to be Dion.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Again Aenesidemus' fourth trope: Sextus, *PH* 1. 114–17. See also Sextus, *AM* 7. 340, 342; Diog. Laer. 9. 91. The first of Aenesidemus' tropes (Sextus, *PH* 1. 59–61) also raises the issue of proving the truth of perceptions: Since things appear differently to men and animals, we can say how they appear to us, but not how they are in their own nature. We cannot assert without proof that our appearances are better, nor can we prove it, since proof would require a judge above both men and animals. The demand for a sign by which true appearances can be separated from false was made by the Academics in their controversy with the Stoics. What is the distinguishing mark, the *propria nota*, of the cognitive appearance? Cf. Cic. *Acad.* 2. 35, 101, 103.

<sup>33</sup> There is probably an allusion here to Anaxagoras, whose black snow is sometimes mentioned in controversies about the accuracy of sense-perception. See for example Gal. *De simp. med.* 2. 1 (11. 461. 14–16 K.); *De temp.* 2. 2 (1. 589 K. = 50. 26–29 Helmreich); and for the skeptics, Cic. *Acad.* 2. 72 and Sextus, *PH* 1. 33.

<sup>34</sup> *PHP* 9. 8. 25 (p. 596. 20–21).

<sup>35</sup> *De temp.* 2. 2 (1. 588–90 K. = 50. 13–51. 17 Helmreich). Cf. also *De simp. med.* 1. 30, 2. 1 (11. 434. 16–35. 3, 459. 1–61. 9 K.).

<sup>36</sup> Galen's term for reminding is ἀναμνησκων. One would expect it to be used by empiricists and skeptics, but the evidence is slight. Janáček's index to Sextus lists only two occurrences. For the empiricists see Gal. *De sect.* 8 (1. 92 K. = *SM* 3. 22. 4–5) (the empiricist is speaking): ἔσται δὲ καὶ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἀνάμνησις τοῦ φαινομένου and *De plenit.* 9 (7. 558. 5–7 K.): ἄρα γε πάνθ' ἅμα τὰ εἰρημένα συνελθεῖν δεῖ πρὸς τὴν ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν ἀνάμνησιν τῆς κενώσεως ...;

<sup>37</sup> See for example *De san. tuend.* 1. 5. 7 (*CMG* V 4.2, pp. 8. 32–9. 1).

<sup>38</sup> *De peccat. dignot.* 6. 3 (*CMG* V 4.1.1, p. 63. 7–10).

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.* 6. 3 (p. 63. 11–13).

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.* 6. 4 (p. 63. 15–18); cf. 6. 6 (pp. 63. 25–64. 2).



Those friends who heard a report that a traveller had returned and rashly announced his arrival were proved to be in error.<sup>41</sup> If people persist in assenting rashly in matters that can be verified, what will they do in obscure matters?<sup>42</sup> The cause of their rashness, Galen decides, is their desire to show that they are quicker than their neighbors to make some discovery, whether by the senses or by thought.<sup>43</sup> To a skeptic rashness is a disease afflicting dogmatists that the skeptic, being a man of good will, would like to cure.<sup>44</sup> But Galen maintains that those who have honored their rational power as their greatest glory and have sought to train and perfect it are neither rash nor boastful.<sup>45</sup>

A different kind of problem is raised by the relativity of hot and cold, dry and wet. It often happens that the same thing appears warm to the touch at one time, cold at another.<sup>46</sup> If you say that Dion's *crasis* is dry and hot, a sophist could easily say that in comparison with those whose *crasis* is hotter and dryer, Dion's *crasis* is wet and cold.<sup>47</sup> Galen's answer is that there are standards that make it possible to say that a *crasis* is in fact hot or cold, dry or wet. For each class of animal and plant there is a mean *crasis* best suited in each case to its proper activity. If an animal or plant is above the mean for its class, it may be said to be hot; if below it, cold.<sup>48</sup> But there is also a midpoint that applies universally to all substances of all kinds, the mean between the cosmic extremes of hot and cold, dry and wet. In terms of this mean a *crasis* may in absolute terms be said to be hot or cold, dry or wet.<sup>49</sup> Now as it happens, the human skin is precisely at the midpoint of these cosmic extremes, and of the human skin that of the hand, and of the hand that on the inside.<sup>50</sup> The skin of the inner side of the hand, therefore, of the well-tempered person, whose hands have not been hardened or calloused by digging or rowing, is the standard (κανόνα τε καὶ οἶον

<sup>41</sup> Ibid. 6. 8 (p. 64. 15–17).

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. 6. 10 (p. 65. 2–5).

<sup>43</sup> Ibid. 6. 11 (p. 65. 9–14).

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Sextus, *PH* 3. 280–81. The charge of προπέτεια had a long history in the controversies between skeptics and dogmatists. Colotes had used it against the Academy of Arcesilaus, and Plutarch in reply turned it against the Epicureans. See Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1124b–c. It appears in Cicero as *temeritas*; see for example *Acad.* 1. 42, 45; 2. 31, 66.

<sup>45</sup> *De peccat. dignot.* 5. 17–18 (CMG V 4.1.1, p. 59. 9–15).

<sup>46</sup> *De simp. med.* 3. 8 (11. 554. 11–12 K.).

<sup>47</sup> *De temp.* 1. 6 (1. 549 K. = 25. 15–23 Helmreich). The sophist here is not necessarily a skeptic. Galen may have had in mind a commentator on Hippocrates; see *De temp.* 1. 7 (1. 553–54 K. = 28. 12–21 Helmreich). The skeptics, however, did use the relativity of hot and cold as an argument against the trustworthiness of sense-perception. See for example Sextus, *PH* 2. 56, and Aenesidemus' fourth trope: Sextus, *PH* 1. 101, 110.

<sup>48</sup> *De temp.* 1. 6 (1. 544–47 K. = 23. 1–24. 19 Helmreich).

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. 1. 6 (1. 550 K. = 26. 6–16 Helmreich).

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. 1. 9 (1. 563–65 K. = 34. 20–35. 16 Helmreich).

κριτήριον) by which you may discover faulty *crases* in all parts of the body.<sup>51</sup>

Galen gives a very different explanation of the taste of honey. Honey when heated changes to yellow bile. In the body of a person who is cool it keeps its sweetness and easily changes to blood; but it quickly turns to bile in the body of a person who is hot and feverish, and for that reason it tastes bitter.<sup>52</sup> Sextus raises the problem of the taste of honey in his account of Aenesidemus' fourth trope,<sup>53</sup> and he goes on to argue that if one says that it is the combination of humors in a perceiver whose state is unnatural that gives the honey its unnatural taste, one might equally well say that the combination of humors in the healthy person gives the honey an unnatural taste.<sup>54</sup> If this argument was actually made by Aenesidemus and is not merely Sextus' own elaboration of the fourth trope, it could have been known to Galen; and he may have tried to avoid it by placing the change in the honey itself. The two different tastes are of two different substances.

A much more serious problem for Galen is that of distinguishing between objects whose appearances are very similar, for the differentiation of things in terms of similarities and differences was an essential part of his scientific method.<sup>55</sup> The Academic skeptics had argued that a perception is not cognitive if, on seeing one of two or more very similar things, we don't know which one we are looking at. Their examples included twins, eggs, imprints of a seal, and Lysippus' statues of Alexander.<sup>56</sup> In *De peccat. dignot.* Galen takes up the problem of the twins which he finds analogous to the *πλάνας καὶ ἀπορίας* that closely similar things cause for physicians as well as philosophers. Like Cicero's Lucullus, he points out that those who are familiar with the twins can easily distinguish one from the other.<sup>57</sup> In *De crisibus* Galen draws an analogy between recognizing diseases and recognizing persons. Each, he says, has its own distinctive mark, which the person who has seen it frequently and continually can

<sup>51</sup> Ibid. 1. 9 (1. 566–68 K. = 36. 20–37. 24 Helmreich); see also 2. 1 (1. 575–77 K. = 41. 24–43. 9 Helmreich). Similarly in *De simp. med.* 3. 8 (11. 555. 17 K.) Galen calls touch the *γνώμων* of hot and cold, and on the next page (556. 12–15 K.) he warns that something may be called hot or cold in an absolute sense only when compared to the mean and best human *crasis*.

<sup>52</sup> *De simp. med.* 4. 17 (11. 675. 15–77. 6 K.); cf. also *De alim. fac.* 3. 38. 3, 6, 7 (CMG V 4.2, pp. 380. 20–81. 4, 381. 21–29); *De antidotis* 1. 4 (14. 21. 5–15 K.).

<sup>53</sup> Sextus, *PH* 1. 101. Sextus raises the problem of the taste of honey also in *AM* 8. 53–54.

<sup>54</sup> Sextus, *PH* 1. 102–03.

<sup>55</sup> The ninth book of *PHP*, for example, is devoted entirely to the problem of knowing how to distinguish between very similar things.

<sup>56</sup> Cic. *Acad.* 2. 54, 84–86.

<sup>57</sup> *De peccat. dignot.* 2. 4–5 (CMG V 4.1.1, pp. 43. 25–44. 11); cf. Cic. *Acad.* 2. 57.

easily recognize.<sup>58</sup> Here Galen has conceded that one must have prior knowledge in order to identify a veridical perception, and to that extent he has departed from his doctrine that the clear perception is the starting-point of knowledge. Clear perception in the case of twins requires prior knowledge of the difference between them.

Other problems in the differentiation of things in terms of similarities and differences were raised by the sorites. The skeptics used the sorites to point out the difficulty of establishing boundaries. Their examples included the boundary between grain and heap, hill and mountain, deity and non-deity, rich and poor, clear and unclear, few and many, small and large, short and long, narrow and wide, virtue and vice, good and evil, true and false.<sup>59</sup> In a more specific attack on Stoic epistemology Sextus argued that as the last cognitive appearance lies beside the first non-cognitive appearance and no boundary can be drawn, the cognitive cannot be differentiated from the non-cognitive. If "fifty are few" is a cognitive appearance, and "ten thousand are few" is non-cognitive, where is the dividing line?<sup>60</sup>

Of course the sorites, which Galen also calls ὁ παρὰ μικρὸν λόγος,<sup>61</sup> was not used exclusively by skeptics. Dogmatists used it against empiricists, and empiricists in turn used it against dogmatists.<sup>62</sup> It was first formulated and named, apparently, by the Megaric Eubulides,<sup>63</sup> but there is something very much like it in a passage from Plato's *Phaedrus* that Galen quoted in *PHP*, where Socrates says that it is easier to go undetected from one thing to the opposite if one proceeds κατὰ μικρὸν, and that the one who is to deceive another without being deceived himself must distinguish accurately the similarity and difference in things.<sup>64</sup>

Galen responds to the problem of the sorites in several ways. He acknowledges that it is common to many things in life and has been discussed by many philosophers and physicians.<sup>65</sup> You can ignore it, he says, and in many places you have to; but when it is possible to set clear boundaries it is not a good idea to expose yourself to unnecessary difficulties.<sup>66</sup>

<sup>58</sup> *De crisibus* 2. 9 (9. 684 K. = 153. 15–25 Alexanderson). Cicero, as spokesman for the New Academy, had argued (*Acad.* 2. 84) that the inability to distinguish between twins results from the lack of a mark (*nota*) by which true is distinguished from false.

<sup>59</sup> See for example Cic. *Acad.* 2. 49, 92–95; *De nat. deor.* 3. 43–50; *De div.* 2. 11; Sextus, *AM* 9. 182–90.

<sup>60</sup> Sextus, *AM* 7. 415–21; cf. *PH* 2. 253–54.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Gal. *De loc. aff.* 1. 2 (8. 25. 16–17 K.).

<sup>62</sup> See *De exp. med.* 7. 5–10; 12. 8; 15–18; 20 (95–97, 106, 111–21, 123–26 Walzer); *Subf. emp.* 3 (47. 1–4 Deichgr.).

<sup>63</sup> Diog. Laer. 2. 108.

<sup>64</sup> Plat. *Phaedr.* 261e6–62c3, quoted by Galen in *PHP* 9. 2. 14–16 (pp. 546. 35–48. 13).

<sup>65</sup> *De loc. aff.* 1. 2 (8. 25. 17–26. 1 K.).

<sup>66</sup> *De marcore* 4 (7. 680. 4–9 K.).

Insofar as the sorites leads to the conclusion that there is no mountain, since the addition of a single foot, at whatever point, is not enough to change the hill into a mountain, Galen would no doubt agree with the view that he attributes to the empiricists in *De exp. med.*, that the sorites is fallacious since it is contradicted by what is plain to the senses.<sup>67</sup> Denying that there is such a thing as a mountain is like denying that there are such things as vision, generation and destruction, motion, aging, change of winter to spring, spring to summer, summer to fall, because you cannot explain how they come about.<sup>68</sup>

But the problem remains how to find the boundaries between kinds of things. When faced with the soritic question—When does old age begin?—Galen finds the answer in the increase in the relative amount of liquids discharged from the body. Old age is a drying out.<sup>69</sup> It is thought to be wet because the discharge of liquids increases, the body being no longer able to retain them.<sup>70</sup> A clear boundary, therefore, between the decline from the prime of life and the beginning of old age is the predominance (ἐπικράτησις) of those fluid discharges that deceived people into thinking that old age is wet.<sup>71</sup>

Galen has a very different explanation of the beginning of disease. It rests on the distinction between change in form and change in magnitude. In homoeomerous parts of the body a disease begins the moment the hot or cold or wet or dry exceeds healthy limits in the *crasis* of the body. At that point the boundary has been crossed. The disease now has its proper form, but it may be too small to be detected by the physician or the patient, just as the first drop of water to hit the rock begins to hollow it out, although the hollow is not yet perceptible. Nature can cure small affections, but when they become too large for nature to overcome, then outside help is needed.<sup>72</sup> The form of the disease, however, is independent of its magnitude.

<sup>67</sup> *De exp. med.* 17. 6–8 (118–19 Walzer).

<sup>68</sup> *De exp. med.* 15–16 (113–15 Walzer); cf. also 19 and 20 (122–26 Walzer). The theme that to deny the existence of something that is evident because one cannot explain it is the result of misguided reasoning appears also in *De semine* 2. 4 (4. 620. 5–6, 10–13 K.); *An in arteriis* 6 (4. 721. 10–12 K.); *De caus. procatarc.* 115–16, 123 (CMG Suppl. II, pp. 28–29, 30); *De consuet.* 1 (CMG Suppl. III, p. 2). Galen does not tell us which argument against motion he has in mind. The argument of Diodorus Cronus is given by Sextus, *AM* 1. 311–12, 10. 85–87, 143; it is not in the form of a sorites. Neither Galen nor Sextus, so far as I know, mentions Zeno's paradox of motion.

<sup>69</sup> *De marcore* 3, 4 (7. 672. 10–13, 678. 15–17 K.).

<sup>70</sup> Cf. *De temp.* 2. 2 (1. 580–82 K. = 45. 9–46. 14 Helmreich).

<sup>71</sup> *De marcore* 4 (7. 680. 9–12 K.).

<sup>72</sup> *De loc. aff.* 1. 2 (8. 26. 3–28. 18 K.). Compare *Ars med.* 4 (1. 316. 4–17. 13 K.), where the continuum from the best condition of the body to painful and crippling disease is divided by clear visual differences; but when there is a weakening of activities the difference between the extremes is easy to recognize but lesser differences are unclear. A condition in this ambiguous middle zone is neither, οὐδ' ἐτέρα. This analysis, like that in *De loc. aff.*, recognizes the difference between the nature of things and their appearance. The author says that appearance should be used in setting boundaries. He rejects setting



Still another response is simply to leave the boundaries imprecise and to make the uncertainty a matter of name-giving. Galen says in *De febr. diff.* that paroxysms of different durations are given different names. It is not possible to define the boundaries precisely because of the soritic puzzle; but it is not necessary to look for such precision in names, since we can prescribe treatment without them.<sup>73</sup> Similarly in *In Hipp. Progn. comm.* the question whether a fever with a crisis after the fourteenth day, on up to the seventeenth or even the twentieth day, can still be called acute, becomes a soritic problem which involves names only.<sup>74</sup>

What limits can be set to great and small, fast and slow? Galen faces this problem in *De puls. dignosc.* 2. 1–2. One of his students suggested that they have an indefinite range but are limited in the sense that one can think of things outside the limits. The size of a city is indefinite, but no city consists of only three households, and no city stretches out to a thousand stades. No mountain is a foot high, but no mountain reaches the moon.<sup>75</sup> On this view both the upper and the lower limit of a class of objects is left indeterminate. But Galen rejects this analogy. There is no upper limit too large, and no lower limit. Such terms as large and small, hard and soft, have a fixed meaning only within a class of objects in which there is a midpoint, a mean, a measure, μέσῳ τε καὶ μετρίῳ καὶ συμμέτρῳ, that can serve as canon and criterion. This mean, Galen says, is sought in all of life. The arts, especially, are engaged in the pursuit of it.<sup>76</sup> Then after a long discussion Galen explains how to find the σύμμετρος σφυγμός.<sup>77</sup>

The recognition that a clear perception does not always become clear until the proper preliminaries have been carried out is nowhere more evident than in Galen's identification, in *PHP* 9, of his φαντασία ἐναργής not only with the Stoic φαντασία καταληπτική but also with Carneades' persuasive appearance, including its three requirements: οὐ μόνον πιθανὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ περιωδευμένην καὶ ἀπερίσπαστον.<sup>78</sup> Consistent with this

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natural boundaries between disease and health on the ground that it would lead to the doctrine of ἀειπάθεια (317. 11–13). I take this warning to mean that if disease is a lack of the proper proportion in the *crasis* of hot and cold and dry and wet, then only the best constitution would be free of it, since bodies that are healthy but not in the best state have already some small defect in their *crasis* (cf. 314. 15–15. 2; 315. 14–17). Here the author of *Ars medica*, whether Galen or not, is clearly trying to avoid the sorites.

<sup>73</sup> *De febr. diff.* 2. 10 (7. 371. 10–72. 14 K.).

<sup>74</sup> *In Hipp. Progn. comm.* 3. 15 (CMG V 9.2, p. 342. 12–30).

<sup>75</sup> *De puls. dignosc.* 2. 1 (8. 840. 11–41. 12 K.). Compare the Epicureans on limits of variation, Philodemus' man of iron who walks through walls (*De sign.* col. 21), and Lucretius' superman who wades through the sea and tears great mountains apart with his hands (1. 199–201).

<sup>76</sup> *De puls. dignosc.* 2. 2 (8. 841. 13–43. 12 K.).

<sup>77</sup> *De puls. dignosc.* 2. 2 (8. 857. 10–58. 17 K.).

<sup>78</sup> *PHP* 9. 7. 3 (p. 586. 16–20); cf. also *PHP* 9. 9. 37 (p. 606. 20–21). For Carneades' three requirements see Cic. *Acad.* 2. 33–36 and Sextus, *PH* 1. 227–29, *AM* 7. 166–84.

identification is his warning against assenting to an appearance ἀπερισκέπτως.<sup>79</sup> These preliminaries, as described in *PHP* 9. 2, are themselves a modified sorites. As a method for distinguishing between very similar things Galen says that one should start with the greatest and easiest differences.<sup>80</sup> Having established these, one may advance κατὰ βραχύ to the differences that are slight. In other words, instead of starting at one pole and advancing gradually from that, as the sorites does, we should first establish two polar opposites and then advance gradually from each toward the other, using the same criteria that we used to establish the poles.<sup>81</sup> The well-trained master of a discipline will be able by this means to separate the false from the true.<sup>82</sup>

After defending the trustworthiness of clear appearances, Galen must next defend against skeptic attack the method of passing from the evident to the non-evident. Galen's term for this is *endeixis*, "indication," which, he says in *Meth. med.* 2. 7 (10. 126. 10–11 K.), is as it were the disclosure of the consequence, οἷον ἔμφασιν τῆς ἀκολουθίας. It is not an inference from a particular perceived thing; it is rather an inference from the very nature of the thing, ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ πράγματος φύσεως (ibid. p. 127. 1). Here "the very nature of the thing" is not a periphrasis for "the thing" or "the thing itself."<sup>83</sup> Nature in this context is something that transcends the individual and is shared by other members of the group to which the individual belongs. As Galen says about the natural criteria, what is natural must be common to all.<sup>84</sup> It is from this common nature that inferences are made by *endeixis*, and *endeixis* gives us truths that apply generally to all members of a class. Applying this to medicine, Galen says that in order to find the cure for every disease one must first find the generic and common *endeixis* of all diseases and from there proceed to the species (ibid. p. 128. 4–6).

In explaining this generic approach to disease Galen introduces a Platonic term. The reason all diseases are called diseases is necessarily because they all participate in one and the same thing, ἐνὸς καὶ ταύτου

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This Carneadean scheme may have been one of the things that Galen recognized as sound (ὀυγιές) in the earlier Academics; see *De opt. doct.* 3 (1. 47 K. = 183. 3–4 Barigazzi).

<sup>79</sup> *PHP* 5. 4. 12 (p. 314. 33); *In Hipp. Epid. III comm.* 3. 76 (CMG V 10.2.1, p. 166. 19); *In Hipp. Epid. VI comm.* 2. 27 (CMG V 10.2.2, p. 91. 8–11, 16). Cf. also *PHP* 9. 9. 38–39 (p. 606. 22 [σκέψις] and 606. 28 [ἄσκεπτοι]).

<sup>80</sup> *PHP* 9. 2. 3 (pp. 544. 36–46. 1). The allusion is to the Hippocratic ἀπὸ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ ῥηίστων (*De off. med.* 1 [3. 272 Liuré]), quoted in *PHP* 9. 1. 14 (p. 542. 22). Quoting this same phrase in *In Hipp. Progn. comm.* 1. 5 (CMG V 9.2, p. 210. 1–2) Galen says that this is the starting-point not only for prognosis but also for the indications (ἐνδείξεις) of what must be done.

<sup>81</sup> *PHP* 9. 2. 4 (p. 546. 1–2).

<sup>82</sup> Cf. *PHP* 9. 7. 18–19 (p. 590. 2–9).

<sup>83</sup> On "the nature of" as periphrasis see Plutarch's charge in *Adv. Col.* 1112f that when Epicurus says "the nature of the void" he simply means "the void."

<sup>84</sup> See above, 284 and note 8.

μεθέξει (ibid. p. 128. 7). He then gives examples of things that have the same name by virtue of what is the same in them (ibid. p. 128. 8–15). When two or more different kinds of things have the same name for each of its meanings, the name refers to what is one and the same in some one kind of thing. A dog may be a land dog or a sea dog. They have only the name “dog” in common; they do not have a common nature (ibid. p. 129. 2–4). At this point Galen introduces another Platonic term: For all land dogs there is one εἶδος by virtue of which they are called dogs (ibid. p. 129. 17–18); and two pages later ιδέα is used along with εἶδος as that to which the name refers (ibid. p. 131. 17–18).<sup>85</sup> There is clearly some close relation here between φύσις and εἶδος and ιδέα. They all refer to that shared unity of members of a class on which the dogmatist bases his *endeixis*.<sup>86</sup>

Empiricists and skeptics had doubts about the possibility of knowing the nature of things. Aenesidemus had argued that since the appearance of things differs with the difference in animals, we will be able to say how an object is seen by us, but we shall stop short of saying what kind of thing it is in its nature, ὁποῖον μὲν ἡμῖν θεωρεῖται τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἔξομεν λέγειν, ὁποῖον δὲ ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἐφέξομεν.<sup>87</sup> In *De puls. dignosc.* Galen says that the empiricists professed ignorance of the nature of things, μηδ' ὅλως μηδὲν ἀπάντων ὡς ἔχει φύσει γινώσκειν,<sup>88</sup> and he links them to the Pyrrhonists by quoting a line from Timon that was quoted also by Sextus and Diogenes Laertius, τὸ φαινόμενον πάντῃ σθένει οὐπερ ἂν ἔλθῃ.<sup>89</sup> Galen rejects their talk about not knowing the nature of things as

<sup>85</sup> Galen uses the term εἶδος frequently in the following pages of *MM* 2. 7. See also *Inst. log.* 12. 8 (29. 5 Kalbfleisch): καὶ γὰρ ἐστὶν ὡς εἶδος ἓν and ibid. 18. 3 (45. 19–21): τὸ γὰρ εἶδος τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἀφ' οὗ λέγεται πάντα τὰ κατὰ μέρος δίκαια. Things are given their εἶδος by the four εἰδοποιοὶ ποιότητες, *De simp. med.* 3. 4 (11. 546. 17–47. 5 K.) or by εἰδοποιοὶ διαφοραί, *MM* 1. 3 (10. 23. 10–14 K.). For ιδέα see τί (or τι) . . . πρᾶγμα μίαν ιδέαν ἔχον, *MM* 2. 7 (10. 144. 3, 5 K.). Galen sees a reference to this unifying one also in the terms γένος, *MM* 2. 7 (10. 139. 10 K.), ἥ (favored by empiricists), ibid. 129. 8, 130. 5–9, 136. 4–5, 140. 9–13, 142. 13 K., and κοινότης (favored by methodists), ibid. 141. 14–16, 142. 12 K.

<sup>86</sup> The close relation between φύσις and εἶδος and ιδέα is evident also in such passages as *De simp. med.* 3. 4 (11. 546. 16–17 K.): κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ὅλην ἀλλοιοῦται (sc. ὁ ἄρτος) καὶ τῆς ἀρχαίας ἐξίσταται φύσεως, εἰς ἕτερον εἶδος μεθιστάμενος, *Inst. log.* 12. 9 (29. 7–8 Kalbfleisch): ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιούτου γε εἶδους αὐτοῦ μία φύσις ἐστὶ, and *In Hipp. Aph. comm.* 2. 34 (17 B. 532. 7–8 K.): ἐστὶν ὅτε γὰρ ὀνομάζουσι φύσιν καὶ ταύτην (sc. τὴν ιδέαν). *Endeixis* may be from an ιδέα: ἐκ τῆς ἐαυτῶν ιδέας ἐνδείκνυται, *In Hipp. Epid. I comm.* 2. 47 (CMG V 10.1, p. 72. 19). In conjoining nature and form Galen may have been influenced by such Platonic expressions as τὸ φύσει δίκαιον, *Resp.* 6, 501b2.

<sup>87</sup> Sextus, *PH* 1. 59; cf. 1. 117, 128, 129, 134, 163; Diog. Laer. 9. 86; and Aenesidemus, 170b15–16 in Phot. *Bibl.* 212 (3. 121 Henry).

<sup>88</sup> Gal. *De puls. dignosc.* 1. 2 (8. 782. 6–7 K.).

<sup>89</sup> *De puls. dignosc.* 1. 2 (8. 781. 10 K.); Sextus, *AM* 7. 30; Diog. Laer. 9. 105. Cf. also Galen's ridicule of those who sit σκεπτομένους καὶ ἀποροῦντας, *De puls. dignosc.* 1. 2 (8. 783. 4 K.). The passage from 8. 780. 14 to 785. 1 K. is quoted by Deichgräber, *Die gr. Empirikerschule* 133–34, with textual corrections.

no more than idle talk.<sup>90</sup> Since in their actions in medicine and in the rest of life they trust their senses and follow them, just like everyone else, their *aporia* cannot overturn the use of clear appearances.<sup>91</sup>

Empiricists and skeptics had also doubted the existence of an εἶδος that is common to many particulars. Sextus raised the question how a genus, being one thing, could be present in all its species;<sup>92</sup> and he asked how it is that the ἄνθρωπος by participation in which we are held to be human beings is not one of us.<sup>93</sup> The empiricists, Galen says, asked to be shown this ἄνθρωπος αὐτὸς καθ' ἑαυτὸν apart from individual ἄνθρωποι.<sup>94</sup> Galen's answer is again aimed at the empiricists. He defends his own position by an argument from names. The unifying one is something, for it can be named, e.g. horse, empiricist, disease; and the name is the name of something.<sup>95</sup> If the name signifies one thing, the form of the thing is necessarily one.<sup>96</sup>

Arguing from names is treacherous. Names can be the names of more than one thing, such as "dog" and "tongue."<sup>97</sup> They may be mere words, signifying nothing, like βλίτυρι and σκινδαψός,<sup>98</sup> or they may, like Scylla and Centaur, have a meaning for which there is no corresponding object.<sup>99</sup> They may say nothing because they arise from a mistaken view of things, like Archigenes' "heavy pulse."<sup>100</sup> Such names as hot, cold, dry, wet may be ambiguous because of the many different objects of which they are used.<sup>101</sup> The ambiguity of names is a source of sophistical arguments.<sup>102</sup> It is clear, then, that when Galen says that there is one thing signified by such a name as ἄνθρωπος or νόσος, he does not mean that from the name we can infer the existence of a class of objects that are in some sense one, but rather

<sup>90</sup> *De puls. dignosc.* 1. 2 (8. 785. 2 K.).

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.* 1. 2 (8. 786. 4–6 K.). See also 783. 18 and 785. 4 K.

<sup>92</sup> Sextus, *PH* 2. 219–22.

<sup>93</sup> Sextus, *AM* 10. 288–91.

<sup>94</sup> Galen, *MM* 2. 7 (10. 140. 14–16 K.); cf. *ibid.* 152. 6–10; 154. 15–16.

<sup>95</sup> See *MM* 2. 7 (10. 128. 13–15, 143. 1, 144. 2–4, 155. 10–13 K.).

<sup>96</sup> *MM* 2. 7 (10. 131. 17–18 K.).

<sup>97</sup> *MM* 2. 7 (10. 131. 2–9 K.). Galen uses the same examples in a discussion of definition in *De puls. diff.* 2. 3 (8. 573. 1–15 K.).

<sup>98</sup> *MM* 2. 7 (10. 144. 9–11 K.). See also *De diff. febr.* 2. 6 (7. 348. 7 K.); *De puls. diff.* 4. 1 (8. 696. 19 K.); *De usu part.* 8. 4 (3. 629 K. = 1. 456. 3–13 Helmreich); *De med. nom.* pp. 8, 17, 32 Meyerhof–Schacht.

<sup>99</sup> *MM* 2. 7 (10. 144. 13 K.); cf. *De puls. diff.* 4. 1 (8. 697. 4–5 K.). The centaur appears alone in *MM* 2. 7 (10. 153. 19 K.).

<sup>100</sup> *De puls. diff.* 3. 3 (8. 652. 2–10 K.). In 3. 4 (8. 662. 4–7 K.) Galen compares Archigenes' heavy pulse to βλίτυρι and σκινδαψός.

<sup>101</sup> The ambiguity of the names of the qualities is a theme to which Galen often returns. See for example *De elem.* 1. 6 (1. 460–65 K.); the convenient summary in *De simp. med.* 3. 2 (11. 542. 11–44. 6 K.); and above, 288–89.

<sup>102</sup> See for example *PHP* 2. 4. 4, 5, 26, 8. 2 (pp. 116. 30–31, 132. 25–28, 158. 1–2).



that the class can be given a name because one and the same thing is present in all its members.<sup>103</sup>

Galen also makes an argument from definitions. Definition of a name, ὁ λόγος τοῦ ὀνόματος,<sup>104</sup> resolves into simple terms the things that the name combines. The name "fever" combines heat and damage to activity, and "phrenitis" combines fever and delirium.<sup>105</sup> The name ἄνθρωπος combines animal, rational, and mortal.<sup>106</sup> But if phrenitis is a thing, disease is also πρᾶγμα τι. It makes no sense to recognise that phrenitis and human being, which are non-simple, are things, and not recognize that disease and animal are things.<sup>107</sup> Animal, in turn, is a body with sense-perception. It is absurd to say that body is something and sense-perception is something, but a body with sense-perception is nothing, or that there is a body with sense-perception but not an animal.<sup>108</sup>

This argument from definition in *MM* 2. 7 places definition on the level of universals and holds that the universals defined and the universals in the definition are things (πράγματα). There is no hint here of skeptical doubts about definition. But Sextus questioned it;<sup>109</sup> and Galen tells us that the empiricists attacked definition<sup>110</sup> and avoided the term.<sup>111</sup> There were also some who in their ignorance wanted to define everything,<sup>112</sup> and some who considered it useless.<sup>113</sup> Galen himself says in *De puls. diff.* that there are not definitions of everything,<sup>114</sup> and when everyone knows what a word means definition serves no useful purpose.<sup>115</sup>

Yet in that same work Galen points out the usefulness of definition when a concept is not clear.<sup>116</sup> But there is a difference between definition

<sup>103</sup> *MM* 2. 7 (10. 128. 9-15, 144. 2-45. 2 K.).

<sup>104</sup> *MM* 2. 7 (10. 151. 15 K.); cf. *De puls. diff.* 4. 2 (8. 705. 11-14 K.).

<sup>105</sup> *MM* 2. 7 (10. 150. 11-51. 11 K.).

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.* 151. 11-12 K.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.* 152. 1-6 K.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.* 153. 14-54. 10 K.

<sup>109</sup> Sextus, *AM* 7. 269-82; *PH* 2. 205-12; cf. *PH* 2. 22-32.

<sup>110</sup> Gal. *De sectis* 5 (1. 77 K. = *SM* 3. 10. 26-11. 2).

<sup>111</sup> The empiricists speak instead of ὑπογραφαί and ὑποτυπώσεις. See Gal. *De puls. diff.* 4. 2, 3 (8. 709. 1-5, 720. 3-9, 721. 15-16 K.); *Subf. emp.* 7 (63. 1-10 Deichgr.). Sextus too uses ὑπογραφή in place of ὄρος; see for example *AM* 6. 42, 8. 9, 12, 244, 314, 454.

<sup>112</sup> Cf. *De puls. diff.* 4. 1, 17 (8. 696. 10-13, 698. 4-6, 763. 2-4, 13-15, 764. 10-11 K.).

<sup>113</sup> *De puls. diff.* 2. 17 (8. 764. 17 K.).

<sup>114</sup> *De puls. diff.* 2. 3 (8. 570. 16-18 K.).

<sup>115</sup> *De puls. diff.* 4. 1 (8. 696. 13-16 K.); cf. 4. 2 (8. 717. 6-13 K.). See the remarks on definition in J. Kollesch, "Anschauungen von den ἀρχαί in der *Ars medica* und die Seelenlehre Galens," *Le opere psicologiche di Galeno* (Naples 1988) 218-20.

<sup>116</sup> *De puls. diff.* 4. 2, 17 (8. 718. 12-15, 763. 4-8 K.). Galen says in *PHP* 6. 1. 3-4 (p. 360. 15-21) that sometimes a clear statement of the meaning of a word can by itself solve a problem.

of a concept and definition of οὐσία,<sup>117</sup> which Galen describes as λόγος διδασκαλικὸς τῆς τοῦ πράγματος οὐσίας.<sup>118</sup> Οὐσιώδης ὅρος, however, is not a good starting-point for instruction.<sup>119</sup> Instruction, Galen says, leads the student from the ἔννοια to the knowledge of οὐσία;<sup>120</sup> and in fact in his treatise *De elementis* and also in *PHP* 8. 2 he begins with a definition of στοιχεῖον and proceeds to the proof that the elements are fire, air, water, earth.<sup>121</sup>

It appears, then, that Galen's view of definition was complex. But whatever the varieties and usefulness of definitions, the important point for the present discussion is that what makes definition possible is the oneness of the thing defined.

Two parts of Galen's defense of universals remain to be mentioned. One is his appeal to the authority of Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Plato.<sup>122</sup> The other is his exploitation of the curious circumstance that although the empiricists doubted such universals as disease and human being, they did recognize that phrenetic is one thing and empiricist is one thing.<sup>123</sup> When asked whether a live empiricist is one with a dead empiricist, they answer that they are one qua empiricists. Galen's argument is that if Serapion and Menodotus are one qua empiricists, it is stupid or perverse not to recognize that since they are both human beings they are one qua human beings.<sup>124</sup>

Having now established that the members of a class have a common nature and participate in a single form, Galen is ready to make inferences by *endeixis* to the non-evident. *Endeixis* reveals what follows from the very nature of a thing. In *MM* 2. 7 he explains it in these words: τὸν (read τὸ) τοῖνον ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ πράγματος φύσεως ὁρμώμενον ἐξευρίσκειν τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἄνευ τῆς πείρας ἐνδείξεις καὶ εὗρεσίν ἐστι πεποιηθῆσαι.<sup>125</sup> It is the instrument of the rational physician: ὁ δὲ λογικὸς ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν

<sup>117</sup> *De puls. diff.* 4. 2 (8. 704. 5–14 K.).

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.* 713. 12–13 K.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.* 718. 15–19. 2 K.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.* 718. 12–13 K.; cf. *MM* 1. 5 (10. 40. 12–42. 9 K.).

<sup>121</sup> Galen's treatises *De typis*, *De marcore*, and *De partium homoeomerium diff.* also begin with definitions.

<sup>122</sup> *MM* 2. 7 (10. 137. 15–38. 4, 139. 16–40. 1, 141. 16–42. 4 K.); cf. also 143. 12–14 K. The reference to the *Philebus* (138. 4 K.) is perhaps to *Phileb.* 14c, quoted by Galen in *PHP* 9. 5. 30 (p. 570. 17).

<sup>123</sup> *MM* 2. 7 (10. 135. 10–12 K.).

<sup>124</sup> *MM* 2. 7 (10. 136. 2–37. 13 K.). Galen extends and amplifies this counterargument up to p. 144. 9 K.

<sup>125</sup> *MM* 2. 7 (10. 127. 1–3 K.). Compare such expressions as τὴν γὰρ οἶον ἔμφασιν τῆς ἀκολουθίας ἐνδείξιν λέγομεν (*MM* 2. 7 [10. 126. 10–11 K.]); ἐκ τῆς τοῦ πράγματος φύσεως ἐνδεικτικῶς (*In Hipp. Epid. VI comm.* 1. 2 [CMG V 10.2.2, p. 14. 20]); ἡ ἐνδείξις ἐκ τῆς τοῦ πράγματος φύσεως ὁρμωμένη τὸ δέον ἐξευρίσκει (*MM* 3. 1 [10. 157. 1–2 K.]); αὐτὴ τῶν πραγμάτων ἡ φύσις ἐνδείκνυται (*De constit. art. med.* 8 [1. 251. 12–13 K.]). There are similar phrases in *MM* 2. 5, 3. 1 (10. 104. 12, 161. 15 K.); *In Hipp. Prorrhet. comm.* 2. 59 (CMG V 9.2, p. 104. 17); *In Hipp. Epid. III comm.* 1. 6 (CMG V 10.2.1, p. 32. 21–22).

αὐτὴν τοῦ πράγματος ἐρχόμενος ἐνδεικτικῶς ἀπ' ἐκείνης εἷς τε τὴν τῶν ἐσομένων πρόγνωσιν καὶ εἰς τὴν τῆς θεραπειᾶς εὕρεσιν ὀνίναται, χρώμενος μὲν ἅπασιν καὶ τοῖς διὰ πείρας εὕρισκομένοις, προστιθεὶς δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῆς λογικῆς μεθόδου πολλὰ.<sup>126</sup> It is rejected by empiricists and skeptics.<sup>127</sup> It is sequential, the first *endeixis* followed by others until the goal, which is to find the cure for every kind of disease, is reached.<sup>128</sup>

The uses of *endeixis* are not limited to the discovery of cures.<sup>129</sup> An example from natural science is that winds indicate that when moisture is changed to air a small amount of moisture produces a very large amount of air.<sup>130</sup> Among animals, the fact that the calf butts before it has horns, and the young of winged animals try to fly before they are able, indicate that the souls that use the parts understand and use them as their own creation.<sup>131</sup> Among human beings the conflict of reason with desire indicates that there are two contending powers in us;<sup>132</sup> and it is by *endeixis* that the rational part of the soul is discovered to be in the brain, the spirited part in the heart.<sup>133</sup> The variety and consistency of the veins and arteries indicate that they contain all the humors.<sup>134</sup> The source and power and use of the nerves are all discovered by *endeixis*.<sup>135</sup> Especially important for Galen's teleological view of organisms is the inference by *endeixis* from the

<sup>126</sup> *De diff. febr.* 1. 3 (7. 282. 1–5 K.); cf. also *De sectis* 1 (1. 65 K. = *SM* 3. 2. 2–3); *MM* 2. 7. 3. 7 (10. 127. 9–12, 204. 11–13 K.); *Subf. emp.* 2 (44. 10–13 Deichgr.).

<sup>127</sup> For the empiricists see below, 301 and note 164. Sextus' attack on the ἐνδεικτικὸν σημείον is in *PH* 2. 99–129, *AM* 8. 143–298 (see below, 302). We must assume that both Stoics and rational physicians had theories of *endeixis* in late Hellenistic times, but there is little evidence outside the vague references in Sextus and Galen. The verb ἐνδείκνυσθαι occurs three times in Philodemus, *De signis* in anti-Stoic contexts, twice (col. xi 11 and xiii 26) in denials of the cogency of Stoic arguments, and once (col. xxxv 26) in an explanation of the use of καθό and ἤ. *Endeixis* is in Posid. test. 87 Edelstein–Kidd = *Gal. PHP* 5. 7. 84 (pp. 356. 31–58. 1) in an epistemological context. In Cicero the terms *declarare*, *declaratio* may be translations of ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ἐνδειξις in such passages as *De nat. deor.* 2. 43: *sensum autem astrorum atque intellegentiam maxime declarat ordo eorum atque constantia*, and *Acad.* 1. 41: *visis . . . eis solum quae propriam quandam habent declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur*. In such passages, however, *endeixis* does not appear to have the methodological significance that it has for Galen.

<sup>128</sup> *MM* 2. 7 (10. 127. 12–18 K.).

<sup>129</sup> Excluded from consideration here is the use of *endeixis* in the explanation of the meaning of a word or in the interpretation of a text, whether of Homer or Hippocrates or Plato or Chrysippus or some other. This usage is very common in Galen. See for example *PHP* pp. 156. 11, 158. 22, 218. 11, 236. 16, 244. 15, 252. 28. *Endeixis* is used also of the meaning of gestures in *PHP* pp. 108. 2–4, 8–10; 114. 13–16.

<sup>130</sup> *De semine* 1. 4 (4. 520. 6–16 K.).

<sup>131</sup> *De foet. form.* 6 (4. 692. 10–18 K.).

<sup>132</sup> *PHP* 5. 7. 22 (p. 342. 1–5).

<sup>133</sup> *PHP* 2. 7. 17; 6. 3. 4; 6. 8. 39, 44 (pp. 154. 28–32, 372. 29–32, 416. 6–9, 21–24).

<sup>134</sup> *De atra bile* 5. 1 (*CMG* V 4.1.1, p. 79. 1–3).

<sup>135</sup> *PHP* 1. 7. 55, 7. 5. 17, 7. 8. 7 (pp. 90. 22–25, 456. 21–25, 476. 19–21).

structure of the body to the wisdom and power of the divine artisan who fashioned it.<sup>136</sup>

In pathology *endeixis* is on the level of the individual. The patient's behavior or his symptoms indicate his condition, and his condition indicates what action should be taken. A dry tongue combined with fever of a certain kind is sufficient indication of the state of the liver.<sup>137</sup> An injury to the spinal cord is indicated by the parts that receive their nerves from it.<sup>138</sup> The patient's habits are indicative of the nature of his body.<sup>139</sup> His condition may be indicated even by what he dreams about.<sup>140</sup> Here universals are present, presumably, in that the patient's symptoms enable the physician to classify him and so draw the appropriate inference.<sup>141</sup>

From the patient's condition the cure is found by *endeixis: a dispositionibus inveniri indicative curam*.<sup>142</sup> This indication of the cure depends on one's medical theory. Galen tells us that the physician must master logical method in order to know by genus and species how many diseases there are and how to take from each disease an indication, *endeixis*, of the cure.<sup>143</sup> Galen's training in the methods of proof enabled him to judge the views of others, and in his cures he was guided by the *endeixis* of what he discovered: ὥς ἡ τῶν εὐρεθέντων ἔνδειξις ἐποδήγει με, τὰς θεραπείας ἐποιοῦμην.<sup>144</sup>

Finding the *endeixis* of the cure in the *diathesis* of the patient has a superficial resemblance to the *endeixis* of the methodists. As Galen explains it, the methodists held that unnatural conditions indicate their remedies. A stone in the bladder indicates removal. A dislocated joint

<sup>136</sup> See for example *PHP* 9. 8. 12 (p. 594. 2-4); *De foet. form.* 6 (4. 687. 13-14, 693. 12-15 K.); *In Hipp. Epid. VI comm.* 5. 4 (CMG V 10.2.2, p. 265. 14-15). In *De usu partium* Galen finds many indications of the wisdom and skill of the artisan who fashioned the bodies of men and animals; see for example 17. 1 (4. 346-62 K. = 2. 437-49 Helmreich).

<sup>137</sup> *In Hipp. Epid. III comm.* 1. 6 (CMG V 10.2.1, p. 30. 30-31).

<sup>138</sup> *In Hipp. Prorrh. comm.* 2. 34 (CMG V 9.2, p. 80. 17-20), reading αὐτῷ with Cornarius at 80. 19.

<sup>139</sup> *MM* 9. 16 (10. 654. 15-16 K.).

<sup>140</sup> *In Hipp. Epid. I comm.* 3. 1 (CMG V 10.1, p. 108. 1-21).

<sup>141</sup> See below, note 143, and *De curandi ratione per venae sect.* 3 (11. 258. 14-18 K.), where Galen speaks of the need to classify by species and differentia the conditions that require evacuation.

<sup>142</sup> *De caus. content.* 10. 8 (CMG Suppl. Or. II, p. 141. 33-34; cf. p. 73. 14-15). There are many similar statements in Galen's other works. See for example *De sectis* 3 (1. 70 K. = *SM* 3. 5. 16-17). Other circumstances besides the patient's διάθεσις may enter into the indication of what is helpful; cf. *De sectis* 3 (1. 70, 72 K. = *SM* 3. 5. 16-6. 1, 6. 25-26); *In Hipp. Epid. VI comm.* 3. 47 (CMG V 10.2.2, p. 187. 4-9). Indications of cures derived from differences in ἔλκη are mentioned in *MM* 3. 10 (10. 221. 15-17 K.).

<sup>143</sup> *Quod opt. med. sit quoque philos.* 3, 4 (1. 59-60, 62 K. = *SM* 2. 6. 10-14, 7. 2-3, 8. 5-6).

<sup>144</sup> *MM* 7. 5 (10. 469. 14-70. 2 K.).



indicates a return to its proper place.<sup>145</sup> The methodists' *endeixis*, however, does not depend on logical method or medical theory. Indeed Sextus found it consistent with skepticism.<sup>146</sup> Galen gave it a limited role in medicine. Everyone agrees that the first indications are taken from the *diathesis*, but this is only at the beginning of the science of medicine.<sup>147</sup> It requires no medical skill; it is obvious even to the layman.<sup>148</sup> Although it indicates what is to be done, only the physician knows how to do it.<sup>149</sup> The methodists are at fault also in that they neglect circumstances relevant to the treatment of the *diathesis*, and they are not even clear about the distinction between natural and unnatural.<sup>150</sup>

The superficial resemblance to the methodists' *endeixis* is in Galen's use of such phrases as τὸ μὲν γὰρ νόσημα αὐτὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ διαθέσεως ἐνδείκνυται τὰ βοηθήματα, and τὴν μὲν ἔνδειξιν τοῦ βοηθήματος ἀπὸ τῆς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα διαθέσεως ἔλαβε.<sup>151</sup> But the difference is that for Galen *endeixis* is a relation of ἀκολουθία. One thing follows from another in accordance with some rational principle. Normally there is a causal relation behind the *endeixis*, or one thing is a necessary condition of another. In the visible symptoms, Galen says in *De sectis*, there is for the dogmatist an indication of the cause, and from that he finds the cure.<sup>152</sup> The choice of drugs is indicated by the degree to which the affected part must be dried and cooled.<sup>153</sup> Symptoms may also indicate the strength or weakness of the body.<sup>154</sup> When there is a conflict between the treatment indicated by the affected part and that indicated by the patient's nature, the well-trained physician is best able to estimate (στοχάζεσθαι) what drug should be used.<sup>155</sup> A future event may be indicated by a symptom when the symptom and the future event are both effects of the same cause.<sup>156</sup>

<sup>145</sup> Galen describes the *endeixis* of the methodists in *De sectis* 6–7 and *MM* 3. 1.

<sup>146</sup> Sextus, *PH* 1. 236–41, especially 240.

<sup>147</sup> *MM* 3. 1 (10. 157. 7–58. 4 K.).

<sup>148</sup> *MM* 3. 1 (10. 158. 10–12 K.).

<sup>149</sup> *MM* 3. 1 (10. 158. 15–16 K.).

<sup>150</sup> Galen presents criticisms of the methodists made by both empiricists and dogmatists in *De sect.* 8–9.

<sup>151</sup> *In Hipp. De vict. acut. comm.* 1. 43, 44 (*CMG* V 9.1, pp. 159. 15–16, 160. 19–20). See also *De curandi rat. per venae sect.* 3 (11. 258. 16–17 K.): τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἐνδεικνυμένων τὴν κένωσιν διαθέσεων, and *De sectis* 3 (1. 70 K. = *SM* 3. 5. 16–18): ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς διαθέσεως ἡ ἔνδειξις αὐτοῖς (sc. τοῖς δογματικοῖς) τοῦ συμφέροντος γίγνεται.

<sup>152</sup> *De sect.* 4 (1. 73 K. = *SM* 3. 7. 19–21; cf. 3. 7. 23–25).

<sup>153</sup> *MM* 3. 8 (10. 212. 11–17 K.).

<sup>154</sup> See for example *In Hipp. Progn. comm.* 1. 8, 2. 28, 3. 15 (*CMG* V 9.2, pp. 216. 23, 284. 3–7, 343. 22–23).

<sup>155</sup> *MM* 3. 9 (10. 216. 8–17. 17 K.). There is another example of conflicting indications in *In Hipp. De vict. acut. comm.* 1. 43 (*CMG* V 9.1, p. 159. 15–23).

<sup>156</sup> For examples see *In Hipp. Progn. comm.* 1. 21 (*CMG* V 9.2, p. 234. 16–22) (death), and *ibid.* 2. 27 (p. 282. 18–24) (recovery).

Galen also speaks of indication, perhaps improperly, when there is more than one explanation of a symptom.<sup>157</sup> Even more surprising is the remark in *De semine* 2. 6 (4. 651. 1–2 K.): ἡ γὰρ τοῦ χωρίου κοινωνία καὶ τὴν τῆς χρείας αὐτῶν κοινωνίαν ἐνεδείξατο, πιθανῶς μὲν, οὐκ ἀληθῶς δέ. Apparently Galen allowed himself some latitude in the use of the term.

Galen recognized that *endeixis* is an inference from a sign, σημεῖον or γνώρισμα.<sup>158</sup> We find such phrases as ἐνδεικνυμένων τῶν σημείων νενικῆσθαι,<sup>159</sup> μοχθηρὸν εἶναι τὸ σημεῖον τοῦτο, νέκρωσιν τινα . . . ἐνδεικνύμενον,<sup>160</sup> τὰ τε τοιαῦτα γνωρίσματα καὶ τὰ τῶν σφυγμῶν ἐνδείζεται τινα διάκρισιν,<sup>161</sup> ἐπὶ γὰρ ἀνομοίοις γνωρίσμασιν ἀνόμοιον εἶναι χρὴ καὶ τὴν ἐνδείξιν,<sup>162</sup> *eam que ex indicativis signis noticiam*.<sup>163</sup> It is as a sign-relation that *endeixis* was rejected by the empiricists and doubted by the skeptics. In his *De sectis* Galen gives the argument of the empiricists that one thing cannot be known from another: μηδ' ἐνδείξιν ὑπάρχειν τὸ παράπαν μηδ' ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου δύνασθαι γνωσθῆναι· πάντα γὰρ δεῖσθαι τῆς ἐξ αὐτῶν γνώσεως μηδ' εἶναι τι σημεῖον ἀδήλου φύσει πράγματος οὐδενός.<sup>164</sup> They argued also that the same appearance may be accompanied at different times by different non-evident things, and thus disagreement arises for which there is no test.<sup>165</sup>

In *De peccat. dignot.* Galen again presents the argument from the disagreement of dogmatists. This time the context is ethical, and his

<sup>157</sup> The examples that I noted are all in commentaries on Hippocrates, *In Hipp. Epid. I comm.* 2. 27 (CMG V 10.1, p. 65. 1–2); *In Hipp. Epid. III comm.* 1. 6 (CMG V 10.2.1, p. 30. 19); *In Hipp. Epid. VI comm.* 5. 14 (CMG V 10.2.2, p. 286. 23–26). Sextus points out (*AM* 8. 201) that the indicative sign must be the sign of one thing only.

<sup>158</sup> *In Hipp. Progn. comm.* 3. 44 (CMG V 9.2, pp. 372–76), in discussing the terms σημεῖον and τεκμήριον, Galen remarks that according to the χαριέστεροι, σημεῖον is used of that which is ἐκ τηρήσεως, τεκμήριον of that which is ἐξ ἐνδείξεως. In his own usage, however, Galen does not observe this distinction.

<sup>159</sup> *In Hipp. Prorrhet. comm.* 1. 2 (CMG V 9.2, p. 10. 27); cf. *ibid.* (p. 11. 6–8, 12–15) and 3. 76 (p. 177. 21–22).

<sup>160</sup> *In Hipp. Progn. comm.* 1. 15 (CMG V 9.2, p. 230. 2–3); cf. *ibid.* 3. 15 (p. 343. 22–23).

<sup>161</sup> *In Hipp. Progn. comm.* 1. 8 (CMG V 9.2, p. 217. 16–17).

<sup>162</sup> *PHP* 6. 5. 5 (p. 388. 22–23). Cf. also *In Hipp. Epid. VI comm.* 3. 30 (CMG V 10.2.2, p. 168. 4–5).

<sup>163</sup> *De caus. content.* 10. 5 (CMG Suppl. Or. II, p. 141. 23); cf. σημεῖον ἐνδεικτικόν, *In Hipp. Epid. VI comm.* 5. 14 (CMG V 10.2.2, p. 286. 23).

<sup>164</sup> *De sectis* 5 (1. 77 K. = *SM* 3. 10. 22–25 = 105. 26–29 Deichgr.). Cf. also *Subf. emp.* 1 and 2 (43. 4–10 and 44. 4–6 Deichgr.). In *De sect.* 8 (1. 89 K. = *SM* 3. 19. 23–24) Galen puts ἐνδεικνυμένων in the mouth of his spokesman for empiricism, but it is in a criticism of the methodists and reflects their usage.

<sup>165</sup> *De sectis* 5 (1. 78–79 K. = *SM* 3. 11. 19–12. 4 = 106. 8–16 Deichgr.). In *De caus. content.* 10 (CMG Suppl. Or. II, pp. 71–73, 141) Galen charges the empiricists with violating their own principles when they call syndromes of symptoms signs of non-evident states of the body and then call these non-evident states the causes of evident states.

opponents are the skeptics. Since philosophers disagree about good and evil, the Academics and Pyrrhonists consider it rash to assent to any opinion about them.<sup>166</sup> Galen's answer is that disagreement arises because not only physicians but even good philosophers who have not been trained in apodeictic method are misled by false arguments that closely resemble true ones. The remedy is daily practice in logic and avoidance of rash statements. With the proper method one may arrive at true knowledge of good and evil.<sup>167</sup>

A comparison of Galen's account of the attack on *endeixis* with Sextus' lengthy discussions in *PH* 2. 99–129 and *AM* 8. 143–298 reveals many differences but some similarities. The indicative sign, Sextus says, ἐκ τῆς ιδίας φύσεως καὶ κατασκευῆς σημαίνει τὸ οὐ ἔστι σημεῖον.<sup>168</sup> Galen's formula, ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ πράγματος φύσεως (see above, 293), does not include κατασκευή, but *endeixis* rests on κατασκευή in such passages as *De instr. odor.* 3. 8 (*CMG* Suppl. V, p. 42. 16): ἀπὸ τῆς κατασκευῆς τὴν ἔνδειξιν τοῦ ζητουμένου λαμβάνοντας and *PHP* 7. 3. 30 (p. 446. 11): τοῦτό τε οὖν αὐτὸ τῆς κατασκευῆς τῶν μορίων ἔνδειξαμένης and many others.<sup>169</sup>

Both Galen and Sextus see *endeixis* as a relation of logical consequence between sign and thing signified.<sup>170</sup> Sextus formulates this relation as a conditional, the conclusion following on the condition.<sup>171</sup> Galen does not ordinarily explain *endeixis* as a conditional, but presumably it could always be so formulated. Many of the conditionals that appear from time to time in his works could be considered instances of *endeixis*, for example, "If the offspring resemble each of their parents, they resemble them by virtue of a cause common to both."<sup>172</sup> In *De caus. content.* 10. 6, where Galen places two *endeixis* in sequence, they are, according to the Latin text, *si hec sunt signa, hec sunt cause*, and *si hec sunt cause, hec est cura*.<sup>173</sup>

In his explanation of the relation of indicator to what is indicated Galen uses the terms ἔμφασις and ἐμφαίνεσθαι: τὴν γὰρ οἶον ἔμφασιν τῆς ἀκολουθίας ἔνδειξιν λέγομεν. The empiricist, he says, also discovers τὸ

<sup>166</sup> *De peccat. dignot.* 1. 6 (*CMG* V 4.1.1, pp. 42. 15–43. 2).

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.* 2. 2–7 (pp. 43. 17–44. 20); cf. 3. 14 (p. 49. 17–21). That disagreement is a sign of ignorance and lack of training in logic is a point made by Galen in *In Hipp. De vict. acut. comm.* 1. 14 (*CMG* V 9.1, p. 127. 23–24) and *Adv. Iul.* 5. 9 (*CMG* V 10.3, p. 50. 11–12).

<sup>168</sup> Sextus, *PH* 2. 101; cf. *AM* 8. 154, 276.

<sup>169</sup> See for example *PHP* 9. 8. 12 (p. 594. 3); *De usu part.* 17. 1 (4. 360 K. = 2. 447. 19–20 Helmreich); *De foet. form.* 6 (4. 687. 13–14 K.).

<sup>170</sup> For Galen, see *In Hipp. Progn. comm.* 3. 44 (*CMG* V 9.2, p. 373. 8): ἡ δ' ἐξ ἀκολουθίας λογικῆς, ὅπερ ἔστιν ἔνδειξις.

<sup>171</sup> See Sextus, *AM* 8. 272, 276.

<sup>172</sup> Gal. *De semine* 2. 1 (4. 609. 7–9 K.).

<sup>173</sup> *De caus. content.* 10. 6 (*CMG* Suppl. Or. II, p. 141. 26–27). In Lyons' translation of the Arabic, however (*ibid.* p. 73. 5–6), the introductory word is "when."

ἀκόλουθον, but not as ἐμφαινόμενον τῷ ἡγουμένῳ.<sup>174</sup> Sextus' term, taken from the Stoic definition of sign, is ἐκκαλυπτικόν.<sup>175</sup> But in *PH* 2. 112 Sextus says that some dogmatists, using ἔμφασις as a criterion, say that a conditional is true in which the consequent is contained potentially (δυνάμει) in the antecedent. This could conceivably be intended as an interpretation of Galen's *emphasis*. If *endeixis* is from effect to cause, as it often is in Galen, Sextus' explanation of *emphasis* would mean that the cause is somehow contained in the effect. This is in fact the case in Galen's explanation of qualitative change. The four active qualities (hot, cold, dry, wet) change an object by making it like themselves.<sup>176</sup> When they generate humors in the body by acting on nutriment, their powers are passed on to the humors that they produce. They are in the body potentially, not actually: δυνάμει μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν.<sup>177</sup> Whether Galen would have considered an inference from the humors to the qualities that cause them an example of *emphasis* must remain uncertain; but in any case we must recognize the possibility that Galen was one of the rational physicians that Sextus included among the proponents of indicative signs.<sup>178</sup>

The charge that there are disputes among dogmatists that cannot be resolved by any test appears to have been the argument that Galen considered the most serious.<sup>179</sup> Galen's answer is that there are tests. In more recent times, he says, physicians have neglected to watch accurately what happens to the sick and to seek out their conditions and the causes from which the cure is discovered, the cure itself being judged also by πείρα.<sup>180</sup> Those who have mastered apodeictic method should test by πείρα whether they have really solved a problem, as a geometer who has found a method for dividing a line into equal parts has the result as witness.<sup>181</sup> The person who designs a sundial follows a logical method that indicates to him where to draw the lines, and he then checks the lines for accuracy against other sundials and

<sup>174</sup> *MM* 2. 7 (10. 126. 10–12 K.).

<sup>175</sup> The word ἐκκαλυπτικόν is in the definition of indicative sign in Sextus, *PH* 2. 101, a passage bracketed by Mau. It has, however, a prominent place in Sextus' attack on the indicative sign. It is in the Stoic definition of sign (*PH* 2. 104), and is discussed in *PH* 2. 116–20. See also Sextus, *AM* 8. 245, 251–53, 256, 257, 273. In *AM* 8. 165 ἐκκαλυπτικόν is paired with μηνυτικόν. In *AM* 8. 154 Sextus says that the indicative sign all but announces what it indicates.

<sup>176</sup> See *PHP* 6. 6. 28 (p. 400. 22–23, with the note on p. 668).

<sup>177</sup> *PHP* 8. 4. 21 (p. 502. 19–25).

<sup>178</sup> Sextus, *AM* 8. 156. Another rather close parallel between Galen and Sextus is mentioned below, note 197.

<sup>179</sup> For the empiricists see Gal. *De sectis* 5 (1. 78 K. = *SM* 3. 11. 20–22); for the skeptics see Gal. *De diebus decret.* 1. 3 (9. 778. 7–18 K.) and Sextus, *PH* 2. 116, *AM* 8. 257, 288.

<sup>180</sup> Gal. *In Hipp. Epid. VI commun.* 3. 30 (*CMG* V 10.2.2, p. 167. 21–25).

<sup>181</sup> *De peccat. dignot.* 3. 1–7 (*CMG* V 4.1.1, pp. 46. 1–47. 21).



against an even flow of water.<sup>182</sup> To disagree when a test is available is as ridiculous as the dispute of the two philosophers, one of whom argued at length on theoretical grounds that wood is heavier than water, the other that water is heavier than wood, as if it were impossible to settle the matter by observation.<sup>183</sup>

There are of course disputes concerning matters about which no apodeictic proof is possible and no test is available, for example, whether the cosmos had a beginning, or whether the whole is finite or infinite.<sup>184</sup> On such matters one should suspend judgment. The question of the substance of the divine craftsman is also unanswerable. We know from his works that he exists, but we do not know his οὐσία.<sup>185</sup> Galen even admits to a Carneadean doubt whether noxious animals were divinely created,<sup>186</sup> but he rejects the argument that what looks like the work of an artisan may in fact be a matter of chance.<sup>187</sup> Closer to medicine, Julianus had argued that we should not use the word "nature," since we do not know what nature is. Galen concedes that it is difficult or impossible to know the οὐσία of nature or soul. We say that every plant is governed by nature, and every animal by nature and soul, when we do not know the οὐσία of either. But, he adds, it is difficult also to know the οὐσία of sense-perception, thought, memory, or reasoning. That is hardly surprising, when we do not even know the οὐσία of the sun, which we see most clearly.<sup>188</sup>

In those matters, then, where our logical method does not help us and no test is available, we must acknowledge our ignorance.<sup>189</sup> But even where a logical inference can be made and can be confirmed by a test, the test

<sup>182</sup> Ibid. 5. 1-4 (pp. 54. 20-55. 27).

<sup>183</sup> Ibid. 7. 2-3 (p. 66. 1-9); cf. 7. 7 (p. 67. 1-6). See also *De caus. procat.* 16 (CMG Suppl. II, p. 4. 24-26): *dissonantie que in rationibus experientia est maximum iudicatorium*.

<sup>184</sup> *De peccat. dignot.* 3. 4 (CMG V 4.1.1, p. 46. 23-25); cf. 7. 8-11 (pp. 67. 6-68. 4). See also *In Hipp. De vict. acut. comm.* 1. 12 (CMG V 9.1, p. 125. 9-16).

<sup>185</sup> *PHP* 9. 9. 2-3 (p. 598. 2-11). On the wisdom and power of the divine craftsman see above, 298-99 and note 136.

<sup>186</sup> *De foet. form.* 6 (4. 701. 1-5 K.); cf. *Cic. Acad.* 2. 120, *De nat. deor.* 3, fr. 7 (pp. 1230-32 in Pease's edition, with Pease's note ad loc.).

<sup>187</sup> *PHP* 9. 8. 4-9 (pp. 590. 22-92. 21). For Carneades, see *Cic. De div.* 1. 23.

<sup>188</sup> *Adv. Iul.* 5. 1-5 (CMG V 10.3, pp. 47. 17-49. 5). The theme that we do not know the οὐσία of the soul is commonplace in Galen's writings. Some references are collected in *PHP* p. 675, note to p. 444. 4-8. According to *De foet. form.* 6 (4. 687. 10-12 K.), we all speak of nature as the cause of birth, but we do not know its οὐσία; cf. also *PHP* 9. 8. 27 (p. 596. 22-29). As for the οὐσία of the sun (*Adv. Iul.* p. 49. 2-5), Galen had chided the latter-day Academics for saying that the sun is not καταληπτός: *De opt. doctr.* 1 (1. 40 K. = 179. 6-8 Barigazzi). The difference, I suppose, between Galen and the Academics is that for Galen there is some real object, whatever it is, that makes the regular movements apparent to us, whereas the Academics stop with the appearances.

<sup>189</sup> It should be noted that Galen recognizes the possibility that a question to which only a likely answer can now be given may receive a "truer" (ἀληθεστέρα) answer in the future: *De semine* 2. 6 (4. 649. 15-17 K.).

comes after the inference. The *endeixis* itself is made ἄνευ τῆς πείρας.<sup>190</sup> How then do we establish the necessary relation between the evident and the non-evident that makes the inference valid? The answer lies in those truths that are clear to the mind. Inferences from effect to cause are governed by such clear and generally accepted truths as that nothing happens without a cause,<sup>191</sup> that which is undergoing change arrives at a form similar to that which is changing it,<sup>192</sup> peculiarities of substance have their own peculiarities of powers.<sup>193</sup> Galen has many such truths which he invokes as he needs them.<sup>194</sup> They are starting-points for reasoning (λογικαὶ ἀρχαί), for they are accepted without proof.<sup>195</sup> When therefore the skeptics and empiricists doubt that we can know the οὐσία of the power of drugs, and the dogmatists who say that it is knowable advance conflicting theories, Galen can explain the power not only of drugs but of all else in terms of the qualities of the thing that causes the change.<sup>196</sup>

This explanation, however, depends on Galen's theory of the elements and their mixture in bodies, whether animate or inanimate, and for that Galen refers the reader to his works *On the elements according to Hippocrates* and *On mixtures*. In the former he presents his proofs that there is more than one element, that the elements undergo qualitative change, that there are only four qualities that can change an object through and through, that these four qualities cannot exist apart from matter, that the four combinations of quality with matter produce four elements, that in the world as we know it these four elements are not found in their pure form but only in combination.<sup>197</sup> In the work *On mixtures* he points out that in any

<sup>190</sup> See above, 297 and note 125.

<sup>191</sup> See *PHP* 4. 4. 36 (p. 258. 13, with p. 646, note to p. 258. 13–14). Galen was aware of, and participated in, controversies about causes; see Bardong's introduction to his edition of *De caus. procatac.*, *CMG* Suppl II, pp. xii–xxxiii.

<sup>192</sup> Εἰς ὁμοίαν ιδεάν τῷ μεταβάλλοντι τὸ μεταβαλλόμενον ἀφικνεῖται, *PHP* 6. 8. 13 (p. 410. 13–14); cf. *ibid.* 6. 6. 28 (p. 400. 21–23); *De semine* 1. 11, 12 (4. 553. 4–5, 556. 16–17 K.); *De usu part.* 4. 12, 14. 10 (3. 298, 4. 185 K. = 1. 219. 6–8, 2. 317. 11–14 Helmreich).

<sup>193</sup> *PHP* 7. 5. 14 (p. 456. 11–12).

<sup>194</sup> See for example *MM* 1. 4 (10. 36. 15–37. 3 K.) and the passages collected in *PHP* pp. 698–99, note to p. 544. 17–19.

<sup>195</sup> *MM* 1. 4 (10. 37. 6–7 K.); cf. *PHP* 9. 8. 1 (p. 590. 12) and *Thrasymbulus* 24 (5. 847 K. = *SM* 3. 62. 9–10).

<sup>196</sup> *De simp. med.* 1. 1 (11. 380. 18–81. 12 K.). Diocles (cf. *De alim. fac.* 1. 1. 4–6 [*CMG* V 4.2, pp. 202. 25–03. 24]) and Quintus (*In Hipp. Epid. I comm.* 2. 7 [*CMG* V 10.1, p. 52. 26–29]) were among those who rejected a theoretical approach to the action of drugs.

<sup>197</sup> See especially *De elem.* 1. 2, 5, 7, 8. In *De elem.* 1. 9 (1. 489 K. = 56. 2–7 Helmreich) Galen raises but leaves unanswered the question whether mixtures are of qualities only or of corporeal substances. He alludes to this same problem also in *De nat. fac.* 1. 2 and 2. 4 (2. 5, 92 K. = *SM* 3. 104. 11–15, 168. 11–14); *MM* 1. 2 (10. 16. 12–15 K.); *In Hipp. De nat. hom. comm.* 1. 3 (*CMG* V 9.1, p. 19. 4–7); and *De prop. plac.* 4. 762. 9–16 K. Sextus (*PH* 3. 57–62) uses the problem whether mixtures are of qualities or

combination of the four elements there may be an even balance of qualities, or one or two qualities may dominate.<sup>198</sup> When one thing causes a change in another, therefore, the change can be traced back to the dominant quality of the cause.<sup>199</sup>

Inference from structure also depends on universal truths, for example, larger things are sources of smaller things,<sup>200</sup> the governing part of the soul is the source of sense-perception and voluntary motion,<sup>201</sup> what is rightly made in all its parts is assigned to art.<sup>202</sup> When Galen makes an inference by *endeixis* without stating the universal truth, whether needing no proof or proved earlier, we must assume that if asked he would supply it.

The answer to those who would question the possibility of proof is now clear.<sup>203</sup> Proof (ἀπόδειξις) follows ἐνδειξις as the final step in Galen's scientific method.<sup>204</sup> It confirms *endeixis* by supplying the universal truth that validates it. There is no infinite regress, since there are starting-points, the universal truths that are accepted without proof, and clear sense-perceptions that require no criterion.<sup>205</sup> Even the philosophers who contentiously question all demonstration understand, even if they do not say so, that if the λογικαὶ ἀρχαὶ are not trusted, nothing can be proved.<sup>206</sup> So we end up where we began, with truths clear to the senses and clear to the mind. On them the whole of Galen's medical theory is based, and without them it would collapse.<sup>207</sup>

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substances or both in his argument against the dogmatists' theory of the mixture of the elements.

<sup>198</sup> On the nine kinds of *crases* see *De temp.* 1. 8 (1. 554–59 K. = 29. 3–32. 4 Helmreich).

<sup>199</sup> A corollary of this theory is that when a cold drug causes heat in the body the drug is said to be potentially hot. See *De temp.* 3. 1 (1. 649–51 K. = 87. 25–89. 14 Helmreich).

<sup>200</sup> *PHP* 6. 3. 20, 32 (pp. 378. 6, 380. 25–28).

<sup>201</sup> *PHP* 8. 1. 1 (p. 480. 8–9).

<sup>202</sup> *PHP* 9. 8. 9 (p. 592. 19–20).

<sup>203</sup> Galen mentions the empiricists' rejection of proof in *De sectis* 5 (1. 77 K. = *SM* 3. 11. 1–2 = 105. 30–32 Deichgr.). He wrote a treatise, now lost, on Clitomachus' attack on proof: *De libr. prop.* 11 (19. 44 K. = *SM* 2. 120. 3–4).

<sup>204</sup> Cf. *De peccat. dignot.* 3. 20–21 (*CMG* V 4.1.1, p. 51. 6–15), where, in spite of the difficult text, it is clear that Galen differentiates three levels, τὸ πρῶτως τε καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ πιστόν, ὁ λόγος μόνης ἐνδείξεως δεόμενος, and ἀπόδειξις.

<sup>205</sup> See for example *De alim. fac.* 1. 1. 3 (*CMG* V 4.2, p. 202. 14–16). Of course the conclusion of one proof (τὸ προαποδεδειγμένον) may be used as the premise of another; cf. *De temp.* 2. 2 (1. 587 K. = 50. 1–4 Helmreich). There is a sequence of such proofs in *De semine* 2. 1 (4. 609–10 K.), where one step, missing from the Greek, is supplied by the Arabic. (I am indebted to Dr. Strohmaier for this information.)

<sup>206</sup> See above, 287 and note 35.

<sup>207</sup> I am indebted to R. J. Durling for help in finding Galen's references to skepticism.

The Fragments of Alexander of Cotiaeum<sup>1</sup>

ANDREW R. DYCK

## I. Introduction

Thanks to the survival of the twelfth speech (really a letter of consolation to the people of Cotiaeum) of Aelius Aristides, the life of Alexander of Cotiaeum is better attested than that of any other scholar of Greek antiquity; for no other do we possess such extensive contemporary documentation. That is not to say that we know everything we would like to know about the man; for Aristides too often contents himself with vague encomiastic generalities where we would prefer specific information. Nevertheless we must be grateful to know as much as we do. In contrast, however, to the amount of biographical information, the work itself is pathetically underdocumented.

Having died around the middle of the second century A.D.<sup>2</sup> at a ripe old age (§§ 35–36), Alexander will have been born ca. A.D. 70–80.<sup>3</sup> We are not told who his own teachers were, the panegyrist being content to note merely that Alexander had surpassed them (§ 6); nor does Aristides identify any students of Alexander besides (unnamed) members of the imperial family and himself—Aristides has never been accused of a lack of interest in self-promotion (cf. also § 40: Alexander's judgment on Aristides' speeches)—though we are assured that they are legion (§ 10).

<sup>1</sup> On the spelling, cf. Keil ad Ael. Aristid. 2. 217. 9; H. Erbse, *Beiträge zur Überlieferung der Iliasscholien* (Munich 1960) 36 n. 2 (I have not, however, regularized the spelling in the documents that follow). I cite the speech hereafter in the text by paragraph number in Keil's edition.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. C. A. Behr, *Aelius Aristides and the Sacred Tales* (Amsterdam 1968) 51.

<sup>3</sup> M. Aurelius to Fronto *Ep.* 3. 9. 2. van den Hout probably should not be used to date the future emperor's tuition from Alexander later than 139, *pace* P. Aelius Aristides, *The Complete Works*, tr. C. A. Behr, II (Leiden 1981) 395 n. 14. The author indicates that, at the date of the letter (139 in view of the allusion to the "Caesaris oratio," probably a speech of thanks to Pius for the granting of the title of "caesar"), what he has learned about Greek composition is abandoning him, not that he had never learned the subject at all: *mihi vero nunc potissimum Graece scribendum est. 'quamobrem?' rogas. volo periculum facere, an id, quod non didici, facilius obsecundet mihi, quoniam quidem id, quod didici, deserit.*



While eschewing the problematical name of "sophist" (§ 8)—perhaps in deference to the Socrates of his beloved Plato (§ 25)—Alexander did not spurn payment for his art (§ 16). An interesting aspect of his teaching is the fact that slaves would attend along with their young masters and that manumission of the slaves would often ensue either as a spontaneous result of their admiration for their slaves' learning or on request from Alexander himself (§ 15).<sup>4</sup>

Aristides offers a pleasing portrait of Alexander's good relations with his colleagues (§ 11), tolerance of the non-professional (*ibid.*, an observation confirmed by Marcus Aurelius: *test.* 2) and generosity (§§ 15–17, including benefactions to Cotiaecum). When Aristides fell ill in Rome in spring of 144, Alexander enabled him to return home safely (§ 39). He died leaving a widow and a small son (§§ 37–38).

Besides a work on Aesop (no doubt inspired by local patriotism in view of the fact that Cotiaecum was sometimes given as that author's provenance: cf. §§ 26–27), the only other work which Aristides mentions is the Homeric συγγραφή, assumed to have been identical with the Ἑξηγητικά in at least two books cited by Porphyry (*test.* 6 = *fr.* 2). Only three fragments are assigned to a specific work, one to the Ἑξηγητικά (*fr.* 2), two to the Παντοδαπά (*frs.* 4 and 5). *Fr.* 2 makes it clear that, as the title suggests, the Ἑξηγητικά concerned the exegesis of specific Homeric passages. On this basis, I have assigned to the Ἑξηγητικά two other fragments which likewise deal with the exegesis of Homeric passages, rather than, e.g., the philological treatment of *voces Homericae*, which, *inter alia*, was dealt with in the Παντοδαπά (*fr.* 5).<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, one cannot exclude that comments on the spelling or etymology of *voces Homericae* appeared in the Ἑξηγητικά, if only as *obiter dicta*. Hence there remains a large category of glosses of uncertain provenance, which I have arranged alphabetically by word discussed (indicated in bold type). I have not ordinarily burdened the critical apparatus with itacistic errors or confusions of ε and α, or indicated variants in the apparatus testimoniorum.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Similarly, slaves who were professional grammarians or philologists had very good chances of receiving their freedom; cf. J. Christes, *Sklaven und Freigelassene als Grammatiker und Philologen im antiken Rom*, *Forschungen zur antiken Sklaverei* 10 (Wiesbaden 1979) 181 ff.

<sup>5</sup> One might wish to contemplate, with M. W. Haslam, the possibility that the Ἑξηγητικά formed part of the Παντοδαπά.

<sup>6</sup> *Et. Gen.* is cited from my collation of photographs.—Note that the Alexander cited at sch. AT (ex.) ad Δ 109b is in all probability Alexander of Myndus, as M. Wellhausen, "Alexander von Myndos," *Hermes* 26 (1891) 565 n. 2, showed (= *FGrHist* 25 F 6; Jacoby also prints it, however, among the dubious fragments of Alexander Polyhistor at 273 F 143). The following works are referred to by abbreviated title:

AO	<i>Anecdota Graeca e codd. manuscriptis bibliothecarum Oxoniensium</i> , ed. J. A. Cramer, 4 vols. (Oxford 1835–37)
An. Orth.	<i>Anekdoten zur griechischen Orthographie</i> , ed. A. Ludwig (ind. lect. Königsberg 1905–12)

- Ap. Dyc. *Apollonii Dyscoli quae supersunt*, ed. R. Schneider–G. Uhlig, 3 vols. (Leipzig 1878–1910)
- Ap. S. *Apollonii Sophistae Lexicon Homericum*, ed. I. Bekker (Berlin 1833)
- Aristox. fr. *Die Schule des Aristoteles*, hrsg. v. F. Wehrli, II: Aristoxenos (2. Aufl., Basel and Stuttgart 1967)
- Choer. Orth. *Choerobosci Orthographia*, ed. in: *AO* II 167–281
- Choer. Th. *Theodosii Alexandrini Canones, Georgii Choerobosci Scholia, Sophronii Patriarchae Alexandrini Excerpta*, ed. A. Hilgard, 2 vols. (Leipzig 1889–94)
- EM *Etymologicum Magnum*, ed. Th. Gaisford (Oxford 1848)
- Epaphr. *Epaphroditii grammatici quae supersunt*, ed. E. Luenzer (diss. Bonn 1866)
- Ep. ad A *Epimerismi Homeric* I, ed. A. R. Dyck, *SGLG* 5/1 (Berlin and New York 1983)
- Et. Gud. . . . Stef. *Etymologicum Gudianum quod vocatur*, ed. A. De Stefani, 2 fasc. (Leipzig 1909–20)
- Et. Orion. G cod. Paris. 2653, s. XVI, ed. in: *Orionis Thebani Etymologicum*, ed. F. G. Sturz (Leipzig 1820)
- Et. Orion. H cod. Darmstad. 2773, s. XIV, ed. in: *Etymologicum Graecae linguae Gudianum*, ed. F. G. Sturz (Leipzig 1818) 610 ff.
- Eust. *Eustathii archiepiscopi Thessalonicensis Commentarii ad Homeri Iliadem*, ed. M. van der Valk, 4 vols. (Leiden 1971–88); *Eust. Commentarii in Odysseam*, 2 vols. (Leipzig 1825–26)
- Greg. Cor. *Gregorii Corinthii et aliorum grammaticorum libri de dialectis linguae Graecae*, ed. G. H. Schaefer (Leipzig 1811)
- Hdn. *Herodiani Technici Reliquiae*, ed. A. Lentz, 2 vols. (Leipzig 1867–70)
- Hsch. *Hesychii Alexandrini Lexicon*, ed. K. Latte, 2 vols. [A–O] (Copenhagen 1953–66); rest in: *Hesychii Alexandrini Lexicon*, ed. M. Schmidt, III–IV (Jena 1861–62)
- Moer. *Harpocraton et Moeris*, ed. I. Bekker (Berlin 1833)
- Porph. *Porphyrii Quaestionum Homericarum reliquias collegit, disposuit, edidit* H. Schrader, 2 vols. (Leipzig 1880–90)
- Porph. . . . Sod. *Porphyrii Quaestionum Homericarum Liber I*, testo critico a cura di A. R. Sodano (Naples 1970)
- sch. Ap. Rh. *Scholia in Apollonium Rhodium vetera*, ed. C. Wendel (Berlin 1935)
- sch. D in Il. *Scholia Didymi quae vocantur in Iliadem*; ed. princ.: J. Lascaris (Rome 1517); here cited from: 'Ομήρου Ἰλιάς καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν σχόλια ψευδεπίγραφα Διδύμου, ἐκ θεάτρου ἐν Ὁξονίᾳ (1675)
- sch. D in Od. *Didymi antiquissimi auctoris interpretatio in Odysseam* (Venice 1528)
- sch. D.T. *Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem grammaticam*, ed. A. Hilgard (Leipzig 1901)
- sch. Eur. *Scholia in Euripidem*, ed. E. Schwartz, 2 vols. (Berlin 1887–91)
- sch. Il. *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem (scholia vetera)*, ed. H. Erbse, 7 vols. (Berlin 1969–88)
- sch. Lyc. *Lycophronis Alexandra*, ed. E. Scheer, II: *Scholia* (Berlin 1908)
- sch. Od. *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Odysseam*, ed. G. Dindorf, 2 vols. (Oxford 1855)
- SGLG *Sammlung griechischer und lateinischer Grammatiker*

## II. Testimonia

## a. De vita

## 1. Ael. Arist. orat. XII tota

2. M. Aurel. Ant. Ad se ipsum 1. 10: παρὰ Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ γραμματικοῦ τὸ ἀνεπίπληκτον· καὶ τὸ μὴ ὀνειδιστικῶς ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν βάρβαρον ἢ σόλοικόν τι ἢ ἀπηχῆς προενεγκάμενων, ἀλλ' ἐπιδεξίως αὐτὸ μόνον ἐκεῖνο, ὃ ἔδει [5] εἰρῆσθαι, προφέρεσθαι ἐν τρόπῳ ἀποκρίσεως ἢ συνεπιμαρτυρήσεως ἢ συνδιαλήψεως περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, οὐχὶ περὶ τοῦ ῥήματος, ἢ δι' ἑτέρας τινὸς τοιαύτης ἐμμελοῦς παρυνπομνήσεως.

3. SHA IV Iul. Cap. M. Ant. phil. 2. 3: usus praeterea grammaticis Graeco Alexandro Cotiaensi (cotidianis: *corr.* Uhlig), Latinis Trosio Apro et Pol<l>ione et Eutychio Proculo Siccensi.

## b. De scriptis

4. Ael. Arist. 12. 36 = 2. 223. 17 Keil: καίτοι τὸ τῆς Ὀμηρικῆς συγγραφῆς ἀποχρῶν καὶ ταύτῃ κόσμος εἶναι πολλαχῇ.

5. Steph. Byz. 379. 3: Κοτιάειον· . . . ἔνθα ἦν Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Ἀσκληπιάδου γραμματικὸς πολυμαθέστατος χρηματίζων, ὃς περὶ παντοδαπῆς ὕλης κδ' ἔγραψε βίβλους.

6, 7, 8 = fr. 2, 4 et 5 infra laud.

## III. Fragmenta

## a. Ἐξηγητικά

1. Sch. A ad N 358–59: τοὶ δ' ἔριδος κρατερῆς <καὶ ὁμοίου πτολέμοιο / πείραρ ἐπαλλάξαντες ἐπ' ἀμφοτέροισι τάνυσσαν>: ὁ λόγος· οἱ δὲ τὸ πέρας τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τῆς

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Su.	<i>Suidae Lexicon</i> , ed. A. Adler, 5 vols. (Leipzig 1928–38)
Tyrann.	<i>Die Fragmente der Grammatiker Tyrannion und Diokles</i> , ed. W. Haas, <i>SGLG</i> 3 (Berlin and New York 1977) 79–184
Tz. Ex.	<i>Draconis Stratonicensis liber De metris poeticis, Ioannis Tzetzae Exegesis in Homeri Iliadem</i> , ed. G. Hermann (Leipzig 1812)
Zon.	<i>Iohannis Zonarae Lexicon</i> , ed. I. A. H. Titmann, 2 vols. (Leipzig 1808)

ἔριδος συνάψαντες ἐπέτειναν ἀμφοτέροις, οἷον ἀμφοτέρωθεν. [5] μετενήνεκται μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν. τῷ δὲ ἐπαλλάξαι ἐπὶ τοῦ συνάψαι χρῶνται καὶ τῶν πεζολόγων τινές, πλεονάζει δὲ Ἀριστόξενος ὁ μουσικὸς ἐπηλλαγμένα λέγων (fr. 137 We.) τὰ συνημμένα. οὕτως ὁ Κοτιαεύς.

1–3 le. suppl. Erbse

Cf. sch. A (Did. | Ariston.) ad N 359a: πεῖραρ ἐπαλλάξαντες <ἐπ' ἀμφοτέροισι τάνυσσαν> (suppl. Villoison): διχῶς Ἀρίσταρχος, καὶ “ἐπ' ἀλλήλοισιν.” ἐν δὲ δι' ἀμφοτέρων τὸ λεγόμενον ὅτι ὁ Ποσειδῶν καὶ ὁ Ζεὺς τὸν πόλεμον τῇ ἔριδι συνέδησαν, τὸ πέρας τῆς ἔριδος καὶ πάλιν τὸ τοῦ πολέμου λαβόντες καὶ ἐπαλλάξαντες ἐπ' ἀμφοτέροις, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ ἄμματα ποιοῦντες, τόδε ἐπὶ τόδε. οὕτως Ἀρίσταρχος. | ἡ διπλῇ, ὅτι παραλληγορεῖ, δύο πέρατα ὑποτιθέμενος, ἕτερον μὲν ἔριδος, ἕτερον δὲ πολέμου, ἐξαπτόμενα κατ' ἀμφοτέρων τῶν στρατευμάτων; sch. D ad N 358–60: ὁ δὲ Ζεὺς καὶ ὁ Ποσειδῶν τὰ πέρατα τῆς μάχης καὶ τοῦ πολέμου τείναντες κατὰ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν στρατῶν, ἔδησαν ἰσχυρῶ δεσμῷ, ὃς (δεσμός) (ut gl. seclusi) πολλοῖς αἴτιος ἀπωλείας ἐγένετο. 3 τὸ πέρας] cf. sch. D ad N 359: πεῖραρ: πέρας, τέλος. 5 τῷ δὲ ἐπαλλάξαι—] cf. sch. D ad N 359: ἐπαλλάξαντες: ἐπιπλέξαντες τὰς κῆρας καὶ οἰονεῖ δῆσαντες; Ap. S. 70. 26: ἐπαλλάξαντες: ἐπιπλέξαντες, ἐξαμματίσαντες, cui sim. Hsch. (Cyrill.) ε 4131: ἐπαλλάξαντες: ἐφαμματίσαντες, ἐπιπλέξαντες . . . ; Porph. 1. 184. 14: δυνατώτερα καὶ τολμηρότερα ἀπὸ τῶν εἰς πέρατα σχοινία συμβαλλόντων καὶ εἰς δεσμὸν ἐπαλλαττόντων τὰ πέρατα, ἔπειτα τεινόντων μετενήνοχεν, ἔριδος λέγων καὶ πολέμου τὰ πέρατα ἐναλλάξαντες καὶ δῆσαντες ἐτάνυσαν ἐπ' ἀλλήλους, οὕτως ἰσχυρῶς τὴν ἔριν τῷ πολέμῳ συνδήσαντες ὡς τὸν δεσμὸν τοῦτον “ἄρρηκτον” (360) μὲν εἶναι καὶ “ἄλυτον” (360) αὐτοῖς, “πολλῶν” δὲ “γούνατ' ἔλυσε” (360); Eust. 937. 5: ἡ δὲ μεταφορὰ γέγονεν εἰς τὴν μάχην ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τοῖς σχοινίοις ἢ τοῖς ἱμᾶσι δεσμῶν, ἃ δῆσαντές τινες ἐξ ἄκρων, εἴτα διαστάντες τανύουσιν, ὡς ἂν ὁ δεσμός πυκνωθεῖς καὶ σφιγχθεῖς ἀσφαλισθῇ. παλαιὸς δὲ τίς φησιν οὕτω. “πεῖραρ ἐπαλλάξαντες ἀντὶ τοῦ μάχην παρατείναντες, ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπιπλεκομένων σχοινίων κατὰ τὰ πέρατα”; Eust. 937. 23.

I assume that this entire scholium, not just the final portion (τῷ δὲ ἐπαλλάξαι—), derives from Alexander.<sup>7</sup> It is all of one piece; the sentence beginning τῷ δὲ ἐπαλλάξαι gives grounds for the interpretation ἐπαλλάξαι = συνάψαι of the paraphrase. Alexander follows Aristarchus in interpreting πεῖραρ as = πέρας (“end”) and ἐπαλλάξαι as “join” (συνάψαι Alexander; ὥσπερ τὰ ἄμματα ποιοῦντες and ἐξαπτόμενα κατ' ἀμφοτέρων τῶν στρατευμάτων respectively in the Didymean and

<sup>7</sup> Subscriptions can be deceptive, however; see on fr. 3 below.



Aristonicean portions of sch. A ad N 359a; ἐπιπλέξαντες Ap. S. 70. 26); the D-scholia, too, present a similar doctrine. Alexander may have been the first to spell out that the underlying metaphor is from ropes, but this was certainly implicit in Aristarchus' position.<sup>8</sup>

Of greater interest for the student of Alexander are the following words (τῷ δὲ ἐπαλλάξαι—). "Certain prose authors" are cited—let us leave open the question whether citation of specific names and passages has been lost in the course of transmission—to establish an identity of meaning of ἐπαλλάξαι and συνάψαι. Possibly Alexander will have in mind the use of ἐπαλλάσσειν in the sense "overlap" or "become confused or intermixed," for which LSJ cites various Aristotelian passages (s.v. ἐπαλλάσσω II.2.a–b). The following citation of Aristoxenus has been misunderstood: it is not, as F. Wehrli supposed (ad Aristoxen. fr. 137), that Aristoxenus is alleging that Homer is guilty of redundancy, but rather that Alexander is accusing Aristoxenus of redundancy (cf. LSJ s.v. πλεονάζω III.6) in calling τὰ συνημμένα ἐπηλλαγμένα. Though both terms occur in the *Elements of Harmony*,<sup>9</sup> the passage Alexander refers to does not. Besides the continuing influence of Aristarchus, this fragment discloses that Alexander read his prose authors with Homer in mind, in the hope that their usage would shed light on the poet's.

Lehrs suspected that this notice reached the A-scholia via Porphyry, *Quaestiones Homericae*, where a similar doctrine is found.<sup>10</sup> The fact that Porphyry elsewhere cites Alexander's Ἑξηγητικά (fr. 2) is a point in favor of this hypothesis. Note, however, that Porphyry's notice diverges from our scholium in content and phraseology. Furthermore the other citations of Alexander in the A-scholia (frs. 5 and 8) have no corresponding material in Porphyry and are not typical of his interests. I suspect that all three fragments derive from an exegetical commentary the author of which, like Porphyry, had access to the Ἑξηγητικά.

<sup>8</sup> M. van der Valk, *Researches on the Text and Scholia of the Iliad*, 2 vols. (Leiden 1963–64), at II 97–99, regards the interpretation of πείραψ as "end" rather than "rope" (cf. LSJ s.v., II.2) as Aristarchus' fatal mistake in this passage. He sees this as the replacement of "a concrete notion by an abstract idea" (p. 97); but note that πείραψ as used here by the ancient interpreters has the concrete sense of "the end of a rope." Furthermore fastening of a rope over two parties would not require two ropes to be joined "crosswise over one another" (pace van der Valk 98–99). If any part of Aristarchus' interpretation fails to satisfy, it is his gloss of ἐπαλλάξαντες, which fails to make clear "daß die Tätigkeit der Götter ihre verderbliche Wirkung auf beide Parteien gleichermaßen ausübt" (A. Heubeck, "Homeric," *Gymnasium* 56 [1949] 251 = *Kleine Schriften zur griechischen Sprache und Literatur* [Erlangen 1984] 124). For the interpretation of this passage, cf. also R. Janko, *The Iliad. A Commentary IV: Books 13–16* (Cambridge, forthcoming) ad loc.

<sup>9</sup> *Aristoxeni Elementa Harmonica*, ed. R. da Rios (Rome 1954) Index verborum s.vv.

<sup>10</sup> K. Lehrs, *Quaestiones epicæ* (Königsberg 1837) II n. 2; similarly Erbse (above, note 1) 96; in his edition of the scholia, however, Erbse adds a question mark after Porphyry's name.

2. Porph. 1. 227. 22 = 27. 29 Sod. = Erbse ad sch. Σ 509–33: ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῶν Ἑξηγητικῶν Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Κοτυαεὺς· δύο στρατοὶ περιεκάθητο τὴν πόλιν πολέμιοι, ἡ πορθεῖν ἀξιούντες αὐτὴν ἢ τὰ ἡμίση λαβόντες ἀπιέναι· οἱ δ' ἔνδον ὄντες οὐκ [5] ἐδέχοντο τὴν πρόκλησιν. οἱ οὖν πολέμιοι, φησὶν, ἐνέδραν τινὰ ἐποίησαντο τῶν ποιμνίων καὶ τῶν βουκόλων, ἃ ἦν κτήματα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει. εἶτα ἀξιοῖ τὸ μὲν “οἱ δ' οὐκ πείθοντο” (513) ἀκούειν περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, τὸ δὲ “λόχῳ ὑπεθωρήσονται” (513) περὶ τῶν πολεμίων, καὶ τὸ “οἱ δ' ἴσαν” [10] (516) περὶ τῶν εἰς τὴν ἐνέδραν ἀπιόντων πολεμίων, οἱ δὲ σκοποὶ τῶν πολεμίων εἰσὶ. τὸ δὲ “οἱ δ' ὥς οὖν ἐπύθοντο πολὺν κέλαδον περὶ βουσὶν” (530) ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἀκούει· ἐκαθέζοντο γὰρ ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ βουλευόμενοι, τὰ τεῖχη φρουρεῖν παραδόντες τῇ ἀπολέμῳ ἡλικίᾳ· τὸ γὰρ “ἱράων [15] προπάροιθε καθήμενοι” (531) σημαίνει τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν, ἐν αἷς εἵρουσι καὶ ἀγορεύουσιν. ὅτε δ' αὐτοῖς ἐμηνύθη τὰ κατὰ τὰ ποιμνία, ἐπιτρέχουσι καὶ ἐξελθόντες συμβάλλουσι μάχην.

subsidia: magna ex parte codicem V (= Vat. gr. 305, anno 1314) secutus sum; ex recensione χ laudo \*B, h.e. codicis Venet. gr. 821 manu recentiore (s. XII/XIII) 1–2 — κοτ. \*B: ἀλέξανδρος μὲν ὁ κοτ. οὕτω φησιν V 2 post κοτ. hab. B ὅτι 3 περιεκάθητο] παρ- \*B 6 τῶν ποιμνίων καὶ τῶν βουκόλων V: τοῖς ποιμνίοις καὶ τοῖς βουκόλοις \*B 10 post περὶ hab. \*B τῶν πολεμίων [τὴν] om. V | πολεμίων V: hoc loco om. \*B 12 περὶ V: παρὰ \*B 13 ἐκκλησίᾳ \*B: ἐκκλησίαις V 14 ἱράων] εἰρ- propter etym. scribendum monuit Haslam 15 τῶν] om. \*B 16 ἀγορεύουσιν] ἐκκλησιάζουσιν \*B

14–16 ἱράων— ἀγορεύουσιν] cf. sch. D ad Σ 531: ἱράων: πρὸ τῶν ἀγορῶν, ὃ ἐστὶν ἐκκλησιῶν, ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶρειν ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ λέγειν, ὅθεν ὁ Ἰππος; Ap. S. 92. 22; Hsch. ι 873; sch. A (Ariston.) et bT (ex.) ad Σ 531a–b; Et. Orion. G 59. 1; Et. Gud. 427. 23 (d<sup>2</sup>); EM 475. 11; Eust. 1160. 34.

Alexander's interpretation of the famous scene of siege and battle from the Shield of Achilles (Σ 509 ff.) is among three interpretations quoted by Porphyry, who (rightly) rejects both this one and the view that the two armies are divided, one friendly to the besieged, the other hostile.<sup>11</sup> Alexander's reading entails a number of difficulties, most notably, as Porphyry pointed out (1. 228. 27 = 29. 7 Sod.), the fact that he must assume a change of subject within v. 513 (οἱ δ' οὐκ πείθοντο, λόχῳ δ' ὑπεθωρήσονται), since he thinks the ambush was conducted by the besiegers, not the besieged; as Porphyry rightly says of this interpretation,

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Erbse (above, note 1) 36 and 54.

ἔστι ἐλεγχόντων τὸν ποιητὴν μὴ δυνάμενον φράζειν ἀταράχως (1. 228. 15–16 = 29. 24–25 Sod.). Moreover, how is it that the besiegers have not already possessed themselves of the townsmen's herds of cattle and flocks of sheep, which Alexander supposes to be the goal of the ambush? Would the besieged risk leaving their walls in charge of women, children and aged men merely for a council? Porphyry's question is also pertinent: If the ambush was mounted only by a portion of the besiegers, how could the townsmen climb on their horses and ride to the scene openly and without opposition (1. 228. 16 = 29. 24 Sod.)?

Alexander remains isolated in this interpretation, accepted neither by Porphyry nor the author of the exegetical scholia (T and b ad Σ 513c<sup>1-2</sup>). Only Eustathius, perplexed by the repeated use of οἱ δέ to shift the subject (vv. 513, 516, 525), accuses the poet of ἀσάφεια and leaves Alexander's interpretation on an equal footing with the other two cited by Porphyry (1159. 33 ff.). Porphyry himself, like modern commentators, prefers the interpretation whereby the besieged undertake the ambush, the women, children and old men guard the walls because the warriors have left for that purpose, the scouts are sent out by the townsmen, not the besiegers, and it is the besiegers whose council is interrupted by the commotion which follows upon the ambush (1. 228. 19 ff. = 29. 29 ff. Sod.). In one detail Alexander was in good company, however, namely his interpretation of ἱράων (v. 531), where he followed a well-established tradition.<sup>12</sup>

3a. Porph. 1. 234. 10 = 112. 7 Sod. = Erbse ad sch. T 79–80a: 'Αλέξανδρος δὲ ὁ Κοτταεύς φησι λέγων· καλῶς ἔχει τὸ ἐστῶτος τοῦ δημηγοροῦντος ἀκούειν καὶ μὴ ὑποκρούειν αὐτὸν καὶ ἐμποδίζειν (τοῦτο γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ “ὑββάλλειν” [T 80])· [5] χαλεπὸν γὰρ καὶ τῷ πάνυ δεινῷ ἐν ταραχῇ εἰπεῖν. τὸ γὰρ “χαλεπὸν ἐπιστάμενόν περ ἐόντα” (ibid.) κατὰ Ἀττικὴν συνήθειαν πλεονάζει τὸ “ἐόντα”· ἐκείνοις γὰρ ἦν σύνηθες λέγειν “μὴ προδοὺς ἡμᾶς γένῃ” ἀντὶ τοῦ μὴ προδῶς, καὶ “παίζεις ἔχων” ἀντὶ τοῦ διαπαίζεις, καὶ ἐνταῦθα “χαλεπὸν [10] γὰρ ἐπιστάμενόν περ ἐόντα” (ibid.) ἀντὶ τοῦ τὸν ἐπιστάμενον θορυβεῖσθαι χαλεπὸν, ὥς καὶ τοῦ ἐπιστήμονος ῥήτορος ἐν θορύβῳ χαλεπῶς δημηγοροῦντος. | ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ . . .

3b. Sch. A ad T 79–80a: ἐσταότος μὲν καλὸν ἀκούειν <— [15] ἐόντα>· καλῶς ἔχει τοῦ ἐστῶτος καὶ δημηγοροῦντος ἀκούειν καὶ μὴ ὑποκρούειν μηδ' ἐμποδίζειν· τοῦτο γὰρ δηλοῖ τὸ “ὑβ<β>άλλειν” (T 80)· χαλεπὸν γὰρ καὶ τῷ πάνυ δεινῷ ἐν ταραχῇ εἰπεῖν. τοῦτο ἀγνοήσας Ἀρίσταρχος καὶ οἰηθεὶς

<sup>12</sup> Probably the interpretation of Aristarchus (cf. sch. A [Ariston.] ad Σ 531a), it entered the scholastic tradition (cf. D).

παραίτησίν τινα ἐκ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος γίνεσθαι παρενέθηκε [20] τὸ “αὐτόθι ἐξ ἔδρης” (T 77). πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τί ἂν καθέζοιτο τὸν ἀγκῶνα τετραμένος; ἔπειτα οὕτως ἔρρωται ὥστε ὀλίγον ὕστερον (cf. T 252–66) κάπρον ἀποσφάττειν. οὕτως ὁ Κοτιαεὺς.

recensionem χ ut pleniorē hic magna ex parte secutus sum

2 λέγων χ: om. V | ἔχει χ: om. V 4 σημαίνει] συμβαίνει V | ὑββάλλειν] ὑβάλλειν \*B: ὑββάλλειν V 5 τῷ ... δεινῷ χ: τὸ (corr. τῷ) ... δεινὸν V | τὸ] τῷ Haslam, fort. recte 5–12 τὸ γὰρ χαλεπὸν—] om. V 10 γὰρ Villoison: περ \*B 17 ὑβάλλειν A: suppl. Villoison

3–4 μὴ ὑποκρούειν—ὑββάλλειν] cf. sch. D ad T 80: ὑββάλλειν: ὑποκρούειν, ἐμποδίζειν τὸν λέγοντα ...; Ap. S. 156. 27 et 33: ... οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Σιδώνιον ἐστῶτα μὲν λέγουσι τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα παρὰ τῇ καθέδρᾳ, οὐδ' ἐν μέσοις ἐστῶτα. ... οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Σιδώνιον ἐκ τοῦ ὑββάλλειν τὸ ὑποκρούειν ἀκούουσιν; Hsch. v 567: ὑποβάλλει: ὑποκρούει; sch. bT ad T 80b: ὑββάλλειν: ὑποκρούεσθαι θορύβῳ τὸν λέγοντα; Eust. 1172. 34: οἱ καὶ αὐτοὶ (sc. οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι) ὑποβάλλειν φασὶ τὸ κωλύειν καὶ ὑποκρούειν διὰ κραυγῆς καὶ ποιεῖν θόρυβον ... 8–9 καὶ “παίζεις ἔχων” ἀντὶ τοῦ διαπαίζεις] cf. Moer. 212. 8 (φλυαρεῖς ἔχων); Greg. Cor. 146–47.

At issue is a passage from the Assembly scene in T (74–80) where Achilles announces his return to battle; the immediate reaction is as follows:

ὥς ἔφαθ', οἱ δ' ἐχάρησαν εὐκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοὶ  
μῆνιν ἀπειπόντος μεγαθύμου Πηλεΐωνος.  
τοῖσι δὲ καὶ μετέειπεν ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαμέμνων  
αὐτόθεν ἐξ ἔδρης, οὐδ' ἐν μέσοισιν ἀναστάς·  
“ὦ φίλοι ἦρωες Δαναοί, θεράποντες Ἄρης,  
ἑσταότος μὲν καλὸν ἀκούειν, οὐδὲ ἔοικεν  
ὑββάλλειν· χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἐπισταμένῳ περ ἔόντι ...”

In light of sch. A ad T 79–80a (= fr. 3b) Alexander has been thought guilty of the grave error of supposing that Aristarchus interpolated (παρενέθηκε) v. 77, on the assumption that αὐτόθεν ἐξ ἔδρης means that Agamemnon spoke from his seat because of a wound;<sup>13</sup> yet Agamemnon's wound was at the elbow (Λ 252). Now T 77 was already read by Aristophanes of Byzantium (and therefore could not have been interpolated by Aristarchus),

<sup>13</sup> This, by the way, was the interpretation of Epaphroditus fr. 43 L. = sch. bT ad T 77b and Eust. 1172. 21.



as we know from sch. AT (Did.) ad T 76–77. Therefore Ludwich thought that Alexander must be burdened with a surprising piece of negligence.<sup>14</sup>

Alexander has, however, been sufficiently exculpated on this score by Erbse, who makes it very likely that the compiler of the A-scholia combined at sch. T 79–80a two passages from Porphyry (1. 233. 3 ff. = 110. 3 Sod. + the first part of our fr. 3a) and carelessly added to the conglomerate the subscription οὕτως ὁ Κοττιαεύς, which applied only to the first part (—ἐν παραχῇ εἰπεῖν ~ first part of fr. 3a). Moreover, the A-compiler evidently misunderstood Porphyry's words (1. 233. 5 = 110. 7 So.) καὶ φησι (sc. ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος) διὰ τοῦτο ἐνέθηκε (sc. ὁ Ὅμηρος) τὸ “αὐτόθεν ἐξ ἔδρης οὐδ' ἐν μέσσοισι ἀναστάς” to mean that Aristarchus interpolated (παρενέθηκε) the verse in question. Finally, the words αὐτόθεν ἐξ ἔδρης can merely mean that Agamemnon spoke from where he was, i.e., did not go to the usual speaker's position in the middle of the assembly, but did stand up (as is implied by v. 79: ἐσταότος μὲν καλὸν ἀκούειν).<sup>15</sup>

If, then, Alexander can be cleared of responsibility for the misinformation laid to his charge in fr. 3b, what was his contribution to the understanding of T 80? Like others, he passed on the interpretation of ὑββάλλειν as equivalent to ὑποκρούειν, ἐμποδίζειν, doubtless known to him from the scholastic tradition (cf. sch. D ad loc.). Whether he did more than that depends upon the status of the latter part of fr. 3a (τὸ γὰρ “χαλεπὸν ἐπιστάμενόν περ ἑόντα” κατὰ Ἀττικὴν συνήθειαν—). E. Kammer, following Barnes, athetized this material, which is absent from V;<sup>16</sup> Sodano agrees that it does not belong to Alexander but believes it to have been added by the redactor of the χ-recension. In putting forward this view Sodano cites sch. A ad T 79–80a (= our fr. 3b), Ap. S. v. ὑββάλλειν and Eust. 1172. 20; but none of these passages excludes the possibility that Alexander explained ἑόντι of T 80 as a pleonasm according to Attic usage.

Now Alexander was interested in matters of dialect (cf. frs. 5 and 13); and one sentence which he cites, “μὴ προδοὺς ἡμᾶς γένῃ,” is not a bad parallel. He should not, however, have mixed this up with such expressions as παίζεις ἔχων and tried to subsume both types under the rubric “pleonastic participle;” also the phenomenon is, of course, by no means

<sup>14</sup> A. Ludwich, *Aristarchs homerische Textkritik*, 2 vols. (Leipzig 1884–85) at I 74–75 (the error posited would be especially surprising since fr. 7 below shows Alexander familiar with, and influenced by, Didymus' work).

<sup>15</sup> Erbse (above, note 1) 54–57; for the last point he compares Demetrius Sidonius *apud* Ap. S. 156. 27 (quoted above; cf. also Eust. 1172. 30); he is likewise able to show that Schader's assumption that a citation of Demetrius has fallen out at 1. 233. 3 of his edition of Porphyry is unfounded and therefore that the Apollonius cited at 1. 233. 11 was the teacher of Porphyry, not of Demetrius.

<sup>16</sup> *Scholia Homerica emendatiora praefatione de scholiis Porphyrianis praemissa*, ed. E. Kammer (diss. Königsberg 1863); Joshua Barnes published Porphyry among other works of Homeric exegesis in the introduction to his edition of Homer (Cambridge 1711); both of these works, cited by Sodano, are inaccessible to me.

confined to Attic;<sup>17</sup> possibly Alexander was here influenced by Aristarchus' view that Homer was an Athenian.<sup>18</sup>

It is worth remembering that in Alexander's day the study of syntax was in its infancy, his contemporary, Apollonius Dyscolus, being the author of the first book on the subject, a book, however, which was not the kind of systematic exposition of Greek syntax a modern reader would expect but rather a paradigmatic discussion of select problems<sup>19</sup> and which offers no guidance on the problem at hand. Perhaps, then, Alexander's attempt to grapple with the conjoined participles of T 80 should not be judged too harshly.

#### b. Παντοδαπά

4. Et. Gen. (A) s.v. δίκρον καὶ δίκροον, unde EM 276. 26 = Hdn. 2. 385. 21: 'Αλέξανδρος δὲ ὁ τοῦ 'Ασκληπιάδου ἐν τῷ ἰ' τῶν Παντοδαπῶν παρὰ τὸ κόρος, ὃ σημαίνει τὸν κλάδον (ἐνθεν καὶ κοριθαλὶς ἢ δάφνη λέγεται) καὶ κορεῖν, τὸ τοῖς [5] κλάδοις σαροῦν. Ἰ ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω μᾶλλον παρὰ τὸ κέρας . . .

5 σαροῦν] σαρρ- A

Ex Et. Gen. etiam Zon. 1238: κοριθαλὶς (sic): ἢ δάφνη, καὶ κόρος, ὁ κλάδος, καὶ κορεῖν, τὸ τοῖς κλάδοις σαροῦν. 3 κόρος = κλάδος] cf. Hsch. κ 3655: κόρος: †πλήθος ἀνθρώπων (πλησμονή dubitanter Haslam). καὶ τὰ νέα βλαστήματα. καὶ μέτρον.

The adjective δίκροος or, later by hyphaeresis, δίκρος (= "cloven, bifurcated") is attested as early as the *Little Iliad* (fr. 5 Bernabé and Davies: ἀμφὶ δὲ πόρκης / χρύσεος ἀστράπτει καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δίκροος αἰχμή = sch. T ad Π 142b = sch. Pi. N. 6. 85b) and continued in use by poets (Ar. *Pax* 637: τήνδε μὲν δικροῖς ἐώθουν τὴν θεὸν κεκράγμασιν; Call. fr. 177. 2 Pf.: δίκρον φιτρὸν ἀειραμένη; conjectured by Hermann at Aesch. fr. 152 R.); it also proved useful to medical and scientific authors (see LSJ, *Thes. Ling. Gr.*, s.v.). If Lentz has correctly assigned our passage to Herodian, whose work on pathology often served as a source for the etymologica,<sup>20</sup> it

<sup>17</sup> Cf. examples cited at R. Kühner and B. Gerth, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache* I (4. Aufl., Hannover 1955) 39 (§ 353.4, Anm. 3).

<sup>18</sup> Cf. sch. A (Ariston.) ad N 197; Vita V (p. 247. 8 Allen = *Vitae Homeri et Hesiodi*, ed. Wilamowitz [Berlin 1916; rp. 1929] 29. 9); R. Pfeiffer, *A History of Classical Scholarship from the Beginnings to the End of the Hellenistic Age* (Oxford 1968) 228. Herodian, too, regarded the Homeric dialect as equivalent to Old Attic: cf. J. Wackemagel, *Kleine Schriften* (Göttingen n.d.) II 1107.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Cohn, *RE* II.1 (1895) s.v. Apollonios no. 81, 139. 16; D. L. Blank, *Ancient Philosophy and Grammar: The Syntax of Apollonius Dyscolus* (Chico, CA 1982).

<sup>20</sup> On the reconstruction of this work, cf. R. Reitzenstein, *Inedita poetarum Graecorum fragmenta* II (ind. lect. Rostock 1891) 18 ff.

is he, rather than Alexander, who has the honor of being the first to propose the etymology currently favored (< κέρας; the stem ending in -f will account for the original δίκροον).<sup>21</sup>

Alexander's mistake was perhaps to attempt to build a word-family on, at best, a very tenuous foundation, the only other independent testimony for κόρος = κλάδος being Hsch. κ 3655; hence, for instance, LSJ does not recognize κόρος in this sense. The word for laurel (usually spelled κορυθαλῖς) is surely related to the cult titles of Apollo (Κόρυθος) and Artemis (Κορυθαλ(λ)ία), rather than a generic word for branch.

Alexander's connection of κορεῖν and κόρος with the same root<sup>22</sup> might seem prima facie more promising in light of φιλεῖν/φίλος. However, if the basic noun stands to the verb's direct object in the relation of an instrument with which it is treated, one expects a formation in -οῦν, not -εῖν.<sup>23</sup>

Together with fr. 9 and test. 5, our fragment preserves what I take to be the name of Alexander's father, Asclepiades;<sup>24</sup> and, like fr. 5, it tells us that Alexander wrote a *Miscellany* in at least ten books (cf. test. 5). If the contents were alphabetically arranged, this might account for δίκροον and ἐπίσχοιες being treated in the same book, but without further evidence we cannot be sure.

5. Sch. A ad Ξ 241c: ἐπίσχοιες: τῷ ἐπίσχοιμι ἀκόλουθόν ἐστι τὸ ἐπίσχοις, τῷ δὲ ἐπισχοῖν τὸ ἐπισχοίης· καὶ ἴσως ἔδει οὕτως ἔχειν, παρεφθάρη δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν μεταχαρακτηρισάντων· τῷ δὲ χαρακτῆρι γινόμενον ὅμοιον τῷ “ιοῖν” καὶ “ἀγαγοῖν” [5] παρὰ Σαπφοῖ (fr. 169 et 182 Voigt) καὶ τῷ “πεπαγοῖν” παρ’ Εὐπόλιδι (fr. 472 K.-A.) εἰκότως ἐβαρυντονήθη τὸ ἐπισχοίης γινόμενον ἐπίσχοιες, ὡς Αἰολικόν. οὕτω καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Κοτιαεὺς ἐν τῷ ι’ τῶν Παντοδαπῶν.

2 ἐπισχοῖν τὸ ἐπισχοίης Cobet: ἐπισχοίης τὸ ἐπισχοῖν A 5 τῷ Bekker: τὸ A

1–2 τῷ ἐπίσχοιμι—ἐπισχοίης] cf. Ap. Dysc. et Hdn. apud Choer. Th. 2. 260. 19–20, unde EM 664. 26 (s.v. περιπατοῖν) et Eust. 983. 1: ἐκ τοῦ σχοῖμι δὲ τὸ σχοῖν Ἀττικῶς, ὁμοίως τῷ περιπατοῖμι περιπατοῖν καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίοις; sch. A ad Ξ 241b<sup>1</sup>: {τῷ κεν} (secl. Erbse) ἐπίσχοιες: οὕτως τὴν γραφὴν παρατίθεται ὁ Ἡρωδιανὸς ἐν τῷ ιζ’ τῆς Καθόλου (Hdn. 1. 469. 14; cf. 2. 230. 20) καὶ λέγει ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐπίσχοις πλεονασμὸν εἶναι τοῦ ε ἢ συστολὴν τοῦ

<sup>21</sup> Cf. H. Frisk, *Griechisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch*, 3 vols. (Heidelberg 1960–72) at I 394, s.v. δίκροος.

<sup>22</sup> M. W. Haslam queries whether κόρος = κλάδος might have been inferred from κορεῖν.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. A. Debrunner, *Griechische Wortbildungslehre* (Heidelberg 1917) 93 f. and 99 f.

<sup>24</sup> Rather than of his teacher, as A. Meineke (*Analecta Alexandrina* [Berlin 1843] 16) supposed.

ἐπισχοίης; sch. A<sup>int</sup> ad Ξ 241b<sup>2</sup>: οὕτως Ἡρωδιανὸς ἐπίσχυες (debuit ἐπίσχοιες, ut vidit Erbse).

In the Διδὸς ἀπάτη Hera offers Ὑπνος the prospect of fine gifts in return for collaboration in putting Zeus to sleep (Ξ 238–41):

δῶρα δέ τοι δώσω καλὸν θρόνον, ἄφθιτον αἰεῖ,  
 χρύσειον· Ἡφαιστος δέ κ' ἐμὸς παῖς, ἀμφιγυήεις  
 τεύξει ἀσκήσας, ὑπὸ δὲ θρήνυν ποσὶν ἦσει,  
 τῷ κεν ἐπίσχοιες λιπαροῦς πόδας εἰλαπινάζων.

At issue in our fragment is the word ἐπίσχοιες, attested here as early as the third century B.C. (π<sup>59</sup> = Pap. Ryl. 49) and assumed by Alexander and Herodian to be the transmitted text.

Alexander notes that one would expect ἐπίσχοις (to ἐπίσχοιμι) or ἐπισχοίης (to ἐπισχοίην). He therefore cautiously (ἵσως) moots the possibility that ἐπισχοίης ought to have been the reading (ἐπίσχοις, of course, being metrically excluded) but that it was corrupted in the process of transcription from Old Attic script, which failed to differentiate between ε and η.<sup>25</sup>

The modern editor must also face the additional query: Is the reading ἐπισχοίης plausibly Homeric in light of what we know about the history of Greek? Now σχοῖς is original, σχοίης an innovation; but how early an innovation? In the *Odyssey* we meet φιλοίη (δ 692) and φοροίη (ι 320), which have been explained as Attic; the *Iliad* has σταίησαν (transmitted without a variant) at P 733.<sup>26</sup> Wackernagel has argued, however, that, since the *Iliad* otherwise has the -ιη- formation only for verbs in -μι, the true reading at Ξ 241 is ἐπίσχοίας.<sup>27</sup>

Admittedly the evidence is less extensive than one would like. However, editors including Ludwig, Allen and Mazon are probably right in preferring Alexander's ἐπισχοίης. Note that it is not a "conjecture of the second century A.D.," as Wackernagel states,<sup>28</sup> but an alternative interpretation of the oldest παράδοσις and that the parchment reading that he prefers is attested only in the sixth century A.D. (a fact which he does not mention).<sup>29</sup> Furthermore if ἐπισχοίης strains credibility in spite of σταίησαν, φιλοίη and φοροίη, how much less likely is Homer to have

<sup>25</sup> This mode of explanation is likely to have been used already by Aristarchus: cf. sch. A (Ariston.) ad Λ 104a<sup>1</sup>, with testimonies adduced by Erbse. I assume, however, that Alexander learned only the principle, not its application to this passage, from his great predecessor (via Didymus?).

<sup>26</sup> Cf. E. Schwyzer, *Griechische Grammatik* I (Munich 1953) 794 ff.; P. Chantraine, *Grammaire homérique* I (Paris 1958) 463 ff.

<sup>27</sup> J. Wackernagel, *Sprachliche Untersuchungen zu Homer* (Göttingen 1916) 14; and *Kleine Schriften* (above, note 18) I 806–07.

<sup>28</sup> Previous note.

<sup>29</sup> Cod. Brit. mus. add. 17210: ἐπίσχοίας.



known an ἐπίσχοις formed on the analogy of the third plural weak aorist optative -ειαν (cf., e.g., πημήνειαν [Γ 299], ἀκούσειαν [B 98, 282])?<sup>30</sup>

The provenance of our scholium is a difficult problem. Erbse would assign it, together with the other A-scholia which mention Alexander, to Porphyry's *Quaestiones Homericae*; he points to the fact that in his eighth *quaestio* Porphyry deals with a problem of textual criticism, just as our scholium does (cf. fr. 15 below, which displays an interest in the processes by which the true reading is corrupted similar to that of our fragment).<sup>31</sup> Van der Valk, however, objects that (a) we have no evidence that Porphyry dealt with Ξ 241; (b) Porphyry's interest in a textual problem in the eighth *quaestio* is an exception; (c) our fragment deals specifically with a grammatical point, and we know that Porphyry despised grammar and grammarians; and (d) the citation by work and book number is more precise than Porphyry is wont to be (but cf. fr. 2).<sup>32</sup>

H. Schrader, on the other hand, assigned this scholium to Herodian.<sup>33</sup> However, if, as I am inclined to believe, at Hdn. 1. 468. 4 Lentz's reconstruction (based on *Ep. alph.* [AO 2. 334. 20] and *EM* 495. 1) is correct, the prosodical portion of our scholium conflicts with Herodian's doctrine that the strong aorist optative only of verbs with participles ending in -ς retains the accent of the primitive; hence, on Herodian's view, one would in any case expect ἐπίσχοιες, not the form ἐπισχοῖες implied by Alexander, so that the supposition of Aeolic barytonesis would be redundant. If this note had passed through Herodian's hands, one would thus have expected it to include a corrective along these lines.

In view of the deficiencies of the hypotheses of Porphyrian or Herodianic provenance, might we be best advised to assign this scholium to the exegetical commentary which seems the likely source of two other citations of Alexander in the A-scholia (sc. frr. 1 and 8)?<sup>34</sup>

### c. Ex opere incerto

6. EM 77. 7 (s.v. ἀμάμαξυς<sup>35</sup>): ἔστιν οὖν ἀμπέλου τι γένος. οἱ δὲ τὴν ἐσπέριον σταφυλὴν· Ἀλέξανδρος τὴν τ'ἀβούβαστον λέγει.

2 τὴν ἀβούβαστον] τὴν ἀβούμαστον PT: τὴν ἄμπελον βουβαστὸν vel βουβάστειον Sturz

<sup>30</sup> Cf. R. Janko (above, note 8) ad loc., who arrives at a similar conclusion.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Erbse (above, note 1) 97–98.

<sup>32</sup> Van der Valk (above, note 8) I 113–14.

<sup>33</sup> H. Schrader, *Porphyrii Quaestionum Homericarum ad Iliadem pertinentium reliquiae* (Leipzig 1880) 379.

<sup>34</sup> This is the alternate possibility mooted (with a query) in Erbse's edition. The citation of Eupolis, ill adapted to the argument, may be a later addition (so M. W. Haslam).

<sup>35</sup> On the accent, cf. Hdn. 2. 762. 6 = Choer. *Th.* 1. 331. 4.

Cf. Hsch. α 3425: ἀμάμαξυς· ἄμπελος, ἥ γένος σταφυλῆς· εἴρηται δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ χωλοῦ τινος, δύο βακτηρίαις ὑπὸ τὰς μασχάλας ἐρειδομένου καὶ ἐκκρεμάμενον ἔχοντος τὸν πόδα ὡς βότρυν.

The compiler of the *EM* adds our fragment immediately after a Methodian gloss (s.v. ἀμάμαξυς) which he copied from the *Et. Gen.*<sup>36</sup> Our material has been thought likely to derive from Diogenianus in view of the similar definitions presented by Hesychius and the *EM*;<sup>37</sup> if that is so, Diogenianus, who was his contemporary,<sup>38</sup> is the earliest author to cite Alexander. The word was used by Sappho (fr. 173 Voigt) and Epicharmus (Γᾶ καὶ Θάλασσα, fr. 24 Kaibel) and in a comic scene described at Hsch. α 3425; in addition, ψευδαμάμαξυς appears at Ar. *Vesp.* 326 (cf. sch. ad loc.). What was meant by those who called the ἀμάμαξυς ἡ ἐσπέριος σταφυλή is obscure enough;<sup>39</sup> but Alexander's remark is corrupt (ἀβούβαστον being *vox nihili*), with no remedy in sight (the connection with Βούβαστις, the Egyptian equivalent of Artemis [cf. Hdt. 2. 137. 5] implied by Sturz's conjectures is far from clear).

7. *Et. Gen.* (A), unde *EM* 145. 38 (s.v. ἄρμάτειον μέλος [Eur. Or. 1384]): . . . ἄλλοι δὲ ὅτι ὁ ἦχος τοῦ ἄρματος ὀξύς καὶ λεπτός γίνεται· τὸν οὖν ὀξὺν καὶ λεπτὸν φθόγγον ἄρμάτειον ἐκ τούτου ὁ Εὐριπίδης ἐκάλεσε· καὶ εὐνούχον [5] εἰσάγει λέγοντα· τοιαῦται δὲ τῶν εὐνούχων αἱ φωναί. οὕτω Δίδυμος (p. 245 Schm.) καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος. ἢ παρὰ τὸν ἄρμόν, ὃ σημαίνει τὸν πόλεμον τῇ τῶν Φρυγῶν διαλέκτῳ φησὶ Παλαμήδης. ἢ ἱστορεῖ ὁ τὴν κωμικὴν λέξιν συναγαγὼν Μεθόδιος.

Cf. sch. TB Eur. Or. 1384 (1. 220. 21 Schwartz): Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ Κυρηναῖος (fr. 1 Dyck) παρεπιγραφὴν λέγει εἶναι τὸ ἰαρμοδίον ᾧ Ἴλιον†. εἰ δὲ ἦν παρεπιγραφή, ἅπαξ ἂν ἐπεγράφετο {τὸ Ἴλιον ἀπώλετο}. ἔνιοι δὲ τὸν ἐκπεπηδηκότα Φρύγα εὐνούχον φασιν εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ εὐνούχους ἐπικικῶς ὀξυφώνους ὑπάρχειν. τὸ οὖν ὀξύτονον ἄρμάτειον αὐτὸν φάναι διὰ τὸν ὑπαξόνιον τῶν ἄρμάτων ἦχον ἀνατεταμένον τε καὶ ὀξὺν εἶναι. ὅτι δὲ εὐνούχος ἦν, φησί· “οὔτε <γὰρ> γυνὴ πέφυκας, οὔτ' ἐν ἀνδράσιν σύ γ' εἶ” (1528)· καὶ πάλιν· “ὀξὺ γὰρ βοῆς ἀκούσαν Ἀργὸς ἐξεγείρεται” (1530). εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι αἰτίαι ἃς ἐκτίθεται ὁ ὑπομνηματισάμενος.

<sup>36</sup> Ed. at R. Reitzenstein, *Geschichte der griechischen Etymologika* (Leipzig 1897) 13. 20.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Erbse (above, note 1) 97.

<sup>38</sup> *Su.* δ 1140: . . . γεγινώς . . . ἐπὶ Ἀδριανοῦ βασιλέως; cf. Cohn, *RE* V.1 (1903) 778. 10 ff.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. L. Dindorf, *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* I.2 (Paris 1831–56) 20d.

Our fragment has reached the etymologica via the fifth-century lexicographer Methodius,<sup>40</sup> who is expressly cited. Methodius is likely to have used an Atticist source, which, in turn, found the comment in the Παντοδαπά (the Ἑξηγητικά not being known to have dealt with authors other than Homer). Sch. Eur. *Or.* 1384 preserves (via Didymus, who is expressly cited: τὸ ἀρμάτειον μέλος ὃ Δίδυμός φησιν ὠνομάσθαι . . . , 1. 220. 9 Schwartz) a more detailed version of the same doctrine (though the scholium's last sentence shows that it, too, is curtailed). Alexander has simply taken over from Didymus an interpretation of the use of ἀρμάτειον at *Or.* 1384; Didymus' own work is largely of value as a collection of the views of his predecessors; we have no way of gauging his originality in this matter, however.<sup>41</sup> Furthermore, Alexander shows no awareness of the possibility that Apollodorus of Cyrene had raised, namely that *Or.* 1384 might be a stage direction that crept from the margin into the text.<sup>42</sup>

8. Sch. A<sup>im</sup> ad A 1i: <Ἀχιλῆος> ὁ Κοτιαεὺς “Ἀχιλῆος,” διὰ τὸ μέτρον ἐν λ γράφει· καὶ γὰρ τὸ Κάμανδρος ἀντὶ τοῦ Σκάμανδρος γράφεται.

1 le. add. Erbse 2 γὰρ Erbse: //// A 3 γρ(άφεται) Erbse, Beitr. 96: γρ(άφεσθαι) Erbse in ed.

1-2 Ἀχιλῆος—γράφει] cf. sch. DAT ad A 1h: Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος: οὕτως ἀναγνωστέον δι' ἑνὸς λ διὰ τὸ μέτρον καὶ διὰ τὸ ἄχος (ὃ ἐστὶ λύπη) ἐπενεγκεῖν τοῖς Ἰλίουσιν. οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ μὴ θιγεῖν χεῖλεσι τροφῆς (debuit χιλοῦ vel χιλῆς, ὃ ἐστὶ τροφῆς, ut vidit Erbse): ὅλως γὰρ οὐ μετέσχε γάλακτος; Ep. ad A 1E (cum test.); Tz. Ex. 61. 3: Ἀχιλῆος: ἐν λ, οὐ διὰ τὸ μέτρον, καθὰ τινες φάσκουσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τε τὸ ἄχος ἐμποιεῖν Ἰλίουσι καὶ διὰ τὸ χιλῆς ἄμοιρον εἶναι . . . ; sim. Tz. laudatus sch. Lyc. 797; Eust. 14. 8: ὅτι ὥσπερ Ὀδυσσεύς ποτὲ μὲν διὰ δύο σσ παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ, ποτὲ δὲ δι' ἑνός, ὡς μετὰ ταῦτα φανήσεται, οὕτω καὶ Ἀχιλλεύς, ἐνταῦθα μὲν ἐν τῷ “Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος” καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ δὲ δι' ἑνός ἐκφωνεῖται λ, ἐν πλείοσι δὲ τόποις δύο λ<λ> (corr. Haslam) ἔχει. ἐπαγωνίζονται δὲ ἄλλοι μὲν τῇ τοῦ ἑνός, ἕτεροι δὲ τῇ τῶν δύο λ γραφῇ, τὰ μὲν δύο τιθέντες ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄχος ἰάλλειν ἤγουν λύπην ἐμβάλλειν, . . . ἢ κατὰ πλεονασμὸν τοῦ ἑτέρου λ διὰ τὸ εὐφωνότερον, . . . τῷ δὲ ἐνὶ λ συνηγοροῦντες πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τῆς ἀναλογίας, ἵνα ἢ ὅμοιον τῷ Ὀϊλεύς, βασιλεύς· εἶτα ἐξ ἐτυμολογίας, ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄχος τοῖς

<sup>40</sup> Cf. C. Wendel, *RE* XV.2 (1932) 1380. 22 ff., esp. 1381. 20 ff.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Pfeiffer (above, note 18) 274 ff.; on the Euripidean commentaries in particular, p. 277.

<sup>42</sup> For Apollodorus' date (prior to the first-century A.D. lexicographer Pamphilus, who quotes him), cf. A. Dyck, “On Apollodorus of Cyrene,” *HSCP* 85 (1981) 106; E. Hoffmann-Aleith, *RE* XVIII.3 (1949) 336. 44 (Pamphilus no. 25). The problem is still debated: cf. Euripides, *Orestes*, ed. C. W. Willink (Oxford 1986) ad loc., with literature there cited.

Ἰλιεύσιν . . . γενέσθαι· ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ α στερητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ χιλός . . . 2–3 τὸ Κάμανδρος—γράφεται] cf. sch. h ad Φ 223 (laud. Erbse ad loc.); sch. D.T. 351. 8: “πῶς οὖν,” ἐπάγουσι, “πάλιν τὸ σκ κοινὴν εἰργάσατο, ὥς ἐν τῷ ‘οὐδὲ Σκάμανδρος ἔληγεν’ (Φ 305) καὶ τὸ ζ διπλοῦν ὃν ἐν τῷ ‘οὔτε Ζάκυνθον ἔναιον’ (B 634);” πρὸς οὓς φαμεν, ἐπειδὴ ἀνάγκη ἦν πάντως τὰ ὀνόματα ἐντεθῆναι τῇ ποιήσει, ἃ πάντως ἐντιθέμενα χωλὸν εἰργάζετο τὸν στίχον· καὶ διὰ τὸ χρειώδες μέτρον κατεφρόνησεν ὁ ποιητής; ibid. 506. 4; Eust. 255. 29 (cum Valkii adn.): σημείωσαι δὲ ὅτι ὁ Σκάμανδρος δυσχερῶς ἐν μέτρῳ ἔχων παρειαρτέειν ἠρωϊκῷ ἐκαινοτομήθη ἐξ ἀνάγκης παρὰ τοῦ ποιητοῦ.

This fragment represents a stage in the efforts of ancient grammarians to bring the spelling and prosody of Homeric proper names under a common denominator. It is surprising that Alexander is singled out for the spelling Ἀχιλλῆος in A 1, which is that both of the vulgate and the scholastic tradition (cf. sch. D ad loc.).<sup>43</sup> In any case, others (like sch. D, Tzetzes, Eustathius and others) sought an etymological, rather than a metrical, justification.

The name of the river Scamander could not have been used in hexameter verse if the initial σκ- caused a preceding short syllable to lengthen. Accordingly, in all twelve passages in which it occurs in the the *Iliad* the σ fails to make position and a variant spelling with κ- is attested.<sup>44</sup> The reading with σκ- is attested at P. Heid. 1262a (= π<sup>12</sup>, 3rd century B.C.) at Φ 305.<sup>45</sup> Alexander provides a terminus ante quem for the spelling Κάμανδρος in Homer.

The rule formulated at sch. h ad Φ 223 whereby only verbs beginning with σκ- or ζ-, but not nouns, lengthen the previous syllable is inadequate: it introduces an alien element (part of speech) into metrical calculations;<sup>46</sup> and what about σκεδάννυμι/κεδάννυμι?<sup>47</sup> More promising is the approach of K. Strunk, who argues that the prosody ξσκ- takes advantage of a reminiscence of a dialect in which σκ had been assimilated to

<sup>43</sup> On the spelling itself, cf. M. W. Haslam, “Homeric Words and Homeric Metre: Two Doublets Examined (λείβω/εἴβω, γαῖα/αἶα),” *Glotta* 54 (1976) 206 n. 12.

<sup>44</sup> E 36, 77, 774, H 329, Λ 499, M 21, Θ 74, Φ 124, 223, 305, 603, X 148; the same is true of the name Σκαμάνδριος derived from it (Z 402); M. W. Haslam compares the treatment of the form σκέπαρνον at ε 237 and ι 391, where the σ likewise fails to make position.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. S. West, *The Ptolemaic Papyri of Homer*, Papyrologica Coloniensia 3 (Cologne and Opladen 1967) 138.

<sup>46</sup> M. W. Haslam raises the interesting possibility that h’s rule may have arisen from a misunderstanding of τὰ ὀνόματα at sch. D.T. 351. 8 (cited above).—For a similarly misguided introduction of part of speech into ancient prosodical doctrine, cf. J. Wackemagel (above, note 18) Π 1105.

<sup>47</sup> Erbse (above, note 1) 96 n. 2, therefore rightly assumes this note to be a late invention.



κ and cites corresponding short forms and papyrus evidence for a personal name Κάμ(μ)ανδρος.<sup>48</sup>

Erbse assigned our scholium to Porphyry's *Quaestiones Homericae*,<sup>49</sup> more perhaps because of fr. 3b above than the nature of our fragment itself (it has no correspondence in Porphyry's extant work; nor is it clear what kind of ζήτημα could have accommodated it). It is argued above (ad frs. 1 and 5) that we should in any case assume that some of the citations of Alexander in the A-scholia derive from an exegetical commentary, a hypothesis which would also suit this fragment well.

9. Et. Gen. (AB) s.v. ἄχνη, unde Et. Gud. d<sup>2</sup> 251. 18 Stef. et EM 181. 55: . . . Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ὁ τοῦ Ἀσκληπιάδου λέγει αὐτὴν παρὰ τὸν αἰξῶ μέλλοντα εἶναι, ὥς τεύχω τέχνη, καὶ ἀποβολῇ τοῦ ι.

2 ὁ τοῦ ἀσκλ. A: om. B 2-3 λέγει αὐτὴν post μέλλοντα hab. B 3 τέχνη B: τεύχην καὶ A | καὶ A: om. B 4 ι A: υ B

3 παρὰ τὸν αἰξῶ] cf. Et. Orion. G (23. 12). | τεύχω τέχνη] cf. Et. Orion. H (616. 44); EM 755. 56, cui sim. Zon. 1720; Eust. 178. 5, 421. 36, 575. 33.

If, as LSJ contends, the basic meaning of ἄχνη is "anything that comes off the surface," then Alexander's etymology from the verb meaning "shoot, dart" has at least some semantic plausibility. However, the supporting analogy is inadequate; for, as M. W. Haslam observes, τέχνη is not formed from τεύξω, nor does αἰξῶ have a present \*αἰχῶ. Not surprisingly, then, Alexander's etymology failed to find favor either in Byzantine or modern times.

The Byzantines preferred the etymology from ἔχω (. . . ἀεχὴνη τις οὔσα, ἥ μὴ δυναμένη ἔχεσθαι καὶ κρατεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ λεπτομερὲς καὶ ἄτομον: Et. Gen.; cf. test. cited by Erbse ad sch. bT ad A 307c). Modern etymologists allow a connection either with ἄχυρον, "chaff," or with the root in Latin *agna* ("ear of grain") and Gothic *ahana* ("chaff") plus the -snā suffix.<sup>50</sup>

Probably this fragment, like Alexander's other etymologies (frs. 4, 11, 12), belongs to the Παντοδαπά (fr. 4 above being expressly attested for that work). In Et. Orion. the gloss s.v. ἄχνη occurs within a group of glosses interpolated into the section from Philoxenus. I suspect that Orion's gloss on ἄχνη may derive from Herodian, as seems likely in the case of fr. 4. The Et. Gen. will have drawn on a more detailed Orion gloss

<sup>48</sup> K. Strunk, "Sprachliches und Prosodisches zur mykenischen Orthographie," IF 66 (1961) 164 f.

<sup>49</sup> Erbse (above, note 1) 96, and, with a question mark, ad sch. A 1i.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. H. Frisk (above, note 21) s.v. ἄχνη; P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque: Histoire des mots*, 4 vols. (Paris 1968-80) s.v. ἄχνη.

than is now extant. Note that the mention of Alexander's father's name also binds fragments 4 and 9 together.

**10a.** Choer. Th. 2. 108. 31: 'Ο δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Κοτυναεὺς θαυμασίως αὐτὸ σχηματίζει· λέγει γὰρ ὅτι πολλὰ ῥήματα ἀπὸ τοῦ μέλλοντος παράγονται εἰς τὸν ἐνεστῶτα, καὶ τρέπουσι τὸ σ εἰς τὸ χ ἢ εἰς τὸ κ, οἷον σμῶ σμήσω σμήχῳ (ἐξ οὗ [5] τὸ σμήξω), ὁλῶ ὀλέσω ὀλέκω· οὕτως οὖν ἐκ τοῦ δείσω μέλλοντος ἐγένετο ὁ ἐνεστῶς δείκω κατὰ τροπὴν τοῦ σ εἰς τὸ κ, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ δείκω λοιπὸν ἀκολουθῶς ὁ μέσος παρακείμενος **δέδοικα**, ὥσπερ λείπω λέλοιπα, λείβω λέλοιβα, πείθω πέποιθα.

**10b.** Et. Gen. (AB), unde EM 253. 9: δέδοικα: ἔστι δεῖδω, οἷον [11] “δεῖδω μὴ τι πάθω”· τούτου ὁ μέσος παρακείμενος δέδοικα καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐπαλληλίαν τῶν δ ἐτράπη τὸ ἔσχατον δ εἰς κ καὶ γέγονε δέδοικα. | ὁ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Κοτυναεὺς θαυμασίως ἀπολογεῖται λέγων ὅτι πολλὰ ῥήματά εἰσιν ἀπὸ [15] μελλόντων εἰς ἐνεστῶτας μεταγόμενα καὶ τρέποντα τὸ σ ἢ εἰς τὸ χ ἢ εἰς τὸ κ, οἷον σμῶ σμήσω σμήχῳ σμήξῳ, ὁλῶ ὀλέσω ὀλέκω· οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ δείσω μέλλοντος ἐγένετο ὁ ἐνεστῶς δείκω καὶ ἐκ τούτου ὁ μέσος παρακείμενος δέδοικα. | διὰ τί γὰρ δείκω ἐγένετο καὶ οὐ [20] δείχῳ; ἐπειδὴ οὐδέποτε τὰ εἰς χῳ ῥήματα θέλουσι τῇ εἰ διφθόγγῳ παραλήγεσθαι, πλὴν τοῦ στεῖχῳ λείχῳ. οὕτως Ζηνόβιος.

1 κοτυναεὺς Ο 6 ἐγένετο] ἐγίνετο C 11 πάθω] fort. πάθησι ut A 470 (cf. anon. ad EM 253. 11) 12 δέδοικα B: δέδοικα A | τῶν B: τοῦ A 13 ante κ hab. A τὸ | γέγονε A: γίνετο B 15 μελλόντων] μέλλοντος A | μεταγόμενα] παρα- B 16 prior ἢ om. B 19 τί A: τοῦτο B | post δείκω hab. A ῥῆμα

Cf. ad Ep. ad A 555.

At issue is the form δέδοικα. For the first question about it, viz. its classification as to tense and voice, Choeroboscus has found an answer to his satisfaction in Apollonius: It is perfect middle, changed from δέδοικα because of the juxtaposition of the three *d* sounds (Choer. Th. 2. 108. 20 = Ap. Dysc. 3. 107. 42). Choeroboscus then goes on to explain that the third *δ* was changed because, owing to the nature of the perfect reduplication, a change of either of the first two deltas would have entailed change of the other and thereby a total change in the appearance and sound of the word. He then goes on to cite the “remarkable” analysis of Alexander, who sees δέδοικα as a regular perfect middle to δείκω, formed on future δείσω, like ὁλῶ ὀλέσω ὀλέκω. By the way, the πάθος by which a present form was

derived from the future was not uncommonly used by the ancients; cf., e.g., *Ep.* ad A 490.

I have focussed on Choeroboscus' presentation, since it gives a clearer notion of the grammatical context in which Alexander's remark was quoted than does the excerpt in the *Et. Gen.* Both Choeroboscus and *Et. Gen.* s.v. δέδοικα are likely, however, to derive from the same source, namely Zenobius' commentary on Apollonius' ῥηματικόν.<sup>51</sup> Choeroboscus' dependence on Zenobius was made likely by Reitzenstein, who compared Choeroboscus' discussion of ἰμάσσω (*Th.* 2. 154. 17) with *Et. Gen.* s.vv. ἰνάσσω and ἰμάσσω.<sup>52</sup> I suspect that Alexander's "remarkable" opinion was already cited (and rejected) by his contemporary, Apollonius Dyscolus; it seems much less likely to have been dredged up by Zenobius centuries later.<sup>53</sup>

11. *Et. Gen.* (AB), unde EM 277. 8: δινωτοῖσιν (Γ 391): ἀπὸ τοῦ δινῶ τοῦ συστρέφω. τὸρνευτοῖς ἢ στρογγύλοις ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν κλινοπόδων περιφερείας. Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Κοτυαεὺς.

2 alt. τοῦ Erbse: τὸ AB 3 ἀλέξανδρος — A: om. B

Cf. sch. D ad Γ 391: δινωτοῖσι: ἤτοι πεποικιλμένοις ἢ κατὰ συστροφήν τετορνευμένοις; Ap. S. 59. 5: δινωτοῖσι λεχέεσσι: στρογγύλοις, ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν κλινοπόδων περιφερείας; *Et. Orion.* G (44. 1; in sede scholiorum Hom.): δινωτή (δινωτή G: corr. Larcher): περιφερής, εἰκουῖα δίνω (ἀδίνω G, corr. Larcher), ὅ ἐστι τὸρνω. δίνος δὲ ὁ τὸρνος παρὰ τὸ δινεῖσθαι καὶ κυκλοῦσθαι (δονεῖσθαι καὶ κολοῦσθαι G, corr. Larcher); sch. bT ad N 407a; ad *Ep. Hom.* δ 48 (= *AO* 1. 114. 10) eius editionis quam prae paro.

The form δινωτοῖσι occurs in the Homeric poems only at this place (but cf. δινωτήν at N 407 and τ 56), where Aphrodite seeks to lure Helen back to Paris' chamber in spite of his debacle in the μονομαχία with Menelaus (Γ 390 ff.):

“δεῦρ' ἴθι· Ἀλέξανδρός σε καλεῖ οἰκόνδε νέεσθαι.

<sup>51</sup> H. Duentzer, *De Zenodoti studiis Homericis* (Göttingen 1848) 14–16, had the merit of observing that, apart from four passages dealing with *voces Homericæ* where Zenodotus was clearly meant, the ζη compendium in the EM should be resolved as Ζηνόβιος. The fragments of this work were assembled by G. Schoemann, *De Zenobii commentario Rhematici Apolloniani* (progr. Danzig 1881); our fragment is no. 12 at pp. 11–12.

<sup>52</sup> Reitzenstein (above, note 36) 361–62.

<sup>53</sup> On Apollonius' date, cf. Cohn, *RE* II.1 (1895) 136. 32 ff. Unlike the younger grammarian Choeroboscus, our Zenobius does not enjoy his own *RE* article; H. Gärtner, *RE* X A (1972) 12. 10 ff., suggests that our Zenobius may be the author of AP 9. 711 in honor of a rhetorician named Victor, if Sulpicius Victor (4th century) is the honoree in question; note, however, that, as Reitzenstein (above, note 36) 362 showed by reference to *Et. Gen.* s.v. οὐδεῖς = EM 639. 16, Zenobius was contemporary with or younger than John Philoponus (6th century), whom he criticized.

κεῖνος ὃ γ' ἐν θαλάμῳ καὶ δινωτοῖσι λέχεσσι,  
κάλλει τε στίλβων καὶ εὔμασιν· . . .”

Alexander's interpretation of δινωτός as a verbal adjective to δινῶ is implicit in the D-scholium to Γ 391; and the agreement in wording of Alexander's explanation with that of Apollonius Sophista is striking. As terminus ante quem for the latter we have only the fact that he is cited by Herodian.<sup>54</sup> However, it is more likely that Alexander has copied from Apollonius (whose *Lexicon* survives in a shortened version only) than vice versa, since, although Apollonius names a good many sources,<sup>55</sup> Alexander is not among them, Apion being the latest source that Apollonius does cite. Apollonius will have been influenced here, as elsewhere, by the D-scholia (or rather their ancient predecessor, the scholia minora).<sup>56</sup>

It is tempting to believe, with Erbse,<sup>57</sup> that Alexander's comment was taken from the Ἑξηγητικά, but since the Παντοδαπά, too, dealt with a Homeric ἅπαξ λεγόμενον (cf. fr. 5), certainty is unobtainable. Nor is it possible to determine the source from which the *Et. Gen.* gleaned this information.<sup>58</sup>

12. EM 294. 7 (s.v. δωτίνη [I 155, 297, ι 268]): Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ σύνθετον εἶναι τὴν λέξιν παρὰ τὸ τὴν δόσιν τίνειν, ἢ ἢ ἀποτινομένην δόσις.

2 δόσιν] -ις D

Cf. sch. D ad I 155: δωτίνησι: δωρεαῖς.

We may assume that Alexander was familiar with the explanation of δωτίνη given in the D-scholium to I 155. His etymology both accounts for the -τιν- element and at the same time adds the idea of “paying what one owes”<sup>59</sup> appropriate to the earliest occurrence of the word in the passage where Agamemnon promises Achilles his choice of one of his three daughters in marriage and seven fortified towns (ποτολίεθρα) as a dowry if he will return to battle (I 154–56 ~ 296–98):

ἐν δ' ἄνδρες ναίουσι πολύρρηνες, πολυβοῦται,  
οἳ κέ ἐ δωτίνησι θεὸν ὥς τιμήσουσι  
καὶ οἱ ὑπὸ σκήπτρῳ λιπαρὰς τελέουσι θέμιστας.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Cohn, *RE* II.1 (1895) 135. 60 ff.

<sup>55</sup> Fifteen to be exact; cf. the detailed discussion by H. Schenck, *Die Quellen des Homerlexikons des Apollonios Sophistes* (Hamburg 1961) 13 ff.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. H. Gattiker, *Das Verhältnis des Homerlexikons des Apollonios Sophistes zu den Homerscholien* (diss. Zürich 1945) 50–65; K. Steinicke, *Apollonii Sophistae Lexicon Homericum* (diss. Göttingen 1957) xvii–xxi; Schenck (previous note) 146 ff. gives a paradigmatic source-analysis of glosses on ten pages of Bekker's edition.

<sup>57</sup> Erbse (above, note 1) 98 n. 1.

<sup>58</sup> Erbse ad sch. Γ 391a mentions Orus with a question mark (because of fr. 14?).

<sup>59</sup> Cf. LSJ s.v. τίνω I, s.v. ἀπό D.4, s.v. ἀποτίνω I.1–2.



These δωτῖναι are clearly, as Leumann remarks, "am Grundstück haftende Abgaben."<sup>60</sup> In the *Odyssey* δωτίνη twice appears as a gift to be given by host to guest (ι 268, λ 352).

This etymology, like Alexander's derivation for δίκρο(ο)ν (fr. 4), has found favor in neither medieval nor modern times. More influential in Byzantium were the two alternative etymologies recorded at Choer. *Orth.* (191. 12): (a) δώσω, δωσίνη, δωτίνη; (b) δέδοται, δοτός, δοτίνη, δωτίνη, both repeated (without mention of Alexander's hypothesis) at *Et. Gen.* (AB) s.v. δωτίνη (~ Zon. 588) and *Et. Gud.* 387. 18 Stef.;<sup>61</sup> the *EM* has sandwiched Alexander's view between these two. One wonders whether it might have been, again, Herodian who saved the doctrine of his elder contemporary for posterity; Herodian himself was, after all, not averse to bold compounds.<sup>62</sup>

Modern comparative linguists see δωτίνη as an old formation from the word for gift, δῶς or \*δῶτ-ς, and the suffix (τ)ιν-, possibly a backformation from a genitive \*δωτίνος.<sup>63</sup>

13. Eust. 859. 50: ἰστέον δὲ καὶ ὅτι τὸν ἱητῆρα οἱ μεθ' Ὀμηρον ἱητρὸν τε λέγουσι καὶ ἱατρὸν, καὶ ὅτι οὐ μόνον κατὰ γένος ἀρρενικὸν ἱατρός, ἀλλὰ καὶ θηλυκῶς. φησὶ γοῦν Αἴλιος Διονύσιος (ι 1) ἱατρὸν γυναῖκα, Ἄλεξις δὲ (fr. 318 K.) [5] ἱάτριαν. ἡ δὲ ἱατρίνη οὐχ Ἑλληνικόν, φησί. παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Τεχνικοῖς κεῖται καὶ ὅτι ὁ μὲν Ὡρος (p. 42 Ritschl) οὐχ Ἑλληνικὴν λέξιν τὴν ἱατρίνην εἶναι φησιν, Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ὁ Κοττυαεύς, πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν λαλῶν, μὴ Ἀττικὴν εἶναι αὐτὴν λέγει.

Cf. Choer. *Orth.* (170. 33 ~ Hdn. 2. 456. 26): Ἀδρησιτίνη, Αἰητίνη: ... τὸ τι ι· τὰ γὰρ διὰ τοῦ ινη μονογενῆ, μὴ γενόμενα ἀπὸ ἐπιθέτων κύρια, ἀποστρέφονται τὴν διὰ τῆς εἰ διφθόγγου γραφὴν, οἷον Ὠκεανίνη, Εὐηνίνη, ἱατρίνη καὶ τὰ ὅμοια; An. *Orth.* 163. 23–24: τὰ δὲ [sc. διὰ τοῦ ηνη] ὑπὲρ γ' συλλαβὰς διὰ τοῦ ι· Αἰητίνη, Ἀδρησιτίνη, Ὠκεανίνη, Εὐηνίνη, Κυρηκίνη, ἱατρίνη ...

This fragment is unique in dealing, not with a textual problem, definition or etymology but exclusively with a question of usage. Here, as elsewhere, Eustathius displays familiarity with the Atticist lexicon of

<sup>60</sup> M. Leumann, *Homerische Wörter* (Basel 1950) 280; he goes on to suggest that δωτῖνα as "rent in kind" at *IG IV* 841. 18, 21 (Calauria, 3rd cent. B.C.) may be a semantic development from this passage.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. also Eust. 743. 44, who merely notes the lengthening of the first vowel of δωτίνη.

<sup>62</sup> Cf., e.g., P. Egenolff, "Zu Lentz' Herodian III," *Philol.* 62 (1903) 57–59; Dyck, *Glotta* 55 (1977) 225–27 (ἴφθιμος < ἴφι + θυμός).

<sup>63</sup> Cf. H. Frisk (above, note 21) s.v. διδῶμι; E. Schwyzler (above, note 26) I 465 n. 5.

Alexander's contemporary, Aelius Dionysius,<sup>64</sup> who made the point that *ιατρός* can be common to both genders,<sup>65</sup> cited Alexis for the form *ιάτρια* but denied that *ιατρίνη* was Greek. Eustathius also used, however, another source which quoted Orus and Alexander and which, it is agreed, he refers to by the periphrasis οἱ Τεχνικοί. While Reitzenstein argued that Eustathius thus refers to an otherwise unknown collection of Atticist excerpts,<sup>66</sup> it is generally agreed today that *παρὰ τοῖς Τεχνικοῖς* is rather an allusion to Choeroboscus, who (among others) is elsewhere so referred to<sup>67</sup> and is the source of Eustathius' other two citations of Orus.<sup>68</sup> Presumably the remark will have stood in a more nearly complete version of Choeroboscus' *Orthography* than is now extant. Orus, in turn, will have cited Alexander,<sup>69</sup> as in fr. 14.

Atticism was certainly in the air in Alexander's lifetime, as the activity of Aelius Dionysius and Herodian<sup>70</sup> attests; it therefore seems likely that his remark on *ιατρίνη* was prompted by Atticist interests (a reply to Aelius Dionysius?).<sup>71</sup> We do not know whether he cited evidence in support of his position, though he certainly could have (cf. LSJ s.v. *ιατρίνη*).

14. Et. Gen. (AB), unde EM 664. 39: *περιρρηδής: οἶον* "περιρρηδής δὲ τραπέζῃ" (χ 84). AB *περιρραγείς, περιρρυείς. οὕτως Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Κοτιαεύς. Πῖος δὲ* (fr. 14 Hiller) *περιφερής, περιρρυής. Ὡρος* (om. Ritschl). A EM

4 ὦρος EM: om. A

Cf. sch. D ad χ 84: *περιρρηδής: περικλασθεὶς ἢ περιρραγείς: ἢ περιρρεόμενος ἢ περιρρυείς ἢ περιφερής; Ap. S. 130. 7: περιρρηδής: περιρρησόμενος, περικεκλασμένος. βέλτιον δὲ*

<sup>64</sup> Cf. H. Erbse, *Untersuchungen zu den attizistischen Lexika*, Abh. der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Philos.-hist. Kl., Jg. 1949, 2 (Berlin 1950) 1 ff.

<sup>65</sup> For *ιατρός* as feminine, cf. Plut. *mor.* 143d, Ath. 636a.

<sup>66</sup> Reitzenstein (above, note 36) 389.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. K. Alpers, *Das attizistische Lexikon des Oros: Untersuchung und kritische Ausgabe der Fragmente*, SGLG 4 (Berlin and New York 1981) 82–83, who finds that in all other passages which refer to οἱ Τεχνικοί Reitzenstein's interpretation is excluded.

<sup>68</sup> Namely 837. 44 (ζήτρεον) from Choer. *Orth.* 215. 27 (possibly via Et. Gen. [AB] s.v. ζήτρεον) and 857. 42 (λέων) from Choer. *Orth.* 235. 32; cf. L. Cohn, *De Aristophane Byzantio et Suetonio Tranquillo Eustathi auctoribus*, Jahrb. f. cl. Philol., ed. A. Fleckeisen, 12. Supplbd. (Leipzig 1881) 295 n. 23, and RE VI.1 (1907) 1474. 2 ff.; Alpers (previous note) 81 n. 12. Cf. in general also Erbse (above, note 1) 97 n. 2, and van der Valk ad Eust. 859. 52.

<sup>69</sup> Κατὰ Φρυνίχου, κατὰ στοιχείου has been seen as the work of Orus in question: cf. F. Ritschl, *De Oro et Orione commentatio* (Bratislava 1834) 42; R. Reitzenstein, *Der Anfang des Lexikons des Photios* (Leipzig and Berlin 1907) xlix; C. Wendel, RE XVIII.1 (1942) 1178. 49 ff.; perhaps, however, this should be modified slightly to Orus' Atticist work later used by himself in his *Orthography*; cf. Alpers (above, note 67) 80–83.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. Reitzenstein (above, note 36) 371 ff.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. L. Cohn, "Der Atticist Philemon," *Philol.* 57 (1898) 365.

μεταφορικῶς περιρρεόμενος· βάλλεται γὰρ καὶ τὸ ποτήριον κρατῶν, ὡς ἅμα τῇ πόσει περιρρεῖσθαι πεσόντα. ὁ δὲ Ἀρίσταρχος στροβηθεὶς περιφερῆς ἔπесе τῇ τραπέζῃ, ὡς περικλασθῆναι περὶ αὐτήν· “περιρρηδῆς δὲ τραπέζῃ / κάππεσεν” (χ 84–85); sch. Ap. Rh. 1. 431a: περιρρηδῆς κερ(άεσσιν): ἐπὶ πρόσωπον μεθ’ ὁρμῆς κατενεχθεὶς, ἐπιρραγεὶς εἰς τοῦμπροσθεν, ἣ ἐπενεχθεὶς <ῆ> (suppl. Haslam) ἀντὶ τοῦ περιρρόμενος, ὡς καὶ παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ· “περιρρηδῆς δὲ τραπέζῃ / κάππεσεν” (χ 84–85). Ἀντίμαχος δὲ (fr. 190 Wyss) τὸ κατὰ κύκλον πεσεῖν οὕτω λέγει. νῦν δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπενεχθεὶς εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν; Eust. 1920. 30: περιρρηδῆς δὲ ὁ ἐρραντισμένος αἵματι, ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ράζω, περὶ οὗ προεῖρηται (sc. 912. 22, 1469. 3), οὗ δεῦτερος ἀόριστος ἔρραδον, ὅθεν ὁ περιρρηδῆς.

The first question that this fragment raises is that of the relation of the two grammarians cited, Alexander and Pius. Now Hiller dates Pius to the end of the second or beginning of the third century, with the *terminus post quem* derived from the fact that Pius is not cited by Herodian.<sup>72</sup> In order for that argument to have force, however, it would have to be shown that Pius offered material relevant to Herodian’s interests. But, in fact, none of Pius’ fragments bears upon prosody, which was the focus of Herodian’s preserved work on the Homeric text.<sup>73</sup> More telling perhaps is the fact that Pius’ work was not cited by Nicanor, who lived under Hadrian and might well have been interested in Pius’ punctuation of Φ 55 (fr. 6 Hiller).<sup>74</sup> Furthermore Hiller’s *terminus ante quem* is given by Orus’ citation; but Orus is nowadays dated to the fifth, not to the first half of the third, century.<sup>75</sup>

It is worth considering whether the grammarian’s name may provide a clue to his date. Like, for instance, the Thucydidean biographer Marcellinus, Pius bears, in Greek fashion, a single name, even though the name itself is Roman. I suspect that the grammarian takes his name from the emperor Antoninus Pius, who adopted the *agnomen* upon ascending the throne in 138.<sup>76</sup> Pius’ case is evidently not parallel with that of Aelius

<sup>72</sup> E. Hiller, “Der Grammatiker Pius und die ἀπολογία πρὸς τὰς ἀθετήσεις Ἀριστάρχου,” *Philol.* 28 (1869) 93–94; the question of Pius’ date is left open by D. Strout and R. French, *RE* XX.2 (1950) 1891. 26 ff., s.v. Pius no. 2.

<sup>73</sup> Namely the Ἰλιακὴ and Ὀδυσσειακὴ Προσῳδία, preserved in extensive excerpts in the scholia on the respective poems; some of the content of these works was doubtless repeated—and not merely in Lentz’s reconstruction—in the Καθολικὴ Προσῳδία. The one doctrine of Pius that might have interested Herodian is that preserved in fr. 1 Hiller (= sch. T ad E 638d<sup>1</sup>), since Herodian, too, dealt with the problem of ἀλλ’ οἶον (sch. A ad E 638c = Hdn. 2. 52. 9 Lentz; cf. also Haas ad Tyrann. fr. 18); however, Pius’ view (i.e., that the words ἦσαν οὐχ οἶος σύ need to be understood) is so eccentric that Herodian may well have thought it unworthy of serious attention.

<sup>74</sup> A point already made by Hiller (above, note 72) 93 and n. 11; for Nicanor’s date, cf. C. Wendel, *RE* XVII.1 (1936) 274. 50–52.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. C. Wendel, *RE* XVIII.1 (1942) 1178. 34 ff., with literature.

<sup>76</sup> Cf. P. v. Rohden, *RE* II.2 (1896) 2497. 60 ff. and 2498. 24 ff.

Herodian and others who, upon receiving Roman citizenship, adopted the gentile name of the emperor responsible,<sup>77</sup> since then we would have expected him also to adopt Aelius (the *nomen gentile* of Imp. Caes. T. Aelius Hadrianus Antoninus Aug. Pius) and to have retained his original Greek name. He is likely rather to have been named after the emperor, who was often simply called Pius to distinguish him from the later Antonini.<sup>78</sup> One would expect a child so named to have been born after the death of Antoninus Pius on March 7, 161, and within ca. one generation of that date, while the memory of the emperor was still potent. We thus arrive by a different route at a date not dissimilar to Hiller's.

It would have been welcome for Alexander to have been contemporary with, or later than, Pius, so that we could assume the same chain of transmission for both fr. 13 and 14 (viz. Alexander > Orus). However, our fragment may have come from Alexander's Ἐξηγητικά, fr. 13 from the Παντοδοπά. Orus is not otherwise known to have used Pius; possibly he found both scholars cited in a commentary of later imperial date. One wishes the citation of Orus were by both name and title. Possibly it derives from the Λύσεις προτάσεων τῶν Ἡρωδιανοῦ, which dealt with controverted *voces Homericae*.<sup>79</sup>

Hiller's comment on our fragment, that Alexander derived περιρρηδής from περιρρήγνυμι, whereas Pius saw περιρρεῖν as its etymon, and his suggestion that περιρρυείς should be deleted, is an attempt to construct a dichotomy at the expense of the transmitted text. Both scholars are, in any case, dependent on the D-scholia or their ancient forerunners.

Modern etymologies of περιρρηδής have not made much progress because of the uncertainty about its meaning. It is evidently formed from περι- and a stem \*ῥήδος, possibly related to ῥαδινός 'slender'.<sup>80</sup>

15. Porph. 1. 286. 19 Schr. = 35. 9 Sod.: Ἐν τοῖς Φιλήμονος Συμμίκτοις περὶ Ἡροδοτείου διορθώματος ὁ γραμματικὸς διαλεγόμενος πειρᾶται καὶ Ὀμηρικὰ τινα σαφηνίζειν, οὐδὲν δὲ χεῖρον καὶ τὸν Ἡρόδοτον φιλοῦντί σοι τὴν πᾶσαν τοῦ [5] ἀνδρὸς ἀναγράψω ζήτησιν. φησὶ γὰρ ὅτι ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ Ἡρόδοτος τῶν Ἱστοριῶν περὶ Κροίσου τοῦ Λυδοῦ πολλά τε ἄλλα διείλεκται καὶ μὴν ὅτι . . . ἀνέθηκε δέ τινα (sc. ἀναθήματα) καὶ "ἐν Βραγχίδησι τῇσι Μιλησίων" (1. 92. 2). καὶ γέγραπται ἥδη κατὰ πάντα ἀπλῶς τὰ ἀντίγραφα τὸ

<sup>77</sup> Cf., in general, Ernst Fraenkel, *RE* XVI.2 (1935) 1662. 55 (s.v. *Namenwesen*) and the case of a Spartan named Eurycles who, upon receiving citizenship from Augustus, was called C. Iulius Eurycles (*PIR* IV 208, no. 301); cf. B. Doer, *Die römische Namengebung* (Stuttgart 1937) 126. On Aelius Herodian, cf. E. Hiller, *Quaestiones Herodianeae* (diss. Bonn 1866) 3, and Lentz, *Hdn.* I xi.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. v. Rohden (above, note 76) 2498. 63 ff.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. Wendel (above, note 75) 1179. 1 ff.

<sup>80</sup> Cf. Frisk (above, note 21) and Chantraine (above, note 50) s.v. περιρρηδής.



[10] "τῆς" ἄρθρον σὺν τῷ ι ἰσοδυναμοῦν τῷ "ταῖς," οὐδένα γε μὴν Ἑλλήνων ὑπομεῖναι θηλυκῶς "τὰς Βραγχίδας" ἂν εἰπεῖν, Ἡρόδοτον δὲ μᾶλλον ἂν ἐτέρων φυλάξασθαι, ἀκριβῆ τε ὄντα περὶ τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ πάνυ ἐπιεικῶς φροντιστικόν. τοῦτο δὲ θεραπεύων τις (sc. Alexander Cot.; cf. quae sq.) οὐχ [15] Ἡροδότου φησὶν ἀμάρτημα γεγονέναι, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸν [συγ]γραφέα φησὶ διαμαρτεῖν παρεμβαλόντα τὸ {σ}ι, πολλὰ δὲ φέρεσθαι μέχρι νῦν ἀμαρτήματα κατὰ τὴν Ἡροδότου συγγραφὴν καὶ ἔτι τὴν Θουκυδίδου καὶ Φιλίστου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀξιολόγων συγγραφέων. τί δ' οὐχὶ καὶ τὰ [20] ποιήματα σχεδὸν ἀνάπλεω πάντα τυγχάνει ἀμαρτημάτων γραφικῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παραδιορθωμάτων πάνυ ἀγροίκων; . . . ἐπανάγωμεν δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἡρόδοτον καὶ τὸν διορθωτὴν τὸν Κοτυαέα Ἀλέξανδρον. ἡξίου γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ γράφειν "τῆσι Μιλησίων" χωρὶς τοῦ ι "τῆς [25] Μιλησίων," ὑποκειμένης ἕξωθεν χώρης ἢ γῆς. "καὶ ἐγὼ δέ," φησὶν (sc. Philemon), "ἐπειθόμην οὕτως ἔχειν τὰ τῆς γραφῆς, τὸν δὲ ἄνδρα τῆς ἀκριβοῦς συνέσεως ἐτεθυμάκειν. ἐντυχὼν <δὲ> τοῖς Ἡροδοτείοις αὐτοῖς ἔπεσι καὶ γενόμενος ἐπὶ τέλει τῆς Αἰγυπτιακῆς βίβλου, ἥτις ἐστὶ δευτέρα τῇ [30] τάξει, εὐρίσκω πάλιν κατὰ τὴν αἰτιατικὴν πτῶσιν εἰπόντα τὸν Ἡρόδοτον· ἀνέθηκεν εἰς Βραγχίδας τὰς Μιλησίων' (2. 159. 3). οὐκέτι οὖν ὥμην ἀμάρτημα εἶναι γραφικόν, Ἰωνικὸν δὲ μᾶλλον ἰδίωμα. πολλὰ γὰρ οὗτοι τῶν ὀνομάτων χαίρουσι θηλυκῶς ἐκφέροντες, οἷον τὴν τε λίθον [35] καὶ τὴν κίονα καὶ ἔτι τὴν Μαραθῶνα· Κρατῖνος (fr. 506 K.-A.) 'εὐπιποτάτη Μαραθῶν,' Νικάνδρος (fr. 111 Schneider) 'εὐκτιμένην Μαραθῶνα.' ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἃ ἡμεῖς εὔρομεν καὶ ἐκρίναμεν ὑγιέα." τοιαῦτα δὲ τοῦ Φιλήμονος λέγοντος, ἃ μὲν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον περὶ τοῦ Ἡροδοτείου διορθώματος [40] εἴρηκεν, οὐκ οἰκεῖον κρίνω τῇ παρούσῃ ὑποθέσει ἐξετάζειν.

subsidia: cod. V tantum

5 ἀναγράψω Schrader: -ψαι V 8 βραγχίδησι ut Hdt. Schrader: βραγχίσι V 16 συγγραφέα V: corr. Schrader | σι V: corr. Rosén 28 δὲ suppl. Schrader 38 ὑγιέα Sodano: ὑγιῶς V

This, the most detailed of all discussions of Alexander's doctrines, came to Porphyry via Philemon, rightly identified by L. Cohn with the Atticist lexicographer who lived ca. A.D. 200.<sup>81</sup>

<sup>81</sup> Cf. L. Cohn (above, note 71) 363-66; C. Wendel, *RE* XIX.2 (1938) 2152. 15 f. and 2151. 37.

Proper names form a difficult transmissional problem,<sup>82</sup> especially when, as in the case of Βραγχίδαι, they are anarthrous unless coupled with attributes. Here, as in fr. 13, the fundamental problem is that of determining the Ἑλληνισμός of a certain form, though in this case the decision on usage has textual consequences. While in fr. 13 Alexander admitted ἱατρίνη as a Greek (albeit not Attic) form, here he denies that Βραγχίδαι as a feminine is Greek (lines 10–12: οὐδένα γε μὴν Ἑλλήνων ὑπομεῖναι θηλυκῶς “τὰς Βραγχίδας” ἂν εἰπεῖν). Note that, unlike Zoilus of Amphipolis and others, his reaction is not to blame the author, but the παράδοσις.<sup>83</sup> Hence he proposes to emend to ἐν Βραγχίδησι τῆς Μιλησίων with (Ionic) χώρης or γῆς understood.<sup>84</sup> The formulation itself is perhaps a bit awkward; one might rather have expected ἐν Βραγχίδησι τῆς Μιλησίης (cf. Paus. 7. 5. 4). But the fatal objection is the one raised by Philemon, that ἐς Βραγχίδας τὰς Μιλησίων is, in fact, read at Hdt. 2. 159. 3. Alexander thus stands convicted of carelessness (though the lack of modern aids should be taken into account).

By the way, Philemon's defense of the παράδοσις on grounds that the Ionians had a predilection for feminine forms is also wide of the mark. Μαραθὼν appears as feminine at Pi. O. 13. 110; and, as Kassel and Austin truly remark ad Cratin. fr. 506, it is odd to see him cited for an allegedly Ionic feature. Presumably Alexander's error lay rather in confusing the ethnic οἱ Βραγχίδαι (cf. Hdt. 1. 158. 1: ἐς τοὺς Βραγχίδας) with the (feminine) toponym.<sup>85</sup>

#### IV. Alexander's Legacy

For Aristides, Alexander's writings were but a pale reflection (μικρὰ ἄττα εἴδωλα) of his lectures (§ 26). No doubt, in turn, the surviving fragments are but a pale reflection of the writings. It is thus doubly difficult for the modern student to do justice to the man who, in his time, held so high a reputation.

The surviving fragments indicate that Alexander was read largely by his contemporaries (Diogenianus [fr. 6], Apollonius Dyscolus [10], Herodian [4, 9, 12]) or those who wrote within about a generation of his death (Philemon [15]).<sup>86</sup> Within the same interval his views will have entered the

<sup>82</sup> Cf., e.g., Haas ad Tyrann. fr. 29 and CP 77 (1982) 273 (problems of accentuation of proper names in the Homeric text).

<sup>83</sup> Cf. Erbse (above, note 1) 98.

<sup>84</sup> The proposed emendation is therefore not τῆς (pace *Herodoti Historiae*, ed. H. B. Rosén, I [Leipzig 1987] app. crit. ad 1. 92. 2).

<sup>85</sup> Cf. H. B. Rosén, *Eine Laut- und Formenlehre der herodotischen Sprachform* (Heidelberg 1962) 99 n. 104.

<sup>86</sup> L. Cohn's idea (above, note 71) 366 that Philemon's politeness in disagreement with Alexander (fr. 15) is an indication that he was a younger contemporary personally acquainted with him is an attractive possibility (though not the only possible explanation).

exegetical commentaries from which most of the Homeric fragments derive (1, 5, 8 and possibly 11 and 14). On one occasion Porphyry's citation of Alexander is demonstrably at second hand (fr. 15) and, in all likelihood, in other cases as well, in spite of citation by book number (fr. 2). In the fifth century Methodius (fr. 7) and Orus (frr. 13 and 14 and possibly 11) probably knew his views via intermediary (Atticist?) works.

It is a pity that so large a percentage of the surviving fragments deals with Homeric problems,<sup>87</sup> since the possibility of reaping a new and true insight from that well-ploughed field was much reduced in Alexander's day. Thus his Homeric criticism makes, on the whole, a much less original impression than that of, say, Apion,<sup>88</sup> since Alexander so often follows the scholastic interpretation (preserved in the D-scholia: cf. frr. 1 and 14 and part of 3) or Apollonius Sophista (fr. 11). In some cases when he does venture out on his own, as in his interpretation of the siege depicted on the Shield of Achilles (fr. 2) or his explanation of the syntax of ἐπισταμένω ἔόντι (fr. 3), the results are unfortunate. It was perhaps premature, however, for G. Wentzel to deny Alexander any "wissenschaftliche Bedeutung."<sup>89</sup> For fr. 5 preserves an (evidently original) interpretation of the παράδοσις at Ξ 241 and an explanation of the corruption which have prevailed to this day.

Aristides praises Alexander for the sheer range of his interests (§ 24), but this is a merit that our fragments are least able to do justice to. We would not know, for instance, that Alexander had devoted attention to emending the text of Herodotus but for the fact that Porphyry, exceptionally in the *Quaestiones Homericae*, quoted Philemon on the subject because he thought the comments on textual corruption of more general interest and because his dedicatee, Anatolius, happened to be interested in Herodotus (fr. 15). The only other author whose exegesis is represented in the fragments is Euripides (fr. 7). Only *en passant* in the Homeric fragments do we find examples of Alexander's wide reading: the citations of Aristoxenus (fr. 1), Sappho and Eupolis (fr. 5), though the latter may have been added later (see above, note 34).

It would be easy to measure Alexander against the standard of modern philology and find him wanting. Though his etymologies (cf. frr. 4, 9, 11, 12) have not found favor, taken as a whole, they are by no means the worst surviving from antiquity, an age when the etymologist's art, like rhetoric, took persuasiveness, rather than truth, as its goal.<sup>90</sup> If on occasion he

<sup>87</sup> 7 of 15 (1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 11, 14).

<sup>88</sup> Cf. S. Neitzel (ed.), *Apions Γλώσσαι Ὀμηρικαί*, SGLG 3 (Berlin and New York 1977) 204 ff.

<sup>89</sup> Wentzel, *RE* I.2 (1894) 1456. 30.

<sup>90</sup> Cf. the definition at *Et. Gen.* (A<sup>1</sup>B) s.v. ἐτυμολογία: ἔστι λέξεως ἀνάπτυξις συμφώνων τῶν σημαιομένων ἀρμόζουσα τῇ φωνῇ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου πράγματος πιθανότητα . . . (known also in simplified form from sch. D.T. 14. 23, 169. 20, 303. 17 and 390. 12, as well as from Eustathius' paraphrase [1408. 13]); C.

seems less careful than he should have been, the difficulty of working without modern aids needs to be borne in mind (cf. ad fr. 15). It is a pity that more of his Atticist work has not survived, since the one fragment that we have (fr. 13) makes it clear that in this field he was an authority more accurate than some who made a name for themselves by writing on such questions.

Such is our picture of Alexander of Cotiaeum: a great teacher, a great personality, but as a scholar largely a *routinier*, though with an occasional flash of insight.<sup>91</sup>

## V. Indices

### a. Passages Discussed by Alexander of Cotiaeum

Eur. <i>Or.</i> 1384	fr. 7
Hdt. 1. 92. 2	fr. 15
Homer:	
A 1	fr. 8
Γ 391	fr. 11
I 155 al.	fr. 12
N 358–59	fr. 1
Ξ 241	fr. 5
Σ 509–33	fr. 2
T 79–80	fr. 3
χ 84	fr. 14

### b. Words Discussed by Alexander of Cotiaeum

ἀμάμαξυς	fr. 6
ἀρμάτειον μέλος	fr. 7
Ἀχιλλῆος	fr. 8
ἄχνη	fr. 9
Βραγχίδαι	fr. 15
δέδοικα	fr. 10
δίκρον, δίκροον	fr. 4
δινωτοῖσιν	fr. 11
δωτίνη	fr. 12
έόντα	fr. 3
ἐπαλλάξαι	fr. 1
ἐπίσχοιες	fr. 5
ιατρίνη	fr. 13
περιρρηδής	fr. 14
ὕββάλλειν	fr. 3

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Wendel, *RE* XVIII.2 (1942) 1448. 8–12 attributes *EM* 817. 4 (ἐτυμολογία δέ ἐστιν ἐπισημασία λέξεων ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον τὸ πάθος ἔχουσα) to Choeroboscus' Προλεγόμενα τῆς Ὀρθογραφίας and notes that it corresponds to the *Prolegomena* of Charax derived from Herodian; the version at sch. D.T. 454. 22 ( . . . ἐπισημασία ἐπὶ τῶν πλείστων τὸ πιθανὸν ἔχουσα) is, however, likely to be original as against *EM* (πάθη being a common, but not essential, characteristic of etymologies); cf. Aristotle's definition of the ἔργον of rhetoric: τὸ ἰδεῖν τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πιθανὰ περὶ ἕκαστον (*Rhet.* 1355b10–11).

<sup>91</sup> I would like to thank my colleagues David Blank, Richard Janko and especially M. W. Haslam for scrutinizing this study in draft and giving me the benefit of their expert advice.





## Parental Gifts: Father–Son Dedications and Dialogues in Roman Didactic Literature

FANNIE J. LEMOINE

### Introduction

Literary dedications are designed either to acknowledge a bond between the author and the dedicatee or to attempt to establish such a bond. In the Latin didactic tradition authors frequently present themselves as fathers giving their educational treatises to their sons or composing fictive dialogues in which they act as the teacher and the son as the pupil. The dedications and dialogues reflected historical practice and reinforced patterns of paternal and filial behavior through literary example.

Father–son dedications and dialogues also serve formal literary ends. They help the author speak in a more intimate, yet authoritative voice and create a sense of reciprocal obligation between composer and reader. The dedication or the dialogue establishes the context within which the author presents his literary gift.

The five aims of this study are: (1) to trace a brief history of father–son dedications and dialogues in Latin didactic literature, (2) to examine the formative contributions made by Cato and Cicero, (3) to argue for a distinctly Roman character to the tradition, (4) to illustrate the conventional presentations of authorial personality and subject matter found in later introductory prefaces, and (5) to show how the conventions dealing with persons and subject matter are subverted by two late Latin paternal authors, Augustine and Martianus Capella. The article concludes with a brief discussion of the influence of this pattern of familial instruction upon didactic texts in the Middle Ages.

Ancient rhetorical theory advocated finding the material for introductions either from the personalities involved (*ex personis*) or from the subject matter itself (*ex rebus*). Close examination of two types of Latin usage in these prefaces, occurrences of the word *munus* and metaphors for eating, will both demonstrate conventional presentations of personality and subject matter and suggest how those conventions are overturned.

The Latin word *munus* is a term regularly used to describe the literary work itself, the service the father has performed for his child, and the

relationship which fulfilling such an obligation, usually responding to a child's request, acknowledges. The word is prominent in Cicero's writings, where it serves as a significant trait in the presentation of the author as responsible and benevolent.

Winning the goodwill of the audience through favorable presentation of the personality of the speaker is a cardinal rhetorical rule for *exordia*. The *ex personis* approach to a beginning is one Cicero himself frequently uses and which he discusses and recommends in the rhetorical handbook he prepared for his son. Acceptance of the *munus* implies accepting a role for father and son which would ordinarily be seen as good and virtuous. The term and this sort of presentation of the paternal author appears in other works of later periods. Yet at least one of our fathers, Augustine, emphatically rejects the role and the implications associated with it.

Metaphors for food or eating, the second type of Latin usage examined in this paper, are regularly employed in this didactic tradition to describe the subject matter or the manner of its preparation, the part of the introduction drawn *ex rebus*. The metaphors become especially prominent in the fatherly gifts of two late Latin authors, Macrobius and Martianus Capella. Macrobius expands on the conventional metaphors; Martianus Capella calls them into question. In both cases, the metaphoric usage indicates attitudes toward education which contrast sharply with present-day views.

This study is suggestive, not exhaustive in its treatment of the topic. The article underscores the importance of the family in the history of Western education and contributes to greater understanding of tradition and originality in Latin didactic literature. The choice of topic is an acknowledgment of the respect I have for the author to whom this volume of essays has been dedicated.

### Fathers and Sons in Roman Didactic Literature

Many years ago Rudolf Hirzel<sup>1</sup> noted how unusual father-son dialogues are among the Greeks and how common they are among the Romans. Among the Latin paternal authors, he cites Cato, Cicero, Livy, Seneca, Asconius, Quintilian, the Jurist Paulus, Martianus Capella, Macrobius, and Tiberius Claudius Donatus. On the other hand, he mentions that among the many dialogues of Socrates only one is held with a family member, a dialogue between Socrates and his oldest son Lamprocles. More recent scholars, such as Tore Janson and Robert Kaster,<sup>2</sup> have also noted how popular the practice

<sup>1</sup> R. Hirzel, *Der Dialog* (Leipzig 1895) 429-30 and 429 n. 4.

<sup>2</sup> For example, see T. Janson, "Latin Prose Prefaces: Studies in Literary Conventions," *Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis* 13 (1964) 117; R. A. Kaster, *Guardians of Language: The Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity* (Berkeley 1988) 66-68; B. A. Marshall, *A Historical Commentary on Asconius* (Columbia, MO 1985) 37-38.

of dedicating textbooks to sons was throughout antiquity and have discussed some of the characteristic features of such dedications.

Many later Greek examples could also be cited. The work Stobaeus prepared for his son Septimius comes immediately to mind as a fifth-century Greek parallel.<sup>3</sup> Yet in Latin letters the dominance of this form of introduction or composition for didactic treatises is clear and deserves study precisely because of its frequent occurrence. Although it shares similarities with traditions of parental advice on morals or conduct, whether Greek, Latin, or vernacular, the Latin works examined here focus more exclusively upon certain technical or encyclopaedic aspects of learning. Philosophical and religious currents also strongly influence some of the later Latin works and establish the supporting framework within which more technical material is set. For example, in the *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii* Martianus Capella combines elements of Platonic dialogues, the priestly colloquies of the *Corpus Hermeticum*, and the Latin didactic conventions of a paternal author.<sup>4</sup>

Hirzel<sup>5</sup> speculated that the difference between Latin and Greek authors might be attributed to the greater power and responsibility the Roman father was expected to exercise over his son. He would have found some support for his argument in other literary comparisons. The *Aeneid*, Roman comedies, and some other Latin works which borrow from Greek models seem to give greater prominence to the relationship between father and son than did the Greek originals.

Responding to another's request for a work is a common device Latin authors use in order to accomplish the difficult task of making a beginning. Tore Janson<sup>6</sup> has gathered a series of Roman authors who claim to write at the urging of relatives, friends, or publishers and has outlined the words and phrases conventionally used to describe the requests and their fulfillment. Sons are prominent among such claimants.

Although the sons may, in fact, have been unwilling recipients of such fatherly attention, the claims in the dedications should not be dismissed as mere adherence to literary convention. They reveal what kind of relations were considered appropriate between father and son and what kind of attitudes

<sup>3</sup> An earlier Greek medical parallel would be Oribasius's dedication of medical writings to his son Eustathius, who was himself archiater in the East in 373-74. A still earlier philosophical parallel is provided by Gentilianus Amelius, who recorded Plotinus's lectures for his adoptive son Hostilianus Hesychius. The Alexandrian astrological writer Paulus offers a late fourth-century example of a surviving astronomical work dedicated to his son Cronamon. Artemidorus's dedication of Books 4 and 5 of the *Onirocriticon* and Basil's dedication of his essay on Greek literature to his nephews provide additional examples of familial dedications of Greek writings which are somewhat analogous to the didactic textbooks of the Latin tradition.

<sup>4</sup> See D. Shanzer, *A Philosophical and Literary Commentary on Martianus Capella's De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii Book I* (Berkeley 1986) 51.

<sup>5</sup> Hirzel (above, note 1) 429 n. 4.

<sup>6</sup> Janson (above, note 2) 27-32 and 116-20.



family members voiced about giving the gift of learning to the next generation. They demonstrate as well the special responsibility Roman fathers were expected to adopt toward their children's education and the perceived value of the educational undertaking itself.

The value placed on learning can be seen in explicit statements and in metaphors found in some of the dedicatory prefaces or the exchanges which form the opening or conclusion of a dialogue. Quintilian, for example, in the preface to the sixth book of the *Institutiones oratoriae*, calls his work the best part of the inheritance he had planned to leave his child:

Respiciens tamen illam curam meae voluptatis, quod filio, cuius eminens ingenium sollicitam quoque parentis diligentiam merebatur, hanc optimam partem relicturus hereditatis videbar ut, si me, quod aequum et optabile fuit, fata intercepissent, praeceptore tamen patre uteretur. (6 pr. 1)

The principles of grammar, rhetoric, or medicine the father preserved for his child constituted a major inheritance and an indispensable entry into a powerful and privileged elite. In antiquity the number of people who participated in such an elite, and the specific rewards participation was likely to bring, varied from age to age and from place to place. Yet, overall, few can doubt William Harris's conclusion in his work on ancient literacy:

The written culture of antiquity was in the main restricted to a privileged minority—though in some places it was quite a large minority—and it coexisted with elements of an oral culture. This written culture certainly helped to widen class differences, as well as having the overwhelmingly important effect of enabling empires to be built. Access to the privileged world of writing was automatic for some and variously difficult for others. . . . If fortune set the individual among the literate, that was a golden gift.<sup>7</sup>

By giving such a gift to their sons, fathers transformed the bonds of authority into ties of affection, not simply because of the instrumental value of the gift as an entree into a privileged world. Certain intrinsic characteristics of the educational gift were likely to reinforce an attitude of reverential respect. These texts affirm the value of the personal bond between teacher and pupil and underscore the widely held ancient opinion that good learning and proper moral behavior are inextricably linked.

The prefaces and the father-son dialogues provide literary models of the proper caring and respectful exchanges expected to characterize relationships between fathers and sons. They also highlight the ethical qualities which ancients found far more essential to the definition of a well-educated man than the modern attributes of intellectual talent, critical inquiry, or technical

<sup>7</sup> W. V. Harris, *Ancient Literacy* (Cambridge, MA 1989) 337.

skill.<sup>8</sup> A well-educated man was expected to conform to established values and to form his own identity by responding to accepted familial and social obligations.

The didactic material also tends to be bounded by set texts, excerpts of which were inserted directly into the author's work. For example, fixed textual structures—such as a set of Ciceronian speeches or works of Virgil, or fragmentary recollections of literary precedents, or distillation of earlier technical handbooks—literally determine the horizon within which inquiry occurs and necessarily limit education to interpretation and reproduction of received opinion. Good education was seen as a combination of these “quiddities” and personal behavioral attributes. In different ways and, no doubt, for different reasons, Augustine in the *De Magistro* and Martianus Capella in the *De nuptiis* challenge that normative picture. They sketch different relationships between father and son and arrange their didactic material within literary frameworks which undermine wholehearted acceptance of paternal instructional authority. Yet, the tradition as a whole conveys a certain attitude toward education and prescribes roles for author and reader which had a strong influence on education throughout the Middle Ages and into the modern world.

### *Imagines apud maiores*

In the *Natural History*<sup>9</sup> Pliny describes the wax facial masks of family ancestors which were kept in the atria of Roman houses and carried in a clan's funeral processions. These family images and family trees served to remind members of their past and reinforce allegiance to the clan for the future.

The following chart of Latin fathers (page 343) illustrates a somewhat analogous literary relationship. It provides a partial list of Latin authors who either dedicated a didactic work to a child or wrote an educational treatise in the form of a dialogue between father and son. Literary borrowings, echoes of influence, and direct quotations show that many of these works are closely connected. For example, the influence of the *Noctes Atticae* of Aulus Gellius upon the *Saturnalia* of Macrobius is salient and easily discernible upon first reading of the prefaces to the two works. The African peripatetic Nonius Marcellus quotes Cato and Apuleius and obviously used Gellius in his own *De compendiosa doctrina*. Flavius Sospater Charisius, in the five books of his *Ars grammatica*, includes a number of quotations from Cato's speeches.

<sup>8</sup> For an insightful discussion of these educational assumptions and the implications they had for ancient students, fatherly teachers, and professional grammarians, see Kaster (above, note 2) 50–70.

<sup>9</sup> Pliny, *NH* 35. 6.

This list is not definitive nor does it make any claim for any sort of direct traceable lineage through the entire series of works. It does, however, illustrate the prevalence of this form of dedication or composition in Roman educational handbooks and suggest how widespread this practice was in antiquity. History, philosophy, or verse might be written for friends or distinguished patrons; but, the field of more humble didactic letters is dominated by handbooks which are prefaced as fathers' gifts to offspring or by literary dialogues between a younger and an older interlocutor, usually a father and a son related by blood or marriage. Although the literary forms are different, the relationship presupposed between author and reader is similar. In both, the reader is expected to assume the role of the son, the respectful junior partner who is frequently pictured as initiator, consumer, and custodian of the literary effort.

The chart shows that fathers addressed educational treatises to their sons on a wide range of topics, from early examples of practical and moral advice to discussions in late antiquity of grammar, rhetoric, literary and historical commentary, medicine, geography, arithmetic, orthography, philosophy, music, and liberal education. The catalogue would be considerably longer if published letters of advice and moral exhortation addressed by fathers to their sons had been included.<sup>10</sup> Such letters are related in form and intent to the dedicatory epistles that preface educational and moral treatises. The list also includes only treatises with explicit references to the son as the recipient and some indication of the reason for the request beyond a conventional formulaic greeting. A few names of paternal authors are included whose works do not survive or survive only in fragments. The prominence of an author such as Livy and the importance of Cato in initiating and fostering the tradition account for their inclusion.

For example, our limited knowledge of Livy's epistolary essay for his son is drawn mainly from a quotation Quintilian includes in the tenth book of the *Institutiones oratoriae*.<sup>11</sup> In the passage cited Livy advises his son to read Demosthenes, Cicero, and other orators who most closely resemble those masters. Livy's essay was probably written to assist the son in his rhetorical studies and may have contained comments on Sallust and the rhetorician Miltiades. Seneca the Elder<sup>12</sup> in the rhetorical work he prepared for his own three sons attributes such comments to Livy. Since Livy's son became a writer and was cited as an authority by Pliny the Elder in the fifth and sixth books of the *Natural History*, Livy's instruction seems to have borne good fruit.

<sup>10</sup> Sid. Ap. Ep. 3. 13 is an excellent example of this sort of moral advice in open epistolary form.

<sup>11</sup> Quint. 10. 1. 39.

<sup>12</sup> Sen. Controv. 9. 1. 14 and 2. 26.

# PATERNAL AUTHORS Latin Dedications and Dialogues Between Father and Son

200 B.C.	M. Porcius Cato	<i>Ad Marcum filium</i>	
100 B.C.	M. Tullius Cicero	<i>Partitiones; De officiis</i>	
A.D. 1	Titus Livius L. Annaeus Seneca (Rhetor) Q. Asconius Pedianus M. Fabius Quintilianus (by intention, not in actuality)	<i>Controversiae; Suasoriae</i> Historical Commentaries on Cicero's Speeches <i>Institutiones oratoriae</i>	
A.D. 100	Lucius Apuleius Aulus Gellius	<i>De Platone et eius dogmate; De mundo</i> <i>Noctes Atticae</i>	
A.D. 200	Julius Paulus Anonymous and multiple	<i>Disticha Catonis</i> (approximate dating) <i>De compendiosa doctrina</i> <i>Institutiones oratoriae</i>	
A.D. 300	Nonius Marcellus Sulpicius Victor (to son-in-law Milo) Flavius Sospater Charisius Vibius Sequester (?)	<i>Ars grammatica</i> <i>De fluminibus, fontibus, lacubus, nemoribus, paludibus, montibus, gentibus per litteras libellus</i> <i>Interpretationes Vergilianae</i>	
A.D. 400	Ti. Claudius Donatus Macrobius Theodosius Marcellus Aurelius Augustinus Mallius Theodorus Martianus Capella Cassius Felix Martyrius (with the inspiration and assistance of his father Adamantius)	<i>Saturnalia; Commentary on Somnium Scipionis</i> <i>De medicamentis</i> <i>De beata vita; De magistro</i> <i>De metris</i> <i>De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii</i> <i>De medicina</i> <i>De B mula et V vocali</i>	
A.D. 500	Boethius (to father-in-law Symmachus)	<i>De Sancta Trinitate; De arithmetica</i>	



Cato and Cicero: *Imago patris et munera*

The chart reveals how frequently father-son instruction appears in Roman didactic letters. The following discussion argues for its distinctively Roman quality and for the particular relationship such father-son dedications tended to portray and to foster in real life. In order to make that argument, greater attention must be given to the two fathers at the head of the tradition, Cato and Cicero. The two contribute quite different features to its subsequent development.

Both in substance and literary form Cicero is a major contributor. His works to his son Marcus have been studied and imitated by countless epigones. On the other hand, Cato's actual literary contributions are much more difficult to assess. Only fragments of his work to his son survive, and the historical and cultural circumstances surrounding its composition are not completely clear. However, his influence as a model, an ideal type of Roman father, was assured by his own actions and by the example later authors made of his life. Therefore, any examination of father-son dedications in Roman educational literature must begin with Marcus Porcius Cato's *Ad filium* or, as it was commonly known, *Ad Marcum filium*.

Cato prepared this collection of practical precepts on various topics for his elder son, Marcus Porcius Cato Licinianus, born to Cato and Licinia in 190 B.C. Cato probably undertook his didactic work during the 170s, when his son would have been old enough to benefit from his instruction. The nature of this collection and the extent of its learning has been the subject of some debate. Alan Astin in his 1978 work *Cato the Censor*<sup>13</sup> has argued against labelling Cato's work a comprehensive encyclopaedia made up of separate books on topics such as rhetoric or medicine. Rather he sees the work as a miscellaneous collection of precepts on agriculture, military affairs, religious law, with little extensive treatment of rhetoric or medicine.

The collection Cato prepared for his son probably had the same terse and elliptical character as his extant work on agriculture. Harris<sup>14</sup> suggests that the rough style and poor organization found in the *De agri cultura* may be the result of oral composition or dictation to a secretary. Since Cato learned Latin letters—i.e., the more formal study of Latin language and literature—only later in life,<sup>15</sup> oral exposition or dictation may have been his preferred method of composing, even though he apparently kept careful written records of his speeches.

Fronto's well-known description of Cato preparing his speech *De sumptu suo*<sup>16</sup> provides us with evidence for Cato's use of both oral and written compositional techniques. The orator incorporated written material

<sup>13</sup> A. E. Astin, *Cato the Censor* (Oxford 1978) 182–83, 332–40.

<sup>14</sup> Harris (above, note 7) 173.

<sup>15</sup> Val. Max. 8. 7. 1.

<sup>16</sup> Fronto, *Ad A. Imp.* 1. 2. 9.

from an earlier speech but relied heavily upon the assistance of a scribe in preparing the new written text. The passage describes Cato listening to his previous words and then dictating word-for-word insertions and deletions. Dictation was a usual manner of composition in antiquity and would certainly not be remarkable in and of itself. Yet in this period of the Roman Republic other signs, such as the growing number of inscriptions, mark a noticeable transition from a predominately oral to an increasingly literate society.<sup>17</sup> Thus, Fronto's description lends evidence for Cato's role in a key transitional period in the development of Latin literacy as well as in the development of Roman literature. His model of careful notetaking and dictation may well have served as an exemplar for the preparation of texts in the later tradition.

Whatever the case, the disjointed quality of his pronouncements and their archaic diction probably added to the authority which later authors attributed to his work. His precepts were delivered in a style which Pliny, Seneca the Elder, and Columella describe as oracular. Seneca the Elder, in the dedicatory preface to the *Controversiae*, gives special weight to the words and the moral authority which the figure of Cato had come to embody:

Erratis, optimi iuvenes, nisi illam vocem non M. Catonis sed oraculi creditis. Quid enim est oraculum? nempe voluntas divina hominis ore enuntiata; et quem tandem antistitem sanctiorem sibi invenire divinitas potuit quam M. Catonem, per quem humano generi non praeciperet sed convicium faceret? Ille ergo vir quid ait? "Orator est, Marce fili, vir bonus dicendi peritus."<sup>18</sup>

The elder Seneca includes this observation as a part of his denunciation of decadent trends he found so detrimental to the growth of eloquence in his own day. Although Seneca assumed a far more intimate and urbane style in addressing his own sons, Cato's ethical and stylistic model—especially the link between character and learning, between what the words said and Cato's moral authority—influenced the later author and served as prelude and counterpoint for the paternal advice and rhetorical memories he preserved for his children.

Cato did much to foster the image of himself as a moral authority. From the swimming lessons in the Tiber to the practical precepts for successful public life in the forum and private life on the farm, Cato not only established himself but also advertised himself as a model for an education he saw as both family-centered and father-dominated. The reasons for this are many and various, but certainly both assimilation and rejection of Hellenic educational patterns play some role.

<sup>17</sup> For a discussion of Cato's use of notes and prepared texts, see Astin (above, note 13) 134–36. Astin's careful treatment of Cato does not consider some of the broader implications of oral and literate practices in Roman society of the period.

<sup>18</sup> Sen. *Controv.* 1 pr. 9.

Cato's consciously adopted lifestyle and his carefully publicized educational program seem to have been carried out at least in part as a reaction to the type of Hellenic influence in education to which Cato objected and which he also appropriated in developing his own educational plan. It was noted earlier that Cato received little formal education early in his life. Later on—although he owned a slave, a *grammatistes* with some instructional ability—he chose not to subject his son to a slave's discipline but to teach his child himself, following an unusual parental course that involved great expenditure of time and effort.<sup>19</sup> In addition to the collection of precepts, he even prepared a Roman history in large letters in order to teach him to read, and later had continued correspondence with him, a part of which came into circulation and was cited by Cicero and Plutarch. In other words, our earliest well-documented example of a fatherly educator is, to a certain extent, a conscious creation in reaction to the Hellenic patterns of the gymnasia, professional experts, and a diminished educational role for both parents.

The Roman pattern may be compared to the Jewish reaction that led to the more violent Maccabean revolt. In both cases contact with Hellenic culture shaped the conscious identity of the other people and gave birth to a more widespread recognition of the distinctive characteristics of Jewish or Roman society. That statement by no means implies a one-dimensional portrait of an anti-Hellenic Cato, fathering a simplistic, reactionary literary tradition. Cato's "Romanitas" is far more complex than such a picture would suggest, and his contributions to the educational tradition must be seen as part of the reaction, adaptation, and adjustment to Hellenic culture which caused a ferment in the Roman upper classes throughout the last two centuries of the Republic.

In sum, Cato's writings for his son, the Roman history, the oracular precepts, and the letters, start literary traditions which serve a number of propagandistic functions. The dedication to the son, the ongoing "public" concern for the son's development, give concrete expression to the father's role as the most important teacher and identify both the literary model and the historical personages who conform to the literary model as virtuous and "Roman."

Later paternal authors cite Cato prominently and account in great part for the fragments of his work which are now extant. Cicero, Livy, Seneca, and Quintilian provide some references, but a vast storehouse of quotations comes from sources like Aulus Gellius, Charisius, Nonius, and Macrobius. Although Festus, Priscian, Servius, and many others add more to the *corpus*, citations by paternal authors are sizeable and, in some instances, seem to have special significance for the quoting author.

For example, Macrobius, at the end of the preface to the *Saturnalia*, mentions that he may need his readers' indulgence because he was "born

<sup>19</sup> Plut. *Cat. mai.* 20. 5.

under an alien sky and his words might lack the polish of the native Roman tongue."<sup>20</sup> He then ends his preface by suggesting that he might merit the neat rebuke Cato gave to Aulus Albinus who had composed a *History of Rome* in Greek and then begged pardon for faults of arrangement and style because he was a Roman, born in Latium, and the Greek language was completely foreign to him. Cato rebukes Aulus for apologizing for an error rather than avoiding a mistake which was neither done unwittingly or under compulsion. The quotation from Cato aptly fits the occasion and at the same time demonstrates that Macrobius the foreigner is in firm command of his Roman literary predecessors.<sup>21</sup>

Cato's work can be seen as not only the first but also the exemplar which later tradition would redesign to fit its own needs. Conservative Cato can be credited with fathering a literary tradition which gains adherents, in part, because of its claim to be an old family custom. Much of the Greek learning which passed into the Latin didactic tradition came through this "Old Roman" route.

In fact, other evidence would suggest that in many ways Italy of the second century B.C. was backward in its educational practices and that fathers were not notable for their care in educating their children. Cicero mentions that Polybius accuses the Romans of negligence in educating their offspring and himself concedes that the Romans had no firmly established and commonly accepted educational standard.<sup>22</sup> At the same time the great increase in the number of inscriptions during the second century B.C. and the influx of Greek teachers suggest a rise in literacy and a growing recognition that formal education was going to play a more important role in the lives of the prominent. The figure of Cato, the father-educator, arises in that time, but only acquires its distinctive character and influence through the colors Cicero, Seneca Rhetor, Plutarch, and other authors add to the portrait.

<sup>20</sup> *Sat.* 1, pr. 11: ... *sed omnia quibus sit ingenium tuum vegetius, memoria adminiculatior, oratio sollertior, sermo incorruptior, nisi sicubi nos, sub alio ortos caelo, Latinae linguae vena non adiuvet.* The entire passage about Cato runs from 12 to 16.

<sup>21</sup> A similar but less compelling argument could be made for Flavius Sospater Charisius. Charisius dedicated a work on grammar in five volumes to his son, probably some time during the middle of the fourth century, and included a number of quotations from Cato's speeches. Since in the introduction he urges his son to perfect by industry the eloquent Latin he could not obtain through birthplace, it seems likely that Charisius was not Italian. Yet, he believed that, by practice and good example, his son could become as eloquent as the native born.

<sup>22</sup> *Cic. De rep.* 4. 3: *disciplinam puerilem ingenuis, de qua Graeci multum frustra laborarunt, et in qua una Polybius noster hospes nostrorum institutorum neglegentiam accusat, nullam certam aut destinatam legibus aut publice expositam aut unam omnium esse voluerunt.*



*Munera Ciceronis*

More modern readers are forced to view Cato and earlier Roman educational tradition through Cicero's eyes and to understand the Latin dedicatory tradition as it has been shaped by Cicero's words. Cicero's example as father-educator was a major influence upon Asconius, Quintilian, Ambrose, Macrobius, Augustine, and many lesser lights, and the picture Cicero sketches of himself as teacher and chief architect of his son's academic and moral advancement becomes the model from which later parental portraits are drawn.

Of the two works Cicero addressed to his son Marcus, the *Partitiones* and the *De officiis*, the *Partitiones* is the more technical and schematic. It draws heavily upon the rhetorical precepts of the Middle Academy and was in turn quoted frequently by Quintilian and later rhetoricians. It is presented in a simple question and answer format with Cicero *pater* acting as the respondent to the questions posed by his son Marcus. As his son indicates in the beginning of the work, this is a reversal of their usual roles and a change of their usual language, for Cicero customarily drilled his son on rhetorical matters by asking him questions in Greek.

The date of composition is uncertain. The most likely possibilities are 53 or 46 B.C. In a letter to his brother in 54 B.C.,<sup>23</sup> Cicero comments upon his nephew's fine progress in rhetorical studies and mentions his desire to give him additional instruction when they are in the country and at leisure. The type of systematic handbook Cicero produced in the *Partitiones* might well be the concrete fulfillment of that wish undertaken for his own son who would then be just beginning his elementary training in rhetoric. Later, in 46 B.C., Marcus *filius* would have been nineteen and ready to leave for Athens to finish his studies. At that time Cicero would have had enough leisure to write such a work, and the letters of the period and the subsequent composition of the *De officiis* in 44 B.C. show how concerned Cicero then was about his son's academic and moral development. Cicero does not specify any setting for the dialogue, but the intimate tone and references to leisure suggest a scene of retirement and relative tranquillity in his Tusculan villa.

In constructing the dialogue's opening exchange Cicero follows precepts for *exordia* he gives in the *Partitiones*. Introductory passages, as he says in 28. 3, are derived *ex personis aut ex rebus ipsis*, and they are used for three purposes: to win a friendly, intelligent, and attentive hearing. He recommends capturing the goodwill of the audience by presenting the speaker's personality in the most virtuous and favorable light and gaining the audience's understanding and attention through a clear exposition of the planned treatment of the subject and an indication of its importance.

<sup>23</sup> *Ad Q. frat.* 3. 34.

As might be expected, the opening exchange between father and son is in a pleasant, relaxed style; but, it sums up in an unambiguous way the importance of a father's attention to his son's education. It begins with a request from the son:

Cicero filius: Studeo, mi pater, Latine ex te audire ea quae mihi tu de ratione dicendi Graece tradidisti—si modo tibi est otium, et si vis.

Cicero pater: An est, mi Cicero, quod ego malim quam te quam doctissimum esse? Otium autem primum est summum, quoniam aliquando Roma exeundi potestas data est; deinde ista tua studia vel maximis occupationibus meis anteferebam libenter. (*Part. 1*)

Janson, in his examination of the preface of the *Orator*,<sup>24</sup> discusses the many bilateral connections which formed the basic social fabric of ancient Rome. These relations could link an inferior and a superior, as *patronus* and *cliens*, or equals in bonds of friendship or mutual self-interest, as *amici*. The maintenance of such relations rested upon the ingrained expectation that an honorable person would feel the obligation to repay any services received and would, when needed or requested, show gratitude by direct action. Thus, the *topos* of responding to a request, which is such a frequent device in these Latin prefaces, stands within an intricate network of relationships that defined individuals and their roles in society. The *topoi* also served to further types of behavior and educational expectations which are consonant with the combination of learning and ethical values discussed above. In short, the literary framework used to pass on the *doctrina* supported and strengthened the *mores*, the ethical qualities which formed a fundamental part of the education itself.

Cicero's use of the device, however, has some noteworthy features. The father who inhabits the world of this dialogue is ready and willing to put all his other business aside in order to educate his son. In fact, Cicero turns to services he can perform for his son when his opportunity for public service has been limited. When his role in the state has been circumscribed, he is still able and eager to fulfill responsibilities which, he asserts, are more important than civic duties. His awareness of his own personal situation and the implications he draws from it can be seen in an examination of his use of the word *munus*, especially in his discussion of Scipio in Book 3 of the *De officiis*.

Before examining that passage and others in which he mentions *munera* in this connection, another important feature of the introduction of the *Partitiones* needs to be reviewed. The son's request immediately introduces the reader into a bilingual and bicultural world of learning, the special domain of an international elite, who are equally comfortable speaking either language and familiar with the pressures of major public and private business.

<sup>24</sup> Janson (above, note 2) 43–44.

Most of the paternal authors who form part of the later didactic tradition can be identified as learned members of a fairly high social class. Although some came from the aristocratic elite, others probably originated from the middle to upper-middle class and based their careers and livelihood on enterprises other than education. Robert Kaster, in his discussion of the development of professional grammarians, argues that no known professional grammarian in late antiquity dedicated a work to his own son and that such familial dedications are the characteristic mark of amateur litterateurs.<sup>25</sup> His basic point is sound, although it is possible to quibble slightly with his claim, for the paternal author Augustine was certainly a professional teacher of grammar and rhetoric early in his career at Thagaste.

The fathers who form part of this tradition are men like Nonius Marcellus, Mallius Theodorus, or the Marcellus of medical fame. Nonius Marcellus is either related to or identical with the Nonius Marcellus Herculi of *CIL* VIII 4878, who in 324 restored destroyed buildings and repaired streets in Thubursicum Numidarum. The honor such an inscription records gives some indication of the wealth and status of the family to which Nonius is assumed to belong. Mallius Theodorus wrote a treatise on metrics, *De metris*, for his son Theodorus. He was the consul of 399 and was celebrated by Claudian in his panegyric. Augustine praised him in both the *De beata vita* and the *De ordine*, and regrets having praised him too much in *Retractationes* 1. 2. Marcellus, a Gallic Christian, served as *magister officiorum* under Theodosius. *De medicamentis*, the work he prepared for his sons, contains over 2,500 entries of various remedies and concoctions, and is prefaced by a series of letters on medicine, the first of which is also a letter addressed to his sons by a certain Largius Designatianus. Although many of these paternal authors have left few prosopographical traces and one is so unknown that the authenticity of his name has been questioned,<sup>26</sup> those who can be identified either come from a social class which had the means and leisure necessary for reading and study or could aspire to membership in such a class.

The importance Cicero ascribes to educating his son finds parallels in a number of the later texts.<sup>27</sup> Calling attention to the use of both Greek and Latin material is also a common feature of the later tradition and underlines the badge of culture and the "Romanitas" of the Latin speaker. References

<sup>25</sup> Kaster (above, note 2) 68.

<sup>26</sup> It has been suggested that Vibius Sequester, the author of the *De fluminibus, fontibus, lacubus, nemoribus, paludibus, montibus, gentibus per litteras libellus*, is a fictive construct from Cicero, *Pro Cluentio* 8. 25. See Schanz-Hosius IV.2 121 for a discussion of the "actuality" of the author.

<sup>27</sup> For example, Aulus Gellius, in his introduction to the *Attic Nights*, gives a clear statement of his priorities in managing his business, educating his children, and completing the volumes of commentaries for their entertainment and edification: *Quantum autem vitae mihi deinceps deum voluntate erit quantumque a tuenda re familiari procurandoque cultu liberorum meorum dabitur otium, ea omnia subsiciva et subsecundaria tempora ad colligendas huiuscemodi memoriarum delectatiunculas conferam* (pr. 23).

to Greek material or sources inevitably make a reader aware of what is non-Greek in the work at hand. The Roman father's selection and interpretation of both Greek and Latin material is regularly mentioned in the later tradition and provides a distinctive cast to the father's role in the presentation of the material.

The education Cicero gives Marcus in the *Partitiones* might be aptly characterized as a translation exercise and summary review. Schematic and reductive, it shows many similarities to the announced objectives and types of material presented by later authors. Other works in the paternal didactic tradition also draw upon Greek material and make explicit references to translating aspects of Hellenic learning into a Roman family gift. The father-teacher frequently assumes the role of translator or interpreter of one text or of an entire body of learning and describes his subject matter and his approach to that subject matter in terms of assimilation, selection, and transmission. In a very basic sense, he "familiarizes" the material taken from a different language, culture, or historical period as an inheritance for his child.

The *De officiis* provides a grander and more comprehensive example of Cicero's role as interpreter of and contributor to Greek learning. The three books of this work Cicero wrote in 44 B.C. and directed to his son Marcus who was then studying in Athens. He begins the first book of the *De officiis* with an appeal to Marcus to combine Latin and Greek philosophical and rhetorical studies. To support that appeal, he cites his own work and underscores the service he has provided others, both those fellow countrymen who know and those who do not know Greek letters. But he is careful to point out that he is not simply a translator but that he draws from his sources according to his own judgment and decision:

Sequitur igitur hoc quidem tempore et hac in quaestione potissimum  
Stoicos non ut interpretes, sed, ut solemus, e fontibus eorum iudicio  
arbitrioque nostro, quantum quoque modo videbitur, hauriemus. (1. 2. 6)

In sum, at the beginning of both the *Partitiones* and the *De officiis*, Cicero calls special attention to his indebtedness to Greek sources, places that philosophical or rhetorical debt within a personal and familial context, and indicates how his own educational values and judgment have shaped the work. By citing the Hellenic debt, Cicero subtly asserts his own independence and illustrates how his Roman ways depart from the Greek.

Similarly, many Roman authors in the later tradition call attention to their careful perusal and selection of Greek sources for incorporation within a Latin work and a Roman family setting. Serving as a Latin translator and interpreter of Greek material was no doubt both fashionable and useful in Cicero's day and later. And later authors continue to cite their reliance upon both Greek and Latin material and to describe their service for their sons in terms of translation, selection, and interpretation. Notable reference to



Greek material occurs both where it would be obviously expected and where it seems to serve other ends than mere necessity.

For example, the Platonist Apuleius, when writing about Plato and addressing his son Faustinus on the chief end of moral philosophy, would be expected to begin with interpretations of Platonic thought. His brief introductory reference to Plato is, however, far from the elaborate listing of Greek and Latin works found in authors like Aulus Gellius or Macrobius.<sup>28</sup> In introducing the *Attic Nights*, Aulus Gellius provides a long list of Latin and Greek sources, reiterates the time and effort he expended in their perusal, and stresses that his notetaking and excerpting were far more selective than the voluminous and tedious commentary characteristic of some of the Greeks.<sup>29</sup> Macrobius's introduction to the *Saturnalia* shows a noticeable dependence on the introduction to the *Attic Nights* and a clear desire to separate his product and manner of composition from that of his predecessor, but he employs many of the same commonplaces, including explicit reference to perusal and judicious selection from diverse works written in Greek and Latin (*Sat. pr. 2*). Less well-known paternal authors, such as the Gallic *magister officiorum* Marcellus and the African physician Cassius Felix, medical writers of the fifth century, stress their own careful attention to Greek sources and their own roles as translators, at least partly in order to warn of the serious errors negligence can produce.<sup>30</sup>

Although Cassius Felix himself admits that his collection of treatments for 82 illnesses is largely excerpted from Greek practitioners, especially Galen's Θεραπευτικά πρὸς Γλαύκωνα, he often cites Roman practice with approval and knows Punic names for medicinal herbs. His identification with Roman culture is especially interesting in view of his apparent knowledge of Punic and the linguistic peculiarities of his Latin style.

To be sure, there is a world of literary and cultural difference and almost five centuries of time between Cicero and Marcellus and Cassius Felix. The

<sup>28</sup> Apuleius, *De Platone* 2 init.: *Moralis philosophiae caput est, Faustine fili, ut scias, quibus ad beatam vitam perveniri rationibus possit. verum † ad beatitudinem bonorum fine ante alia contingeret ut ostendam, quae de hoc Plato senserit.*

<sup>29</sup> Aulus Gellius, *Noc. Att. pr. 3-14*.

<sup>30</sup> Marcellus, *De medicamentis*, *epist. ad filios* 5: *Nam licet attentissime species et mensuras specierum remediis quibusque adscripsero et ipsarum mensurarum notas vel ponderum qualitates secundum Graecam traditionem et medicorum veterum consuetudinem seorsum libello huic inseruero et non solum Romana, sed etiam Graia expositione digressero, tamen ex re est, ut haec eadem cum peritioribus conferantur ac saepius retractentur et quae confecta fuerint vel parata medicamina sub signaculis semper habeantur, ne aut casus incidat aut malignitas alicuius obrepat, quae benivole et sincere parata corrumpat, sitque de remedio venenum et de salubritate pernicies culpeturque medicina, cum peccarit incuria.*

Cassius Felix, *De medicina*, *init.*: *cum diuturno tempore sedulus mecum volvendo, carissime fili, de medicina tractassem, omnipotentis dei nutu monito placuit mihi ut ex Graecis logicae sectae auctoribus omnium causarum dogmata in breviliquio Latino sermone conscriberem.*

latter are translating technical works for readers somewhat removed from the liberally educated, sophisticated audience Cicero could expect. The son of Cassius Felix no doubt needed a translation of the Greek and may also have needed his father's admonition that he neither add nor subtract anything from the given text. Yet almost all of these paternal authors assume the role of cultural and historical intermediary and limit their own original contribution to the setting, selection, and arrangement of previous texts.

At the conclusion of the *Partitiones* Cicero again sets his schematic outline of rhetorical theory in a context which identifies transmission of learning with performing a service, a personal obligation which arises out of affection and is reinforced by family tradition. The conclusion of the dialogue follows rhetorical precepts in that it contains both recapitulation and amplification. Cicero places the dry and bare presentation of rhetoric in the wider framework of moral philosophy and ends with an exhortation to follow what the dialogue has presented as a guide for more important matters. The dialogue ends with the son's acknowledgment of the service Cicero has rendered: *Ego vero ac magno quidem studio, mi pater, multisque ex tuis praeclarissimis muneribus nullum maius exspecto* (Part. 140).

The word *munus* which Cicero uses here to characterize his service also appears at the end of the *De officiis* and at other key points within that text. Cicero employs the term frequently to describe literary services and to highlight special relationships established by this type of gift-giving. The important connotations of the word can be most easily seen in an examination of its use in the *De officiis*. In the conclusion of that work, Cicero employs the term but in a far more artful and moving address to his son: *Habes a patre munus, Marce fili, mea quidem sententia magnum, sed perinde erit, ut acceperis* (*De officiis* 3. 33. 121).

Cicero then continues his conclusion with personification of his instruction as three books who are to be received as fellow-guests and who are to speak in his own voice as he would speak with Marcus were he able and as he hopes soon to do—a wish of course never fulfilled for Cicero—but his son fortunately escaped the proscription because he was in Athens. The personification shows how the father's gift becomes the substitute for the father himself and reveals how intensely personal, almost physical, the educational bond could be which surrounded the selected didactic material contained in the gift.<sup>31</sup>

*Munus*, the Latin word which Cicero uses regularly to describe what he has done for a recipient, is usually translated by the more general English

<sup>31</sup> *De officiis* 3. 33. 121: *Quamquam hi tibi tres libri inter Cratippi commentarios tamquam hospites erunt recipiendi; sed, ut, si ipse venissem Athenas (quod quidem esset factum, nisi me e medio cursu clara voce patria revocasset), aliquando me quoque audires, sic, quoniam his voluminibus ad te profecta vox est mea, tribues iis temporis quantum poteris, poteris autem, quantum voles. Cum vero intellexero te hoc scientiae genere gaudere, tum et praesens tecum propediem, ut spero, et, dum aberis, absens loquar.*

terms "service," "duty," "obligation," "tribute," "gift," or by the more concrete "work" or "book." It is of course the proper term for the last office for the dead and, especially, the gift of funeral games or public monuments to celebrate the memory of a family member, such as Augustus's gift of the Theater of Marcellus and Octavia's gift of the library in memory of her son. The frequency with which this term is used in dedications and the eagerness with which the multiple connotations are explored by some Latin authors suggest that the term, at least from Cicero onward, held special meaning and should not be dismissed as a banal convention of literary dedications.

The public, personal, reciprocal nature characteristic of the literary service that Cicero describes as *munus* is as evident in the conclusions of the *Partitiones* and *De officiis* as it is in Cicero's much more playful use of the term in his letter to Varro of July 11 or 12, 45 B.C. The letter was sent as a reminder that the treatise which Varro had promised to dedicate to Cicero (probably the *De lingua Latina*) was, like many scholarly works both now and then, some four years overdue. The letter begins with a pun upon *munus* as both a gladiatorial show and a literary gift. Cicero then refers to his dedication to Varro of the four books of the *Academica posteriora*, four immodest reminders of the literary obligation Varro owes him. In his subsequent word-plays upon *munus* and *remunerari* Cicero stresses the reciprocity of the bond of affection and study that is given formal, public expression through such gifts:

Etsi munus flagitare, quamvis quis ostenderit, ne populus quidem solet, nisi concitatus, tamen ego exspectatione promissi tui moveor, ut admoneam te, non ut flagitem. Misi autem ad te quattuor admonitores non nimis verecundos. Nosti enim profecto os adulescentioris Academiae. Ex ea igitur media excitatos misi, qui metuo ne te forte flagitent; ego autem mandavi, ut rogarent. Exspectabam omnino iamdiu, meque sustinebam, ne ad te prius ipse quid scriberem, quam aliquid accepissem, ut possem te remunerari quam simillimo munere. (*Ad fam.* 9. 8. 1)

Cicero uses the word frequently in other dedications or prefaces, as, for example, in the dedication of the *Paradoxa Stoicorum* to Brutus, or in the famous proemium to Book 3 of the *De officiis* on the leisure and solitude of Scipio Africanus. There he employs the term in both the narrow meaning of "literary work" as well as in its broader sense:

Sed nec hoc otium cum Africani otio nec haec solitudo cum illa comparanda est. Ille enim requiescens a rei publicae pulcherrimis muneribus otium sibi sumebat aliquando et e coetu hominum frequentiaque interdum tamquam in portum se in solitudinem recipiebat, nostrum autem otium negotii inopia, non requiescendi studio constitutum est. Exstincto enim senatu deletisque iudiciis quid est quod dignum nobis aut in curia aut in foro agere possimus? . . . Quamquam Africanus maiorem laudem meo iudicio assequeretur. Nulla enim eius ingenii monumenta mandata litteris, nullum opus otii, nullum

solitudinis munus exstat; ex quo intellegi debet illum mentis agitatione investigationeque earum rerum, quas cogitando consequatur, nec otiosum nec solum umquam fuisse; nos autem, qui non tantum roboris habemus, ut cogitatione tacita a solitudine abstrahamur, ad hanc scribendi operam omne studium curamque convertimus. (*De officiis* 3. 1. 2-4)

In this passage Cicero draws an explicit comparison between himself and Scipio. Scipio, known for his outstanding gifts (*rei publicae pulcherrimis muneribus*) to the state, had no need to erect literary monuments or perform a service of solitude (*nullum solitudinis munus*). Cicero does not have such strength of mind nor ability to sustain himself when alone. Instead, as he himself admits, he devotes himself to performing this service for his son and to other literary efforts.

Hidden in that explicit comparison is the tacit admission that Cicero can only sustain his isolation and affirm his self-worth by fulfilling services which will win him the respect and gratitude of his son or of others for whom his writings are destined. The senate is dead, the courts are effaced, no worthy service is possible there, because there is no worthy recipient of such service. But Cicero, in writing the *De officiis* for his son, creates a memorial, a public gift commemorating himself and calling for acknowledgment of his role as paternal benefactor by his son Marcus and by all subsequent readers.

The literary work becomes the concrete fulfillment of an obligation, whether of family or friendship, not dissimilar from the recognition for services rendered to the gods or the state. As such, the dedication or the dialogic frame becomes a way of asserting and affirming the author's own identity and worth as a valuable member of the state or the family community. The work itself preserves and commemorates the author and affirms his and his son's identity by incorporating historical, literary, or scientific monuments from the past into a literary family portrait. Cicero does this subtly with his portrait of Scipio and his service to his son. Many of the authors on the list handle their gifts with far less finesse. Still, works in this tradition can be called *munera*, in more than one sense of the word. They are literary monuments which incorporate old and new material in a celebratory structure. They might be compared to visual monuments, like the Arch of Constantine, where the deliberate inclusion of past material signals an attempt to foster an identity and establish a bond between the best of the past and the present.



The Use of *Munus* by Later Paternal Authors:  
Seneca, Boethius, and Augustine

Later authors in the didactic tradition use *munus* or similar words for gift-giving as a regular part of the introduction. Just as Cicero draws the comparison between a gladiatorial show and his *munus* for Varro, so Seneca the Elder in the preface to Book 4 of the *Controversiae* draws the same playful comparison between his own activity and the stage managers of gladiatorial shows and indirectly reinforces the connection between his literary *munus* and a show in commemoration for the dead.<sup>32</sup> Although Seneca's reference is playful, his usage seems apt, especially since so much of his work is devoted to celebrating and preserving in memory the accomplishments of rhetors and orators long departed.

One of the most elaborate examples of the repetition of *munus* is found in the dedicatory preface to the *Arithmetic* of Boethius. There the role-reversal of son-in-law dedicating a *munusculum* to his father-in-law adds an extra degree of point to the theme of giving and receiving service. The submissive tone of the preface comes in part from the role-reversal of dedicator and dedicatee, but it also conforms to the practice more common in late antiquity of stressing the humility of the author and the exaltation of the recipient of the gift.<sup>33</sup> Boethius's preface repeats and amplifies a number of the *loci communes* expected in late Latin dedicatory prefaces, such as the responsibility of the dedicatee to examine, improve, and approve of the work before it is submitted to others, the transmittal of Greek riches into a Latin treasury, the questionable competence of the author, the amount of labor expended in preparing the work, the diminutive and unfinished results (*munusculum, novi operis rudimenta*), as well as a long excursus on the plastic arts and the appearance of attenuated food-metaphors throughout.<sup>34</sup>

*Munus* appears four times in this relatively short dedicatory letter. It opens the address (*in dandis accipiendisque muneribus*), it appears in the playful description of the work as a *munusculum*, intensified by the

<sup>32</sup> Sen. *Controv.* 4 pr. 1: *Quod munerarii solent facere, qui ad expectationem populi detinendam nova paria per omnes dies dispensant, ut sit quod populum et delectet et revocet, hoc ego facio: non semel omnes produco; aliquid novi semper habeat libellus, ut non tantum sententiarum vos sed etiam auctorum novitate sollicitet.*

<sup>33</sup> See Janson (above, note 2) 120.

<sup>34</sup> Boethius, *Arithm.*, pr. 3. 1–16 Friedlein: *In dandis accipiendisque muneribus ita recte officia inter eos praecipue, qui sese magni faciunt, aestimantur, si liquido constabit, nec ab hoc aliud, quod liberalius afferet, inventum, nec ab illo unquam, quod iucundius benevolentia complecteretur, acceptum. Haec ipse considerans attuli non ignava opum pondera, quibus ad facinus nihil instructius, cum habendi sitis incanduit, ad meritum nihil vilius, cum ea sibi victor animus calcata subiecit, sed ea, quae ex Graecarum opulentia litterarum in Romanae orationis thesaurum sumpta conveximus. Ita enim mei quoque mihi operis ratio constabit, si, quae ex sapientiae doctrinis elicui, sapientissimi iudicio conprobenitur. Vides igitur, ut tam magni laboris effectus tuum tantum spectet examen, nec in aures prodire publicas, nisi doctae sententiae adstipulatione nitatur.*

fortifying pun, *sed huic munusculo non eadem quae ceteris imminet artibus munimenta constituo*,<sup>35</sup> and it is repeated in two instances near the end of the dedication which stress Symmachus's role as the worthy recipient of the gift because of his learning and his ability to correct the faults of the author.<sup>36</sup> The repetition links the son-in-law with the fatherly reader in a tight bond of personal obligation and almost seems to compel the reader's service and partnership in producing the learned work. The bonds of personal service and relationships affirmed in the Boethian dedicatory letter stand in stark contrast to Augustine's use of the word *munus* in his discussion of the *De magistro*, one of the two dialogues in which he and his son Adeodatus appear.

In recalling the *De magistro* in Book 9 of the *Confessions*, Augustine uses the word *munus* so prominently and with such insistence that the passage clearly reads as a profound rejection of the traditional didactic relationships celebrated in father-son dialogues and a concomitant rejection of the *munera* by which fathers and sons established their identities and affirmed their worth in the Roman world. The nominal subject of that chapter is Augustine's baptism at Milan with Alypius and Adeodatus, his fellow catechumens who were receiving baptism at the same time. Yet what the reader may notice immediately is how little of the chapter is concerned with the rebirth of the three *coaevi*, Alypius, Augustine, and Adeodatus, and how much of the chapter is concerned with Augustine's reflection on his own lifegiving, parental role:

Adiunximus etiam nobis puerum Adeodatum ex me natum carnaliter de peccato meo. Tu bene feceras eum. Annorum erat fere quindecim et ingenio praeveniebat multos graves et doctos viros. Munera tua tibi confiteor, domine deus meus, creator omnium et multum potens reformare nostra deformia: nam ego in illo puero praeter delictum nihil habebam. Quod enim enutriebatur a nobis in disciplina tua, tu inspiraveras nobis, nullus alius: munera tua tibi confiteor.

Est liber noster, qui inscribitur "de Magistro." Ipse ibi mecum loquitur. Tu scis illius esse sensa omnia, quae inseruntur ibi ex persona conlocutoris mei, cum esset in annis sedecim. Multa eius alia mirabiliora expertus sum. Horreri mihi erat illud ingenium: et quis praeter te talium miraculorum opifex? (*Conf.* 9. 6. 14)

Running through this passage is the refrain *munera tua tibi confiteor, domine deus meus*. It is apparent that Augustine repeats the refrain almost as a ritualistic acknowledgment of thanksgiving for God's gifts. It is equally apparent that at the same time he is rejecting the conventional role

<sup>35</sup> Pr. 3. 20–21 Friedlein.

<sup>36</sup> Pr. 5. 7–10 Friedlein: . . . *tu tantum dignus eo munere videbare, eoque magis inerrato opus esse intellegebam*; 5. 21–23 Friedlein: *Tu tantum paterna gratia nostrum provehas munus. Ita et laboris mei primitias doctissimo iudicio consecrabis et non maiore censebitur auctor merito quam probator.*

of the Roman father as instructor, educator, nourisher, and bestower of gifts. God is the father; Christ, the teacher. Men like Augustine may assist, but the gift of life and true learning is divine. Augustine makes the same point on the divine origin of wisdom and the inner, personal nature of learning in the *De magistro*, and he repeats the same admonition elsewhere, notably, for example, in Letter 266. The Bishop of Hippo wrote this letter to his spiritual daughter Florentina, a girl of serious, studious inclinations. Florentina's mother had introduced the girl to Augustine and had requested the Bishop's instruction for her. Augustine replied to the request willingly enough, but he concludes his letter with this caveat:

... admonendam te his litteris credidi secundum supra dictas optiones, ut quaeras, quod vis, ne sim superfluous, si conatus fuero docere, quod scis, dum tamen firmissime teneas, quod, etsi aliquid salubriter per me scire potueris, ille te docebit, qui est interioris hominis magister interior, qui in corde tuo tibi ostendit verum esse, quod dicitur, quia neque qui plantat, est aliquid, neque qui rigat, sed qui incrementum dat deus. (*Ep.* 266. 4 = *CSEL* LVII 650. 13–20)

The quotation from 1 Cor. 3. 7 picks up on the theme of instruction from the Apostle Paul developed earlier in the letter and underscores the limited role a human being can play in providing nourishment or instruction if the human lacks divine help and guidance.

Augustine's rejection of the traditionally understood and accepted role of teacher is reaffirmed in *Retractationes* 1. 11, where he again discusses the *De magistro* and stresses that the one teacher is Christ.<sup>37</sup> That he chose the dialogue between father and son as the literary vehicle for this discussion of teaching and that he refers to that work and his son so prominently in the baptism chapter of the *Confessions* are two signs of the radical departure Augustine takes from the traditional patterns and claims of paternal authorship sketched earlier in this article. Augustine rejects the paternal role considered normative in this educational tradition and, in its place, substitutes a much more profound dependence upon the inner man's relation to God. Augustine's comments in the *Confessions* and the position on teaching he outlines in the *De magistro* question the very basis of a father's educational authority. For Augustine, legitimate instructional authority stands on religious and theological grounds which differ profoundly from the familial model espoused by Cato, Cicero, and other Roman paternal teachers.

<sup>37</sup> *Retract.* 1. 11: *Per idem tempus scripsi librum, cuius est titulus "de Magistro," in quo disputatur et quaeritur et invenitur magistrum non esse, qui docet hominem scientiam, nisi deum secundum illud etiam, quod in evangelio scriptum est: "Vnus est magister vester Christus."*

*Digesta et Indigesta*

Metaphors for food and digestion are often used in these prefaces to characterize the discovery, ordering, or presentation of the subject matter. Since the father-son didactic tradition shares some features with symposia and literary feasts, it is not surprising to find occasional metaphors comparing intellectual sustenance to food, but in the *De nuptiis* of Martianus Capella, these metaphors overturn rather than support the role of the paternal author as a competent provider.

Many authors use *digerere* or *digesta* to describe the process of arrangement and interpretation they have used in preparing their works. When the term is used without metaphoric elaboration, it does not call up strong associations between food and subject matter or between intellectual activity and eating. For example, Vibius Sequester uses the word twice in the opening seven lines of the *De fluminibus, fontibus, lacubus, nemoribus, paludibus, montibus, gentibus per litteras libellus*.<sup>38</sup> Charisius describes the *Ars grammatica* he is giving his son as a gift *a me digestam in libris quinque*.<sup>39</sup> Marcellus in the introductory letter to his sons repeats the digestion-metaphor at two points when he describes what he has included from Latin and Greek sources and what he has appended to the *De medicamentis*.<sup>40</sup>

On the other hand, in the preface to the *Attic Nights*, the comparisons are somewhat more apparent. Aulus Gellius ascribes to his finished work the same disparity of subject matter he had included in his first short and undigested notes.<sup>41</sup> He also characterizes his work as the first fruits or appetizers of the liberal arts, *sed primitias quasdam et quasi libamenta ingenuarum artium*.<sup>42</sup> When Macrobius writes his introduction to the *Saturnalia*, he echoes the words and phrasing of the preface to the *Attic Nights*, but he sharply distinguishes his practice from that of his unacknowledged predecessor. In describing his method and its intended result, he places far greater emphasis upon the comparisons between intellectual and physical digestion. For example, he asserts that he has

<sup>38</sup> *Quanto ingenio ac studio, fili carissime, apud plerosque poetas fluminum mentio habita est, tanto labore sum secutus eorum et regiones et vocabula et qualitates in litteram digerens. . . . fontium etiam et lacuum, paludumque et montium, nemorumque et gentium, . . . huic libello in litteram digesta nomina subieci.*

<sup>39</sup> *Amore Latini sermonis obligare te cupiens, fili karissime, artem grammaticam sollertia doctissimorum virorum politam et a me digestam in libris quinque dono tibi misi.*

<sup>40</sup> See note 30 for quotation of Marcellus's first usage.

<sup>41</sup> Pr. 3: *Facta igitur est in his quoque commentariis eadem rerum disparilitas quae fuit in illis annotationibus pristinis, quas breviter et indigeste et incondite ex auditionibus lectionibusque variis feceramus.*

<sup>42</sup> Pr. 13. At the end of dedicatory preface of the *De arithmetica* Boethius uses the same analogy (*laboris mei primitias*).



brought material from diverse authors and disparate times together into a coherent whole:

nec indigeste tamquam in acervum conessimus digna memoratu: sed uariarum rerum disparilitas auctoribus diversa, confusa temporibus, ita in quoddam digesta corpus est, ut quae indistincte atque promiscue ad subsidium memoriae adnotaveramus in ordinem instar membrorum cohaerentia convenirent. (*Sat.* pr. 3)

He then develops five comparisons to describe his method of composition and the resulting form of the work. His composition imitates the bees' production of honey, nature's transformation of food into blood and bodily strength, the combination of single numbers into a finished product, the blending of scents to make a single perfume, and the blending of voices to form a choir.<sup>43</sup>

Macrobius borrowed this section of his preface from the eighty-fourth letter of Seneca. In that letter Seneca endorses the usefulness of extensive reading and argues for excerpting material from others and transforming it into one's own possession. With only minor revisions, Macrobius lifts the five comparisons given in sections 3–10 of Seneca's letter and juxtaposes the Senecan excerpts with the echoes from Aulus Gellius cited above. In other words, the text in which Macrobius describes his method of composition is an example of the appropriation method he claims for his text. He advocates seamless synthesis as an author's major task and endorses verbal regurgitation both by precept and in practice.

Martianus Capella uses eating- and regurgitation-metaphors as major elements in the literary frame in which he sets the *De nuptiis* and in the narrative of the second book of the myth. By calling attention to the literary functions these metaphors fulfill, Martianus subverts his persona's narrative authority and raises questions about the principles of seamless synthesis and verbal regurgitation which Macrobius so effectively demonstrates.

The *De nuptiis* is written as a Menippean Satire, a classical genre which has no well-defined literary canon, but is usually thought to include a

<sup>43</sup> *Sat.* 1, pr. 5–10. The first two comparisons run as follows: *Apes enim quodam modo debemus imitari, quae vagantur et flores carpunt, deinde, quidquid attulere, disponunt ac per favos dividunt et sucum varium in unum sorem mixtura quadam et proprietate spiritus sui mutant. nos quoque, quidquid diversa lectione quaesivimus, commitemus stilo, ut in ordinem eodem digerente coalescat. nam et in animo melius distincta servantur et ipsa distinctio non sine quodam fermento, quo conditur universitas, in unius saporis usum varia libamenta confundit, ut, etiam siquid apparuerit unde sumptum sit, aliud tamen esse quam unde sumptum noscetur appareat: quod in corpore nostro videmus sine ulla opera nostra facere naturam: alimenta quae accipimus, quam diu in sua qualitate perseverant et solida innatant, male stomacho oneri sunt: at cum ex eo quod erant mutata sunt, tum demum in vires et sanguinem transeunt. idem in his, quibus aluntur ingenia, praestemus, ut quaecumque hausimus non patiamur integra esse, ne aliena sint, sed in quandam digeriem concoquantur: alioquin in memoriam ire possunt, non in ingenium.*

mixture of prose and verse, journeys to the underworld or the heavens, and a questioning of the authority of the narrator and the decorum of literary conventions. The work contains nine books, the first two devoted to the myth of the marriage between the god Mercury and the human maiden Philology, and the last seven devoted to presentations by the personified Liberal Arts: Grammar, Dialectic, Rhetoric, Geometry, Arithmetic, Astronomy, and Music. The entire work is surrounded by a literary frame in which Martianus, the white-haired father, retells for his son Martianus the story Satura had told him.

In the opening prose section, Martianus attributes the entire work to the personification of the genre, Satura, and includes her as an important figure in the subsequent development of the literary frame. She interrupts Martianus at the beginning of the eighth book and at the end of the work in order to protest angrily about his authorial incompetence. The word *satura* was thought to derive from a type of stuffing,<sup>44</sup> and Martianus seems to play upon that derivation in his final poem describing the work. In the poem Martianus describes the fable Satura told him as an indigestible mixture of contrasting ingredients (997-98):

habes senilem, Martiane, fabulam  
miscilla lusit quam lucernis flamine  
Satura, Pelasgos dum docere nititur  
artes cathedris vix amicas Atticis,  
sic in novena decedit volumina.  
haec quippe loquax *docta indoctis aggerans*  
*fandis tacenda farcinat, immiscuit*  
Musas deosque, disciplinas cyclicas  
garrire agresti cruda finxit plasmate.

At this point Satura can no longer contain her rage at the hash the author has made of her tale. Swelling with rage and bile (999 *turgensque felle ac bili*), she interrupts and attacks him viciously, and concludes her remarks to the son or reader with these words (1000):

ab hoc creatum Pegaseum gurgitem  
decente quando possem haurire poculo?

The narrator uses similar language in the interchange with Satura at the beginning of the eighth book on astronomy. At that point in the wedding some of the guests have lost interest in the presentations given by the Liberal Arts and have turned their attention elsewhere. Silenus has fallen into a drunken sleep, and Cupid rudely awakens him. Satura cannot

<sup>44</sup> Varro's derivation is recorded by Diomedes in the third book of his *Ars Grammatica* as follows (Keil, *Gramm. Lat.* I 485 ff.): *sive a quodam genere farciminis quod multis rebus refertum saturam dicit Varro vocitatum. est autem hoc positum in secundo libro Plautinarum quaestionum "satura est uva passa et polenta et nuclei pini ex mulso consparsi."*

stomach such levity (807 *nondum stomacho senescente*), she attempts to call the narrator back to his senses with a poem on a loftier plane, but the narrator responds with a spirited defense of his efforts which include a series of playful questions and a final piece of advice which reinforces the connection between tasting and being wise: *ride, si sapis, o puella, ride*.<sup>45</sup>

The concluding poem and the interchange at the beginning of Book 8 contain a strong admixture of farce (incidentally, another literary term which derives from stuffing). These episodes portray the process of composition as awkward and interrupted, and they stress that the finished product is not a sweet and pleasant blend, like the honey to which Macrobius alludes, but an indigestible collation, impossible to sip or even to be contained in a fitting cup. When describing his own work or the disposition of Satura, Martianus frequently uses words which imply breaking apart or breaking through barriers of constraint. This language, the disparate subject matter, and the variation from lofty religious speculation to low farce give the entire work a degree of ambiguity not found in most of these didactic texts, and reveal doubts about the competence of the cook and the quality of the educational feast.

Such doubts may have arisen from the religious or spiritual beliefs to which Martianus<sup>46</sup> gives dramatic enactment in Book 2 of the *De nuptiis*. Before the human maiden Philology can make her ascent to the stars, she is forced to vomit up a large number of heavy texts lodged in her breast. These books the Muses hasten to gather up and preserve for earthly use.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>45</sup> 809: *Talia adhuc canente Satura, vetitus ille ac durissime castigatus denuo me risus invasit. "euge" inquam, "Satura mea, an te poetriam fecit cholera? coepistine Permesiaci gurgitis sitire fontes? iamne fulgores praevides et vultus deorum? ubi illud repente discessit, quod irrisoria semper lepidaque versutia inter insana [semper] deridebas vaturn tumores, dicabulis cavillantibus saleque contenta nec minus [poetarum] rhetorum cothurno inter lymphatica derelicto, et quod rabido fervebas cerebrosa motu, ac me Sileni somnum ridentem censorio clangore superciliosior increpabas? ergone figmenta dimoveam, et nihil leporis iocique permixti taedium auscultantium recreabit? Paeligni de cetero iuvenis vesiculo respisce, et ni tragicum corrugaris, ride, si sapis, o puella, ride."*

<sup>46</sup> The extensive religious speculation in the *De nuptiis* would suggest that the author was a well-educated and devout pagan.

<sup>47</sup> 134-38: *et "heus" inquit "virgo, praecepit deorum pater hac regali lectica in caeli palatia subveharis, quam quidem nulli fas attrectare terrigenae, sed ne tibi quidem, si ante nostrum poculum, licet." et cum dicto leniter dextra cordis eius pulsum pectusque pertractat, ac nescioqua intima plenitudine distentam magno cum turgore respiciens, "ni haec," inquit "quibus plenum pectus geris, coactissima egestionem vomueris forasque diffuderis, immortalitatis sedem nullatenus obtinebis." at illa omni nisu magnaue vi quicquid intra pectus persenserat evomebat. tunc vero illa nausea ac vomitio laborata in omnigenum copias convertitur litterarum. cernere erat, qui libri quantaue volumina, quot linguarum opera ex ore virginis diffuebant. alia ex papyro, quae cedro perlita fuerat, videbantur, alii carbasinis voluminibus implicati libri, ex ovillis multi quoque tergoribus, rari vero in philylae cortice subnotati; erantque quidam sacra nigredine colorati, quorum litterae animantium credebantur effigies, quasque librorum notas Athanasia conspiciens quibusdam eminentibus saxis iussit ascribi atque intra specum per Aegyptiorum adyta collocari, eademque saxa stelas appellans deorum stemmata praecipit continere. sed dum*

Martianus dwells upon the outer, physical characteristics of the books Philology disgorges and provides a catalogue of works of differing languages written on various materials and with quite differing outer forms. The scene is an unforgettable presentation of a mystical insight. It simultaneously stresses the value of human learning and the necessity for its ultimate rejection if the human hopes to gain a vision of the divine.

Both Apuleius and Macrobius act as interpreters of philosophical and religious matters for their sons. Apuleius's *De Platone et eius dogmate* and the *De mundo* and Macrobius's *Saturnalia* and *Somnium Scipionis* contain revelation and religious speculation which the father explains and clarifies for his child. Those paternal authors do not overtly question either the nature of their work or their competence to undertake it. Their role is to translate difficult philosophical concepts into understandable form.

Martianus follows a different course. He creates a myth, sets didactic discourses within unfamiliar surroundings, and subverts his paternal authority by open abuse of his authorial persona. He uses comparisons between his literary effort and food, but his comparisons stress indigestibility and ejection. Throughout his work Martianus stresses the underlying unity of opposites and his own inability to achieve it. Augustine challenges the tradition by rejecting the basis for paternal educational authority. Martianus undermines it by suggesting that all the disparate elements of knowledge cannot be brought together into one smooth mixture humans can swallow.

In general, the digestion-metaphors in ancient didactic texts present a somewhat unappetizing vision of the subject matter either as disordered tidbits or already processed pap. While such a vision may be offensive to a modern reader, the repetition of the metaphor in the ancient authors suggests that they held a different view. They saw themselves as processors and preservers of intellectual nourishment which could be used to sustain the next generation.

### Roman Models and Medieval Textbooks

The influence of father-son dialogues and dedications extends far beyond the ancient world. Two brief examples from Cato and Cicero will illustrate how the tradition continued into medieval textbooks. Cato influences the development of the tradition, not so much through the survival of his words as through the exemplary portrait later authors made of his life. Cicero shapes and develops the father-son didactic tradition through the direct

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*talia virgo undanter evomeret, puellae quamplures, quarum Artes aliae, alterae dictae sunt Disciplinae, subinde, quae ex ore virgo effuderat, colligebant in suum unaquaeque illarum necessarium usum facultatemque corripient. ipsae etiam Musae, praesertim Vranie Calliopeque, innumera gremio congressere volumina.*



influence of his writings and the indirect influence which derived from his reputation.

Thus, it is not the actual, historical Cato, but the Cato of romance, the typical wise old Roman father who is the voice of the popular *Disticha Catonis*. These two-line hexameter maxims were purportedly directed by Cato to his son Marcus. The kernel of the collection of moral aphorisms originated well before the third century A.D., although the collection continued to grow and change in the course of its later use as a primary text. As one of the basic texts for the elementary study of Latin during the medieval period, the *Disticha* spread the influence of Cato and the father-son educational model widely. To be sure, the *Disticha* were not without rivals in the medieval classroom and were supplanted to some degree by the *Monosticha* of Eugenius and, later especially, by the study of the Psalter. Still, the number of extant manuscripts and the references to maxims from other sources attest to their currency from the fourth century onward. The very attribution of the collection to Cato and its subsequent popularity not only furthered the literary convention but also fostered a memory of an educational practice which was centered upon the father teaching his son.

Cicero's two works for his son provide models for imitation throughout the later tradition. Of the many followers and imitators, Ambrose deserves special mention because his work marks a turning point in the tradition's development. In his three books *De officiis ministrorum* Ambrose uses the Ciceronian literary model in order to address the young clerics of the diocese for whom he is the spiritual father. His work exemplifies the transition between the dedication of moral instruction to children of the flesh and the deliverance of moral precepts to children of the spirit.

Three observations may be gleaned from a quick retrospective of the catalogue of authors: (1) the prominence of the father-son dedication in authors of the late fourth and fifth centuries; (2) the large number of Latin paternal authors who were not born under Italian skies and, in some instances, call attention to their foreign origins (Seneca, Aulus Gellius, Apuleius, Nonius Marcellus, Charisius, Macrobius, Augustine, Martianus Capella, Marcellus, Cassius Felix, and Martyrius could be included in such a group); and (3) the number of important educational texts of the early and later Middle Ages which are prefaced by father-son dedications or are constructed as a father-son dialogue. By manuscript count alone, the *Disticha Catonis*, the *De nuptiis*, and the *De arithmetica* would rank among the most widely distributed texts. Others on the list are not far behind in count, although a few are preserved in a unique manuscript or only in fragments.

Ancient education depended very much upon the possession, preservation, and transmission of actual texts. Such education can be characterized as highly literary and almost slavish in its adherence to earlier textual authorities as an abstract generalization. It was also bounded by the

scrolls and books, the concrete physical signs and the means by which learning was passed from one generation to the next. Moderns live in a world of multiple copies, easy duplication, and quick obsolescence; and modern education must teach the ability to search and synthesize. Not even the wealthiest readers in antiquity faced comparable problems of textual proliferation and intellectual plenty. Owning and displaying the scrolls and books themselves were signs of the owner's participation in the cultural tradition.

School texts in the late Middle Ages, for example, show a number of signs of the pride of ownership.<sup>48</sup> Paul Gehl has discussed examples of Tuscan production of small books for children. These texts gave the child simultaneously a set of moral goals, instruction in Latin, and a tangible, attractively decorated artifact of book culture. In a similar way, the earlier Latin texts in this tradition represented an actual physical gift, a scroll or codex which the father intended as a more permanent, outward expression of the learning he hoped to transmit. The father's role in educating his child then becomes not so much an act of discovery for the future but a monument to past learning, digested and assembled into a conventional literary structure which celebrated family relations and accomplishments.

The literary convention of father-son dedication so prevalent in the Roman encyclopaedic tradition may thus be linked with a conscious identification in the author's mind between the type of learned work and virtuous attributes. The prevalence of this form of dedication in late antiquity should not be seen as meaningless repetition of an outmoded convention but rather as a badge, a consciously assumed marker of participation within Roman culture. The subject matter taught (the ethical and practical precepts of agriculture, rhetoric, religion, and politics) also served similar aims and was, like the conventional dedications, both descriptive and prescriptive.

To be sure, the major subject matter of the educational treatise, the basic text of the handbook, usually proceeds without frequent references to the reader, whether addressed as son or not. Yet the frame which the dedication or dialogue provides sets up a fictive educational model and pattern of identification which subsequent readers are forced to recall or even, to a limited extent, to assume. In short, the texts themselves contain reminders of the primary role of the parent in educating his offspring. Although Bishop Eucherius's dedication of religious writings to his sons Salonius and Veranius, and Boethius's dedication of the *De sancta trinitate* to his father-in-law indicate how subject matter and catechetical expectations were changing in the later period, the instructional patterns and the familial format remain remarkably constant. The ancient model for teaching and learning accompanies the subject matter taught and retains some influence in

<sup>48</sup> See P. F. Gehl, "Latin Readers in Fourteenth-Century Florence: Schoolkids and their Books," *Scrittura e Civiltà* 13 (1989) 396-98, 410.

the later period, if only as the fictive, textbook setting for instruction or the imagined context by which the author establishes a bond with his reader.

It is misleading to read these ancient dedications and dialogues as if the literary forms served the same functions as modern dedications. Such a reading fails to acknowledge the source of the author's authority and the relationships which define the work's purpose and execution. Modern didactic authors, relying on their membership in a professional class, use their works to demonstrate their authority in the field. Dedication to a husband or child is a brief recognition of other aspects of the author's life. Ancient authors draw their didactic authority from the family relation and construct their works as celebratory monuments of that relationship. The works confirm the family's identification with a cultured class in Roman society and stand as visible, public testimony of personal commitment to virtue and learning.

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## The Text of Prodromus' Novel

MIROSLAV MARCOVICH

Theodorus Prodromus (ca. 1100–1158) was a prolific author.<sup>1</sup> Doubtless the masterpiece of his poetic skill is the romantic novel in verses (4,614 of them) Τὰ κατὰ 'Ροδάνθην καὶ Δοσικλέα, divided into nine books. The romance is preserved in four manuscripts, clearly falling into two classes: HV vs. UL.<sup>2</sup>

The older class is represented by H (= Heidelbergensis Palatinus gr. 43, saec. XIV, ff. 39<sup>r</sup>–83<sup>r</sup>). H is by far the best codex, but it has been heavily damaged by moisture and time; hence it is difficult to read. The other MS of this class is V (= Vaticanus gr. 121, saec. XIII, ff. 22<sup>r</sup>–29<sup>v</sup>). V is copied in four columns per page, with 61–71 lines per column. No dodecasyllabic line is longer than 4 cm. Consequently, V is difficult to read because of its extremely small letters.

The younger class is represented by U (= Vaticanus Urbinas gr. 134, saec. XV medii, ff. 78<sup>v</sup>–119<sup>r</sup>), copied by the scribe Francopulos, and by L (= Laurentianus Acquisti e Doni 341, saec. XVI ineuntis, ff. 1<sup>r</sup>–50<sup>r</sup>).

In addition, between 1328 and 1336 Michael Macarius Chrysocephalus copied moral sentences (γνῶμαι) from Prodromus' novel (total: 99 verses) and included them in his Anthology 'Ροδωνιαί, "Rose Garden." Chrysocephalus' autograph is preserved in cod. M (= Marcianus gr. 452 [Collocazione 796], ff. 245<sup>r</sup>–246<sup>v</sup>). On the other hand, cod. Musei Britannici Sloane 2003, saec. XVII (fol. 174), is of no value for the establishment of the text, since it copied Prodromus' *loci communes* from the first printed edition of the novel.<sup>3</sup>

This *editio princeps* appeared in 1625 in Paris, as prepared by Gilbert Gaulmin (1587–1667), along with a Latin metrical version and copious

<sup>1</sup> Compare W. Hörandner, *Theodoros Prodromos: Historische Gedichte*, Wiener Byzantinistische Studien 11 (Vienna 1974) 37–67 (Werke).

<sup>2</sup> So correctly M. T. Cottone, "La tradizione manoscritta del romanzo di Teodoro Prodromo," *Università di Padova, Istituto di Studi Bizantini e Neellenici, Miscellanea* 2 (1979) 9–34.

<sup>3</sup> *Contra* R. Beaton, *The Medieval Greek Romance*, Cambridge Studies in Medieval Literature 4 (Cambridge 1989) 67: "Prodromos' romance . . . was excerpted in a further two [manuscripts], the second from as late as the seventeenth century. . . . This evidence for a continuing readership . . ."



notes by Gaulmin.<sup>4</sup> The edition is based on H alone, which Claude de Saumaise (Claudius Salmasius, 1588–1653) had copied for Gaulmin with an infinite number of misreadings and omissions (e.g., Saumaise skipped ff. 55<sup>v</sup>–56<sup>r</sup> of H, comprising 4. 89–191 of the novel). Now, since H has a major lacuna after f. 77<sup>v</sup> (comprising 8. 398–497), its text was supplied for Gaulmin by John Barclay (1582–1621) from V. Incidentally, in the copy of Gaulmin's *editio princeps* in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris (Y<sup>2</sup> 6072) there are marginal emendations by Pierre Daniel Huet (1630–1721), which I have used.

Prodromus' novel was edited for the second (and last) time by Rudolf Hercher (1821–1878), in 1859, in his *Erotici Scriptores Graeci*.<sup>5</sup> Hercher did not collate the MSS, but rather relied on Gaulmin (read: Saumaise), in addition to the work of Philippe Le Bas (1794–1860). The consequence is that Hercher's edition is full of false readings and mistakes. The merit of the edition, however, is in the fact that Hercher, a learned scholar, was able to emend many a scribal error.

While preparing a first critical edition of Prodromus' novel,<sup>6</sup> I have twice collated all the manuscripts in their originals. It is my impression that the archetype contained supralinear *variae lectiones*. In addition, Prodromus' own σκοτεινὴ ἔκφρασις was not always correctly understood by the scribes; hence an abundance of undetected scribal errors in the extant manuscripts. It is instructive to point out the degree of deterioration of the original text of the novel during one single century of its transmission: 1150–1250 (the age of V).

On this occasion, I am presenting a selection of emendations suggested by me, along with a few remarks on Prodromus' probable sources of poetic inspiration.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> *Theodori Prodromi philosophi Rhodanthes et Dosiclis amorum libri IX*. Graece et Latine. Interprete Gilb[erto] Gaulmino Molinensi. Parisiis, apud Tussanum du Bray, sub via Iacobaea, sub spicis maturis. M.DC.XXV. Cum privilegio Regis. 592 p. (Greek text with a facing Latin version, pp. 1–423; Gaulmin's notes, pp. 471–574.)

<sup>5</sup> Ἑρωτικῶν λόγων συγγραφεὺς, recognovit Rudolphus Hercher. Tomus alter, Lipsiae 1859, pp. 287–434 and xli–lviii.

<sup>6</sup> Forthcoming (1992) in the *Bibliotheca Teubneriana*.

<sup>7</sup> Compare also O. Häger, *De Theodori Prodromi in fabula erotica 'Ροδάνθη καὶ Δοσικλῆς fontibus* (diss. Göttingen 1908); H. Hunger, "Antiker und byzantinischer Roman," *SB Akademie Heidelberg*, Philos.-hist. Klasse 1980, Abh. 3 (Heidelberg 1980) 1–34; idem, "Die byzantinische Literatur der Komnenenzeit. Versuch einer Neubewertung," *Anzeiger der Akademie Wien*, Philos.-hist. Klasse 105 (1968) 59–76; idem, *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner*, Byzantinisches Handbuch, V.2 (Munich 1978) 128–33; A. D. Aleksidze, *Vizantijskij roman XII veka* (Tbilisi 1965); S. V. Poljakova, *Iz istorii vizantijskogo romana* (Moscow 1979) 89–124; R. Beaton (above, note 3) 67–73 and 220 (with literature).

(1) The pirates of Mistylus conquer Rhodes and take many captives, among them the young couple Rhodanthe and Dosicles. 1. 33–38 Hercher reads:

“Ἄλλους δὲ δεσμήσαντες ἐκ τῶν αὐχένων  
κλοιοῖς σιδηροῖς ἐσφυρηλατημένοις  
καὶ χεῖρας ἐκδήσαντες ἐξοπισθίους,  
δοῦλους προηγὼν ἀθλίως τοὺς ἀθλίους·  
μεθ’ ὧν Δοσικλῆς καὶ Ῥοδάνθη παρθένος  
χειρὶ συνεδέθησαν ὡμοῦ βαρβάρων.

In 38, Gaulmin and Hercher follow the reading of HV, *ξυνεδέθησαν*, but it does not scan. Isidor Hilberg suggested *ξυνεσχέθησαν* instead.<sup>8</sup> Hilberg was right, but the fact is that the reading *ξυνεσχέθησαν* already exists in the class UL. Prodrōmus employs *συνέχω* in the same sense at 1. 94 and 4. 56. The probable reason for the reading *ξυνεδέθησαν* in HV was the presence in the scribe’s memory of 33 *δεσμήσαντες* and 35 *ἐκδήσαντες*.

(2) Within the traditional *ecphrasis* of a beautiful bride,<sup>9</sup> in our case Rhodanthe (1. 39–60), we read (1. 46–47):

Ὅφρ’ οὖς φυσικῶς εὖ γεωμετρομένη  
εἰς εὐφυᾶ μίμησιν ἡμικυκλίου.

V has *εὐφυοῦς*, and this is the correct reading; compare 5. 113 *καὶ κύκλον ὥσπερ εὐφυᾶ μιμουμένων*.

(3) In prison, the young hero Dosicles is seriously worried about his own and Rhodanthe’s future (1. 97–98):

“Καὶ ταῦτα μικρά, τῶν δ’ ἐς αὔριον χάριν  
λίαν κατασπᾶ τὴν ἐμὴν ψυχὴν φόβος . . .”

*Λίαν* is Saumaise’s mistake; all MSS have *πολύς*. Compare 7. 470 *εἰς μέγιστον ἐμπεσὼν φόβον*. Cottone 15 is correct.

(4) “Barbarians are by nature passionately fond of women,” states Dosicles (cf. 3. 154) echoing Chariton 5. 2. 6 (*φύσει δέ ἐστι τὸ βάρβαρον γυναιμανές*), and if they do not get what they want they are ready to commit murder (1. 110–11):

“Θερμὸν γάρ ἐστιν εἰς ἔρον τὸ βάρβαρον,  
κἂν μὴ τύχη, πρόχειρον εἰς φονουργίαν.”

<sup>8</sup> *Epistula critica ad Ioannem Vahlenum* (Vienna 1877) 14.

<sup>9</sup> Compare Constantine Manasses, *Itinerary* 1. 166–99; idem, *Chronicle* 1157–67; Nicetas Choniates, *Hist.* p. 151 Bekker (= p. 116. 61–66 van Dieten); Eustath. *Macrembolita* 3. 6. 1–4; Achill. Tat. 1. 4; Xenoph. *Ephes.* 1. 2. 6; Musaeus 55–66 et alibi.

Κἄν μὴ τύχη is an emendation by Le Bas and Hercher of καὶ μὴ τύχη of the class UL. But the older class HV, seconded by Chrysocephalus' autograph M, have καὶ μὴ τυχόν, and this is the correct reading. Maybe the scribe of the source for UL was influenced by 106 κἄν μὲν τύχη and 109 εἰ δ' οὐ τύχη.

(5) The noble Rhodanthe is of delicate nature, says Dosicles, not accustomed to the hardships of life, and sensitive to the lightest illness (1. 118–21):

“... ἄλλ' ἢ Ῥοδάνθη πῶς ὑποίσει τὸν πόνον,  
γυνὴ θαλάμῳ καὶ τρυφαῖς εἰθισμένη,  
σὰρξ ἀπαλή, πρόχειρος εἰς πᾶσαν νόσον,  
εἰ καὶ μικρᾷ γοῦν αἰκίᾳ παρεμπέσοι;” 120

Αἰκία is Hercher's emendation for the transmitted αἰτία (actually, H has μικρὰ and αἵτια). Read: εἰ καὶ μικρὰ γοῦν αἰτία παρεμπέση (= MSS), “should even a slightest occasion for illness occur,” and compare 2. 465 καὶ μηδὲν ὑμῖν ἐμποδὼν παρεμπέσοι.

(6) But in the same prison there is a friend in need, to cheer up Dosicles, Cratander from Cyprus, who addresses his fellow-prisoner as follows (1. 137–43):

“παύθητι” φησὶ “τῶν στεναγμῶν, ὦ ξένε·  
ἐπίσχες ὥπὲρ τὰς ῥοὰς τῶν δακρύων,  
ἀποξενωθεὶς τῆς ἐνεγκούσης φέρε·  
ἔχεις γὰρ ἡμᾶς συναπεξενωμένους.  
Ληστῶν ἀπηνῶν ἀρπαγῇ κατεσχέθης·  
πάντες κατεσχέθημεν ὅπλοις βαρβάρων.  
Οἰκεῖς φυλακὴν· συμπεφυλακίσμεθα...” 140

In 139, ἀποξενωθεὶς is Saumaise's mistake; all MSS have ἀπεξενώθης, which corresponds to 141 κατεσχέθης and 143 οἰκεῖς φυλακὴν. Thus read line 139: ἀπεξενώθης τῆς ἐνεγκούσης· φέρε.

(7) Cratander tells Dosicles his own tragic story—the accidental death of his beloved girl Chrysochroe. He was just paying a secret visit to the girl's premises, just as Clitophon in Achilles Tatius 2. 23. 4 did, (1. 176–77):

“προβάς δὲ πρὸς τοῦμπροσθεν ἡσύχῳ ποδὶ  
ἔσπευδον ἐλθεῖν ἀμφὶ τὴν Χρυσοχρόην.”

Ποδὶ is a rare metrical irregularity. (Every Byzantine dodecasyllable should end with a paroxytone.). The meter is restored by reading ἡσυχον πόδα. The construction is common enough: Theognis 283; Aristoph. *Eccl.* 161;

Eur. *Bacch.* 647, *Or.* 136, *Med.* 217; E. Forberg, *Abhandlung über πόδα βαίνω und ähnliche Strukturen im Griechischen* (Coburg 1850).

(8) In his dirge for the dead daughter, Chrysochroe's father Androcles likens his daughter to a beautiful tree cut before its time (1. 224–25):

“ὦ δένδρον εὐχρουν, εὐπρεπές, κάλλος μέγα,  
κενῶς ὑπανθοῦν, ὠραϊσμένον μάτην.”

Κάλλος is Saumaise's mistake; all MSS have καλόν. Thus read the line: ὦ δένδρον εὐχρουν, εὐπρεπές, καλόν, μέγα.

(9) Androcles continues his dirge (1. 247–48):

“Ποῦ σὸν τὸ κάλλος τοῦ προσώπου, παρθένε;  
Ἥ μὲν κεφαλὴ τῷ λίθῳ σινετρίβη . . .”

First, the MSS have σοι, not σὸν. Second, σινετρίβη is the reading of the younger class UL; the older one, HV, has συνεθρύβη, and this is the correct reading: Compare 6. 449 τέθνηκεν ἡ παῖς (i.e., Chrysochroe) συνθυβεῖσα τὴν κάραν.

(10) In his turn, the misfortunate groom of Chrysochroe, Cratander, opens his own dirge (1. 277–78):

“ὦ ὦμοι” λέγων “ἄγαλμα σεπτὸν παρθένου,  
ὦ κάλλος, οἷον καὶ θεοὺς ἐφέλκυσει . . .”

All MSS have παρθένε. Thus read: ἄγαλμα σεπτόν, παρθένε, and compare 1. 39–40, Ἦν οὖν τὸ κάλλος τῆς κόρης χρῆμα ξένον,/ ἄγαλμα σεπτόν, εἰκόνοσ θείας τύπος . . .

(11) Cratander continues (1. 301–02):

“Στέργοιμ' ἄν αὐτὸς τὸν φόνον τὸν ἐκ λίθων,  
ἐπεὶ λίθῳ τέθνηκεν ἡ Χρυσοχρόη.”

Ἐκ λίθων is Gaulmin's emendation for the transmitted ἐν λίθοις. Hercher adopts the emendation (p. xliv), since the instrumental ἐν is employed with a noun (φόνος), not with a verb (“to kill”). I think this distinction is irrelevant, and the MSS' ἐν λίθοις should be retained. Compare 1. 266 ἡ τοὺς κρίνοντας συμπατάξεις ἐν λίθῳ; NT Hebrews 11. 37 ἐν φόνῳ μαχαίρης ἀπέθανον.

(12) Androcles preferred a quiet, private life (1. 323–26):

“καλὸν μὲν ἦν μοι, ναὶ καλὸν καὶ συμφέρον  
βιοῦν καθ' αὐτὸν εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον·  
τὸ γὰρ σιωπᾶν καὶ στέγειν ἐμὰς τύχας



δημηγορικῶν ὑπερέκρινον λόγων."

In 325, στέγειν is Hercher's conjecture for the transmitted βλέπειν. The change is, however, unwarranted, since Prodrōmus elsewhere employs βλέπειν in a metaphorical sense ("to mind, pay attention to"). Compare 9. 94 θεὸς δὲ τὴν βουλὴν βλέπει; 5. 81, 6. 334. Cottone 15 is correct.

(13) Androcles explains his case to the judges (1. 337–40):

"Ἦν μοι θυγάτηρ τοῦνομα Χρυσοχρόη,  
καλὴ μὲν εἶδος, ναὶ καλὴ καὶ παρθένος,  
ἤδη δὲ πρὸς θάλαμον ἡτοιμασμένη  
καὶ πρὸς γάμον καὶ ζυγὸν ἡτρεπισμένη." 340

HV omit line 340, and UL have καὶ πρὸς γαμικὸν ζυγὸν, which is correct: compare παστάδες γαμικαί at 1. 216–17, γαμικὴ ἄλυσις at 6. 157.

(14) In his defense, Cratander's father Craton asks the judges, "Who has ever accused my son of any crime?" (1. 360–63):

"... εἰς ἄχρι καὶ νῦν εὐγενὴ ζήσας βίον, 360  
φόνων καθαρὸν καὶ συλημάτων ξένον  
καὶ παντὸς αἰσχροῦ καὶ βδελυκτοῦ τοῖς νόμοις·  
ἢ τίς κατηγορήσεν αὐτῶν τοιάδε;"

In 363, Hercher adopts Gaulmin's reading, αὐτῶν. HV, however, have αὐτοῖς, while UL have αὐτοῦ, which is the correct reading: αὐτοῦ refers to Cratander.

(15) After submitting to a *iudicium Dei* through fire,<sup>10</sup> Cratander is found innocent. The crowd that is present cheers Cratander and Craton, and boos the false accuser Androcles (1. 401–04):

Πρὸς ταῦτα κράξας συμμιγῇ φωνὴν μίαν  
ὁ συμπαρεστὼς ὄχλος ἀμφὶ τὴν κρίσιν  
τὸν συκοφάντην Ἀνδροκλῆν κατηγοροῦν,  
ἡμᾶς περικροτοῦντες εὐφήμοις λόγοις.

Gaulmin and Hercher follow V in reading 403 κατηγοροῦν. But HUL have κακηγόρου, and this is the correct reading: The crowd employs only verbal abuse against Androcles, without accusing him of anything.

(16) Again Cratander comforts Dosicles in prison (1. 506–07):

<sup>10</sup> Compare Soph. *Antig.* 264–65; Heliod. *Aethiop.* 8. 9, 10. 8–9; Strab. 5. 2. 9, 12. 2. 7; Pliny, *NH* 7. 19; Verg. *Aen.* 11. 787–88; Raymond, *Hist. Francorum*, pp. 120–22 ed. Hill; Georg. *Acropol. Chron.* 50 (pp. 96–98 Heisenberg); Georg. *Pachym. Mich. Pal.* p. 92 ed. Bonn.; Ioann. *Cantac. Hist.* 3. 27 (pp. 172 f. ed. Bonn.); C. Cupane, *Rivista di studi bizantini e neoellenici*, N.S. 10–11 (1974) 147–68.

“Τῶν μὲν καθ’ ἡμᾶς τοῖς θεοῖς φροντιστέον·  
ναὶ γάρ, Δοσίκλεις, τοῖς θεοῖς πάντως μέλοι.”

Gaulmin and Hercher read πάντως μέλοι. But HV have πάντων μέλον, and this is the correct reading (against πάντων μέλει L, and πάντως μέλει U).

(17) To Cratander’s request to tell his own story, Dosicles replies with a Vergilian *Infandum, regina, iubes renovare dolorem* (1. 510–11):

“Κλαυθμούς μὲν, οἶδα, καὶ ῥοὰς τῶν δακρύων  
ἡμᾶς ἀπαιτεῖς, συννεωκόρε ξένη.”

But neither of the youths is a νεωκόρος. Read instead: συννεώτερε. This συννεώτερε means the same as συνηλικιώτα; compare Ioann. Malal. *Chron.* 7 (= p. 181. 17 Dindorf).

(18) The harbor of Rhodes is quiet and safe (2. 9–10 and 15–16):

“Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔνδον ἀσφαλῇ τοῦ λιμένος·  
οὐ κυμάτων θροῦς, οὐ λόφοι καὶ χάσματα . . . 10  
οὐδ’ ἀντέγερσις πνευμάτων ἀντιθρώων 15  
δινεῖ τὸ ρεῖθρον καὶ κυκλοῖ τὰς ὀλκάδας.”

First, in 15 Hercher follows V by reading ἀντιθρώων. But it was induced by 10 θροῦς. HUL have ἀντιπνώνων, and this is the correct reading. Compare 2. 317 ταραχθεῖς . . . πνοαῖς ἀντιπνόοις. Second, in 16 Hercher follows UL by reading κυκλοῖ. But κυκᾶ of HV is a *lectio difficilior* and is to be preferred.

(19) Dosicles depicts a rich banquet given by Glaucon at Rhodes (2. 105–10):

“Οὔτω μὲν εἶχε τῆς καθέδρας ἡ θέσις· 105  
καὶ πάντες εἰσιτῶντο λαμπροῖς σιτίοις,  
ὑπὸ Στρατοκλεῖ λιγυρῶς κεκραγότες,  
ᾧδῃς ἀγαθῆς ἐμμελῶς ἡγουμένῳ.  
Εὐθύς δ’ ἀναστὰς τοῦ πότου Ναυσικράτης  
ὄρχησιν ὥρχήσατο ναυτικώτεραν.” 110

There is a lacuna after line 106 properly describing the banquet and the transition to a drinking-party, for Stratocles is not likely to have been singing *during* the dinner. This is confirmed by 109 τοῦ πότου, which cannot refer to the dinner, but only to the ensuing symposium.

(20) The host’s young (and drunk) son Dryas makes advances to Rhodanthe, while imitating Achilles Tatius 2. 9. 2–3 (2. 141–46):

“Ἄλλ’ ὁ προσηνὴς μειρακίσκος ὁ Δρύας

ἀλοὺς ἔρωτι τῆς Ῥοδάνθης ἀδίκῳ  
 βάκχον προπηδᾷ καὶ κρατῆρα λαμβάνει,  
 λαρὸν δὲ κιρνᾷ τοῖς ξένοις πιεῖν πόμα.  
 Εἰς γοῦν Ῥοδάνθην ἐμμανῶς ἀφιγμένος  
 διδοῖ προπιῶν τὸν κρατῆρα τῇ κόρῃ."

145

Read in 143 βακχῶν, and compare 145 ἐμμανῶς ἀφιγμένος and Aesch. *Septem* 498.

(21) Finally Dosicles tells his story. Imitating Hero's father (Musaeus 187–92), Rhodanthe's stern father Straton was keeping his daughter shut up in an ivory tower, in order that she escape men's lusty eyes (2. 175–79):

"Ταύτην δὲ<sup>11</sup> πατὴρ ὁ προλεχθεὶς ὁ Στράτων  
 ἔσωθεν ἐγκέκλεικε μικροῦ πυργίου,  
 ὥς ἂν δύσοπτος ἀρσένων χωρὶς μένη,  
 οὐδ' ἐκτὸς ἐλθεῖν τῆς φυλακῆς ἤξιον."

175

Already Cottone 15 f. has pointed out that all MSS have κόραις (177), not χωρὶς, and that this reading is confirmed by line 182 ὥς ἂν ἐραστοῦ λίχνον ὀφθαλμὸν φύγη. Let me add to this that χωρὶς is one of Saumaise's many blunders, shared by Gaulmin and Hercher, and that Nicetas Eugenianus, in his own love-novel *Drosilla and Charicles*, imitates Prodromus' lines as follows (2. 60–62):

"Σύνεγγυς ἦν μοι παρθένος Καλλιγόνῃ,  
 τὴν ἄρρένων μὲν ὄψιν εὐλαβουμένη,  
 मुखαιτάτῳ δὲ θαλάμῳ φρουρουμένη."

(22) But Dosicles was able to have a look at Rhodanthe on her way to a public bath (2. 186–89):

". . . εἶδον Ῥοδάνθην πρὸς τὸ λουτρὸν ἡγμένην  
 ὑπὸ προπομποῖς, ὑπ' ὀπαδοῖς μυρίοις.  
 Ἴδὼν προσῆλθον καὶ προ<σ>ελθὼν ἡρόμην  
 τὰς ἀκολουθοὺς 'τίς, τίνων ἡ παρθένος;'"

In 186, HVL have ἰδοῦ Ῥοδάνθην πρὸς τὸ λουτρὸν ἡγμένην, and this is the correct reading. Following U (ἰδοῦ Ῥοδάνθην πρὸς τὸ λουτρὸν ἡγμένην) Hercher changed ἰδοῦ into εἶδον. But 188 ἰδὼν is not a sufficient reason for such a change.

(23) Dosicles depicts himself as a handsome young man, a match for Rhodanthe's beauty (2. 251–54 and 259–60):

"Ἄλλ' οὐδ' ἐμοὶ πρόσωπον ἡσβολωμένον,  
 οὐδὲ ξένη τις καὶ δυσέντευκτος πλάσις."

<sup>11</sup> Δὲ scripsi: ὁ codd.

ἄλλως τε κάλλος ἀνδρικὸν σταθιρότης,  
ἀλκὴ κραταιά, πρὸς μάχας εὐανδρία . . . 254

Εἰ γοῦν κατ' ἄνδρα τις τὰ τοῦ κάλλους κρίνει,  
ὥραϊον ἂν μάθοι με τὴν θεωρίαν." 260

Obviously lines 259–60, describing Dosicles' physical beauty, belong immediately after lines 251–52 and before the next point, 253 "Ἄλλως τε, as already Huet had pointed out in the margin of Gaulmin's edition (p. 70).

(24) Dosicles is love-stricken and cannot sleep (2. 319–21):

" . . . τοιοῖσδε πολλοῖς ἀντιπαλαίσας λόγοις  
ὥδ' ἄς ἐς αὐτὰς δευτέρας ἀλεκτόρων 320  
ἔλαθον ὥσ' καὶ πρὸς ὕπνον ἐτράπην."

Read ἦλυθον for ἔλαθον, and compare 1. 429–30: "ὕπνῳ τὸ μακρὸν κουφιοῦμεν τῶν πόνων / ἐσμεν γὰρ ὥδ' ἄς εἰς τρίτας ἀλεκτόρων."

(25) Anxiety obfuscates man's mind (2. 322–27):

"Ἡ γὰρ περιττὴ συρροὴ τῶν φροντίδων  
σκότον καταρραίνουσα τῶν ἄνω τόπων  
καὶ στυνγὸν ἄνω δημιουργοῦσα γνόφον  
καὶ νύκτα πολλὴν καὶ βαθύσκιον ζόφον 325  
καὶ τοῦ λογισμοῦ συνθολοῦσα τὰς κόρας  
φιλεῖ τὰ πολλὰ καὶ τὸν ὕπνον εἰσφέρειν . . ."

In 324, ἄνω is an echo of the ἄνω in the preceding line. M has ὄλον, which I would take to be a corruption of the correct οἶον. Compare Georg. Pisida, *Exp. Pers.* 2. 289–91.

(26) How the craftsman Night creates dreams (2. 329–33):

"Τῶν πραγμάτων γὰρ καὶ λόγων τῶν ἐν φάει  
εἶδωλα πολλὰ καὶ φάσεις νυκτιχρόους 330  
ἢ νύξ ἀναπλάττουσα καὶ σκιάς μόνας  
πλαστογραφοῦσα δακτύλῳ σκιαγράφῳ  
φέρει τὸ φάσμα τῇ καθ' ὕπνους ἐμφάσει"

In 330, νυκτιχρόους is nonsensical and influenced by 331 ἢ νύξ. Read μικτοχρόους, "party-colored," instead, and compare Archimed. *Probl. bovinum* 13 and 21.

(27) How Eros wounds (2. 424–26):

"γελῶν δὲ πέμπει τῶν βελῶν τὰς ἐντάσεις·  
τόξον γὰρ ἐστὶν εὐφυῶς ἐξημμένον· 425  
μέσης κατ' αὐτῆς εὐστοχεῖ τῆς καρδίας."



In 425, first, read with HM, ἐξημμένος (*sc.* "Ἐρως), not with V ἐξημμένον (UL omit lines 329–433). Second, read ἔς τιν' for ἐστίν.

(28) Dosicles elopes with Rhodanthe and embarks on a ship in the harbor of Abydus. His friends bid them farewell (2. 458–61):

“Εὐθύς δὲ πάντες οἱ συνεργοὶ καὶ φίλοι  
πάντες πρὸς αὐτὸν” ἦν δ' ἐγὼ “τὸν λιμένα,  
‘σώζοισθε’ φασὶ ‘καὶ φιλανθρώποις τύχαις  
ὑπὸ προπομποῖς ἀνύοιτε τὴν τρίβον’.” 460

In 459, πάντες is a repetition of πάντες in the preceding line. Read βάντες instead.

(29) After the banquet, the guest Nausicrates falls asleep while drunk (3. 43–46):

“Οὕτω μὲν ὠνείρωπτεν οὗτος τὸν πότον·  
ἐγὼ δ' ὀρέξας δεξιὰν τῇ παρθένῳ  
καὶ συλλαβὼν ἔξειμι τοῦ δωματίου,  
ἀφείς ἐκεῖ δειπνοῦντα τὸν Ναυσικράτην.” 45

In 46, Nausicrates cannot dine while sleeping (43). The obvious emendation, δ' ὑπνοῦντα, was seen already by Gaulmin (p. 491). I prefer, however, γ' ὑπνοῦντα.

(30) There was an ithyphallic statue of Hermes in Abydus (as the sculptors used to represent this god). Well, he once appeared to Rhodanthe in a dream, telling her that by the providence of the gods worshiped in Abydus she will be married to Dosicles in that city (compare Achilles Tatius 4. 1. 4), 3. 69–75:

“Ἑρμῆς γὰρ αὐτός, ὃν σοφὸς λιθοξόος  
λιθοξοήσας, ὥς ὁ τεχνίτης νόμος, 70  
ἔστησεν εἰς Ἀβυδὸν ἐν προαυλίοις,  
νύκτωρ ἐπιστὰς τῇ καθ' ὕπνου ἐμφάσει  
‘ὁ τῆς Ῥοδάνθης καὶ Δοσικλέος γάμος’  
ἔλεξεν ‘εἰς Ἀβυδὸν ἐκλείσθη μέσην,  
θεῶν προνοία τῶν ἐκεῖ κεκλεισμένων’.” 75

First, in 70 read: λιθοξοήσας ὥς ὁ τεχνίταις νόμος. Second, in 75 read κεκλημένων, “of the gods invoked in Abydus.” Κεκλεισμένων is an echo of 74 ἐκλείσθη.

(31) Horace's idea (*Odes* 1. 35. 26–27), *diffugiunt cadis / cum faece siccatis amici*, is expressed in these terms (3. 141–47):

Ὑποδράμοι γὰρ οὐκ ἀνεύλογος φόβος  
μή που φίλοι γίγνοιτο τοῦ πότου πλέον

καὶ τὴν τρυφὴν στέργοιεν οὐχὶ τὸν φίλον  
οἱ τὸν πόθον γεισοῦντες ἐν μέσαις μέθαις  
σαθοῦς θεμέθλοις εὐδιαστροφωτέροις 145  
καὶ τῶν ἐν ἄμψ παιδικῶν ἀθυρμάτων  
στέγασμα πιστεύοντες ἀγάπης μέγα.

In 145–46, a scribe had misread the abbreviations for -ων and -οις. Read instead:

καὶ τὴν τρυφὴν στέργοιεν, οὐχὶ τὸν φίλον,  
οἱ τὸν πόθον γεισοῦντες ἐν μέσαις μέθαις,  
σαθρῶν θεμέθλων εὐδιαστροφωτέραις,<sup>12</sup> 145  
καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἄμψ παιδικοῖς ἀθύρμασι<sup>13</sup>  
στέγασμα πιστεύοντες ἀγάπης μέγα.

(32) The king Mistylus had dedicated Rhodanthe and Dosicles to the gods as νεωκόροι. The satrap Gobryas asks Mistylus to give him Rhodanthe in marriage instead. The king categorically refuses while stating (3. 252) ὑπεσχόμεν γὰρ τοῖς θεοῖς τὴν παρθένον. But the closing of Mistylus' argument is corrupt (probably because of Prodrōmus' σκοτεινὴ ἔκφρασις), 3. 258–63:

“Σὺ (sc. Gobryas) δ' ἄλλ' ἔοικας καὶ λαβὼν τὴν παρθένον  
καὶ πυρσὸν ἄψας νυμφικῆς δαδουχίας  
καὶ πασιτάδων ἔσωθεν ἐγκαθιδρύσας 260  
τὸ μὴ παρασχεῖν ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ Μιστύλῳ,  
ἐφ' ᾧ περ ἐβράδυνεν ἡ συνουσία·  
καίτοι δέδωκε προφθάσας ὁ Μιστύλος,  
καὶ Γωβρύας εἴληφε τὴν ἐρωμένην.”

First, lines 260 and 259 should be transposed, since during a wedding first comes ἡ πασιτάς and then ἡ δαδουχία; compare 1. 216–18 and 6. 381–83. Second, in 263 read θεοῖς for the senseless καίτοι. And finally, in 264 read ἡρνημένην for ἐρωμένην. The sense of lines 261–64 is: “It seems to me, Gobryas, that you blame Mistylus for not granting the very reason for the delay of your marital union, which is simply: Mistylus had already *given* the girl to the gods, and Gobryas had taken her in spite of her being denied to him.”

(33) Gobryas tries to persuade Rhodanthe in the prison to sleep with him. Failing in his attempt he withdraws to his palace fearing Mistylus (3. 322–25):

... σιγῶν μετῆλθεν εἰς τὸν οἰκεῖον δόμον,  
οἶμαι πτοηθεὶς μὴ φανέν τῷ Μιστύλῳ

<sup>12</sup> Compare Xen. *De re equestri* 1. 2.

<sup>13</sup> Compare *Iliad* 15. 362–64; Eurip. fr. 272; Clem. *Protrept.* 17. 2, 109. 3; Iambl. ap. Stob. *Ecl.* 2. 1. 16; Georg. Pisida *Hexaem.* 568–69 et alibi.

ποινηλατηθῇ τῇ προσηκούσῃ κρίσει  
ὥς ἔμπαροιῶν τοῖς θεῶν νεωκόροις.

325

In 323, read φανεῖς for φανέν, which is confirmed by 325 ἔμπαροιῶν.

(34) Imitating Heliodorus (*Aethiop.* 1. 22 and 1. 25; 7. 13 and 7. 26), Gobryas takes Dosicles for Rhodanthe's brother and promises him Mistylus' daughter Calippe in marriage if Dosicles could persuade Rhodanthe to marry Gobryas. Dosicles politely declines the offer (3. 376–84):

“Καλῶς μὲν ἡμῶν ἐστοχάσω, Γωβρύα,  
καὶ τὴν ἀδελφὴν εὐφυῶς ἔγνωσ φύσιν  
ἐκ τῆς ἀδελφῆς τῶν χαρακτήρων θέας.  
Ἐγὼ δ' ἑμαυτοῦ συννοῶ μὲν τὴν τύχην,  
οὐκ ἀγνοῶ δὲ δοῦλος ὢν τοῦ Μιστύλου,  
ἀνάξιος δὲ τῇ Καλίππῃ νυμφίος·  
αἰσθάνομαι δὲ καὶ παροικῶν ἐν ξένη.  
Ἄνῆρ γὰρ αἰχμάλωτος εἰς ὕψος τόσον  
οὐκ ἂν ποτ' ἀρθῇ καὶ μεταπτῇ τὴν τύχην . . .”

380

Line 382 has been misplaced. Read the passage as follows:

ἐκ τῆς ἀδελφῆς τῶν χαρακτήρων θέας·  
ἐγὼ δ' ἑμαυτοῦ συννοῶ μὲν τὴν τύχην,  
αἰσθάνομαι δὲ καὶ παροικῶν ἐν ξένη,  
οὐκ ἀγνοῶ τε δοῦλος ὢν τοῦ Μιστύλου,  
ἀνάξιος δὲ τῇ Καλίππῃ νυμφίος.

379

382

380

381

(35) “It would have been better for you,” says Dosicles to Rhodanthe, “had Gobryas killed you when taking Rhodes, than to become his wife” (3. 437–43):

“(Εἴθε) . . . διεχρήσατο καὶ σὲ Γωβρύας,  
ὅταν κατεσκύλευε τὴν ὅλην Ῥόδον  
καὶ τῶν κατοίκων ἐσκύλευε τὸ πλεόν,  
καὶ μὴ κατασχὼν ζῶσαν ἐζώγρησέ σε,  
σώζων ἑαυτῷ καὶ προμενηστευμένους  
τὴν οὐχ ἑαυτοῦ, τοῦ μόνου Δοσικλέους,  
σωτὴρ πονηρός, ἀθλίαν σωτηρίαν.”

440

In 440, read μῆ<ν> for the senseless μῆ (already Gaulmin wrote μὲν), and in 442 τὴν μόνου Δοσικλέος.

(36) Rhodanthe reassures Dosicles about her faithfulness to him (3. 519–22):

“Ἐγὼ μὲν” ἀντέλεξεν εὐθύς ἡ κόρη  
“(θεοὶ δὲ πάντως ἀκροῶνται τῶν λόγων)  
ἢ σοὶ φυλαχθῶ καρτερῶς τηρουμένη

520

ἡ τῷ ξίφει γοῦν, οὐ γὰρ ἂν τῷ Γωβρύα.”

First, in an oath one badly needs either an optative or an imperative (“so help me God”). Consequently, read in 520 ἀκροῶντο, and compare 8. 518 θεοὶ δὲ μαρτυροῦντων τῷ λόγῳ. Second, in 521 καρτερῶς is Saumaise’s misreading; all MSS have καθαρῶς, which is the correct reading.

(37) King Bryaxes sends an ultimatum in writing to the king Mistylus (4. 47–52):

“Ἐγὼ μὲν οὕτω τὸν πόθον φρουρεῖν θέλω,  
καὶ θεσμοφύλαξ εἰμί σοι τῆς ἀγάπης·  
σὺ δ’ ἀλλὰ ταύτην εἰς τὸ πᾶν ἀνατρέπεις.  
Ὅρους παλαιούς, ὥς ὀρώ, περιτρέπων  
λύεις τὰ θεσμὰ καὶ τὰ δεσμὰ τοῦ πόθου  
καὶ πρὸς μαχησμὸν συγκαλεῖς ἄκοντά με.” 50

In 49, Hercher follows U by reading ἀνατρέπεις. But HUV have ἀποτρέπη instead, and this is the correct reading for “turning away from something.” Incidentally, in 50 it seems preferable to read παρατρέπων, “altering, perverting, revoking, falsifying,” for HUL περιτρέπων, V μετατρέπων.

(38) “Return to me my city Rhamnon at once, or else . . .” Thus Bryaxes finishes his letter (4. 58–68):

“Καίτοι τὸ Ῥάμνον ὥς ἐμὴ πάντως πόλις  
καὶ μοι προσῆγε τοὺς φόρους ἐτησίως  
καὶ τὸν Βρυάξην εἶχε δεσπότην μόνον,  
οὐκ ἄγνοεῖν φαίμεν ἂν σε, Μιστύλε.  
Ἦ γοῦν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀντίπεμψον τὴν πόλιν  
καὶ τοὺς ἀλόντας λῦσον ὥς δεσμίους,  
καὶ πάλιν ἡμῶν ἀρχέτω τὰ τοῦ πόθου,  
ἦ γοῦν Βρυάξην κατὰ σοῦ κινῶν μάθε·  
πάντως δὲ πάντως ὥς τὸ Ῥάμνον τὴν πόλιν  
καὶ τοὺς ἀλόντας στρατιώτας ῥύσομαι,  
τυχὸν δὲ καὶ σὰς συνυφαρπάσω πόλεις.” 60 65

In 59, all MSS have ἐτησίους, which is confirmed both by Nicetas Eugenianus 5. 296 ὑπηρετοῦσιν εἰς ἐτησίους φόρους and by, e.g., IG 7. 2227. (The inversion suggested by Ph. Le Bas, ἐτησίους φόρους, is not necessary.) In 65, read κινεῖν for κινῶν, and in 66 καὶ for ὥς.

(39) When Mistylus had read Bryaxes’ letter, he became prey to two different feelings at the same time—*shame* from his own satraps vs. *fear* from the mighty Bryaxes. This conflict of opposing emotional impulses is depicted in these terms (4. 85–99):





βάθος χωροῦντος καὶ οἶον νεκρὰν τὴν ἐκτὸς καταλιμπάνοντος  
ἐπιφάνειαν.

(40) Mistylus gives orders to his satrap Gobryas, "Today entertain Bryaxes' messenger Artaxanes with a banquet. Tomorrow he shall return to his master with my answer" (4. 107–10):

"... φιλοφρόνησον<sup>16</sup> καὶ μακροῦ μόχθου βάρος  
λῶσον τραπέζῃ καὶ καταστρώσει κλίνῃς·  
εἰς αὔριον δὲ συλλαβὼν ἀντιγράφους  
λαβὼν μετέλθοι πρὸς τὸν αὐτοῦ δεσπότην." 110

In 109, Hercher changed συλλαβὼν of UL to συλλαβῶν, *epistolae* (p. 1). But HV have συλλαβὰς, and this is the correct reading; συλλαβαὶ ἀντίγραφοι is an "answering letter" (compare *lemma* to line 4. 423, 'Ἐπιστολὴ Μιστύλου πρὸς Βρυάξην ἀντίγραφος, MSS).

(41) During the banquet, sparrows fly out of the belly of a roasted lamb, witnessing to the presence of Petronius (*Satyricon* 40. 5) in Byzantium (4. 144–47):

"Τί δ'; Οὐχὶ θαῦμα καὶ τὸ πῦρ φέρει μέγα,  
ὅπως τὸν ἀρνὸν ἀνθρακῶσαν, ὡς βλέπεις, 145  
ἔσωθεν ἐλθεῖν εὐλαβῶς ὑπεστάλη,  
μή που λυμανθῇ τὸ πτερὸν τοῖς στρουθίοις;"

In 145, Le Bas and Hercher follow the reading of VUL, ὅπως. But the reading of H, ὅπερ (*sc.* τὸ πῦρ), is to be preferred.

(42) The *ecphrasis* of a precious cup with the representation of Dionysus, Satyrs and Bacchants opens thus (4. 331):

"Υλῇ μὲν ὑπέστρωτο σάπφειρος λίθος ...

Both Gaulmin and Hercher read ὕλη, with the latter's remark (p. 1), "ὕλη corruptum est." I think the MSS' ὕλη could be retained in the sense, "the basic material of the cup." Compare Prodrōmus' probable source of inspiration, Achilles Tatius 2. 3. 2, 'Υάλου μὲν τὸ πᾶν ἔργον ὀρωρυγμένης, "The material of the cup was wrought rock-crystal," where τὸ πᾶν ἔργον seems to correspond to our ὕλη.

(43) The main theme on the wine-cup is, of course, *vintage*. While one group of workers presses the grapes in the wine-vat, and another one pours the wine in large wine-jars, a third group engages in dancing (just as Homer's grape-gatherers do, *Iliad* 18. 569–72), 4. 355–64:

<sup>16</sup> *Sc.* Artaxanes. Compare 9. 378; Theophan. *Chronogr.* p. 106. 12 de Boor.

"Ἄλλοι θλίβοντες τὰς ῥάγας τῶν βοτρυῶν 355  
τὸν οἶνον ἐξίκαζον εἰς ληνὸν μέσσην·  
πλεξάμενοι δὲ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν δακτύλους  
χορὸν ξυνίστων, λίθινοι χοροστάται.  
"Ἐφης ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐντρανέστερον βλέπων  
ᾄδειν ἀληθῶς εὐφυᾶ τραγῳδίαν, 360  
καὶ που ξυνελθεῖν καὶ ξυνεμπλέξαι χέρα  
καὶ ξυγχορεύσειν ἔσχες ἂν σφοδρὸν πόθον.  
"Ἄλλοι τὸν οἶνον ἐν σμικροῖς κεραμίοις  
βάλλοντες ἀντέβαλλον εἰς νέους πίθους.

This text is both dislocated and lacunose. First, lines 363–64 belong immediately after line 356: "Ἄλλοι . . . "Ἄλλοι. Next, a third "Ἄλλοι is missing: There is a lacuna after line 364, indicating the dancing group (already L had marked a lacuna after line 357). Finally, in 364 read λαβόντες for βάλλοντες. The scribal error λαβών: βαλών is proverbial (and present in our novel as well: 3. 110 προσλαβών for προσβαλὼν, 6. 49 λάβοι HV for βάλη). Consequently, read the passage as follows:

"Ἄλλοι θλίβοντες τὰς ῥάγας τῶν βοτρυῶν 355  
τὸν οἶνον ἐξίκαζον εἰς ληνὸν μέσσην, 356  
ἄλλοι τὸν οἶνον ἐν σμικροῖς κεραμίοις 363  
λαβόντες ἀντέβαλλον εἰς νέους πίθους. 364  
\* \* \* \* \*  
πλεξάμενοι δὲ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν δακτύλους 357  
χορὸν ξυνίστων, λίθινοι χοροστάται.<sup>17</sup>

(44) The Bacchantes are doing everything to induce Dionysus to join them in dancing. The first one grabs him by his tunic (4. 401–06):

Ἡ μὲν τις ἐδέδρακτο τοῦ χιτωνίου,  
τὸν συγχορευτὴν ἔνθεν ἐκκαλουμένη·  
ἄλλη μαλακῶς τῆς πυγῆς εἰλημμένη  
τὸν μειρακίσκον ἀντέσυρεν ἡρέμα·  
ἄλλη δὲ φιλήματι μαλακωτέρῳ 405  
ὑφείλκεν αὐτὸν εἰς μέσον χοροῦ στόμα.

Line 401 does not scan. Hilberg suggested αὐ̃ δέδρακτο for ἐδέδρακτο, but αὐ̃ does not go well with μὲν. Read ἐ<ν>δέδρακτο, and compare *Pap. mag. Paris*. I 2137 ἐνδεδραγμένος.

(45) "You are to blame for the present enmity between us," replies Mistylus to Bryaxes (4. 432–42):

<sup>17</sup> Compare 4. 397–99 (representations on the same cup):

Αἱ δ' ἄρα Βάκχαι τοὺς ἑαυτῶν δακτύλους  
πλεξάμεναι κύκλωθι καὶ χοροστάδην,  
ἐώκεσαν κάλλιστον ἑξάδειν μέλος . . .

“Σὺ δ', ὥς ἔοικε, τὴν σχέσιν καὶ τὸν πόθον  
 τούτῳ περατοῖς καὶ περιγράφειν θέλεις,  
 τῷ τὰς ὑφ' ἡμᾶς ἐξαποσπάσαι πόλεις  
 καὶ σοὶ παρασχεῖν ἀνελευθερώτατα 435  
 καὶ σμικρύναι μὲν τὴν ἐμὴν ἐξουσίαν,  
 τὸ σὸν δὲ μᾶλλον ἀντεπαυξῆσαι κράτος·  
 ὅπερ φόβου φαίνοιτο σημεῖον πλέον,  
 ἀλλ' οὐ τρανὸν γίγνοιτο σύμβολον πόθου,  
 ψυχῆς <δ'> ἀγεννοῦς, οὐ φιλούσης καρδίας, 440  
 γνώμης ταπεινῆς, ἀνελευθέρου τρόπου,  
 ἥθους σαφῆς ἔνδειξις εὐηθεστάτου.”

In 435, the meter is restored by reading ἀνελευθερωτάτα<ς>. In 440, Hercher's addition δ' will not do the job, since 442 σαφῆς ἔνδειξις must come first. Thus read:

“ἀλλ' οὐ τρανὸν γίγνοιτο σύμβολον πόθου· 439  
 ἥθους σαφῆς ἔνδειξις εὐηθεστάτου, 442  
 ψυχῆς ἀγεννοῦς, οὐ φιλούσης καρδίας, 440  
 γνώμης ταπεινῆς, ἀνελευθέρου τρόπου.” 441

(46) Mistylus continues his letter to Bryaxes (4. 475–77):

“... εἶδες φονευθὲν τοῦ στρατοῦ σου τὸ πλέον, 475  
 εἶτα τὸ 'Ράμνον μυρίοις ὅσοις πόνοις  
 ἐπεκράτησας αὐτὸς<sup>18</sup> ὥς ἄναξ ὅλων ...”

Hercher follows UL by reading in 476 εἶτα, which is nonsensical, while Gaulmin follows HV εἶδες, which is an echo of the εἶδες in the preceding line. Huet had seen the truth while jotting εἶλες in the margin of p. 181 of Gaulmin's edition. Compare 4. 470, μάχην συνῆξας, ὥς τὸ 'Ράμνον συλλάβης. A comma should come after 476 πόνοις.

(47) “You, Artaxanes, are more gullible than a small child,” says the king Bryaxes while referring to Mistylus' trick with the sparrows flying out of the belly of a roasted lamb (cf. no. 41), 5. 73–80:

Τούτων ἀκούσας ὁ Βρυάξης τῶν λόγων  
 “ἀλλ' ἡγνόουν” ἔλεξεν, “ἀρχισατράπα,  
 οὕτω πενιχοῦς μορμολυκείων τύπους 75  
 ὑποτρέμοντα καὶ σκιὰς Ἀρταξάνην  
 καὶ δειλιῶντα παιγνίων ψευδεῖς πλάσεις,  
 ἃ μὴδ' ἂν αὐτῶν τῶν βρεφῶν κατισχύσοι,  
 συλῶμενον δὲ τὰς φρένας καὶ νοῦν ὅλον  
 γελωτοποιῶν καὶ μαγείρων ἀπάταις.” 80

In 77, πλάσεις is Gaulmin's convincing emendation of the MSS' φράσεις. Cottone (16) objects, “φράσεις è la lezione da accettare.” However, when

<sup>18</sup> Αὐτὸς ἐπεκράτησας codd.: transposuit Le Bas.



dealing with a "magic trick" (not a "magic spell"), πλάσεις (not φράσεις) is the right word; compare 4. 165, said of Mistylus, πλάττων, παριστῶν τῇ τερασίῳ πλάσει. Furthermore, in 79 Hercher follows UL by reading συλῶμενον, but συλωμένων of HV is to be preferred (*sc.* κατισχύοι). And all MSS have καὶ, not τὰς. Thus read: συλωμένων δὲ καὶ φρένας καὶ νοῦν ὅλον.

(48) Before attacking the army of Mistylus, the king Bryaxes delivers a 300-line speech to his own army and navy (5. 115–414). The speaker is standing on a shield, held on the shoulders of his soldiers,<sup>19</sup> in the middle of the navy (5. 112–14):

... ἔλεξε ταῦτα, τῶν νεῶν ἡθροισμένων  
καὶ κύκλον ὥσπερ εὐφυᾶ μιμουμένων,  
ἐξ οἷα κέντρον τοῦ κρατοῦντος ἡρμένον.

In 114, Hercher writes ἡρμένον, "being lifted, elevated." But HV have ἡργμένον and UL ἡργμένων. Consequently, read ἡργμένον. The ruler *begins* his speech as it were from the center of an imaginary circle, formed by the ships of the expedition. Compare 5. 500: καὶ δευτέρων νῦν ἄρχομαι μηνυμάτων, writes Bryaxes to Mistylus.

(49) "If you defeat a weaker enemy, small indeed will be your glory," states Bryaxes (5. 175–77):

"Τί γὰρ μέγα τρόπαιον ἢ ποῖον γέρας  
μικρός, πενιχρός, εὐαρίθμητος στόλος<sup>20</sup>  
μετατροπωθεὶς ἐκ τοσούτων ναυμάχων;" 175

All MSS have κατατροπωθεὶς for μετατροπωθεὶς, which is confirmed by 5.193, μὴ που λάθοιμεν κατατετροπωμένοι . . .

(50) "The sword of the goddess of Justice<sup>21</sup> will punish Mistylus for sending to death so many brave defenders of the city of Rhamnon," says Bryaxes (5. 233–35):

"... οὓς δ' ἐκ μαχαίρας ληστρικῆς χαλκοστόμου  
εἰς ἔσχατον τάρταρον, εἰς βαθὺ σκότος  
ρίψαντα πικρῶς καὶ κακοτρόπῳ τρόπῳ." 235

<sup>19</sup> Compare Tacit. *Hist.* 4. 15. 2 *impositusque scuto more gentis et sustinentium umeris vibratus*; Ammian. Marc. 20. 4. 17 (*Iulianus*) *impositusque scuto pedestri*; Liban. *Orat.* 13. 34.

<sup>20</sup> While Mistylus' army is εὐαρίθμητος (compare Nic. Eugen. 4. 21; Georg. Pisida, *Exp. Pers.* 3. 207), Bryaxes' own army is δυσαρίθμητος (5. 183, 202, 225). Incidentally, in 4. 499 for μήκος . . . εὐπερίγραπτον, read μήκος . . . ἀπερίγραπτον, "unlimited, infinite." Compare 7. 367 (HL) ἀταξία for the correct εὐταξία (U).

<sup>21</sup> 5. 228 ἡ μάχαιρα τῆς Δίκης. Compare Aesch. *Choeph.* 647.

Hercher follows UL by reading in 234 *τάρταρον*, but the older class HV have *πέταυρον* instead, which is to be preferred as deriving from VT (Proverbs 9. 18 *ἐπὶ πέταυρον* "Αἰδου), as Gaulmin (510) had pointed out. Compare *Suda*, s.v. *πέταυρον*.

(51) Imitating Theodosius Diaconus (*Expugn. Cretae* 1. 73–76), Bryaxes calls the soldiers his own sons and heirs (5. 243–51):

“Παῖδες Βρυάξου καὶ φίλοι καὶ σύμμαχοι  
(καλῶ γὰρ υἱοὺς καὶ φίλους καὶ συμμάχους  
δεικνὺς τὰ δεσμὰ τῆς ἐς ὑμᾶς ἀγάπης), 245  
ἂν ὁ Βρυάξης εἶχεν ὑμᾶς μισθίους,  
ἂν δεσπότης ἦν, ἀλλὰ μὴ φυτοσπόρος,  
οὐκ ἂν ἐπεσπύσατε τοῦ μισθοῦ χάριν,  
μάχην παραρτύοντες ἐξ ἐναντίας,  
καταδραμεῖν μὲν δυσμενῶν πάντας τόπους, 250  
παρασπάσαι δὲ καὶ λαβεῖν ὅλας πόλεις . . .”

First, there is an obvious lacuna after line 242 (as pointed out by Hercher, p. lii), since the paragraph 236–42 lacks a finite verb. But a new paragraph would not have opened with 243, Παῖδες Βρυάξου, but with such a phrase as, "Ἄνδρες στρατάρχαι, θρέμματα στρατηγίας (compare 5. 115, 163, 223, 236, 272). Second, in 245 all MSS have *θεσμὰ*, not *δεσμὰ*, and *πρὸς*, not *ἐς*. Compare Bryaxes' own words: 4. 33 τὰ *θεσμὰ* τῆς *πρὸς* αὐτὸν ἀγάπης, 4. 48 καὶ *θεσμοφύλαξ* εἰμί σοι τῆς ἀγάπης, 4. 51 λύεις τὰ *θεσμὰ* καὶ τὰ *δεσμὰ* τοῦ πόθου. Finally, lines 249 and 248 should change places.

(52) Borrowing the Homeric simile about the irrational leopard (*Iliad* 21. 573–78), only substituting boar for leopard, Bryaxes says (5.305–12):

“ . . . καὶ καθάπερ σὺς ἐκ δρυμοῦ πηδῶν μέγας 305  
καὶ θηραγρευταῖς δεξιόις ἐντυγχάνων,  
ἄλλου παρεμπήξαντος ἄκρον τὸ ξίφος,  
ἔσω διωθεῖ καὶ κατὰ σπλάγχνων μέσων,  
αὐτὸς μανικῶς ἀντιβαίνων τῷ ξίφει,  
καὶ πικρὰν αὐτῷ τὴν σφαγὴν παραρτύει, 310  
θρασὺς μαχητῆς εἰς τὸν οἰκεῖον φόνον,  
οὕτω καθ' αὐτῶν ἀκονῶντες<sup>22</sup> τὴν σπάθην;”

With 305 a new sentence begins (300 "Ἡ πῶς ἂν οὐ πάσχοιτε μανικὸν πάθος is understood). Consequently, read in 305: "Ἡ καθάπερ . . . Moreover, lines 309 and 308 should change places, as is witnessed by *Iliad* 21. 576–78 (the subject is the leopard):

εἷ περ γὰρ φθάμενός μιν ἦ οὐτάσῃ ἡ ἐβάλῃσιν,  
ἀλλὰ τε καὶ περὶ δουρὶ πεπαρμένη οὐκ ἀπολήγει

<sup>22</sup> Ἀκονοῦντες codd.: corr. Hercher conl. 4. 217.

ἀλκῆς, πρίν γ' ἡ ἐ ξυμβλήμεναι ἡ ἐ δαμῆναι.

(53) Bryaxes continues his speech (5. 334–37):

“Ἴν' οὖν ἐφ' ὑμᾶς μή τι τῶν δεινῶν ῥέποι,  
μὴ πρὸς λαφύρων ἀρπαγὴν μηδεὶς ῥέποι·  
εἰς ἀρπαγὴν γὰρ αὐτὸς ἡσυχολημένος  
χώραν παράσχοι τοῦ φυγεῖν τῷ Μιστύλῳ . . . ” 335

In 335, ῥέποι is an echo of the ῥέποι in the preceding line. The original reading was βλέποι. Incidentally, ἀρπαγὴν in 335 is the reading of U alone; HVL have ἀρπαγὰς, which is the correct reading, just as in 5. 316 μὴ πρὸς λαφύρων ἀρπαγὰς (codd.: ἀρπαγὴν Gaulmin, Hercher) ὠρμηκότες . . . , as Cottone 16 already had pointed out.

(54) “*Fear* will surely kill us before the enemy does,”<sup>23</sup> continues Bryaxes (5. 385–88):

“Ἡ καὶ περιττὸν τοῦτο τοῖς ἐναντίοις·  
φόβος γὰρ ἡμᾶς καὶ πρὸ Μιστύλου φθάσας  
θανὴν πρὸ θανῆς καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ξίφους φόνον  
δοίη, σπαθίζων ὥσπερ εἰ ταῖς ἐλπίσιν.” 385

This text is nonsensical. Read instead:

“φόβος γὰρ ἡμῖν, καὶ πρὸ Μιστύλου φθάσας,  
θανὴν πρὸ θανῆς καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ξίφους φόνον  
δοίη σπαθίζων, ὥσπερ εἰ ταῖς ἐμπίσιν.”

The proverbial *gnats* are mentioned at 5. 187–89: “ἀρχαῖκός γὰρ καὶ παλαιότερος λόγος / κροτεῖν παραινεῖ τὴν μάχην ταῖς ἐμπίσιν / ὥς οἶα τοῖς λέουσι τοῖς παναλκέσι.”<sup>24</sup>

(55) “*Cowardice* is an unforgivable affliction,” says Bryaxes to his soldiers (5. 389–97):

“Ἴν' οὖν ἀποτρέποιτε ταῦτα μακρόθεν,  
μὴ πρὸς φυγὴν ῥέψοιτε δυσγενεῖ τρόπῳ.  
Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐξῆν τὴν θανὴν πεφευγέναι  
καὶ τὴν τελευτὴν εἰς τὸ πᾶν ἀποδράναι  
ἄληκτον ὥσπερ εὐτυχήσαντας<sup>25</sup> βίον,  
κάνταῦθα φαῦλον τὴν μάχην ἐκφυγάνειν·  
τίς γὰρ πτοηθῇ τὴν τελευτὴν, εἰπέ μοι,  
ζῶν ἄληκτον εὐτυχήσας ἐκ τύχης; 390  
395

<sup>23</sup> This is a recurrent idea in Prodrōmus; compare 1. 28, 3. 123, 7. 346, 519.

<sup>24</sup> Compare Aesop, *Fab.* 267 Hausrath; Achill. Tat. 2. 22; Nicit. Choniat. *Hist.* p. 650. 20 Bekker.

<sup>25</sup> Εὐτυχήσαντες codd.: corr. Le Bas.

"Ὅμως γένοιτ' ἂν τοῦ πάθους συγγνωστέος."<sup>26</sup>

I think that Gaulmin and Hercher have not understood the sense of this passage. Read ἦν for τὴν in 394, πτοηθεῖς for πτοηθῇ in 395, add a δ' in 396, and include line 397 in the same sentence. Thanks to Prodromus' redundancy, lines 395–97 say much the same as lines 391–94. Thus read:

"... κἀνταῦθα φαῦλον ἦν μάχην ἐκφυγγάνειν·  
τίς γὰρ πτοηθεῖς τὴν τελευτήν, εἰπέ μοι, 395  
ζῶν <δ'> ἄληκτον εὐτυχήσας ἐκ Τύχης  
ὁμως γένοιτ' ἂν τοῦ πάθους συγγνωστέος;"

Τὸ πάθος in 397 refers to "cowardice," implied by 390 φυγὴν and δυσγενεῖ τρόπῳ, 394 ἐκφυγγάνειν and 395 πτοηθεῖς.

(56) Finally, Bryaxes gives his navy the order to attack (5. 434–40):

Τοσαῦτά φησι, τοῖς γε μὴν κωπηλάταις  
κινεῖν κελεύει τὰς τριήρεις ὡς τάχος, 435  
ὡς ἂν παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν τοῦ Μιστύλου  
φθάσαιεν ἀπρόοπτα μὴδ' ἐγνωσμένοι  
ἄελπτον ἐμπέσοιεν εἰς μέσον νέφος  
καὶ νύκτα δοῖεν τοῖς ἐναντιουμένοις  
καὶ σφῶν κατεργάσαιντο μυρίον φόνον. 440

In 434, read τε for γε; in 437, φθάσαντες for φθάσαιεν; and in 438, ὡς for εἰς (εἰς μέσον HV: μέσον ὡς UL): The attacking army is likened to a dense black cloud (*Iliad* 4. 274, 16. 66; Herodot. 8. 109. 2).

(57) The description of Mistylus' navy (5. 469–75):

Ταύτην μὲν εἶχον αἱ τριήρεις τὴν θέσιν·  
κύκλῳ δὲ τὸν σύμπαντα Μιστύλου στόλον 470  
πληθὺς μεγίστων ἐστεφάνου φορτίδων·  
ὑπόστενον δὲ παρανοίξασαι στόμα  
χώραν παρεῖχον ἐξόδου τοῖς ναυμάχοις·  
τὸ δ' ἐκτὸς αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς ἄκταις χωρίον  
πολὺς παρειστήκεισαν ἑσμός ἱππέων. 475

Since all MSS have in 472 παρανοίξασα, and in 473 παρεῖχεν (*sc.* 471 πληθὺς . . . φορτίδων), read 471–75 as follows:

πληθὺς μεγίστων ἐστεφάνου φορτίδων·  
(ὑπόστενον γὰρ παρανοίξασα στόμα  
χώραν παρεῖχεν ἐξόδου τοῖς ναυμάχοις),  
τὸ δ' ἐκτὸς αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς ἄκταις χωρίον  
πολὺς παρειστήκεισαν ἑσμός ἱππέων. 475

<sup>26</sup> Συγγνωστέος HV: -τέον UL.



(58) The naval battle between Bryaxes and Mistylus begins. At first, Mistylus has the upper hand (6. 25–31):

Τὰ πρῶτα μὲν δὴ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς τῆς μάχης  
τὸ κρεῖττον εἶχεν ὁ στόλος τοῦ Μιστύλου·  
τρεῖς γὰρ τριήρεις συλλαβὼν ὁ Γωβρύας  
ἐκ τῆς ἐκεῖθεν δυσμενοῦς ναυμαχίας  
ὅπλων μετ' αὐτῶν καὶ σὺν αὐτοῖς ναυμάχοις  
μικροῦ γ' ἂν ἐτροποῦτο τοὺς ἐναντίους  
καὶ πρὸς φυγὴν ἔκλινεν αὐτοὺς ἀθρόαν. 25  
30

Read in 28 ναυαρχίας, “from the enemy *fleet*” (cf. Lycophron, *Alex.* 733), not “sea-fight” (ναυμαχίας). The scribe was influenced by the ναυμάχοις at the end of the following line. The same scribal error recurs at 5. 442, ναυαρχίαν HUL: ναυμαχίαν V.

(59) Eventually Bryaxes wins the sea-battle thanks to his clever frogmen, and conquers Mistylus’ city. The description of the ransacking and looting of the captured city is filled with horror-stories. One of them reads (6. 134–39):

Αἱ πλούσιαι γυναῖκες (ὃ πικρὰς τύχης)  
χεῖρας συνετέμνητο τοῖς δακτυλίοις·  
ἡ δυσπραγοῦσα πλοῦτον ἠϋπόρει ξένον,  
τὸ σῶμα κερδαίνουσα· κἂν οὐκ εἰς τέλος  
οὐκ ἦν λαθεῖν οὐ δοῦλον οὐδὲ δεσπότην·  
κοινὴ τύχη τὰ πάντα καὶ κοινὸς νόμος. 135

First, line 135 does not scan. Hilberg’s suggestion, συνε<κ>τέμνητο, is warmly recommended by 6. 204 συνεκτέμοις. Second, in 137 read οὖν for οὐκ.

(60) Rhodanthe and Dosicles are taken prisoners, put on two different ships as slaves and sent away (6. 192–94):

Ἀπέπλεον μὲν ἡ ζυγὰς τῶν ὀλκάδων,  
νεκρὰν φέρουσαι τὴν ζυγάδα τῶν νέων,  
ἡ μὲν Ῥοδάνθην, ἡ δὲ τὸν Δοσικλέα.

Hercher follows HV by reading in 192 ἀπέπλεον, then he writes φέρουσαι in the next line. It seems preferable to follow L (U) by reading in 192 ἀπέπλεον, and then in 193 φέρουσα with all MSS.

(61) Rhodanthe and Dosicles are two halves of the same body. If one splits an animal in two parts neither part will live (6. 200–04):

Οὐ γὰρ καθάπερ ἐκ φυτοῦ τμηθεὶς κλάδος  
εἰς αὐθις ἐκτέθηλε καὶ ψυχὴν ἔχει,  
οὕτως ἔχοιεν αἱ κατ' αἰσθησιν φύσεις·  
ἀλλ' εἰ τέμοις βοῦν εἰς μέσας τομὰς δύο, 200

ζωὴν ἂν αὐτῶν αὐτίκα συνεκτέμοις.

An Aristotelian vegetative soul is out of place here. Read in 201 ζωὴν for ψυχὴν, and compare 204 ζωὴν.

(62) A severe sea-storm surprises the ships (6. 209–13):

Νῦξ δευτέρα μετῆλθε, καὶ θρασὺς Νότος  
δριμὺς προελθὼν ἐκ μέσης μεσημβρίας 210  
κυρτοῖ μὲν εὐθύς τῆς θαλάσσης τὴν ῥάχιν,  
ὑποῖ δὲ ταύτης κυμάτων πολλοὺς λόφους,  
καὶ χάσμα τοῦ κάτωθε μέχρι πυθμένος.

Line 213 does not make sense. Unless there is a lacuna after line 212, I would suggest reading καὶ χασμάτων for the transmitted καὶ χάσμα τοῦ. Compare 2. 10–14:

οὐ κυμάτων θροῦς, οὐ λόφοι καὶ χάσματα 10  
(τούτων ἐκείνοις ἀντεπεξηγερμένων  
πυκνῇ ταραχῇ καὶ συχνῇ μετακλίσει,  
καὶ τῶν λόφων μὲν ἀντιχασματουμένων,  
τῶν χασμάτων δὲ τοῦπαλιν λοφουμένων).

(63) The storm causes the shipwreck of Rhodanthe's vessel, but she is saved while safely riding on a plank from the wreckage (compare Achill. Tat. 5. 9. 1). Some sea-merchants take Rhodanthe in their ship and sell her as a slave on Cyprus (6. 239–44):

... ἐντυγχάνει μὲν (sc. Rhodanthe) ἐμπορικαῖς ὀλκάσι  
τὴν ἀμφὶ Κύπρον εὐθύ που στεिलाμέναις, 240  
καὶ τὴν ἑαυτῆς λιπαρεῖ σωτηρίαν  
ἐκ τῶν ἐν αὐταῖς ἐμπλεόντων ἐμπόρων.  
'Ἄλλ' οἳ δυσωπηθέντες αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον  
ἀνελκύνουσιν ἐκτὸς αὐτὴν αὐτίκα ...

Read lines 243–44 instead:

'Ἄλλ' οἳ, δυσωπηθέντες αὐτῆς τὸν λόγον,  
ἀνελκύνουσιν ἐντὸς (sc. τῆς ὀλκάδος) αὐτὴν αὐτίκα ...

(64) Dosicles takes Rhodanthe for dead at sea and engages in a 250-line dirge, in which he says (6. 281–85):

"Κατέσχον ἡμᾶς ληστρικαὶ χεῖρες δύο,  
ἐχθρὸς Βρυάξης, ἄλλος ἐχθρὸς Μιστύλος·  
ἀλλ' ἐλπὶς ὑπέδραμεν, ἀλλ' ἔθαλψέ με  
ἐλεύθερον φῶς ὅπερ γοῦν δεδορκέναι  
τοῦ δουλικοῦ τεθέντος ἐκποδὼν νέφους." 285

What Dosicles loathes is not "the cloud" but "the darkness of slavery." He has in mind the darkness of a prisoner's dungeon: 7. 250 Καὶ δεσμὸς ἡμῖν

καὶ φυλακὴ καὶ σκότος (compare 3. 119, 244, 7. 20, 9. 282). Accordingly read in 285 <κ>νέφους for νέφους.

(65) Dosicles continues his dirge (6. 296–302):

“Ποῦ σοι τὰ κρίνα τῶν καλῶν φιλημάτων,  
 ποῦ σώματος τὰ μύρτα, σαρκὸς ἡ χλόη,  
 τὸ τῶν βλεφάρων ἄνθος; ὦ μοι, παρθένε,  
 μαραίνεται τὸ μῆλον,<sup>27</sup> ἡ ῥοιὰ φθίνει,  
 φυλλορροεῖ τὰ δένδρα, πίπτει τὰ κρίνα·  
 εἰς γῆν ὁ καρπός, ἡ χάρις παρερρή,<sup>28</sup>  
 τοῦ μετοπώρου προφθάσαντος τὸν χρόνον.”

300

In 297, all MSS have τοῦ for ποῦ, which is the correct reading, and in 302, Hilberg's suggestion, φθινοπώρου for μετοπώρου, restores the meter. Again, the archetype of HV UL was more corrupt than hitherto assumed by scholars.

(66) Dosicles vividly depicts Rhodanthe's plight at sea (6. 323–28):

“... θαμὰ συνείλκου ταῖς ῥοπαῖς τῶν κυμάτων,  
 τῶν ἀνέμων δὲ ταῖς πνοαῖς ἀντεπνέου,  
 εἰς ὕψος αἰθέριον ἀνασπώμενη,  
 κατηγμένη δὲ μέχρις αὐτοῦ πυθμένος  
 ὥς ἂν τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ κύμα συμφέρη,  
 ἐκεῖθεν ἔνθεν ῥαδίως στρωφωμένη.”

325

In 324, for ἀντεπνέου read ἀνεπνέου, “you were revived by the blowing winds,” and read lines 326–28 as follows:

“... πυθμένος,  
 ἐκεῖθεν ἔνθεν ῥαδίως στρωφωμένη,  
 ὥς ἂν τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ κύμα συμφέρη.”

326  
328  
327

(67) Dosicles continues his dirge (6. 373–76):

“Τὴν γὰρ θάλατταν ἔσχες ἀντὶ παστάδος,  
 τῶν κυμάτων τὸν βόμβον ἀντὶ τυμπάνων,  
 τῶν ἀστραπῶν τὸ φέγγος ἀντὶ λαμπάδων,  
 τὸν τῶν ὑγρῶν κοίρανον ἀντὶ νυμφίου.”<sup>29</sup>

375

In 373, all MSS have παστάδων, which goes well with the rhyming plurals in 374 and 375. Παστάδες, *pluralis pro singulari*, is employed at 1. 216, 2. 63, 3. 260, 9. 43.

<sup>27</sup> Compare Achill. Tat. 1. 8. 9; Nicet. Eugen. 6. 74.

<sup>28</sup> Compare Archil. fr. 196A. 18 West; Theocrit. 7. 121; Ioann. Geometra, *Carm.* 2. 56; Prodrōmus, *Catomyomachia* 279.

<sup>29</sup> Compare A.G. 6. 70. 1.

(68) Following the rules of a dirge, Dosicles addresses Rhodanthe's parents (6. 379–84):

“Καλῶς ἀπηλαύσατε τοῦ θυγατρίου,  
μῆτερ Ῥοδάνθης καὶ πάτερ, Φρόνη, Στράτων· 380  
καλὴν συνεπῆξασθε γάμου παστάδα,  
καλὸν συνεπλέξασθε τῇ κόρῃ στέφος,  
λαμπρὰν ὑπεξήψατε τὴν δαδουχίαν·  
τοιούτων ἀπάνασθε τῶν φυλαγμάτων.”

While in 384 Hilberg was convincing when restoring the meter by reading τοιοῦτον for τοιούτων (another sign of how precarious Hercher's edition is), he was less fortunate in line 381, where he suggested συνεπλέξασθε for the unmetrical συνεπῆξασθε. For συνεπλέξασθε is discarded by the same word in the next line. The correct reading is συνε<κ>πῆξασθε ... παστάδα. Compare a few lines earlier (6. 369) ἐπήσσομεν ... παστάδα, 7. 172 καὶ νυμφικῶν ἔννοια παστοπηγίων; Nicetas Eugenianus 6. 552; Constantine Manasses, *Aristander and Callithea* fr. 100. 1 Mazal παστάδων πηγνυμένων γὰρ καὶ γάμων τελουμένων ...

Finally, it seems preferable to take the entire passage 6. 379–92 as a set of rhetorical questions (with an expected answer, “No way!”). Accordingly, question marks are needed after lines 380, 384, 386, 389 and 391. These five rhetorical questions are answered by Dosicles himself in 392–93:

“ὦ φροῦδα πάντα καὶ κενὸς μόνος λόγος·  
χανὼν ὁ πόντος ἐκροφᾷ τὰς ἐλπίδας.”

(69) Cratander tries to dissuade Dosicles from committing suicide; a *traditional* mourning for Rhodanthe will do (6. 436–45):

“Εἰ δ' ἄρα καὶ τέθηκεν ἡ σὴ παρθένος  
(κείσθω γὰρ οὕτω καὶ διδόσθω τῷ λόγῳ),  
τί δὴ παρ' αὐτὸ τὴν τελευτὴν ἀσπάση;  
Ἐκκοψον ἄκρον τῇ θανούσῃ τὴν κόμην,  
σπεῖσον πικρὸν<sup>30</sup> δάκρυον ἐκ βλεφαρίδων, 440  
ῥῆξον τὸ χιτῶνιον, οἰμῶξον μέγα,  
ρίψον σεαυτὸν κατὰ γῆς ἐπὶ στόμα,  
θές εἰς κορυφήν, ἣν δοκῇ σοι, καὶ κόνιν·  
ἀνδρὸς γὰρ οὐδὲ ταῦτα, πλὴν φορητέα  
ψυχῆς ἀλούσης ἐξ ἐρωτοληψίας.” 445

In 444, read οὐ δὴ for οὐδὲ, since ταῦτα refers to the suicide (438 τὴν τελευτὴν), not to the mourning (439–43).

(70) Dosicles is disconsolate and engages in yet another dirge while addressing Rhodanthe (6. 487–91):

<sup>30</sup> Πικρὸν Le Bas: μικρὸν codd.



"Ἰχθὺς διεῖλον καὶ διεσπᾶσαντό σε,  
 ἢ κῦμα τοῖς κάχληξιν ἐξέθρυψέ<sup>31</sup> σε  
 καὶ ταῖς ὑφάλοις τῶν πετρῶν ἤραξέ<sup>32</sup> σε;  
 Πνέεις τι μικρὸν καὶ παρασπαίρεις ἔτι,  
 ἢ κῆτος ἀντίνηκτον ἐρρόφησέ σε;" 490

In 491, ἀντίνηκτον is Hercher's conjecture for the transmitted ἀντίπνικτον. Read ἀρτίπνικτον, "(you), just drowned," instead, and compare, e.g., 8. 479 ἀρτίσως, "just healed."

(71) While Dosicles remains enslaved and imprisoned in Pissa, Rhodathe is serving as a slave of Craton on Cyprus (7. 5–11):

Τί δ' ἢ Ῥοδάνθη; Κἂν ἔγνω δούλην τύχην, 5  
 κἂν εἶδε τὸν Κράτωνα δεσπότην νέον,  
 οὐ τὸν πρὶν ἠγνόησε δεσπότην Ἔρον·  
 κἂν ἐκ Τύχης δέσποιναν ἔγνω τὴν Στάλην,  
 οὐ τὴν παλαιὰν Ἀφροδίτην ἠγνόει.  
 κἂν πλείστον ἐσμὸν εὔρε συνδούλων νέων, 10  
 σύνδουλον ἠπίστατο τὸν Δοσικλέα·

In 6, read οἶδε for εἶδε.

(72) Rhodanthe matches Dosicles' dirge with one of her own (7. 57–68):

"... καὶ σοῦ τυχὸν θανόντος (ᾧμοι νυμφίε)  
 ἔμοῦ Ῥοδάνθης τῆς ταλαιπώρου χάριν,  
 ἐγὼ βλέπω φῶς καὶ πνέω τὸν ἄερα  
 μὴ φῶς ἐρυθριῶσα, μὴ τὸν ἄερα, 60  
 ὃν πνεῖν ἀφῆκας, ὃν βλέπειν ἡμῶν χάριν;  
 Ὅρῳ δὲ πόντον, πόντον οὐκ αἰδουμένη,  
 ὃν ἔσχες (αἰαῖ) καὶ τάφον καὶ παστάδα;  
 Πατῶ δὲ γῆς τὴν ῥάχιν ἐκτὸς αἰσχύνης,  
 ἣν οὐ πατεῖς σύ (φεῦ θεοί) τίνος χάριν; 65  
 Ἐμοῦ χάριν· καὶ ζῶσαν οὐ πιμπρᾷτέ με;  
 Διχῇ λιπόντος τὸν βίον Δοσικλέος  
 βιοῖ Ῥοδάνθη καὶ βιοῦσα λανθάνει;"

In 61, read (with UL) ὃ (sc. φῶς) βλέπειν. And in 67, read Δίκη for Hercher's Διχῇ; all MSS have δίκη. According to Rhodanthe, Dosicles justly and dutifully dies for her while fulfilling his marital pledge of eternal union; compare 7. 56 σαυτὸν προαπέπνιξας αὐτὸς αὐτόχειρ.

(73) Everybody is asking Rhodanthe about Cratander. She tells them what she knows (7. 275–77 and 280–85):

<sup>31</sup> Ἐξέθρυψέ V<sup>2</sup>, Gaulmin: ἐξέθρυψε HV<sup>1</sup>: ἐξέθραψε UL.

<sup>32</sup> Ἡραξέ Hercher: ἤρραξέ HUL: ἔρραξέ V.

- “Τανῦν ὅποι γένοιτο καὶ τίνος βίου” 275  
 ἔφη Ῥοδάνθη “μηδὲ πυνθάνεσθέ μου ...  
 Μιστύλος αὐτὸν εἶχεν ἐγκεκλεισμένον 280  
 φρουρᾷ σκοτεινῇ καὶ ζοφώδει χωρίῳ.  
 Μικρὸς παρῆλθε ναὶ μικρὸς μέσον χρόνος,  
 καὶ τις Βρυάξης ἀντιβὰς τῷ Μιστύλῳ  
 μάχην συνεκρότησεν ἐξ ἐναντίας  
 καὶ πᾶν κατεστρέψατο τούτου τὸ κράτος.” 285

In 275, read with H Νῦν οὖν for Hercher's improvisation, Τανῦν. And in 282, read with HUL καὶ βραχὺς for καὶ μικρὸς (Gaulmin), ναὶ μικρὸς (Le Bas, Hercher), and compare 4. 82, 8. 3 and 8. 284.

(74) Rhodanthe ends her information, and Craton leaves for Pissa at once (7. 304–05 and 310–12):

- Τούτους Ῥοδάνθη συμπεραίνει τοὺς λόγους·  
 ὁ δ' ἄρα Κράτων “χαῖρέ μοι, τέκνον” φράσας ... 305  
 εἰς Πίσσαν ἐξώρμησε τοῦ παιδὸς χάριν. 310  
 ὦ σπλάγχνα πατρός, ὦ τεκόντος καρδία,  
 ὥς κρεῖττον οὐδὲν πατρὶ τῆς εὐστοργίας.

In 304, τούτους and τοὺς λόγους are Hercher's emendations (with reference to 2. 52). But HUL have τούτοις (*sc.* τοῖς ἔπεισι) and τὸν λόγον, and this is the correct reading. In 312, Gaulmin and Hercher have πατρὶ τῆς, but the reading of HUL πατρικῆς is to be preferred (Prodromus employs πατρικός at 1. 237, 5. 258, 6. 274).

(75) The king Bryaxes argues with Dosicles for human sacrifice, “Gods expect the most precious sacrifice from men” (7. 423–25):

- “Τί δ'; Ἄν μυρίον ἐντυχὼν χρυσοῦ βάρος  
 ἔπειτα μέντοι σκεῦος ὀστράκου φέρω,  
 ἂρ'” εἶπεν “ἀγάσαιντο καὶ δέξαιντό με (*sc.* θεοί);” 425

Read with HUL ἐντυχὼν for ἐντυχὼν (Gaulmin, Hercher).

(76) Cratander refutes Bryaxes (7. 493–501):

- “Εἰ δ' οὖν ὁ καλός, βασιλεῦ, τὴν ιδέαν  
 ἄξιός ἐστι τῆς θεᾶς θανεῖν χάριν  
 καὶ θυσιασθεῖς τοῖς θεοῖς χάριν φέρει, 495  
 τί δὴ ποτε προῆλθεν εἰς γῆν, εἰπέ μοι;  
 Ὡς ἂν θάνῃ καὶ <τοὺς> θεοὺς ἐστιάσῃ;  
 Τί δ' οἱ θεοὶ παρῆξαν αὐτὸν ἐν βίῳ;  
 Ὡς ἂν τυθεῖς τράπεζαν αὐτοῖς ἀρτύσῃ;  
 Τί δ' ἀδικοῦντες οἱ καλοὶ τὴν ιδέαν 500  
 θεοῖς ἐτοιμάζοισι τὴν εὐωχίαν;”

First, in 495 read with H φέρειν for φέρει UL, Gaulmin, Hercher. Second, in 497, θάνη καὶ <τοὺς> is the reading of Le Bas, adopted by Hercher. Since HUL have θανῆται καὶ instead, read the line, Ὡς ἂν θανεῖται καὶ θεοὺς ἐστιάζῃ. Finally, read 500–01 as follows:

“Τί δ’; Ἀδικοῦντες οἱ καλοὶ τὴν ιδέαν  
θεοῖς ἐτοιμάσουσι τὴν εὐωχίαν;”

(77) Craton arrives in Pissa, learns about the human sacrifices, and starts entreating Bryaxes to free Cratander (8. 5–12):

... ἀλαλαγὴ θρηνοῦντος ἀνδρὸς ἐν μέσῳ 5  
καὶ πάντας ἐξέπληξε τῷ καινῷ φόβῳ.  
‘Ο δ’ ἦν ὁ Κράτων· ὥς γὰρ εἰς Πίσσαν φθάσας  
τῆς νηὸς ἐκβὰς ἀναβαίνει τὴν πόλιν  
καὶ ξυντυχὼν γέροντι τινὶ βαρβάρῳ  
(ἔροιτο γὰρ γέροντα Βρυάξου πέρι) 10  
καὶ τὰς θυσίας ἐκμαθὼν καὶ τοὺς φόνους  
πρόσεισιν εὐθύς τῷ νεῷ κράζων μέγα ...

First, in 6 read ναὶ for καὶ. Second, in 7 read Τὸ δ’ ἦν (HUL) for ‘Ο δ’ ἦν (Gaulmin, Hercher), and ὥς for ὡς. Finally, read 9–10 as follows:

καὶ ξυντυχὼν γέροντί τινι βαρβάρῳ  
ἔροιτο τὸν (HUL) γέροντα Βρυάξου πέρι.

(78) Craton implores Bryaxes (8. 26–30):

“Μάτην γὰρ ἀνύσαιμι τὸν πλοῦν τὸν τόσον,  
εἰ Κύπρον ἀφείς ἐν κενοῖς ὥδε δράμω,  
μάτην δὲ τῶν σῶν ἱερῶν ποδῶν θίγω.  
Οὐ ζῶν τὸ τέκνον ὄψομαι πατὴρ γέρων;  
Μὴ τοῦτο, θεῖε βασιλεῦ, μὴ πρὸς θεῶν.” 30

Read lines 28–29 instead:

μάτην δὲ τῶν σῶν ἱερῶν ποδῶν θίγω,  
ὥς ζῶν τὸ τέκνον ὄψομαι πατὴρ γέρων.

(79) Craton continues (8. 38–42):

“Δότω πατὴρ δέιλαιος ἀνθ’ υἱοῦ δίκας·  
γέροντα θυσίαζε, μὴ καλὸν νέον·  
γέροντι μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ξίφους μικρὸς λόγος, 40  
ὥς μικρὸν ἤδη καὶ ξίφους χωρὶς θάνη·  
νέῳ δὲ τοῦ ζῆν ἡ χάρις πρὸς τοῖς πρόσω.”

In 41, Hercher follows Chrysocephalus (M) in reading ὥς. But ὅς of HVU (οἶ L) is to be preferred. Thus read: ὅς ... καὶ ξίφους χωρὶς θάνοι.

(80) Craton quotes the prophet Hosea (6. 6 ἔλεος θέλω καὶ οὐ θυσίαν), 8. 50–55:

“Δὸς τοῖς θεοῖς τὸν οἶκτον ἀντὶ θυσίας·	50
καλὴ θεοῖς τράπεζα φιλανθρωπία,	
καλὸς κρατὴρ ἄνθρωπος ἐκφυγὼν φόνον.	
Οὕτω θεοὶ δειπνοῦσι τὴν σωτηρίαν,	
οὕτω θεῶν ἄριστος ἡ κοινὴ χαρά,	
ἀλλ’ οὐ κρέας βρότειον, οὐ πολὺς φόνος . . . ”	55

In 54, I think Prodrōmus wrote ἄριστον, not ἄριστος (to avoid ambiguity), and certainly χάρις for the unmetrical χαρά. ‘Ἡ κοινὴ χάρις,’ “the gratitude of all,” is common enough.<sup>33</sup>

(81) Employing the image of God as a potter (Jeremiah 18. 6, Romans 9. 21 *et saepius*), Craton says (8. 74–81):

“Θεοὺς δὲ χαίρειν ἀξιοῖς ἐμῷ φόνῳ,	
τοὺς τέκτονάς μου, τοὺς ἐμοὺς κεραμέας,	75
τεθρυμμένων μάλιστα τῶν κεραμίων;	
Οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἴσχυον εἶναι τεχνίται	
καὶ τὰς ἀφορμὰς λαμβάνοιεν τοῦ βίου,	
ἄλλου θρυβέντος ἄλλο πλάττοντες νέον;	
‘Ἀλλ’ οὐ γελῶσι, <sup>34</sup> πᾶν γε μὴν τοῦναντίον.	80
Θεοὶ δ’ ἐφ’ ᾧ τερφθεῖεν ἀνθρώπου φόνο;	

Read lines 75–79 instead:

τοὺς τέκτονάς μου, τοὺς ἐμοὺς κεραμέας;	75
Οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἴσχυον εἶναι τεχνίται	77
τεθρυμμένων μάλιστα τῶν κεραμίων;	76
καὶ τὰς ἀφορμὰς λαμβάνοιεν τοῦ βίου,	78
ἄλλου θρυβέντος ἄλλο πλάττοντες νέον;	

(82) While Dosicles and Cratander are standing on the pyre to be sacrificed to the gods, suddenly a miraculous shower extinguishes the pyre and saves their lives. (The same miraculous shower saved lives in Xenophon, *Ephes.* 4. 2. 8–10; Parthenius, *Narrat. amat.* 6, p. 52. 2–5 Martini; *Acta Pauli et Theclae* 22). Then the king Bryaxes sets the youths free (8. 130–35):

‘Ο δὲ Βρυάξης μηνύσας σιγὴν ἔφη·	130
“Σώζοισθε, τέκνα, καὶ πνοὴν ἐλευθέραν	
πνέοιτε καὶ βλέποιτε λαμπρὰν ἡμέραν.	
Ἔχεις τὸν υἱὸν ἐκ θεῶν, πάτερ γέρον·	
ἔχεις, Δοσίκλεις, ἐκ θεῶν μὲν τὸν βίον,	

<sup>33</sup> Compare, e.g., Lycurg. *In Leocrat.* 139 Blass.

<sup>34</sup> ‘Ἀλλ’ οὐ γελῶσι hints at 8. 71, οὐκ ἂν χαρῇ τὴν θρύψιν οὐδὲ καρχάσοι (*sc.* κεραμεύς).



ἐκ δὲ Βρυάξου τὴν ἐλευθέραν τύχην."

135

In 134, Hercher follows U in reading ἐκ θεῶν. But HVL have ἐκ Διὸς instead, and this is the correct reading: ἐκ θεῶν is an echo of the ἐκ θεῶν in the preceding line. It is Zeus who sends showers.

(83) How all the maidens of Cyprus became love-stricken as soon as they approached Dosicles (8. 191–94 and 200–04):

Οὕτως ἐκείνων τῶν νέων τιμωμένων  
ἔπαιξεν ὡς εἴωθεν ὁ δριμύς Ἔρως,  
πολλοὺς οἷστοις τοῖς νέοις καὶ ταῖς νέαις  
ἐκ τοῦ πυρώδους τανύων τοξαρίου . . . 194

Ἡ μὲν γὰρ (sc. παρθένος) αἰδοῦς ἐκποδῶν τεθειμένης 200  
ἤγγισεν, ἀντέβλεπεν ἀπλήστοις κόραις,  
ὡς ἐγγύθεν βλέπουσα καθαρῶς βλέποι.  
ἄλλη προσήλθε, τοῦ χιτῶνος (sc. Δοσικλέος) ἤψατο  
κάκ τῆς ἀφῆς ἔλαβε δεύτερον βέλος . . .

In 192, read with all MSS ἔπαιξεν. And in 202, read φλέγοι for the senseless βλέποι. Φλέγοι (intransitive) is confirmed by 204 ἔλαβε δεύτερον βέλος.

(84) "I cannot believe that Dosicles is unable to recognize me. He who . . .," says Rhodanthe (8. 352–57):

"... ὃς ζωγραφεῖν ᾤμνυτο τὴν ἐμὴν θεάν  
μέσῳ πρὸς αὐτῷ καρδίας πινακίῳ,<sup>35</sup>  
δι' ὃν παροικῶ Κύπρον ἐν δούλῃ τύχῃ·  
ἦν αὐτὸς οἶδεν ἐκλιποῦσαν πατρίδα,  
ἦν οἰκίαν, ὃν ὄλβον, οὓς φυτοσπόρους,  
κἂν νῦν θεωρῶν ἀγνοεῖν πλάττοιτό με." 355

In 355, Gaulmin and Hercher follow U<sup>1</sup> in reading ἐκλιποῦσαν. But HVU<sup>2</sup>L offer the correct reading, ἐκλιποῦσα. Accordingly, punctuate as follows:

δι' ὃν παροικῶ Κύπρον ἐν δούλῃ τύχῃ,  
ἦν, αὐτὸς οἶδεν, ἐκλιποῦσα πατρίδα, . . .

(85) After the happy reunion of Rhodanthe and Dosicles, the host Cratander proposes (8. 403–06):

"Μῆτερ, προκεῖσθω δευτέρα πανδαισία·  
πανήγυριν στήσωμεν εὐκλεεστέραν,  
χορῶμεν, εὐφρανθῶμεν ἡδονὴν νέαν·  
τὰ πρῶτα κακὰ τοῖς νέοις ὑπεκρύβη." 405

<sup>35</sup> Compare 2 Cor. 3. 3, Prov. 3. 3, 7. 3.

Cratander is not inviting people to dance, but to rejoice. Thus in 405 read with VUL χαρῶμεν for χορῶμεν of Gaulmin and Hercher (H omits 8. 398–497), and compare line 412: Πρὸς ταῦτα ποῖον γῆθος, ἡδονὴ πόση.

(86) Cratander's sister Myrilla, a contender for Dosicles' heart, puts poison in Rhodanthe's wine causing a total paralysis of her rival's body. The poet is shocked and exclaims (8. 448–52):

ᾠ ζηλοτύπου καρδίας καὶ βασκάνου·  
ἐφ' ᾧ τυχεῖν ἔρωτος, ἐντυχεῖν γάμφ,  
ὧν οὐ τυχεῖν ἔμελλεν ἐνδίκῃ κρίσει,  
ἐφ' ᾧ συνελθεῖν τῷ Δοσικλεί νυμφίῳ,  
δέδωκε σαρκὸς πάρεσιν τῇ παρθένῳ. 450

Reverse the order of lines 450 and 451.

(87) The poet continues, “And where is the Goddess of Justice?” (8. 460–63):

Ἡ μὲν Μύριλλα ταῦτα βασκάνῳ τρόπῳ· 460  
τί δ' ἡ θεῶν χεὶρ καὶ τὰ θεσμὰ τῆς Δίκης;  
Οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀντέστραπτο τῇ πονηρίᾳ;  
Μέντοι· μισεῖ γὰρ τὴν κακότροπον φύσιν.

In 461, Hercher (p. lvii) follows U<sup>2</sup> by reading θεσμὰ, which can be paralleled by 7. 389 νόμους προτιμῶ καὶ τὰ θεσμὰ τῆς Δίκης. But VU<sup>1</sup>L have δεσμὰ instead. “The shackles of Dike” is to be preferred to “Dike's laws” in view of 5. 228 ἡ τῶν θεῶν χεὶρ, ἡ μάχαιρα τῆς Δίκης.

(88) While hunting in a forest, Dosicles and Cratander see a partially paralyzed bear finding the healing herb (8. 466–70 and 476–79):

... ἄρκτον νοσοῦσαν εὖρον ἡμιπληξίαν,  
τοῖς δεξιόις μὲν νεκράν, οὐ κινουμένην,  
εὐωνύμοις δὲ προσεσυρμένην μόνοις.  
ᾠς δὲ προῆλθεν εἰς ποηφόρον τόπον,  
ἀνεσπακυῖα ποῖαν εὐπρεπεστάτην ... 470  
ταύτην περιτρίψασα τῷ νεκρῷ μέλει 476  
ἡ φυσικὴ τεχνίτις (ἄρκτος, ἦν ἔφην),  
τὸ νεκρὸν ἐζώωσεν ἅπαν σαρκίον  
καὶ φυγὰς ἀρτίσωμος ὥχετο δρόμῳ.

First, in 468 read προσ<σ>εσυρμένην. Second, in 470 ποῖαν εὐπρεπεστάτην is Hercher's reading for εὐπρεπεστάτην πόαν VUL. But the form πόα recurs in lines 475, 484, 503, 517 and 521. Consequently, read the line instead ἀνεσπακυῖά <γ'> (ἀνεσπακυῖαν V: ἀνεσπακυῖα UL) εὐπρεπεστάτην πόαν. Finally, in 479 ἀρτίσωμος is senseless. Read ἀρτίσωος, “just healed,” instead.

(89) "Who could expect such an irrational act from Myrilla?" asks Dosicles (9. 75-80):

"Καὶ ποῦ γὰρ ἂν ἥλπιστο τῷ Δοσικλέϊ  
οὕτω Μύριλλαν τῶν φρενῶν ἀφεστάναι,<sup>36</sup>  
ὥς προσδοκῆσαι τὸν Δοσικλῆν ἐλκύσαι,  
εἰ τῇ 'Ροδάνθῃ παρεθείσῃ προσβλέποι,  
ὃς τηνικαῦτα καὶ σπάθην ἐσπασμένος  
μέσων κατ' αὐτῶν ἐγκάτων ἐπηξάμην;" 75  
80

Dosicles was ready to kill himself, but he did not. Thus read in 79 τηνικαῦτ' ἂν for τηνικαῦταν (L: τηνικαῦτα HVU).

(90) Rhodanthe advises Dosicles that both of them should flee from Cyprus. But he is afraid of greater perils than Myrilla (8. 104-11):

"Ἐπειτα κἄν φύγοιμεν εἰς ἄλλην πόλιν,  
τίς ἐγγυᾶται καὶ θεοὺς ὄμνυσί μοι  
μὴ χεῖρα ληστοῦ μήτε βάρβαρον στόλον  
μηδὲ Βρυάξην δυσμενῇ βασιλίᾳ  
ἐλθόντα συνδῆσαί με δεσμοῖς ἀλύτοις<sup>37</sup>  
καὶ δοῦλον ἐκπέμψαί με πρὸς τὴν πατρίδα;  
Κἄν θυσιάζειν τίς με τοῖς θεοῖς θέλῃ,  
τίς τοῦ πυρὸς ῥύσαιτο δεῦτερος Κράτων;" 105  
110

In 106, read with all MSS μηδὲ for μήτε. In 110, Κἄν θυσιάζειν τίς με is the reading of Gaulmin and Hercher for MSS' κἄν καὶ θυσιάζειν με. Read instead: Κἄν που θυσιάζειν με. The subject is, of course, Bryaxes (line 107). Κἄν που in this position recurs at 6. 87, 7. 151 and 177.

(91) Rhodanthe tells her story—how she survived the shipwreck and was saved from the sea (9. 149-59):

"... τὰ δ' ἔνδον οὐδὲν ἢ Φθόνος κακὰ πλέκων  
καὶ χεῖρ θεῶν λύουσα τὰς πλοκαμίδας.  
'Η ναῦς γάρ, ἦν εἰσηλθόν, εὐθὺς ἐρράγη,  
ὁ φόρτος ἅπας τῷ βυθῷ προσερρίφη,  
ἐγὼ δὲ τῷ κλύδωνι συμμεθειλκόμενη,  
μικρῷ παριζήσασα προσβάδην ξύλῳ,  
ἐφ' ᾧ τρόμφ μὲν, ὑπερέπλεον δ' ὅμως . . ."  
"Θεῶν λέγεις πρόνοιαν, ὥς ἔσφζε σε"  
τεμῶν Δοσικλῆς τὴν διήγησιν λέγει  
"ὑπὲρ κορυφῆς ἀφανῶς ἵπταμένα  
καὶ τῷ ξύλῳ διδοῦσα χειραγωγίαν." 150  
155

<sup>36</sup> Compare Soph. *Philoct.* 865; Eur. *Or.* 1021, *Bacchae* 944; *Prodromus* 2. 218, 3. 497, 4. 426, 5. 79, 8. 442.

<sup>37</sup> Compare *Odyssey* 8. 274-75; Aesch. *Prom.* 155.

In 149, read with UL ἔνθεν, "what followed," for ἔνδον HV. And in 158, read ἀσφαλῶς, "safely," for the insipid ἀφανῶς.

(92) Finally, Lysippus and Straton, the fathers of Dosicles and Rhodanthe, arrive in Delphi to consult Pythia about the destiny of their children. She produces nine cryptic hexameters beginning with Τίπτε (just as the oracle in Xenophon's *Ephesiaca* 1. 6. 2 did),<sup>38</sup> which in Hercher's edition read (9. 196–204):

“Τίπτε, δὺν γενέτα, πολυηράτοιο τε μόσχον  
 πόρτιός θ' ἀπαλῆς σκολιάς δίξεσθε κελεύθους;<sup>39</sup>  
 Χέρσφ ὕφ' ἀλικλῦστω,<sup>40</sup> ζωοτρόφον<sup>41</sup> ποτὶ νᾶσον,  
 ἦν λάχε Κυπρογένεια, Πόθου γενέτειρ', Ἀφροδίτη  
 (ἡ ἐπαρασχομένη τόδε οὖνομα, ἡ ἐλαβοῦσα),  
 δερκόμενοι βιόωντας ἐλεύσετε· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πάτρης  
 στέψαθ'<sup>42</sup> ὑπὸ στεφάνοισι τροπαιοφόρου Κυθερείης·  
 τοὺς γὰρ Ἔρωσ τε Πόθος τε καὶ Ἀφρογένεια Κυθήρη<sup>43</sup>  
 δμήσατο θειοδέτοιο ἀλυκτοπέδησι σιδάρου.”<sup>44</sup>

200

*Versus claudicant*, but the poet is to blame (since α, ι, υ remain δίχρονα in his hexameter as well). In lines 196–97, “the young bull and heifer” are, of course, Dosicles and Rhodanthe. In 200, read with Gaulmin (p. 550) <τ>οῦνομα. And in 201, read λεύσετε, “you will see them alive,” for ἐλεύσετε V and Huet: ἐλεύσσετε HUL: ἔ λεύσσετε conjectured Gaulmin (p. 551), and compare Lysippus' interpretation of the oracle (9. 220), ὡς ἄρα καὶ βιόωντας ἴσχοιμεν βλέπειν . . .

(93) Finally, Dosicles and Rhodanthe obtain pardon from Lysippus and Straton for their elopement (9. 301–11):

Οὕτω Δοσικλῆς καὶ λέγων καὶ δακρύων  
 ἐξιλεοῦν ἔσπευδε τοὺς φυτοσπόρους·  
 ὑποφθάσας δὲ τὸν Δοσικλῆν ὁ Στράτων  
 καὶ τὴν Ῥοδάνθην τῶν ποδῶν<sup>45</sup> ἀνασπάσας,  
 “ὦ δεῦτε” φησὶ “τέκνα, προσπτύξασθέ με,  
 ὦ δεῦτε, προσπλάκητε τῷ φυτοσπόρῳ  
 καὶ χεῖρας εἰς τράχηλον ἀρτήσατέ μου·  
 ὦ τέκνον, ὦ θύγατερ, ἀσπάσαιό με.

305

<sup>38</sup> Compare also Heliod. 2. 26 and 2. 35.

<sup>39</sup> Compare Dionys. Perieg. 62 σκολιάς ἐνέποιτε κελεύθους; Pindar, *Pyth.* 2. 85; Nicander, *Ther.* 267, 478.

<sup>40</sup> Compare Soph. *Ajax* 1219; A.G. 9. 657. 2.

<sup>41</sup> Ζωοτρόφον Hercher: ζωητρόφον HV: ζωηφόρον UL.

<sup>42</sup> Στέψαθ' Hercher: στέφαθ' HUL: στέφηθ' V: στέφθεθ' Gaulmin.

<sup>43</sup> Κυθήρη Gaulmin (p. 551), Hercher: κυθερώ H<sup>2</sup> (ὡ corr. ex ἐ): κυθήρω V: καθαρά UL.

<sup>44</sup> Compare Hesiod, *Theog.* 521; Apoll. Rhod. 2. 1249; A. G. 5. 229. 6.

<sup>45</sup> Τῶν ποδῶν codd.: τοῖν ποδοῖν Gaulmin, Hercher.



Ἦ δὲ δεῦρο, νύμφη, δεῦρο, λαμπρὲ νυμφίε·  
ὥς εὐτυχῆς ὁ γάμος ὑμῶν, τεκνία, 310  
τοῖς ἀθανάτοις εὐτυχῶν νυμφοστόλοις."

It is only natural that Rhodanthe's father Straton will embrace his daughter first. Accordingly, transpose line 308 to follow line 304:

καὶ τὴν Ῥοδάνθην τῶν ποδῶν ἀνασπᾶσας, 304  
"ὦ τέκνον, ὦ θύγατερ, ἀσπᾶσαιό με· 308  
ὦ δεῦτε" φησὶ "τέκνα, προσπύξασθέ με . . ." 305

As for the postponement of φησί, it can be paralleled by 9. 432–35, where it is postponed three lines. Furthermore, in line 311 Gaulmin and Hercher followed HV in reading εὐτυχῶν, and then Hercher (p. lviii) conjectured the change of the datives into accusatives. But UL have ἐντυχῶν, and this is the correct reading. Maybe εὐτυχῶν was written under the influence of the εὐτυχῆς in the preceding line.

(94) Dosicles calls his hosts to introduce them to the newcomers Lysippus and Straton (9. 357–59):

"Ἦ καὶ ξενισταὶ καὶ ξένοι καὶ δεσπόται,  
Κράτων, φίλε Κράτανδρε, παγκάλῃ Στάλῃ,  
ὦ δεῦτε, δεῦτε, συνεορτάζοιτέ μοι."

Both Gaulmin and Hercher have ξένοι. But Craton and Stale are not Dosicles' guests but hosts. All MSS have φίλοι instead, and this is the correct reading.

(95) During the banquet, seeing his happy guests Lysippus and Straton eating nothing, the host Craton says, "People overwhelmed with joy need no food" (9. 389–94):

Ἐπεὶ δὲ μηδὲν μὴ Λύσιππος, μὴ Στράτων  
ἔσθιοιεν, ἡδὺ προσγελάσας ὁ Κράτων, 390  
"ἐπεῖπερ" εἶπεν "(ἀγνοῶ δὲ τὸν τρόπον)  
οὐδὲν φαγεῖν θέλοιτε τῶν προκειμένων,  
ἐγὼ γελοίους ἐν μέσῳ προθεῖς λόγους  
κἂν γοῦν δι' αὐτῶν ἐστιάσω τοὺς φίλους."

Evidently, Craton is well acquainted with such behavior (391 τὸν τρόπον), for he can explain it (9. 418–22):

" . . . ἀλλ', ὥς ἔοικε, τῆς χαρᾶς ἡ πληρότης  
δεξαμενὴν ἐπλησε παντὸς ἐντέρου,  
ὥς μηδὲ μίαν ἰσχύειν λαβεῖν ψίχα 420  
ἢ τι κρέως μόριον, ἢ μικρὸν μέθυ,  
ἢ τι πλακοῦντος ἢ σισαμοῦντος μέρος."

Consequently, ἀγνοῶ in 391 is corrupt. Read instead lines 391–92:

“ἐπεῖπερ” εἶπ’ (<οὐκ> ἀγνοῶ<ν> δὴ τὸν τρόπον),  
 “οὐδὲν φαγεῖν θέλοιτε τῶν προκειμένων . . .”

(96) The explanation of the phenomenon, ὅλην ὁ χαίρων ἀτροφεῖ τὴν ἡμέραν (9. 407), is actually due to an old nurse of Craton’s; he then exclaims (9. 423–24):

“Ναὶ<sup>46</sup> χαῖρε, τίτθη, γραῦς φιλοσοφωτάτη,  
 ὥς φυσικῶς ἔλυσας ἡμῖν τὸν λόγον.”

Φιλοσοφωτάτη is unmetrical, and Hilberg (p. 15) was quick to suggest φίλη, σοφωτάτη instead. However, line 2. 434, ἀπρόσφορος γὰρ ἄρτι φιλοσοφία, reminds one of the necessity of living with metrical irregularities when dealing with “heavy words.”

#### Appendix: A Godsent Remedy for Paralysis

Myrilla, the rival for the heart of Dosicles, puts a poison in Rhodanthe’s cup of wine and causes a total paralysis of her body (8. 437–47). But Dosicles, while hunting in the forest, finds a miraculous healing plant,<sup>47</sup> applies it to Rhodanthe’s body as an ointment (8. 504 περιχρίσας) and cures her of the paralysis (8. 504–09).

The question is now: What is the source of this anecdote? Rohde<sup>48</sup> and Krumbacher<sup>49</sup> assumed popular and oriental origin (“Einzelne früher nicht vorkommende Motive gehen vielleicht auf die populäre Überlieferung orientalischer Märchen zurück”). I would like to suggest Greek learned sources instead—the physicians Dioscurides of Cilicia and Paul of Aegina.

In his practical *Handbook of Medicine*, Paul states that bodily paralysis could be cured by applying the plant *crowfoot*, *Ranunculus* (Greek *Batrachion*, “frog-plant”) to the body as a plaster (3. 18. 3, p. 163. 15 Heiberg). And Paul is our only source for such a cure. In his turn, Dioscurides describes a kind of *Ranunculus* as having a white root and red flower (2. 175 Wellmann = Pliny *NH* 25. 172–74). Now, this description

<sup>46</sup> Ναὶ Hercher: καὶ codd.

<sup>47</sup> In this endeavor, our hero is assisted by a semiparalyzed bear (8. 466–79). Wild animals often provide humans with magic cures in international folklore; compare Stith Thompson, *Motif-Index of Folk Literature*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington, IN 1958) B512. Also V. Pecoraro, “La nascita del romanzo moderno nell’ Europa del XII° secolo. Le sue origini orientali e la mediazione di Bizancio all’ Occidente,” *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik* 32 (1982) 307–19.

<sup>48</sup> E. Rohde, *Der griechische Roman und seine Vorläufer* (Leipzig 1876; 2nd ed. 1900; 3rd ed. 1914; 4th ed. Hildesheim 1960) 126 n. 2 (= 134 n. 2) and 529 n. 2 (= 546 n. 2).

<sup>49</sup> K. Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Literatur von Justinian bis zum Ende des oströmischen Reiches (527–1453)*, 2nd ed. (Munich 1897) 751.

of crowfoot coincides with Prodromus' description of the miraculous plant healing the paralysis—white root, green leaves and red flower (8. 471–75).

Both handbooks of medicine, by Paul of Aegina and by Dioscurides, were well known in Byzantium. There can be little doubt then that Prodromus used them as his source for the wonderful plant healing the paralysis. Of course, a partially paralyzed bear in the forest was needed to demonstrate the treatment with the crowfoot. The anecdote attests to the erudition of our *poeta doctus*.

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
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